

THE
WORKS

Of the late

Right REVEREND and LEARNED

Dr. *FRANCIS HARE*,

LORD BISHOP of

CHICHESTER.

VOL. III.



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THE



The MANAGEMENT of the
WAR.
In a LETTER to a
TORY-MEMBER.

Bella geri placuit nullos habitura triumphos.

S I R,

Nov. 23, 1710.



S little as I love Scandal, whatever Side it comes from, I have prevailed with myself, in Obedience to your Commands, to run over the Bundle you sent me; and knowing you to be a Person of that Integrity and Honour, as to have more Regard to Truth than Party, I will, without more Ceremony, give you my Thoughts; as you desire, upon such Parts of them as relate to the Management of the War, which I hope you will find not to be the less true

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or just for the Haste they are writ in; for plain Truths need no Disguise; Fiction and Ornament are of no Advantage, but when they serve a Cause, that cannot bear to be seen in its true Light. This I hope will be Excuse enough, for the many Marks of Haste and Negligence you will meet with in this long Letter.

You will not expect I should consider each of these Papers by themselves, that would be giving too much Trouble to one, who, I know, is too good a Judge to think them of so much Consequence; *The Letter to the Examiner* is a meer Declamation, and, considered in that View, is a pretty smart Performance, and you may read it to be entertained, but not to be informed: There is some Fire and Imagination, but no Reasoning, Judgment, or Experience; plain Marks of a young Writer, who may in Time ripen into something considerable, and come up to the Author of *Artus and Odolphus*, which is the Fiction of a more able Writer, and has the Beauties of a tolerable Romance; and, to shew the Skill of the Author, is very happily called a *Secret History*; which is a Cover for all the Lyes the Father of them can invent, since that Name immediately forbids all Asking of Questions; for, were the Proofs to be produced, where would be the Secret? I cannot say I was so well pleased with *Sir Thomas*, which I found so dull and tedious, it was impossible to get through it; there is, by all I could see, neither Decorum nor Argument, nor Life in it; the Author shews he was sadly put to it for Matter, when he is forced, to make up his Invective, to take

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In the Compass of 22 Years, the fatal Period some amongst us are so angry with, that is 18 more than the present Change is concerned in; for it is but four Years, at most, that his Principals *pretend* to think (for think they do not, as I shall shew you by and by) that the Management of Affairs has been wrong. In short, it is a stupid, unnatural Piece, and what made me more sick of it, I have been told, it is as ungrateful as it is senseless, writ by a Man, who owes his Bread to those, whom he has with so much Venom drawn his Pen against. I do not know whether you will agree with me, when I tell you, I think the *Letter from a Foreign Minister* the most artful Performance of them all; the rest seem to be the Works of under Agents, from Directions and Hints marked out for them; but this I take to be the Work of the chief Operator himself; who, if he was not at Leisure to write more largely, has in this short Piece sufficiently shewn, what a Right he has to the Esteem the World have long had for him; there being in it some quick and crafty Turns, and an affected Appearance of Fairness, with which he gilds over the blackest Poison of Malice and *Invention*. You will see I use that last Word in the modern Sense of it; and, in my Mind, the whole Letter is well enough contrived to answer its Design, which plainly is, to please Friends, take off Enemies, amuse and quiet all, who are not acquainted with Affairs, nor enter into Parties, but, by the new *Scheme*, might be apt to be alarmed. *Faults on both Sides* has, to my Thinking, a good deal of plain common Sense in

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it, which Experience has all along justified, and, I dare say, always will. And common Sense, at this Time of Day, I take to be a great Commendation to a Paper, and that this Writer seldom loses Sight of, except where his Cause obliges him to quit it; which it does in several Places, but no where more than where he speaks of Credit, all which is as mean as the late *Essay* upon that Subject; and that I take to be the most affected, uncommon, mysterious Piece of Nonsense, even this wonderful Year has produced.

Taking these Papers together, there is one Thing in them, for which I mightily admire the able Architect, under whom they have all been formed; and that is the Difference of Spirit one sees in them, according to the several Sorts of Readers they are intended to impose on. One makes great Court to the *Tories*, another is to gain the *Whigs*, or divide them at least; others pretend mightily to Moderation; to catch the Men that have Honesty and Temper, and have not engaged far in either Party: Others seem chiefly designed to impose on Foreigners, and make them believe, all we have been doing these six Months, is only a personal Business, that can have no Influence on the Publick; that therefore the Allies, particularly the *Dutch*, and the House of *Hanover*, should not be alarmed to see those Men disgraced, who, whatever other Faults they may have, never lay under the Suspicion of favouring Popery and *France*; but have been ever true to the Revolution; have always gone into Measures for a vigorous Prosecution of the
War,

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War, and have constantly been struggling to gain new Securities for the Defence of the Protestant Succession.

The various Shapes of this Posture-Master in Politicks make this Bundle of Papers, methinks, if you will pardon the Comparison, not much unlike a Pedler's Rare-Show, in which there is a great Number of very different Figures, all in Motion at once, which the gaping Spectators think there is some strange Magick in, and that the Spring of Action is in themselves, when, in Truth, they are nothing but the Pedler's Engines, moved all by one and the same secret Hand, and all contrived for the same End, to delude and cheat the Multitude. And what is still more surprizing, this great Master himself has in his own Person acted, and that at the same Time, all the different Parts which his Tools in their Writings have but copied from him. But whatever various Figures these Engines of his affect to move in, and whatever different Ways they take, they all make to the same End, and agree in those Parts, of which you desire my Opinion, I mean, in censuring the Management of the War, and endeavouring to ruin the Reputation of those, who have been hitherto the chief Directors of it. Upon which Head, all they say may be reduced to these four Points.

1st. That a good Peace might have been had at the End of the *Ramillies* Campaign.

2^{dly}. That the War in *Spain* has been shamefully neglected, though the Recovery of that King-

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dom was the chief Thing we proposed by entering into the War.

3^{dly}. That Pushing the War in *Flanders* was Pushing it in the wrong Place, *France* being covered on that Side with so strong a Frontier.

4^{thly}. That it is many Ways apparent, that the Duke of *Marlborough* has unnecessarily prolonged the War for his own Interest.

Now if it can be shewn, that these terrible Accusations are not only false in themselves, but certainly known to be so by the Authors of them, I leave it to you to consider, what Regard ought to be had to such Men, or what Treatment they deserve, who have so grossly imposed upon the Nation, to the apparent Hazard of its Safety, and of losing all the Fruits we might hope for from a War, that has been hitherto conducted with so much Glory and Success.

To clear these great Points, we are desired, it seems, to go no farther back than the four last Years at most: In Truth, it is not much above three that there is any Dispute about: Till then, all is allowed to have gone well for certain Reasons, that held good till about the Time that the *French* King dismissed Monsieur *Chamillard* from the Finances, for no other Reason, that I have ever heard, but to shew us what we ought to have done here at the same Time; and it was not the Fault of those, who have played their Game better since, that we did not. This was in *February* 1701, all the Complaints, we have heard of the Management of the War, are from the Beginning of that Year, but without much Noise till these

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these last six Months. Since then we have been told, every Thing relating to the War is wrong, and are filled with loud Clamours of Grievances, which before went Abroad in gentle Whispers only, or were not at all heard of. And —

First, They tell us, a good Peace might have been had at the End of the *Ramillies* Campaign.

Now to decide this Question, we must first settle what a Good Peace is; and, in order to that, must consider what it was we went into the War for. Nobody wants to be told, that this was chiefly to obtain these two Ends, the Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy to the House of *Austria*, and the Procuring of a good Barrier against *France* on the Side of the *Netherlands*. Without which two Points there can be no Security for *Great-Britain*, that their best Trade will not be lost, and with it their Religion and Government, and every Thing that is dear to them; for we should every Minute be in Danger of having the Bigotry, Slavery, and Poverty of *France* forced upon us, by the exorbitant Power of that most arbitrary Prince, if he should be suffered to strengthen himself with the Addition of that vast Monarchy, who was before much too great for his Neighbours; to say nothing of the Safety of the *Dutch*, or the Liberty of *Europe*; the last of which, most of us, I fear, have little or no Sense of; and for the Safety of the *Dutch*, so fatal a Delusion has possessed many of us, that one may every Day meet with Men who are silly enough to wish against it. Now the *Spanish* Monarchy, the Restitution of which is the first Ar-

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article of the Grand Alliance, is known by every Body to consist, besides the *Spanish Netherlands*, of these two great Parts, of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and of *Milan*, *Naples*, and *Sicily*, with *Sardinia*, and the adjacent Isles. And a good Barrier against *France* means at least a better than the *Dutch* had before ; which, by the Experience of fifty Years, has been found to be much too weak for so large a Frontier ; the *Spanish Flanders*, and its capital City *Gand*, having, in Truth, no Cover at all, and *Brabant* but a very poor one ; while, the *French* being intire Masters of the *Lys* and the *Schelde*, both Provinces lie exposed to their Invasions. Look but on some large Maps of these Provinces, such as have been printed of late Years, and your own Eyes will presently convince you of the Truth of this. But, if this Restitution and this Barrier were thought necessary at our Entering into the War, nobody, I presume, will say, they are less necessary now, when so much more has been done to gain these Ends, than any Body at the Beginning could ever hope to see. And, if these two Points are necessary, then no Peace without them can be a good Peace. Let us then compare this good Peace with what the *French* offered at the End of the *Ramillies* Campaign ; which is so far from being a Secret, that the Letters, written to the Maritime Powers by the Elector of *Bavaria*, who was employed by the King of *France* to make the first Overture, were immediately communicated to all the Allies, and by their Consent made publick : And whoever will be at the Pains to look back to the News-Papers, and
monthly

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monthly Accounts of that Time, or will consult even the common yearly Collections, will see there is no Mystery in the Whole of that Affair; which, in short, is no more than this, that the *French* offered to give up, to the Allies, which of these two they liked best, either *Spain* and the *Indies*, or *Milan, Naples, and Sicily, &c.* Which Offer was unanimously rejected.

I suppose there is no Need of proving, that the Allies ought not to have accepted either Part of this Alternative, it being so short of what, upon our Entrance into the War, was thought necessary. To have been content with a Moiety of what we went into the War for, after so many Successes, and not a few surprizingly great, would have rendered us inexcusable to all Posterity; and some body, who, we are now told, prolongs the War, would have been said to have been well paid for such a Peace; it would have been, in the Language of the Faction, a plain Case we were sold to *France*, and nothing less than his Head could have attoned for it. But, instead of proving the Absurdity of accepting such a Peace, I shall shew you rather, what to every body is not so plain; and that is, that the *French* were not sincere; they meant nothing, by their Offer, but to amuse the Allies, and knew, they could not all agree to accept either Part of the Alternative, and that *England* and *Holland*, without the Emperor, could not take *Spain* and the *Indies*, were they never so much inclined to it. For, had the Allies hearkened to this Proposal, it had been in the Power of the *French* to have closed with which
they

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they would. Now it is easy to see what this must have ended in : For, in such a Partition, there is no Doubt, but, as the *Dutch* and we should have been for *Spain* and the *Indies*, it is as plain the Emperor would have made the other Part his Choice, which is evidently best for him. Which Part now of the Allies, in this Division, would *France* be most willing to comply with ? Or, in other Words, which Part of the Monarchy would they chuse of the two to quit ? A Man must be blind not to see, that the Part the Emperor would like best to have, the same *France* would like best to part with : Behold then the necessary Consequence of hearkening to such Terms ; the Confederacy broken, and the Maritime Powers left to shift for themselves, without being able to obtain either of the Parts, when they ought to be content, according to the Terms of the Grand Alliance, with nothing less than both.

Who now, I would fain know, have most Reason to complain that these Offers were rejected, the People of *London* or *Vienna* ? They who might have had the Part they had most Mind to, if they would have abandoned their Allies, or we, who, it is certain, besides the Infamy of so base an Action, could have had nothing ? Had the Writers, who are so able at making Something out of Nothing, had their Lot in *Austrian* Ground, what a Field had there been for them ? What rare Matter to shew their Skill in ? What specious Pretences, without the Help of *Secret History*, to give out, that the Emperor was ill advised ? What ! reject so advantageous an Offer, by which

so

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so great an Addition of real Strength would have been made to the House of *Austria*, and that at a Time, when they were so unable to carry on the War, when the People have been exhausted with continual Wars for more than thirty Years! When the *Malecontents* are at the Gates of the Capitol! When the King of *Sweden* insults, in that outrageous Manner, the *Imperial* Dignity, and every Minute threatens an Invasion! Is that a Time to reject so good a Peace, and hazard the Safety of the Empire in Compliment to the Maritime Powers? What wicked Counsellors must these be, who can advise at this Rate? Is it not plain they are false, and in some other Interest, or that they mind nothing else but making their own Fortunes, when they act so manifestly against the Welfare and Honour of the *Imperial* Family, and shew they have no Regard to the Safety even of the Empire? Would not this be the Language of the Faction, if the Scene were changed from *London* to *Vienna*? And yet we do not hear, that either the Emperor or his People have hitherto thought it any Crime in the Ministers, who would not hearken to those Terms; instead of that, all the World think it much for their Honour, that they have appeared true to themselves, and faithful to their Allies, in rejecting so pitiful and insecure a Peace.

And is not this a Reproach to us, who suffer ourselves to be deluded by such vile Impostors, who would persuade us out of our Senses, that Half the *Spanish* Monarchy is as good as the Whole, and that Nothing is as good as Half? For

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For I have shewn you, that one Half only was offered, and that even that could not be had. It must sure, to all thinking Men, be very surprizing, that we only, of all the Allies, should complain that this ridiculous Offer of the *French* was rejected, when we, of all of them, have most Reason to be pleased with it: There must needs be some Secret in it above the Reach of common Sense, that all of a Sudden this should be made a capital Crime in our Ministers, their not doing three Years ago that, which, if they had done, we should all before now have thought they deserved to lose their Heads for.

I believe you begin to be tired with this Article, and would be content I should say no more in so plain a Case, after such a plain Discovery of the Impudence of these State Mountebanks, who would have persuaded us, that we were dangerously ill, when we saw and felt ourselves to be very well; and that we were all undone, if we did not leave the skilful and able Hands we had long used with so much Success, to try their boasted Medicines, when we were not in the least Want of them. Nobody, if you will believe them, have such universal Remedies, for all the Evils of the State, as they; and, under this popular Pretence of curing the Nation, they take all the Pains they can to poison it; of which I have already given you one Example; you shall have more in what follows.

But, before I dismiss this Subject, I must beg Leave to observe one Thing farther, which is of too much Moment to be passed over; and that is,
That

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That they, who have done their Country so much Service in rejecting this Offer from the *French*, would have done it still much greater, could they have prevented any Regard being given to it. For, though the Refusing these Terms could do no Harm, the Harkening to them, I will shew you, did a great deal. The Inclination some People, of the same Complexion with the Author of the *Secret History*, expressed to come to a Treaty with the *French* upon the Terms offered, raised in the *Imperial Court* a great Jealousy, that the Maritime Powers were tampering with *France*, and making Terms for themselves, to which the Interest of the House of *Austria* was to be sacrificed. This put that Court upon Measures that had a fatal Influence on the next Campaign, and occasioned the two most unfortunate Events that have happened all this War. *First*, This Suspicion made them begin and conclude a Treaty with the *French* for Evacuating the *Milanese* without the Privity of *England* and *Holland*, who did not know one Word of the Matter. And what do you think was the Consequence of this? Why, it gave the *French* an Opportunity of sending immediately into *Spain* a great Body of good veteran Troops; and it is to this Reinforcement sent the Duke of *Anjou*, that we owe the Loss of the Battle of *Almanza*, which proved so fatal to our Affairs on that Side; if those Troops had not joined, we had been superior to the Enemy, and that Battle had either not been fought, or it had been won, and *Spain* with it, considering the ill Condition the Duke of *Anjou's* Affairs were then in; and the true Reason

son

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son we ventured that Battle, was to prevent the Junction which we did not know, or at least did not believe, was made at the Time we fought ; a Mistake, we may think, very easily made in *Spain*, when it is known we owe the Victory of *Ramillies* to the *French* making the very same Mistake in *Flanders*, where they thought the *English* had not at that Time joined the Confederate Army, and reckoned for certain that the *Danes*, at least, neither had nor could : And this Persuasion made them venture a Battle, which the *French* have so much Reason to remember, without waiting for a considerable Body of Troops that were coming to them from the *Rhine*, the Head of which were actually at *Namur*, when Monsieur *Villeroy* began his March towards the Confederates. But to return, it is plain the *French* had not gained the Battle of *Almanza* without that Reinforcement from *Italy*, and even with it, though the Battle was fought in *April*, and our Army was, in a Manner, ruined by that Blow, all they did that Year was only to take *Lerida*. But that Reinforcement could not have been sent, had not the Secret Treaty, for the Evacuation of the *Milanese*, been made ; and the Treaty had not been made, had not the Jealousy raised in the Imperial Court, by the Inclination of some People, expressed to hearken to the Offer of the *French*, made them resolve upon securing something for themselves. And the same Jealousy put them upon taking another Step, no less prejudicial to the common Cause ; and that was the Expedition to *Naples*, which they could not be prevailed with

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to defer, upon the repeated and most pressing Instances that the Maritime Powers made to them by their Ministers, both at *Vienna* and *Italy*. And the Consequence of the Expedition was, that it not only diverted a great Part of the Troops that were to execute the Project on *Toulon*, but retarded, for a considerable Time, the March of the rest; and this Loss of Time, and Lessening of their Numbers, seem to have been the chief Occasions of the Miscarriage of that glorious Enterprize. Nothing made the Imperial Court so obstinately bent on that unhappy Expedition, but the Fears they had, that *Naples* as well as *Milan* would, at the *Hague*, be given up to facilitate a Peace, which they were resolved to prevent, by getting Possession as soon as they could. This is all we have got by hearkening to those Offers, which it is now thought a great Crime we did not close with; the Loss of the Battle of *Almanza*, and the Miscarriage of the Project on *Toulon*, the greatest, most important, best concerted Enterprize that was ever entered on. And both these Misfortunes had, in all Probability, been prevented, had the Offers of the *French* been roundly rejected at the first, and no Occasion of Jealousy had, by listening to them, been given to the Imperial Court. This is all plain naked Truth and Fact, which these Writers, or those at least that dictate to them, know as certainly as they do, that two and two make four; and, if they have any Modesty, they will blush when you let them see their Inventions thus exposed.

After saying so much of that Part of the Offer
the

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the *French* made, which concerns the Partition they proposed of the *Spanish* Monarchy, which we ought not to have accepted, if we could, and could not, if we would ; there is no Need of telling you what Barrier was offered for the *Netherlands*, which the *Dutch* were most concerned in, who do not use to neglect good Offers to come at Peace, if we may believe the Faction, who have for a long Time pretended to fear nothing so much as their Quitting the Alliance for their own separate Interest. Though now the noble Firmness they have shewn in Adhering to it, till Terms may be had to the Satisfaction of all Parties, is, by these ill designing Politicians, who can take every Thing by a wrong Handle, imputed to them for a Crime ; a Crime, perhaps, that they may not be guilty of much longer ; or, if they are, it is not for Want of some Men's taking the most effectual Methods to cure them of a Fault, which, I do not remember, they were ever before blamed for.

That this is the whole Truth of this Matter ; that these, and no other, were the Offers the *French* made after the *Ramillies* Campaign, I will give you, besides those already hinted at, one plain authentick Proof, which is as good as a thousand Demonstrations ; and that is a Letter of the *French* King to the Pope, on this Subject, writ in the Spring, when all Thoughts of Peace were at an End, and a new Campaign was entering upon.

This

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This Letter may be found in the *Mercure Historique & Politique*, Tom. 43. pag. 33. and here follows a Translation of it.

Letter of the King of *France* to the Pope.

Dated at *Versailles*, Feb. 15, 1707.

THE Care, which your Holiness continues to take for procuring the Peace of Europe, is always equally agreeable to us. We have nothing more at Heart than to second your Endeavours; and we would even prevent you in any Thing we could do to make them effectual. As it was not our Fault that the War was begun, so we shall seek Occasions to end it, by the most ready and easy Methods. Your Holiness has been informed, that we have already made frequent Advances to come to so wholesome an End. It can be attributed only to the Misfortune of the Times, that Catholick Princes, struck with a Fear of displeasing their Allies, should yet refuse to bear the holy Exhortations of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. When we left it to the Arbitration of your Holiness to satisfy the Rights and Demands of the Emperor, by a valuable Compensation, upon some Parts of the Spanish Monarchy; the Ministry of your Holiness were charged with the Care of making the Proposal of it to that Prince. But with what Haughtiness did he reject it! Having said Things exorbitant, and insolently demanded that our Grandson should be recalled. Who could have thought, most holy Father, that he would have made so arrogant a Return to an insulted King, to a Minister of your Holiness, and to

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our Love of Peace. For the Conjuncture, far from being favourable to the House of Austria, seemed then to threaten it, by the Superiority of our Forces, and by our gaining the Battle of Cassano. But God, who is the Master of Events, changed the Posture of our Affairs. Yet, though we were employed with the Cares of repairing our Losses, we had still in our Minds the Idea we had conceived of Peace, at the Time even of our greatest Prosperity. We renewed to Holland the Offer of a Barrier for their State, and of the Security demanded for their Trade; reserving it still to ourselves to treat with the Emperor about a Compensation. Propositions so reasonable were again rejected by the Intrigues of that Party, which had shewed itself averse to the Advancement of our Grandson: And then we employed all our Thoughts to increase our Preparations for a War, which had been violently and unjustly declared against us.

Nevertheless, as it becomes us to be obedient to the pious Exhortations of your Holiness: And to the End that our Enemies may have no Pretence to impute to us the Loss of so much Christian Blood, as is already spilt, and now going to be let out, we will give your Holiness a plain and frank Account of the Disposition we are in for Peace. We will therefore acquaint your Holiness, that the King our Grandson has entrusted us with full Power to convey the Archduke a Part of those Estates that compose the Spanish Monarchy. The Catholick King has the Hearts of the true Spaniards, and is content to reign over them.

It only depends, therefore, on the Emperor to explain himself at this Time, who may have, if he pleases,

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pleases, for ever reunited to his Family, The Milanese, Naples, and Sicily, with the other Islands belonging to Spain, that are situate in the Mediterranean Sea.

We should easily agree about a Barrier for the Republick of the United Provinces : And the two Pretences for the War, being thus removed, it would not be difficult to put an End to those Misfortunes, which Europe has been so long oppressed with.

We pray God that he will preserve your Holiness a great many Years in the Government of his Church.

Your Devout Son,

the King of France

and Navarre,

S. Louis.

I shall leave it to yourself to make the Reflexions which naturally arise from this Letter ; and, having thus plainly shewn you how groundless the first Complaint of these Writers is, I shall endeavour to prove to you, with the same Clearness, that there is as little Ground for the next, which is this :

2. That the War in Spain has been shamefully neglected, though the Recovery of that Kingdom was the chief Thing we proposed by entering into the War.

This is the most plausible of all their Complaints, and yet I doubt not but I shall easily con-

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vince you, that it has, if possible, less Sense in it than any of the rest. We, that live at Home have, for the most Part, no other Way to judge of Affairs Abroad, but by Events ; and Things having succeeded but ill on the Side of *Spain*, or at least very short of the Expectations we were filled with, that a Revolution there might be compassed with as little Trouble as it was here, we readily give into any Insinuations or Surmises, be they never so groundless or extravagant, that impute the Event, we did not expect, to ill Conduct or Mismanagement ; it is the Nature of Mankind, they would fain be knowing, or judging at least, whether they know or not ; which makes them catch at every Shadow of a Reason, to account for Things, especially when they do not go to their Mind ; they take for granted, where-ever there is Want of Success, there is a Fault ; and it is some Amends they fancy, for a Disappointment, if they can first lay the Blame somewhere, no Matter where : It is this Humour makes this Complaint so popular ; and when the Faction has given out, that the War in *Spain* has been neglected, it is easily believed by those that know no better : But a very little Examination will clear up this Matter to the meanest Understanding.

This Complaint must mean one of these two Things, either that the Parliament has not been moved to make sufficient Provision for the War in *Spain*, or that the Provision made by Parliament has been misapplied ; and that either here at Home, or by those who have commanded the Forces that have been sent thither. If the Parli-
ment

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ment was not moved to make sufficient Provision for the War in *Spain*, or there was any Neglect here at Home, it will concern those whom this Complaint comes from, to shew they had no Part in the Management they now complain of, or else they will come themselves into some Part of the Blame; unless it can be proved, that they made proper Remonstrances against the Manner in which this War was carried on. If the Neglect was not here but in *Spain*; if they misapplied the Money, and returned false Musters, or did not manage the Troops they had to the best Advantage, let those, who were entrusted with the Command there, look to that. It is a pretty great Presumption, there was no Fault in what was to be done here at Home, that they who, in that Case, had most Reason to complain, have been so silent, though it so highly concerned them, for their own Honour, to remove the Blame of our ill Successes from themselves. But to come a little to Particulars. This Complaint is dated with one Consent, from the Battle of *Almanza*, and yet, in all Reason, they ought to have looked back at least one Year farther: For it is yet a Secret how the mighty Advantage we had over the Enemy, upon Raising the Siege of *Barcelona*, came to end as it did, when we had so fair a Prospect of making an intire Conquest of the whole Kingdom. Why do not they ask, What was the true Reason that obliged King *Charles* to lose six Weeks at *Barcelona*, when he should have been hastening to *Madrid*? Why my Lord G. and the *Portuguese* General, who lay so long in the Neighbourhood

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of *Madrid*, could have no Intelligence from those who commanded in *Catalonia*? Why, when King *Charles* did at last march to join the *Portuguese*, his Orders were not obeyed, when he desired that all the Troops, that could be drawn together, should be sent to reinforce those he had with him; which might have enabled him to give the *French* a Battle, and have ended the War on that Side at once? And as to the whole Conduct of the War in *Catalonia*, to the End of that Year, why do not they ask, What Care was taken in transmitting Muster-Rolls, and what became of the Money issued for that Service? Why the Pay for full Companies was given to the Captains, when they had not ten, nay, some not five Men in them; which made the *Spanish* Service so beneficial to the Officers, that they returned Home full of Money; a Thing very uncommon in Soldiers, and of which, among the inferior Officers in the *Flanders* Army, it is not easy, by all I have ever heard, to find a single Instance? One would think, when so much Complaint is made upon this Subject, these were proper Points to be enquired into; which, as great a Secret as they are at present, may one Day be laid open, so as every body may be able to see what Neglect there has been, and whose Door it lies at. But to come to the Battle of *Almanza*, from which their Complaints are dated, what occasioned the Loss of that Battle, or, which comes to the same Thing, what gave the *French* that great Superiority of Troops, I have told you before; it was the Reinforcement which the *French*, by the Evacuation of the *Mila-*
nese,

these, were at Liberty to send from *Italy* to *Spain* ; a Thing, which in *England* we did not know till it was too late to fence against it. What Pains had been taken here at Home, to enable King *Charles* to recover the Ground he had lost, upon his Retreat from *Madrid*, has been so well shewn, in an Answer I have read to that Part of *Faults on Both Sides*, which relates to this Matter, that I shall beg Leave to refer the Reader to it.

As to the general Scheme of the War on that Side, and the Provision made for it, let those, who clamour upon this Head, shew us, that they disapproved it, and let them tell us what they thought wrong, and how they would have had it mended, and then we may think, for once, there is some Sincerity in what they say ; but, till then, I shall take Leave to suspect all they say on this Head is only an Invention to infuse groundless Prejudices into the People against their best Friends : And, for my own Part, I am fully persuaded that these Writers, or those at least whose Tools they are, have been long convinced, from all the Experience we have had of the *Spanish* War, and particularly from the Battle of *Almanza*, and what followed upon it, that the best Thing for *England* is to draw the War on that Side, into the least Compass we conveniently can, and keep on the Defensive only, contenting ourselves with maintaining the Footing we had got, without pretending to more than to be in a Readiness to lay hold of any favourable Opportunity of Action, which either the Weakness or Negligence, or ill Conduct of the Enemy, might offer, or which we might

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be invited to by the Encouragement given us by those that are in the *Austrian* Interest. This, I dare say, those Gentlemen think is the true Foot we should put the *Spanish* War upon; and that it should be chiefly carried on by taking Foreign Troops into our Pay, and not employing our own Men, which cannot be done without the greatest Inconveniencies: Besides that, at this Time, they may, it is plain, be much more usefully employed nearer Home; and therefore I can think nothing to be farther from these Men's Thoughts, than what is so much in their Mouths, that this War has been neglected, and that greater Provision ought to have been made for it. My Reason, why I think them so insincere, is plainly this, that they cannot but know the great Difference there is between an Offensive and Defensive War, and that what they seem to contend for is impracticable, and the most effectual Way we can take, never to have what their Writers and their Friends pretend to be so mightily concerned for: It is so evident to all that know any Thing of these Matters, upon how unequal a Foot the *French* and we must make an Offensive War in that Country; But nothing can make this so plain as to put a Case to you.

Suppose then, to humour these Men, we were to send from hence an Augmentation of 20,000 Men, or for our own Share 10,000, to *Catalonia*; shall we not then have 10,000 less in *Flanders*, and may not the *French* lessen their Army there by the same Number? Suppose then the *French* and we both would send an Augmentation of

10,000

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10,000 Men thither, let us see what will be the Consequence : The Men we send will be transported at a very great Charge, and we can never make any tolerable Guess when they will come thither, and consequently can be sure of nothing, that depends upon their Arrival, which may be near a Twelvemonth from the Time they lay ready to embark ; and when Deductions are made for Sickness and Desertion, while they lie at *Portsmouth* waiting for Ships and Winds, and for what Numbers of them may die at Sea, in so long a Passage, especially if any malignant Distemper get among them ; when we consider how unable these Men will be for Service, upon Landing after so long a Voyage, which will make it absolutely necessary for them to go into Quarters of Refreshment, before they take the Field ; the Chance they have of arriving at the most unwholsome Season of the Year ; the Difference of that Climate from our own in all Seasons ; the Numbers that will be swept away by drinking immoderately the strong *Spanish* Wines, which it is impossible to keep Men from, when they are easy to be come at ; and the intemperate Eating of rich Fruits, which are always very fatal to an Army ; the many Men that will be lost by *Maroding* in a strange Country, before they know where they are ; a Word Soldiers are well acquainted with, and by which an Army loses more Men than can be easily imagined by those who are Strangers to these Matters : When all these Things are considered, after so much Expence and Time, I believe our 10,000, at the End of two Months after
their

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their Arrival, will, upon a modest Computation, be found not to exceed 4000 effective. Let us now see what will become of those Men *France* sends : They may be fetched from *Dauphine* and that Neighbourhood, and their Place may be supplied from the *Rhine*, and theirs again from *Flanders* : They may be sent at the most proper Season of the Year ; their March may be made in a Month or six Weeks ; their Arrival may be known to a Day, and all Things may be concerted against the Time they shall be fit to enter upon Action. Their Transportation costs nothing, and, when they arrive, they are what they set out, 10,000 Men ; and the Wines, and Fruits, and Climate, are so little different from their own, that it is very little they suffer from them. I may add, that their Religion procures them better Quarter from the Peasants of the Country, than Hereticks can hope for ; which makes no inconsiderable Difference : So that to *France* it is in a Manner the same Thing, in all Respects, to send Men to *Spain* as it is to *Flanders* ; but to us it is not only a vast Expence, but almost all to no Purpose.

But this is not all : I would ask these Gentlemen, how these Troops, when they come to *Spain*, shall subsist ; how they shall get Horses, or find Forage, or be provided with sufficient Magazines ? They, that know any Thing of *Spain*, can tell them (but I know they do not want to be told) that the Country is not able to subsist its own Inhabitants, much less an Army of Foreign Troops, those Parts especially that are in our Hands : And I have heard, that one great Reason for venturing the

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the Battle of *Almanza* was, that as few Troops as, it is said, we had there, they were too many to subsist, and that they must have starved, if they had not fought. Now, if the Country will not furnish Necessaries, whence they are to be fetched? Why, either from *England* or *Italy*; except some small Matter that may be had from the Coasts of *Africk*. And is not this a pretty Method to subsist an Army? Ask those, who know any Thing of our *Flanders* Armies, what would become of them, if Bread and Forage were to be brought to them by Sea, from Places 30, 50, or 100 Leagues from them? Ask them, What Straits they are put to, when only a little bad Weather has spoiled the Roads, though their Magazines be but four or five Leagues from them? Ask them, How inconvenient, in general, it is for them, when they cannot be supplied, by Water, with the Things they want, though *Flanders* be the finest Country in the World to subsist an Army in; it is so fruitful in Corn, so full of good Towns, and affords so great a Quantity of Wheel-Carriage. Ask but these Questions, and you will be presently convinced, how difficult it must be to subsist an Army in *Catalonia*, when a great Part of their Subsistence must be brought by Sea, and from Places so remote; and the Little, the Country itself affords, must be fetched often-times a great Way, and over such Mountains, as no Carriages can pass; all must be brought by Mules, which cost a great deal, and are not to be had for Money, in such Numbers, as a very moderate Army has Occasion for. In short, to subsist any Army in this Country

try

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try is very difficult ; they must often be in great Danger of starving, while they depend on Winds and Seas for their Provisions ; and to subsist a great one, which these Gentlemen would seem to argue for, is absolutely impossible.

Let us now see how it stands with *France* in this Point : Even as well as they can wish ; for it is a very short Passage from *Marseilles* and *Toulon* to *Roses* and other Ports on that Side of *Spain*, and the Provinces of *France*, that lie nearest to their own Ports, are extremely fruitful, so that Magazines may be erected in them with all the Ease imaginable ; and when the Winds will not let their Ships come out, which does not happen very often, they have a Reserve in Case of Necessity, and can supply their Troops by Land. Such a prodigious Advantage has *France* over us in making War on that Side, even upon Supposition of maintaining but a moderate Army there, that shall act offensively, and be to make great Marches in so barren a Country ; and if we would send a great one thither (not that I think any Army could be very great by the Time it was there) these Inconveniences would increase in a double Proportion at least ; that is, sending twice the Number would be attended with four Times the Disadvantages, thrice the Number with six Times, and so on : But this is so plain, that I cannot think it needs any farther Illustration : Need I add, how hard it is to recruit the Troops in this Service, which, one may be sure, finds no Volunteers ; and those, the Law would give to it, will of two Evils be glad to chuse the least, and, to prevent

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prevent being sent to *Spain*, will list themselves in any other Service. Besides, when these Recruits are raised, how shall they be sent? In small Numbers by the Packet-boats? But how often are they taken? And, when they come to *Lisbon*, how shall they get on to *Catalonia*? And, if they are kept till they can have an Opportunity of a Convoy, how long will they be wanted, and how insensibly will they moulder away, while they lie expecting the Time they so little wish for? And is not this a blessed Place to push the War in, where a great Army can neither be had, nor subsisted, nor recruited, without the utmost Difficulties, the greatest Hazards, and perpetual Disappointments? I know but one sure Effect of such a War, and that is, that, were it constantly fed, it would soon eat up all our Men: For every twenty effective Men in *Spain*, *England* loses at least threescore: And our Treasure, issued for that Service, we shall have Reason to think, sinks in the same Proportion as our Men do, if we consider the Expences of Transportation, and of Supplies sent from hence; the Danger they go in from the Enemies Ships of War and Privateers; the Exchange of Money between *England* and *Genoa*; the excessive Price which Things will cost, that are brought there for *Catalonia*, by the Time they get thither; the Charge we are at to get Horses for our Cavalry, which, one with another, cost as much as five sent to *Flanders*. A slight View of these and the other necessary Articles, besides the standing vast Expence of maintaining so great a Part of our Fleet in the *Mediterranean*,
will

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will easily shew you, that to extend this War would serve to little else but to exhaust us of our Money as well as Men. In short, both Men and Money shrink almost to nothing, when they come thither, in Comparison of what they were, when they went from us: From all which I cannot but conclude, That nothing can be greater Nonsense, or rather greater Villany, than what these Writers, or those that direct them, tell us upon this Head: For they know all this to be true, that there is no Pretence for the Complaints they make of the War on this Side having been neglected; but that, on the Contrary, nothing can be so ruinous to *England*, as the Measures they would hurry us into. We cannot have a better View, with what a Disadvantage we make an Offensive War in *Spain*, than our Affairs there give us at this Time, when the greatest Advantages are lost, through the utter Inability we are in to support them; for we can neither send them timely Help, nor so much as know what it is they want. Which, by the Way, is another Circumstance that ought to cure us of our Fondness for this War. The *French* King can hear from thence in as few Days as we commonly do in Weeks; and that regularly; whereas we are always at Uncertainties. This we are all at present sensible of: The Impatience we have for these four Months, and more, been in, to know what our Friends are doing there, makes every Body feel the Want we have of Intelligence from those Parts: We know nothing but what the *French* are pleased to tell us, who will not lose, we may be sure, the Opportunity

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to impose upon us what they think most for their Purpose: Which makes it impossible, even for the New M—— to take the proper Measures to support our Troops; though could we have known as much and as early as we would, all Relief from hence must have come too late to enable our Men to keep the Ground they had with so much Glory gained; and thus it must always be, unless we could foresee, some Time before, when a Battle will be lost or won, and provide accordingly; otherwise every Thing must come out of Time; while the *French*, in the mean While, have it in their Power to shape their Measures, as the Exigencies of Affairs require; of which we have seen a melancholy Instance in the Support they have given the Duke of *Anjou*, when his Affairs seemed to be desperate and past Remedy. They can hear quickly, have the Means to support him always near, and can concert Things with that Exactness, as to make them all bear to a Point; whereas we can neither know nor do what we would, and the Uncertainty, our Preparations are unavoidably attended with, makes it impossible to depend on them, or to concert any Measures against such or such a Time, if they must wait the Arrival of Succours or Supplies from *England* for their Execution. In a Word, all Things conspire to make *Spain* the least desirable of all Places to push the War in; and one ought rather to wonder we have been able to maintain our Ground there so well, than complain that more has not been done, or pretend I know not what Neglects to account for it: The Thing is so plain, it speaks itself;

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itself; the *Dutch* are so convinced of it, that they have never, for these three Years past, been prevailed with to send any fresh Troops thither; *England* only is to be persuaded into these wise Measures, as if we could not be ruined fast enough.

If you have any Doubts about the Truth of any Thing I have said on this Head, I will put you into a Way how you may easily inform yourself: Get a Sight of the Accounts of the several Embarkations that have been made for *Spain*, both before and since the Battle of *Almanza*, and observe the Distance of Time between the Encampments of the Troops to go on Board, and their Taking the Field in *Catalonia*: Inquire into the Numbers the Regiments consisted of, when they marched for these Encampments, and how strong they were, when they joined our Army: Ask some of the Officers of the six Regiments that were broke into others, a little before the Battle of *Almanza*, how many private Men they left, when they came away, and some of them will tell you, that their Regiments had not above 50 Men in them, and some not so many. I cannot suppose you will pretend these Inconveniences arise from any Neglect in the Admiralty, because that is no Part of the Complaint these Gentlemen make, and you know the Sea Affairs have generally been in the same Hands which we are at present so much pleased with. If this be then a true State of this Matter, I can compare Men's being fond of enlarging the Scheme of the War in *Spain*, to nothing but to *Shakespear's* strange Alacrity in Sinking;
for

for sink we shall, and that very fast, if the Advice of these Writers be pursued.

But if this be the Case, you will say, Why then did we at first begin a War in *Catalonia*, or have not long since quitted it? This admits of a very easy Answer, if we look back into the Posture of Affairs at that Time, and consider what it was we proposed by making War on that Side, and what were the true Reasons that engaged us in it. Such an Enquiry will shew you, it was begun with the most promising Appearances in Favour of it, could we but succeed in the first Step; and, though they have not answered our Expectations, yet, when so good Footing was once got, we neither could nor ought to have quitted our Ground. When the Forces, which began that War, were first embarked, it was very difficult to determine, at this Distance, which was most for the Service of King *Charles* and the Common Cause, to land in *Catalonia*, or attempt to give some Relief to the Duke of *Savoy*, which he was at that Time in the greatest Want of: The Decision of this was left to the two Kings of *Portugal* and *Spain*, and their Ministers, who were best able to judge what Part was best to take; and, after the Matter had been thoroughly considered, it was resolved for *Catalonia*, upon the pressing Instances of King *Charles*, and the many and repeated Assurances that had been given him of the good Dispositions of the *Spaniards* to declare for him, as soon as he should have any firm Footing in *Spain*, and be in a Condition to protect them. For we did not pretend to conquer *Spain*, or to force a Revolt

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upon them, but to favour one, supposing them inclined to it ; and what made the Experiment the more worth trying was, the desperate Condition of Affairs in *Italy*, which this was thought the likeliest Way to give some Relief to, by obliging the *French* to take off a Part of that Weight of Troops with which the Duke of *Savoy* was so violently pressed : Besides, you may remember, that, at the Time this War in *Catalonia* was begun, we had not the least Prospect of making such mighty Conquests in *Flanders*, which was every Inch of it in the *French* Hands ; and it was more than any body could tell, when it would be otherwise, much less could they hope to see any Possibility of penetrating into *France* on that Side, which we have had since the *Ramillies* Campaign so fair a Prospect of. These Circumstances of Affairs, the Appearance there was of losing all in *Italy*, and of getting nothing in *Flanders*, made it very reasonable for us to try the Inclinations of the *Spaniards* ; and, had they answered better the Assurances that had been given, whatever Body of Troops had for once been carried thither, had doubtless been very well employed, to give them Countenance.

These were the Motives, upon which the War was begun on that Side, and nothing but Experience could have convinced People, that *Spain* might not have been had for going for ; especially when those, who were presumed to be the best Judges, were so sure of the Success ; so that nothing could have justified our not making the Trial ; whatever had been said against it, would

III. 30 not

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not have been believed, while the Inconveniences of this War had not yet been felt, and for that Reason could not be so certainly judged of.

These were great Inducements to try what might be done there, and the first Attempt met with Success; for, the Enemy not being prepared for us, and the People on that Side being pretty much in our Interest, *Barcelona* soon fell into our Hands, and all *Catalonia* with it; and we gained Footing enough to encourage a Revolt in the other Kingdoms, but not to force one, unless they had been more disposed to it themselves; in which Point, nobody wants to be told, they failed: But though this Consequence, which we hoped for from our Success, did not follow from it, the Advantage we had gained was too considerable to be parted with; for, by being Masters of *Barcelona*, we kept up Life in our Friends, and gave a perpetual Alarm to our Enemies, who were, by this Situation of ours, obliged to lessen considerably their Army on the Side of *Portugal*, which, one might have expected, would have turned to a better Account than it did, and would have enabled the *Portuguese* to have made some Impression on *Spain*. But that is not all, as long as we had such a Footing, and the Enemy could not depend on the Inclinations of the People to the Duke of *Anjou*, which, by what they they had seen in *Catalonia*, they had Reason to be very apprehensive of, they were forced to employ an Army, much superior to ours, to observe our Motions, not knowing to which Side we might turn ourselves, or where an Insurrection might break out in *Fa-*

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vour of us. And besides the Distraction, Uneasiness, and great Expence this new War created the Duke of *Anjou*, and his Adherents, it obliged him to discover his Distrust of the *Spaniards* more than he had done before; and to shew, he thought himself safe only in *French* Armies, as well as *French* Councils; which could not but make a great deal of ill Blood, though not so much as might have been hoped for from the old Spirit of that Nation. These, you will allow, were no slight Reasons for maintaining the Footing we had in *Catalonia*; much more will you think so, when you reflect, that this little Piece of *Spain* had four Years ago let us into a full Possession of the Whole, had not a most fatal and unaccountable Mismatchment ruined all; not to insist on several other good Effects, such as keeping his Holiness, and the other *Italian* Princes in Awe, who discovered but too much Inclination to a League with *France*, the Alarming all the *Southern* Coast of *France*, and giving Encouragement to the *Sevennois*, and other new Converts, who had long shewn they would stir, if they could; which created a fresh Trouble and Expence to the *French* King, by obliging him to keep Troops on that Side, to no other End but to observe the Motions of his own Subjects; and, in the last Place, had it succeeded, it is to this we had owed the Whole of the grand Project against *Toulon*. These are such Advantages of the *Spanish* War, as will sufficiently justify the Beginning and Pursuing of it in the Manner we have done, especially since the Reduction of *Minorca* has made it so safe and easy to keep a good Squadron

draw all the Year in the *Mediterranean*. But these Purposes are all answered, while we confine that War within moderate Bounds, and pretend to keep on the Defensive only. There is no Need of enlarging the Scheme of the War, which, instead of doing Service to the Common Cause, would make us lose several of the Advantages we have by it, while it lies in a narrow Compass, and would endanger what we might maintain, while we extend ourselves beyond our Strength, and grasp at more than we can hold; besides the other great Inconveniences, which, I have shewn you, must follow the Making an offensive War on this Side, which can never possibly succeed, unless the *Castilians* were more our Friends, or more were to be expected from the *Portuguese*. And even a defensive War, Experience has shewn us, is much better carried on by Foreign Troops, which not only spares our Men, but saves a great deal of Money, and is much more convenient for the Service, the Passage being so much shorter from *Italy* than it is from *England*. And yet we all see, that, notwithstanding the Endeavours to support King *Charles* upon his late Victories, no Reinforcement has yet been sent him, even from thence, as feasible as it seems, and as great Occasion as he has for them; and the Reinforcement that was last sent, it is known, did not arrive till the Middle of *June*, though it was intended and ordered, that they should be there in *January*. Thus difficult it has been to maintain this War on the Foot it has been hitherto upon; and from Experience we may be sure, thus it will

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be, and worse, proportionably worse, as we enlarge it. And therefore I cannot think any body does, in Earnest, mean more, than to do what we design, without Loss of Time, but not to design more than is absolutely necessary, or to extend the Compass of the War.

But they tell us, there is a Necessity for it, and that *Spain* is not otherwise to be had? But why so? Have they never heard in Physick of such a Term as Revulsion, which teaches to remove the Evil from one Part, by proper Applications, not to the Part itself, but to its Opposite? Or, Have they not so much Mechanicks as Children can teach them, who, if they would throw down *B*, which is at the Top of *A*, and out of their Reach, will presently try if they cannot pull down *A*: They know, almost by Instinct, that it is all one whether you pull down *B*. directly, or that which supports it. And it is the same Thing with *Spain*; if that Kingdom be ever recovered, it must be by proper Applications to *France*. *France*, all the World sees, is the Support of the Duke of *Anjou*; and, if this Support be forced from him, he will as surely tumble, as if you could pull him with your Hands from the Throne he has usurped. Since therefore we cannot reach him, we should set ourselves with all our Might to pull from him his Support, and then he must fall on Course: How near we have been succeeding in this, you cannot want to be told. And, how it came not to be quite done, your Friends know without being told; and, how much soever they may like the Reason of this, I am persuaded they do not
much

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much like to hear of it. And, if *Spain* be not gained this Way, one may without the Spirit of Prophecy foretel, it never will be gained at all.

Read now again these admired Pamphlets, and when their general Declamations have amused you, and you begin to think there is something in them, then turn to this true State of the Case, and the Mist, they have cast before you, will vanish; their Harangues will leave no more Impression upon you, than the famous Doctor's Speech does upon those that look into his Sermon. But, instead of those Impressions, I cannot but think there will remain upon your Mind, as there does on mine, an utter Detestation and Abhorrence of the black Villany and Malice some Men have used to ruin the Reputation of the ablest and most faithful Ministers, and to hazard every Thing that is dear to us as *Englishmen* and Protestants, rather than not compass their own destructive Ends.

I remember, I have often thought, upon the late intended Invasion of the Pretender, that it was on his Part a very foolish Enterprize; for, though it might answer the Purposes of *France*, and force us to an ill Peace, it could hardly fail to end in the Ruin of him and his Friends. And I am of the same Opinion with Respect to our Domestick Invaders, if I may use that Expression; the Publick, indeed, may suffer by them, as much as *France* can wish; but, if it should have the good Fortune to escape the Danger it is threatened with, the Attempt, that has been made upon it, will, I

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am persuaded, sooner or later bring inevitable Ruin upon themselves.

But we are both, I dare say, sufficiently tired for one Time; I shall therefore take Leave of you for the present, with Assurances that you shall, in a very little Time, hear again from,

S I R,


Your most faithful,

bumble Servant.

Postscript.

SINCE these Papers were in the Press, the ill News is come of a Battle lost in *Spain*, after the glorious Actions of *Almanara* and *Saragossa*; two Victories so great in themselves, and in the Consequence of them, that they might have been decisive of the War, if the *Portuguese* had joined; which I am very sorry they did not, for the Sake of the Common Cause, and even of the young General himself, so justly applauded for his fearless Zeal both in Fighting and Speaking for the Service of his Country. But, though this unfortunate Battle has too much justified what I have said against Enlarging the Scheme of the War in that Country, I still hope we may be in a Condition not much worse than last Year, and able to continue acting in the *Defensive* Manner I have recommended.

The



The MANAGEMENT of the

WAR.

In a Second LETTER to a

TORY-MEMBER.

Non Cauponantis bellum, sed Belligerantis.

*** Novemb. 30, 1710.

S I R,



YOU have here, according to the Promise I made you in my last, the Thoughts of your humble Servant, with the same Freedom and Impartiality, upon the other two Points, relating to the Management of the War, which the Pamphlets have been so full of; I mean, the Fault of making *Flanders* the chief Seat of the War, and the Methods

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thods the D. of M. has used to prolong it for his private Interest.

First, It is pretended, that Pushing the War in *Flanders*, is Pushing it in the wrong Place, *France* being covered on that Side with so strong a Frontier. But this Accusation will appear to have no more Sense in it, than I have shewn you in my former Letter there is in Complaining, as they do, of our not pushing it in *Spain*. To clear this Matter they should shew, not how improper or inconvenient a Country *Flanders* is to make the War in; but where it could have been made better, or with more Success: For, if they do not prove this, they prove nothing. If it be the best Side we could have turned the main Force of our Arms to, though it be not so good as we could have wished, there is no Pretence for finding any Fault upon this Head: And they, who do so, can mean nothing else, but to condemn indirectly the War itself; which, had it depended upon them, they do in effect say, should never have been begun. But to come nearer the Point, and to judge whether it be wrong to make *Flanders* the chief Seat of the War, we must compare it with what other Places it could be pushed in; and a short Comparison will decide this Matter, to any Man of tolerable Understanding, if he have with it, what I confess is not common, tolerable Honesty: For Integrity and Honesty of Mind cannot preserve themselves, where the violent Prejudices of Party and Faction have once got Possession. Now all the other Places, the War could have been
pushed

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pushed in, are *Spain*, *Italy*, and the *Rhine*. The First of these I have already shewn, till I have tired you, is impracticable : And I think Experience has abundantly convinced us, how little it is to be hoped for from the other two. Besides, an Experiment of the Second has been made ; and, when the War had been removed, with incredible Success and Speed, from the *Danube* to the *Rhine*, and from thence to the *Moselle*, the next Year a great Army was carried thither, to penetrate *France*, on that which is confessedly the weakest Side. But how did this end ? Much indeed to the Honour of the General, who, by that glorious March, outdid himself ; but, through the Disappointments he met with, not at all to the Advantage of the Common Cause : He was forced to return to *Flanders*, where the *French* had made his Presence absolutely necessary. If this had not been tried, these Gentlemen might have complained, though, for some Reasons, I scarce think they would ; but to complain now, when the Experiment has been made, is Imposing too grossly upon us.

Well then, what is next ? Would they have had the D. of *M.* have marched with a great Army to *Savoy*, as a proper Place to be the main Seat of the War ? I shall shew you, by and by, it was not the D. of *M.*'s Fault he did not go to *Italy*, when our Affairs there were most desperate ; but should he, when there was no Necessity for it, have carried Forty or Fifty Thousand Men thither, what Treatment must he have expected from those Men, who made his March to *Bavaria* so great a Crime,

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as we all remember this Party did, in the Interval between the Actions of *Schellenberg* and *Blenheim*. And even that great unparalleled Success, and all the glorious Conquests of that Year, could not divert the Malice that some swelled with, or hinder the Rage from breaking out, which they hoped to vent with so much Pleasure and Revenge. I mention this only, to shew the Sense of the Party, and what might have been expected from them, who were so angry at that glorious March, if the D. of *M.* had carried his Army to *Italy* or *Savoy*, when *Turin* was relieved, and no pressing Necessities called for it.

But the Mention of that Interval puts me in Mind of another Thing, which the same Pamphlets make so much Noise about, that, I hope, you will pardon the Digression, while I take a little Notice of it; and that is, the famous *Act of Security*; which was the other favourite Topick with which the Faction pleased themselves; tho' the prodigious Successes of that Year might easily have convinced them, such Clamours would be as unpopular, as they were unjust. For, that they were unjust, every impartial Man will be satisfied, that does but examine the Fact, how that Bill came to be passed. You remember, I am sure, what a very melancholy Prospect we had here in *England*, of Affairs in that Interval. At that Time the *Scotch* Parliament was sitting, were very uneasy, would give no Money, nor dispatch any publick Business, till that Act was granted them. What Part shall the *Q.* take in this Matter? It is the unanimous Opinion of her *Scotch* Ministers, that
it

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it must be complied with ; they cannot answer for the Quiet of the Kingdom an Hour, if it be refused : Shall an *English* Minister take upon him singly to advise the Contrary, in a *Scotch* Affair, and against their Opinions, who may be presumed to be the best Judges of the Disposition and Temper of their own People ? Let us suppose he had done so, and that the Refusal had produced any Tumults or Insurrections in that Kingdom, where every body knew there had for a long Time been a great deal of ill Blood. Without Entering further into this Matter, I would only ask this Question ; What would these Gentlemen have said in this Case ? Would it not have been loudly affirmed to have been a concerted Thing to ruin us ; and that our Army was sent out of the Way on Purpose, that we might be the more effectually undone, and out of the Reach of any Succour or Relief ? Could the Success of *Blenheim* be foreseen ? Could any body be sure the Refusal of the Bill would have ended in nothing worse, than the Losing the Supply ? Which does not use to be thought a trifling Matter. Was it not of the utmost Consequence, in that untoward Posture of Affairs, that Peace should be preserved among ourselves ? To be angry therefore with a Minister for advising, or not opposing the Royal Assent to this Bill, in such Circumstances, is both unjust and absurd. And, I think, one may be pretty sure, what, as I have put the Case, the Faction would have said, had the Bill been refused, who now say the Passing of it was so great a Fault, and make heavy Complaints about it ; though the same Minister
has

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has taken the Advantage of better Times, to undo what bad ones had forced him to comply with : And has, to the Surprize and Confusion of his Enemies, extinguished the unhappy Differences that threatened the Constitution and Succession, by a perpetual Union ; which he will always be allowed to have been the chief Adviser and Promoter of. And, if the Truth were known, it is this, which is at Bottom the impardonable Crime. Such is the hard Fate of *British* Ministers, whom no Wisdom or Abilities, no Justice or Integrity, no Fidelity and Zeal for their Prince and Country, nor the most happy and successful Administration, can protect from the Virulence of Faction ; which has made me often think them the only Slaves in this very free Nation. This has been the Fate of the Old M——rs, and sure the new ones cannot hope for better Luck.

But to return from this Digression : You see, upon a very short View, that to lay a Stress of the War in *Spain*, *Savoy*, or the *Rhine*, is altogether impracticable. From whence it follows, that it must be laid in *Flanders*, or no where ; which last, I am afraid, is what these Complainers would bring about.

But to set this Matter in another Light : If *Flanders* be so improper a Place to push the War in, How came all the Allies so readily to give into it ? How came no Remonstrances to have been made by any of them against it ? How came the *Dutch*, who have been always thought to be in Hastenough for Peace, to go into that Scheme, by which they are so unlikely to obtain it ? How
came

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came the Prince, whose Troops are in our Service, to send them into the Field so easy, and let them continue there so long as they do, if the Scene of the War is so wrong laid, and we are so little the nearer coming to an End of it; though the Service be so hard, and their Troops suffer so much in it? How comes the Emperor, when the Empire is so naked and defenseless, and is so terribly threatened to be invaded by the *French*, and one Year felt their Threats in Earnest: How comes he to send such a Body of Troops to *Flanders*, if they could be employed better any where else? Especially when he has so good a General of his own to put at the Head of them; a General who has the Happiness to be in Favour with the Faction, for no other Reason but because he is not their own; for if he were, What Quarter could he expect for advising to send Troops to run their Heads against Walls in *Flanders*, which, they would say, he advised merely for his own Honour, and for the Pleasure of being at the Head of a Hundred Thousand Men. Thus the Faction would use him, if he were *English*; for thus they use the D. for no other Reason in the World; and thus the *French* Scribblers, who are in the same Interest, use them both. I would recommend to you, upon this Head, a Monthly *French* Paper, called, *The Clef de Cabinet*; which would be a better Key to the Understanding the Designs and Language of the Faction, than all the Things they write themselves; and of more Use than any Thing that is writ against them; for which Reason, I have many
Times

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Times wished it translated into our own Language, for the Benefit of the *English* Reader, who will be judging of the Affairs and Politicks of all Countries, when he can speak no Language but his own, and that obliges him blindly to follow those blind Guides the Pamphleteers, who are but the mercenary Tools of the Party they serve, and seldom know any Thing of Affairs Abroad themselves; much less are they fit Masters to teach others how to judge about them. And I could be glad to know, how such Guides and their Followers come to be more competent Judges in what Manner the War should be pursued, than our Allies are, who have so great an Interest in it; who, by their Situation, have so much the Advantage of us in knowing what is done; who, by their Nearness, see and feel what we only talk of at a Distance; and, in short, under whose Eyes every Thing passes: And yet, notwithstanding the separate Interests they have, they all agree to shew us, that, in their Opinion, the War could no where else be pushed to so much Advantage to the Common Cause, as it has been in *Flanders*: Where, if we were to be on the Defensive only, and do nothing but march from one strong Camp to another, to wear out a Campaign of four Months, which, by the Help of good Management, may, in a little Time, be the Case; even then a great Army would be absolutely necessary to cover so large and weak a Frontier as that of the *Netherlands* was three Years ago, when it had not one single Town of any considerable Strength to secure any Part of it. And, is it not a great Pity,

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Pity, a noble Army should not be suffered to continue in Tranquility and Quiet, that is, useless and unactive? Ought a General to be forgiven, who has taken so much Pains to make them useful, by the Addition of a little more Strength, which could not have been employed, we are sure, to any Purpose any where else. This single Reflexion may convince a Man how ridiculous all their Clamour is against making *Flanders* the chief Seat of the War, where upon any Scheme the greatest Army must have been, though little enough to do nothing, had not that Addition been made to it, which these Gentlemen are so much offended at. There is nothing wanting to make this single Argument a Demonstration, but to shew you, that this Addition to the *Flanders* Army could have been of no Service any where else. If they had not been employed here, they would either not have been used at all, or upon the *Rhine*; Now there was no Want of them to be on the Defensive; that is plain from the Event; and act offensively they could not, for one plain Reason; which is, that the *Imperial* Army have no one Thing that is necessary for an offensive War; they have neither Money, nor Magazines, nor Ammunition, nor Artillery, nor Bread-Waggon; and even where all these Things may be had, to how little Purpose is it, if they, that are to use them, cannot take the Field betimes; which is what is never to be hoped for on the *Rhine*? It is therefore plain these Troops must have been perfectly useless, had they not been brought to *Flanders*; where, without them, no more could

have been done than there has been in other Parts; and this, we may be sure, was the true Reason of the Emperor's sending such a Number of his Troops thither as he did: He took them from a Place where he knew they could be of no Use, to send them where they might act vigorously in Conjunction with an Army which is perfectly well provided with all Necessaries, and under the Conduct of a General, whose Services the H. of *Austria* will always retain a grateful Sense of, for having, in so wonderful a Manner, saved the Empire.

After having seen the Judgment of the Allies in this Point, it may not be amiss to turn to another View of it; and see the Sentiments of our Enemies upon the Question, who, we shall find, have confirmed the Opinion of our Friends. There is nothing they have shewn themselves so much afraid of, as of our Progress in *Flanders*; nothing they have so much laboured to divert us from. What else is the Meaning of the mighty Threats they have filled us with every Winter since the *Ramillies* Campaign, that they would invade the Empire with a powerful Army in the Spring, and drive King *Charles* out of *Catalonia*? Which two Things they never threatened more than last Year; and the Latter, we were, I believe, all in Pain for, upon their making so much Noise of entering *Catalonia* with two Armies at the same Time? I ask, what they did this for? Could it be for any other End, but to make us lessen our Strength in *Flanders*, and persuade us to detach to the *Rhine*, and send Troops to *Spain*? If this

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were not their Meaning, why did they not execute their Threats, when they were sure to meet with so little Opposition? Why have the Allies drawn the greatest Force of the Enemy to *Flanders*, rather than they the Strength of the Allies to *Germany*? Can it be for any other Reason, but because the Enemy knew they could not give so deep a Wound in one Place, as they might receive in the other? It is this made them withdraw their Troops from *Spain*, and make so many Detachments from the *Rhine*, and fetch the Duke of *Berwick* from *Savoy*. All other Points have been given up to guard this one. They have neglected all the other Parts of the War, where they might have acted with Success; not to make a vigorous Effort in *Flanders* themselves, where, for several Years, they have not so much as pretended to do any Thing, or to give the Allies a Blow, but to fence against those they apprehended from them. And is not this a plain Confession, they think no Ravage they can make in the Empire, no Attempt they can make in *Spain*, of so much Consequence to them, as to stop the Progress the Allies are making in *Flanders*? Do not they by this own, that this is the Home-Push they are most concerned to guard against? Is not the last Campaign a surprising Instance of this, in which they have shewn, they thought 140,000 Men well employed in doing nothing else but hindering the Allies from doing so much as they would? Though what they did, notwithstanding all the Opposition so vast an Army could make, was more than the great Monarch ever did any

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one Year of the last War, or we, I fear, are like to do again. Go now, and believe, if you can, these Men that tell you the Scene of the War is ill laid, and that *Flanders* is not the properest Part to attack *France* in; after you have seen the Judgments both of Allies and of Enemies upon it.

Thus far I have been shewing you, that, as bad a Place as *Flanders* is to push a War in, it is the best, or rather only one, in which it could be pushed with any tolerable Prospect of Success. But I shall now set this Matter in another Light, and distinguish upon what I have hitherto allowed. *Flanders* was, indeed, a very bad Part to attack *France* in, it being covered with a Frontier that was thought impenetrable; but that Frontier has now great Part of it been taken, and is turned against those it has hitherto defended: And by this Means *France* lies now as open and exposed on the *Flanders* Side, as on any other; and, indeed, more. So that nothing can be wished more feasible, than what remains to enable the Allies to penetrate into the Heart of it. Not above a fifth Part of the Work is now left, of what the Allies had upon their Hands three Years ago. *Flanders*, I say, was, at the Beginning of the War, a very bad Part to attack *France* in, it was covered with so strong a Frontier. I will readily allow these Gentlemen this; but then I must tell them, That it was for this Reason the D. of M. looked out for another Scene of Action, and did all that could be done on his Part towards it; and, therefore, when he had, in the two first Campaigns, driven

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driven the *French* from *Nimeguen* to *Namur*, and had set the *Dutch* at Ease by the Reduction of *Gelder* and *Limburg*, and cleared the *Rhine* by taking *Bonne*, he did not the third Year content himself with walking up and down in the Neighbourhood of *Holland*, where there was no Prospect of doing any Thing to Purpose ; but marched into the Heart of *Germany*, forced the strong Pass of *Schellenberg* before the End of *June* ; which is the Key of *Bavaria* : And, had the Ammunition and Artillery been ready, as the Duke had been assured it was, he had marched directly to *Munich*, and, without the Hazard of another Battle, had in a Fortnight's Time not only extinguished that fatal War, that threatened nothing less than the Ruin of the whole Empire, but had gained the Elector also over to the Side of the Allies, who, could he have been persuaded to make their Interest his own, might have done the greatest Service to the Common Cause, both in *Germany* and in *Flanders*. But when that Point was lost, and the Inability of the *Germans* to make a Siege had encouraged the Elector to break off the Treaty he had entered into, and the Sword had decided the Fate of his Country, what Part did the D. of *M.* take next ? Not that of returning to *Flanders* ; no, he improved the rest of that wonderful Campaign, to facilitate the Operations of the next, in a Part where *France* might be more easily attacked : He passed the *Rhine* before the End of *August*, and made, or rather submitted to the Making the Siege of *Landau*, by Prince *Lewis*, while he covered it : And, that the unexpected

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Length of the Siege might not break his Design, without waiting for the End of it, he advanced with a Body of Troops to the *Saar*, surprised *Treves*, and possessed himself of other proper Posts for erecting Magazines, and opening the next Campaign with the Siege of *Saar-Lewis*; and, had that Project succeeded, that Campaign had probably been the last. Why it did not, I need not tell you: You cannot but remember, that the D. of *M.*'s Part was punctually performed: His Army arrived at *Treves* at the Time appointed, and from thence he made a bold March to *Syrk*, in the Sight of Monsieur *Villars*, who thought fit to retire to a safe Post, where he could not be attacked, and left the Country open to the Confederates, quite to *Saar-Lewis*; of which they might have made the Siege, without any Opposition. But all was defeated by the Failure of Prince *Lewis*; though more Pains had been taken to fix him to what had been agreed, than any one, that does not know the Thing, can believe; and the Duke was obliged to hasten back to *Flanders*, where the *French* begun to act: Which he did with that Success, that he obliged them to raise the Siege of *Liege*, retook *Huy*, forced the Lines, defeated great Part of their Army; and, had every body been as forward as his Grace on that Occasion, he had anticipated no little Part of the Glory of the next Campaign. All that was done this Year, in *Flanders*, gave the Duke no great Hopes of doing much there the next. The Duke of *Savoy*, in the mean Time, was reduced to the last Extremity. This made him not only persuade the

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Allies to send two considerable Reinforcements to him, but form the Design of marching thither himself to his Relief. And nothing hindered his Going, but that the *Dutch* thought they should be too much exposed by his Absence; who would not consent to the Sending the 10,000 *Hessians* to *Savoy*, but on Condition he would stay with the Army in *Flanders*; and God was pleased to bless his Zeal for the Common Cause, by a most surprising Victory, when he had not the least Hopes of it. For who could have expected the *French* would quit the *Dyle* they had been for nine or ten Months fortifying, to give the Allies the Opportunity, they so much wanted, of a fair Engagement; which ended in the Reduction of the greatest Part of the *Netherlands*, which, as much as Forgetting is in Fashion, I doubt not, but honest Men will remember.

Thus you see, for five Campaigns of this War, the D. of M— either did not act in *Flanders*, or did it out of Necessity, and much against his Will. So sensible was he how difficult it must be to bring the War to a speedy End, when the chief Weight of it lay in a Country against which *France* was so well defended. The Sense he had of this made him very unwilling to end so great a Campaign as that of *Ramillies*, without the Reduction of *Mons*, which he would fain have made the Siege of, to frighten the *French* into a Peace, or secure the Making a good War the next Year; which, he foresaw, he could not be sure of without that Conquest, since it would be in the Power of the Enemy to avoid a Battle, if they pleased,

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and the Confederate Army would not be big enough to make any great Siege, and cover *Brabant* at the same Time. This Apprehension made the Duke of *M*—— earnest for the Siege, but the Badness of the Weather at the End of the Siege of *Aeth* made the *Dutch* afraid of entering upon so great an Enterprize so late in the Year. They, who know any Thing of the War, know this to be true, and those, from whom these Clamours come, know a great deal more; they know his Grace went to the *Hague* himself soon after the Battle of *Ramillies* to concert with the States how that Victory might be improved to the best Advantage, and to hasten the Preparations for it. They, I believe, could tell us, that, if what his Grace proposed and pressed for had been complied with, that Campaign had been still greater than it was, and had enabled us to push the War in *Flanders*, with the like Vigour, the next Year; which, for the Reasons I have already hinted, was spent without much Action; the *French* declining to fight, and the Allies, on their Part, having no Inclination to it, nor Force enough to make a Siege without great Difficulty: Not that the Duke of *M*—— himself was for Sitting still; but the States were so frightened with the Battle of *Almanza*, and the Invasion of *Germany*, that they would not let him stir. Thus the Duke could neither carry the War out of *Flanders*, nor act with Vigour in it; such was the Fate of this Campaign, and the same it must have been of all succeeding ones, had not the Duke laid hold of the Opportunity, which the Change of
Affairs

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Affairs in *Italy* gave him, to increase his Army, by that Addition of Troops which the Emperor was prevailed with to send to him, otherwise there was nothing to be hoped for but from Battles, which it is very easy for the Enemy to avoid in *Flanders*; and, when they can be attacked, it is with more Hazard than the States care to run so near Home, especially considering, that the little Work our Allies give the *French* upon the *Rhine*, and in *Savoy*, leave them at Liberty to bring what Numbers they please against the *Flanders* Army. There was no possible Way of overcoming this Difficulty, but that which the Duke took to procure a Body of Troops to join him from the *Rhine*; where, I have already shewn you, they would have been of no Use at all.

It is to this we owe all the Successes we have had in *Flanders* for these three last Campaigns, in which, through the indefatigable Care and Diligence of my Lord M. and the perfect good Agreement between him and Prince *Eugene*, Things have been done, that Posterity will wonder at; the Frontier, that was thought impenetrable, is not only broken into, but thorough; the Work of half an Age has been undone; Places have been taken, upon which an infinite Treasure has been spent; and the Enemy have been reduced so low, after all the Advantages with which they began this War, that, had our Engineers been at all equal to our Generals, the Allies had been now upon the *Soame*; which would have left the *French* no Room to doubt, whether they should give them the Peace they demanded, or not. But we see but half the Advantage

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vantage the Allies had in acting offensively in *Flanders*, if we consider only the Successes of our Arms on that Side. The Vigour, with which they acted here, was, at the same Time, the Saving of all the weak Parts of the Alliance from the Dangers they would otherwise have been exposed to. Had the Allies been upon the Defensive only in *Flanders*, the *French* would not have been content to be so in the other Seats of the War. We may remember they began the *Ramillies* Campaign offensively in all Parts at the same Time; and they would have been at Liberty ever since to do the same in other Places, had not the Vigour with which the War was pushed in *Flanders*, and the near Danger with which that threatened them, made them weaken themselves every where else to guard this single Point, and yet to very little Purpose; as you will easily be convinced, if you run over in your Thoughts the many and great Sieges we have made in the Sight of the Enemy, and in Defiance of such vast Numbers, who think it Work enough to make Intrenchments to cover themselves, while we are taking their Towns; and every Step we advance is so sensible to them, that they dare not give the least Room for it, by attempting either to raise the Siege, or make a Diversion; so weak and tender is *France* become on this Side, where, a few Years ago, it was so strong, that all Attempts against it seemed to be vain. I believe, I may now take for granted, you have heard enough upon this Head; the State of which stands thus: *Flanders* was indeed at first a very bad Place to push the War in, but there was
a Ne-

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a Necessity for it; it was the only Place where was a Possibility of doing any Thing; and, as bad a Place as it was, it is now, by the successful Conduct of this War, become a very good one; the Success on this Side has saved all the weak Parts of the Alliance; it drew the Troops of *France* out of *Spain*, from whence no Forces sent thither could ever have driven them; it has obliged them to be on the Defensive in *Savoy*, or rather to leave *Dauphiné* or *Provence* without Defence, if our Friends on that Side would do what we expect from them; it has preserved that great but languid Body, the Empire, from the dreadful Ravages it has been yearly threatened with; it has reduced their Armies to subsist upon their own Country, a Thing new to *France*, and has turned all their Thoughts of invading others to defend themselves; it has driven them from Post to Post, and, in Spite of all the Opposition the united Force of *France* could make, has taken whole Provinces from them: Nothing but *Arras* is wanting to the Allies, to oblige them to retire within their inmost Circle, beyond which all would be open to us: In short, it has driven them to the Extremity of Danger, and, had not some new Appearances made them hope the Face of the War would now at last change, it is pretty certain, the Invincible *Louis* would not have hazarded the Safety of his own Kingdoms by further Efforts to support the Usurpation of his Grandson.

This Point is the *Flanders* War brought to by the surprising Conduct of the Man, whom the Faction is so angry with; and one is tempted to suspect

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suspect this is his great Crime: What else can mean so much Clamour, against Pushing the War on that Side, when we are upon the Point of entering *France*, which true *Britons* have so long wished for, and that from Men, who made no Noise at all, but, on the contrary, highly approved, as may shewn under their own Hands, the Management of the War, and the Conduct of the General, when there were little Hopes of his making his Way through so many Difficulties, which have since so happily been overcome.

But, whatever be the true Reason that has brought the Duke of M--- under the Displeasure of these Gentlemen, the pretended one is chiefly this, that he has unnecessarily prolonged the War for his private Interest, a Calumny which you will, I dare say, conclude to be very groundless, from what I have already said. But because this is the capital Accusation, and it is natural for People, when they grow weary of a War, to give into any Surmises of this Kind, be they never so ill grounded; I shall shew you the vile Ingratitude and Impudence of these Men, in such a Manner, as will, I hope, abundantly convince you, the most implacable Malice could have invented nothing more stupidly ridiculous, than to accuse him of prolonging the War, who has more Reason than any Body to wish a good End to it, and has done more towards it, than his best Friends could ever hope for.

Now, if there were any Truth in this Accusation, and the D. of M. had unnecessarily prolonged the War, it must be either in the Quality of General,

or

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or as he is her Majesty's Plenipotentiary. To judge therefore rightly of this Matter, we must see how he has behaved himself in each of these Capacities : And First, as he is General. If he has offended in this Quality, he has the Happiness to offend with good Company ; with Prince *Eugene*, and with the Deputies of the States, whose Consent is necessary in all the Operations of the War. If therefore there be any Blame in the Management of that, it must not all lie upon the D. of *M.* unless it appear that he has hindered the good Measures they would have taken, or forced upon them his own ill ones. But neither of these, I think, are so much as pretended ; nor, I suppose, will be. I cannot hear there have ever been any Differences between the Duke and the Prince, not so much as in their Opinions about any one Enterprize : Nobody has observed any Coldness or Reservedness between them, or any other the least Sign of Misunderstanding. But, on the contrary, it is notorious to all the World, that they act with the most perfect Harmony, and with the greatest mutual Esteem of each other ; without any Marks of Jealousy, without the least Suspicion of Envy, or of having any separate Ends or Aims, to eclipse the Glory of one another, or advance their own. The Friendship is so great, the Agreement between them is so intire, the Intimacy and Secrecy they concert with, is so wonderful, that the Armies under them enjoy all the Advantages they can have from the Command of two great Generals ; without any of the Inconveniencies that one would think those Advantages must unavoidably

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ably be attended with. They are to all Purposes but one Army, and under one General; there is no Sign of more than one, the Unity between the Two is so perfect. If then there be any Fault in the Conduct of the War, for these Three last Years, the Prince must come in for his Share; they must both be absolved, or both condemned; or else these Gentlemen have some strange Rules of Judging by, which I am yet to learn. But let us see whether it will mend their Cause, to consider the Part the Deputies of the States have in these Matters: If they agreed with the Duke in the Measures that have been taken, can he be in Fault, and not they? Or have we heard they have ever differed from him, in opposing any Thing that would tend to prolong the War? Have they desired the Army might take the Field sooner than he would have them, or continue in it longer? Have they pressed any brave and bold Undertaking, that he has declined? Has he been against Fighting, when they were for it? Have they been for making Sieges of Towns, that were more advanced within the Enemies Frontier, and leaving those that have been besieged, behind them, to fall of themselves? Or have they been for penetrating into *France*, without making any Sieges at all? If any Thing of this Kind could be made appear, that would be a Discovery indeed. But, depend upon it, they have never proposed any one Thing that would push on the War, which he has been against: But, on the contrary, his Hands have been often tied, when he was impatient to be doing something brave and enterprising. But I had rather leave
his

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his Grace without Defence, than pretend to do him Justice, by entering into Things he thinks fit to make a Secret of; the End of the War will be Time enough for that. In the mean While one may be sure, by all one has ever heard of Deputies, that they are something like *Socrates's* Genius, which never put him upon doing any Thing; its whole Business was to check him, when he seemed to be too forward. If therefore one would do the Duke Justice, the Vigour, that has been used in pushing the War, should be imputed to him; and that there has not been more done, to the Restraints he has been always under; always, but one Campaign, that of *Blenheim*, in which he has shewn what he would do, were he left to himself. Had he a Mind for a lingering War, nothing was so easy; he needed only not have fought that Battle, and the War might have lasted *there* long enough, which that Day ended at a Blow.

In one Sense, indeed, I am willing to allow he has prolonged the War, that, without him, must have ended long ago in an ill Peace; which he has hindered our Coming to, so soon as some seem to wish we had: And this may some Time or other be made his Crime. In Truth, his Conduct the whole War has been one constant Endeavour to hinder its Ending ill so soon as it might, and must have done otherwise. This made him so earnest to fight the *French*, as we all know he was, the first Campaign, when he thought he had them at a great Advantage: This made him take so much Pains to bring them to an Engagement the second Campaign, when he stole a March, and passed

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passed a River, and got between their Army and their Lines : This made him march to *Bavaria* the Third, and to the *Moselle* the Fourth : This made him endeavour to go to *Italy* the Fifth, to prevent the Ruin of the D. of *Savoy*, and the Loss of All on that Side : This made him the Sixth so importunate with the States, for near two Months together, to march from the Camp of *Meldert*, and after that to try to fall upon the *French* Army at *Seneff* : This made him the Seventh pass the *Schelde*, and fight the Battle of *Oudenarde* ; without which all *Flanders* must have been lost ; and afterwards make the Siege of *Lisle*, which was the most sensible Part *France* could be wounded in ; and begin in *December* the Siege of *Gand*, which had it been left in *French* Hands, the Allies, instead of doing any Thing themselves the next Campaign, must have seen *Lisle* and *Menin* taken from them, without a Possibility of Relieving them. This made him the next Year, when he could not fight the *French*, surprise them with the Siege of *Tournay*, when they expected nothing less, and take so much Care that the rest of the Campaign might not be lost. With this View he endeavoured to surprise *St. Guilain* ; and that failing, by the Time the Garrison of *Tournay* marched out, he had passed the Lines of *Mons* ; After which he fought the great Battle of *Taniers* ; in which the Enemy were so defeated, that they, who had hazarded a Battle to prevent the Siege of *Mons*, did not dare to venture any Thing for the Relief of it ; towards which they did not make the least Step, though the Allies had neither River
nor

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nor Intrenchment to cover them. Lastly, it was this made him begin the last Campaign six Weeks sooner than the Enemy were able to take the Field ; which gave him Possession of their Lines, and soon after of *Douay* ; and, had that Siege been ended in the Time proposed, *Arras* had met with the same Fate ; which, however, was in great Measure compensated by the Reduction of *Bethune*, *St. Venant*, and *Aire* : Which last Place, though some may think it a slight Conquest, the *French*, who knew best the Importance of their own Places, thought it so great an Enterprize, that they could not believe the Allies would venture on it ; and, when it was taken, they owned it opened to them a Passage to the *Soame* ; and, without much Skill in military Matters, a Man cannot look upon a Map, and not see, that, besides the Command of all the *Lys*, which is a vast Advantage for erecting Magazines against another Year, it gives the Allies a great Front, which will make it much more difficult for the *French* to stop their Progress on that Side, when they are not confined to one Way only of advancing to their remaining Frontier, as they would have been, had the Campaign ended without *Aire*.

These have been the Endeavours and Steps the D. of M. has made this War, which have all contributed to prolong it in one Sense, as they have kept the Allies in Heart, and set them above the mean Conditions of an ill Peace ; which they must have long since have submitted to, had either the Emperor or the Duke of *Savoy* been ru-

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ined, or had the Enemy gained any considerable Advantage in *Flanders* ; or if our Inaction there had left the Enemy at Liberty to act offensively in other Parts. All which has been prevented by the Conduct of the Duke of *M.* as you cannot but see in what I have already said, except that which respects the Duke of *Savoy* ; in the saving him, you may be apt to think, the D. of *M.* could have no Part. But not to tell you, he made all the Use he could of the Queen's Interest to support Prince *Eugene* at the Imperial Court, where, at that Time, he had his Enemies, nor to mention the Supplies he procured him from *England* ; if you look back five or six Years, you will find the Duke made, in the Depth of Winter, a Journey to *Berlin*, which obtained, from the King of *Prussia*, a Succour of 8000 Men for *Italy*, which had been often and absolutely refused to the Imperial Court ; and, the Applications of the Ministers of *England* and *Holland* had been made to as little Purpose. These were the Troops that, as we all know, enabled Prince *Eugene* to make a Stand ; and two Years after, the same Zeal for the Common Cause procured for *Italy* two more Reinforcements ; a lesser of *Palatines*, and another of 10,000 *Hessians* ; which last is, in so particular a Manner, owing to the Duke, that, after they had not only been agreed for, but had actually began their March, they had been diverted from this Service, and employed on the *Rhine*, had not he persisted for their being sent to *Italy*, where some were inclined to think, they would not be wanted, upon the Turn that the Battle of *Ramillies* would

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would probably give to Affairs. But the Event shewed how right the Duke judged: Nothing could have saved *Turin* but a Battle, and without those Troops a Battle had been impossible, which was difficult enough with them. And now I believe you will allow, I have Reason to put the Methods that were taken to prevent the Ruin of the Duke of *Savoy*, among the Ways the D. of *M.* has taken to prevent an ill Peace: To which I ought to add another, which was as strange an Action in him, as any of the rest; and that was his Journey to *Saxony*, to persuade the King of *Sweden* not to disturb the Allies by the Jealousy his Stay in *Saxony* gave the Emperor. What a very ill Influence his Stay there had on the Common Cause, we all know: How far that Journey contributed to remove it, I am not enough in the Secret to know; but it is certain, he did from that Time give no fresh Jealousies by making any new Demands, but, on the contrary, receded from several Points, and set himself in Earnest to making the necessary Dispositions for quitting *Saxony*; which he did at the End of the Summer, as soon as ever the Treaty, between him and the Emperor, was signed; which put an End to the Fears the Allies had been so long under, and enabled both King *Augustus* and the Emperor to send Troops to the Support of the Common Cause, instead of drawing any from it; which had the King of *Sweden* not removed, they must have done. Now what Part the D. of *M.* had in this, I cannot pretend to affirm; but I believe I may venture to say, that, had some others done what he did, they

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would have made no Difficulty to give these Men all the Merit, who are so unwilling to allow any Thing to the D. of M.

Now, if this be Prolonging the War, the D. of M. is certainly guilty in a very high Degree : For all this he has done, we are sure, and more ; besides a great deal of Management and Negotiation, which is yet a Secret to us. But thus much is open and above-board : And if his Accusers do not mean an ill Peace, and Prolonging the War to hinder it, I cannot imagine what they would pretend. I always thought to take all Opportunities of acting offensively, in an offensive War, had been the right Management, and the most natural Way to put a good End to it. I never could have suspected, that great Armies, long Campaigns, surprizing Marches, glorious Battles, and important Sieges, had been the Way to prolong the War, if these Gentlemen had not told us so. By what they find Fault with, you may see what it is they like, and which Way they would have a General take to end a War. They would, it seems, have him manage his Troops tenderly and frugally ; take Care how he takes the Field too soon, for Fear of ill Accidents ; instead of drawing them out in *April*, keep them in their Quarters till *June* ; and, because the latter Season is usually wet, let them leave the Field before the *September* Rains overtake them : To keep Men in the Field, till *November* or *December*, is the Ruin of an Army. They would have him make no Sieges of Towns that are well fortified, for that is making Men run their Heads against Walls :
Fight

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Fight no Battles, but when you are sure of Victory; that is, never fight at all, much less fatigue the poor Men with great and continual Marches to look out for the Enemy, to force their Camp, to attack an Intrenchment, or pass a River in their Sight: These are hazardous Things, and cannot be done but at great Disadvantage: Such Attempts have often miscarried, except this War; and, when they succeed, Armies often suffer very much: Though it must be confessed, indeed, the D. of M. has been very fortunate, in passing so many Rivers and Lines with so little Loss. But Things are not the more reasonable, because a Man has Luck; and, therefore, he is justly to be blamed for them; for he could not be sure he should succeed. In short, a General should always favour his Men, never make unmerciful Night-Marches; though the Duke, indeed, has practised them with strange good Fortune, upon a great many Occasions. Never march above three Leagues at a Time, that the Enemy, knowing your Rule, may never be surprized; for, by your long Marches, your own Army, and the Enemy's too, suffer extremely, especially in warm Weather, when Men and Officers are, for Want of their Baggage, forced to be without the necessary Refreshments. Lastly, Avoid, of all Things, marching in wet Weather, which tires the Men strangely: And, for that Reason, when you are in a good Camp, never leave it without consulting the Glass: Wait till it be *settled Fair*, and then a moderate March can do the Men no Hurt, but rather Good. These, by the Rule of Con-

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traries, seem to be the Methods by which these Gentlemen think the War ought to have been managed. These are the old military Maxims, which are evidently good for an Army; and it is impossible, in their Opinion, a General can recede from them so much as the D. of M. has done, but for his private Interest, and with a Design to prolong the War. And it must be confessed, if the Generals of both Sides were agreed to follow these Maxims, an Army would have a good Time of it, be a fine Army, brave complete veteran Troops: The Men and Officers would understand their Business; and we should not have our Regiments filled with so many raw unexperienced Creatures as are now in them: Besides, so few Recruits would be wanted, that they might be all picked Men, and raised without any Grievance to the Country. I fancy, if the Government were of the Mind of these Gentlemen, and thought this the likeliest Way to put a good End to the War, there might be Generals enow found, who would be very careful and exact to execute them; which, it is certain, the Duke of M. never has been, nor ever will be. And, therefore, if that be a Crime, it is high Time he should be removed: But, if this be a sure Way to prolong the War, without a Possibility of ever coming at a good Peace, as I and all others, who are not in the Secret of the Faction, must needs think it is, then the Way, the Duke of M. has taken, must be the true Way to end the War by such a Peace, as will best answer our Design in going into it; and consequently their Insinuations against the Conduct

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Conduct of the Duke of *M.* as if he had a Mind to prolong the War, are ridiculous and scandalously false; and honest Men must always think them so, till they shew that more might have been done, or that the Reason, it was not done, proceeded from his own Fault, and not from the Want of any necessary Consent in others: Or that he persuaded those, who act in Conjunction with him, to go against their own Judgments, into any wrong Things of his own Proposing. But I must beg these Gentlemen to distinguish between Judging of Things before they are done, and making Judgments of them afterwards. There is nothing so easy as to be wise when it is too late; but the true Wisdom is to know, which is the most reasonable Part to take, while the Event is future, and in the Dark, and the Mind must determine itself according to what *then* seems most probable; when no Certainty can be had, and Probabilities only are within its Reach; and, therefore, if they can say any Thing to the Purpose, they must shew, that the Duke of *M.* and Prince *E.* and the Deputies of the States, and such other Persons as they think fit to consult with, as well qualified as they are supposed to be to judge of military Operations, have not always chosen that Side of the Question, which, upon the Whole, was not reasonable.

Arlus, indeed, the Writer, I mean, of the *Secret History*, who, I have Reason to think, is abler at asking Questions, than he is at answering them, puts in here, and with great Seriousness asks, if some *Counter-Steps* have not been made, for Fear

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our repeated Successes should put too quick an End to the War ; and, that he may not seem to suspect this without Grounds, he desires to know, *If last Year's bloody Battle was so well concerted, as it might have been ; and if there was an absolute Necessity to stay two Days, within Sight of the Enemy, for a few Troops, that never engaged when they came, and give them so much Time to throw up such unequal Fortresses before we attacked them ?* I little thought to have seen the Battle of *Taniers* instanced for a *Counter-Step* designed to hinder the Effect of our former Successes, when it was itself so great an one ; but it shews the Absurdity of their Cause, when Victory itself is made a Crime ; and they attempt to prove a General designs to prolong the War, because he has endeavoured to force the Enemy to put an End to it by a new Defeat. This is a strange Way of Arguing indeed, peculiar to the Cause, and its worthy Defenders. It is a known Saying, *Victoriæ ratio non redditur* ; but, it seems, it now must not be allowed. A General has been often called to give an Account how he came to lose a Battle ; but to be accountable for winning one is something new ; and, if Victories had not been so common, we should hardly have been so difficult : We should have understood the Value of a single Victory, and been thankful for it ; but the Number, it seems, has made us so nice, that we had rather not have them, if they are not just to our Minds ; if they are not of as much Consequence as *Blenheim*, or as cheap as *Ramillies* or *Oudenarde*. I would be glad to know, if ever
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any one *French* Writer treated the Battle of *Landen* with that Contempt that these Gentlemen do that of *Taniers*; or thought the Fighting it a Crime in the General, because it was dear bought, and had little other Consequence but the gaining what *Arlus* calls *unprofitable Honour*. On the contrary, never Victory was so much magnified; the Tongues and Pens of that Nation were for many Years full of nothing else; and yet those who were at that Battle will tell you, that the *French* did not only lose as many Men as the Confederates, but double or treble their Number; and the Allies recovered that Defeat so soon, that, in six Weeks Time, they had a better Army than before the Battle; and all the Use, the *French* made of their Victory, was to take *Charleroy*, though the Battle was fought in *June*; a Conquest one may easily suppose they might have made, without the Purchase of so dear a Victory; as they made those of *Mons* and *Namur*, Places of much more Importance. Now let us see whether the Victory of *Taniers* be, on any Account, inferior to that of *Landen*. That it exceeded it in Honour, *Arlus* himself allows, for he grants, *that, in all the Wars of immemorial Time, there never was a Battle fought, where mortal Men gained such immortal Honour*: And whether he will allow it or not, it is as certain, it was more valuable also in its Consequence, and the Advantage the Common Cause reaped from it; for *Mons* was evidently a greater Conquest in itself, and of more Use to us, when *Brabant* had no other Cover, than *Charleroy* could be to them; besides, *Charleroy* might have been

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been had without *Landen*, but *Mons* could not have been had without *Taniers*; and, though that Battle was not fought till the last of *August*, *Mons* had not been the only Fruits of it, if the Weather would have permitted the Allies to keep the Field longer; and the Success of the Siege was a plain Discovery that the Loss of the Enemy was not only as great as that of the Allies, but greater much. Why else should they venture a Battle to prevent the Siege, and yet not move a Step to disturb it, when it was formed? Is not this a Confession, that they, who thought themselves a Match for our Army before the Battle, did not think so after it, though so many Troops were employed and weakened in the Siege? Did they not spend the Time, the Allies were making the Siege, in Throwing up Lines, and Drawing all the Troops together that possibly they could? And was not the Duke of *Berwick* sent for Post from *Dauphine*, to join with *Mareschal Boufflers* in the Command of them? What, I would fain know, was all this for? Why such strong Lines, so vast an Army, so many Generals, so much Concern, in the Middle of *October*, when the Ways were impassable, and the Confederate Army was intirely ruined by their Victory? If their Loss was so unequal, as *Arlus* thinks it was, the *French* might have done what they would; they might not only have lain still, in great Tranquillity, without any Apprehension of being disturbed by the Allies, but might have advanced to them, given them Battle, and not only saved *Mons*, but ruined their Army, if they were so much superior to them,

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as their Writers would make the World believe. But, if we will allow the *French* to be better Judges of these Matters than our Paper-Politicians, the Difference, that was made by the Battle between the two Armies, was to their Disadvantage intirely; and the Impression, which the Loss of that Battle gave them, made them think themselves never safe; as if neither Weather, nor Intrenchments, nor Numbers, could effectually stop the Progress of this victorious Army, though weakened by three Sieges, and a Battle equal to three more. They shewed plainly, by all their Motions, they thought nothing impossible to such an Army that could beat 100,000 Men, the best Troops of *France*, through such Intrenchments, or, in the Language of the learned *Arlus*, through such unequal Fortresses.

This short Account, I am persuaded, will satisfy you, that the Battle of *Taniers* was more glorious in itself than that of *Landen*, more advantageous in its Consequences, more necessary to be fought, and that it turned the Scale more in Favour of the Conquerors. Why then must it be treated in so cold a Manner; nay, censured and condemned; while the *French* think *Landen* an eternal Honour to that Nation: And that they can never do too much Honour to him who gained it? Why cannot they, who love to imitate their dear Friends the *French* in their Government and Politicks, learn a little from them how to value a victorious General, and the Battles he has won for them? The *French* have made successful Wars for many Years, and can recount the

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the Names of many great in Arms ; and yet are always ready to do Justice to every new Name that brings, by his Fortune and Conduct, fresh Glory to their Nation : But we, God knows, have but one to boast of, that has, by his Success, done much Honour to his Country ; and him we are weary of. We were once so wonderfully grateful, that the happy Conduct of one Campaign was thought, or said at least, to be *Retrieving* the Honour of our Arms ; but now the Gaining of a Victory, one would think, were Receiving a Disgrace. How must *Boufflers*, and *Tallard*, and *Villeroy*, and *Vendosme*, and *Villars*, and the rest of the *French* Generals, who have been unfortunate this War, bless themselves, that they are not *Englishmen*, when they see the Man, who has beat them round, treated in this injurious Manner in his own Country, after such Services, as the rest of the World never think they can do him too much Honour for ? What Usage must this General have expected, had he lost the Battles he has won ; had he, in any single Instance, been unfortunate ; had but one ill Day succeeded the many glorious ones he has shined in ? If so severe an Account be demanded of *Taniers* won, what a Reckoning would there have been, had that Battle turned against him ? What can be more unjust than to impute, to a Design of prolonging the War, a Battle which was fought for no other End, but that the War might not be needlessly prolonged ? A Battle, without which the rest of that Campaign must have been spent without Action, and perhaps this last also ? For we could not have

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have carried our Arms into the *Artois*, while *Brabant* was so much exposed, as it was before the Taking of *Mons*; which would consequently have thrust the Work of this Year one Campaign at least backward. But if the Necessity, the Glory, and Advantage of this Victory, cannot keep off these Examiners, you may be well assured it will bear Examination: I have heard a good deal of it, and, by all I can find, there never was a Battle for which there was a more unanimous Concurrence of all Parties, than there was here. And the Delay, that happened, was not only to wait for a few Troops, but for Bread, which Men, who had been continually marching for seven Days together, were not very fit to fight without; besides, the Troops, they stayed for, were not a few, and there was a great Number of Officers with them; and it is most ridiculous to fancy Troops were not worth staying for, because they did not engage. At that Rate, all *Corps de Reserve* are very foolish and unnecessary Things. Might there not have been an Occasion for Troops, because there was not? Or is it no Encouragement to Men that do engage, to know there are others ready to sustain them upon Occasion? But it is endless to argue with the real or affected Ignorance of these Men: It is no great Compliment to our Generals to suppose they understand their Business; and we ought always to presume they concert their Matters well, unless we are sure of the Contrary; which we may easily believe neither these Writers nor their Masters are in the Case before us; since they were neither
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ther at the Consultations of our Generals themselves, nor pretend to any Correspondence with those that were. And, therefore, to insinuate, that they did not consider Things so maturely as they should have done, is extreme Impudence. Those *unequal Fortresses*, indeed, which the Enemy had thrown up, were, I have heard, more and greater than they were thought to be: Our Generals knew they were Entrenching; but neither believed so much Work could have been done in so little Time, nor that the Fears of the Enemy could make them think so much was necessary. But this served only to render the Victory more glorious: And, notwithstanding all their *Fortresses*, had the Orders which to prevent all Mistakes were given in Writing, been rightly executed, the Price of it had been much cheaper than it was. But there is no Need of entering farther into the Particulars of this Battle, to shew the Folly and Malice of this most profligate Libeller, and the rest of his Companions. The Event sufficiently proves it was no *Counter-Step* to our other Successes; and the whole Conduct of the Duke, to any reasonable Man, is a Demonstration, it could not be designed for one; since, had he a Mind to prolong the War, he might have done it very much at his Ease, without being at the least Pains for it, or giving the least Suspicion of designing it. For, I have already shewn you, he could have done nothing in *Flanders*, unless he had been joined by a Body of *Imperial* Troops; which, you may imagine, did not come without Sending for; nor could they have been had with Sending for,

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if the Duke had done nothing more towards it. These Troops could not have been got, had not the War been carried out of *Italy*; and that could not have been, had not Prince *Eugene* been supported as he was; had not 8000 *Prussians* been sent to reinforce him one Year, and 10,000 *Hessians*, besides a Body of *Palatines*, the next; and none of these, it is certain, had been sent but for the Duke of *M.* Nor even, after the *Italian* War was at an End, would the Emperor have consented that these Troops should come to *Flanders*, had not the Danger the *Empire* was under from the Neighbourhood of the King of *Sweden* been removed; which, there is Reason to think, the Duke's Journey to *Als Ranstat* contributed a great deal to.

Thus, you see, the very Possibility of Acting with Vigour in *Flanders* is owing to the Man who is now accused of a Design to prolong the War. But this is not all: When these Troops were in *Flanders*, had they in the Winter been suffered to return, they could never have come back again to any Purpose; so much Time would have been spent in going backwards and forwards, to and from Quarters, at so great a Distance; besides the Burthen they would have been to the Country they must march through. To make, therefore, these Troops useful, it was not enough to bring them to *Flanders*, but *Ways* and *Means* must be found to keep them there; which was, from the first, very hard to do, and every Day grows more and more difficult. Had the Duke now a Mind to prolong the War, What a fine Opportunity is here?

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here? It is but Sending these Troops Home, and nothing is so easy as to say, It is impossible to keep them there any longer: For the States of *Brabant* and *Flanders* do already say this: That these Troops are so much in Debt, that they are not able to subsist them in their Winter-Quarters. And this they have persisted in to that Degree, that nothing, but the most pressing Instances of the Duke, could prevail with them to make one Effort more, in a Point of so much Importance to the Common Cause. What now can be more senseless and ridiculous, what more unjust and villainous, than to accuse such a Man of prolonging the War unnecessarily? What have the poor People of *England* done, to be so grossly imposed upon? Or, What Treatment does such a detestable Writer deserve from them, that uses such base and vile Artifices to corrupt their Judgments, and incense them against those, who have done their Country the truest, the most faithful, and most important Services? Farewel Gratitude, and Justice, and Honesty, and all common Sense, if such Opinions can be entertained of a General, who, instead of prolonging the War, has precipitated it in a Manner that will hereafter seem incredible, and, by a strange Rapidity of Success and Victory, has out-done our most forward Hopes, and by all his Actions given the World the most convincing Proofs, that he never thinks he can put an End to it too soon.

If any Thing in the World be certain, I think this is, That the D. of *M*— has not prolonged the War in the Quality of *General*: Whether
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what they impute to him in his other Capacity, as *Plenipotentiary*, has any better Grounds for it, shall be the Business of another Letter. In the mean Time, I am persuaded, you will not be in Hastē to hear what I have to say upon that Subject; since nothing can be more improbable, than that a Man should endeavour to undo, in one Quality, all he has been doing, with so much Glory and Success, in another.

Such is the wretched Stuff, which is imposed on the Credulity of this poor Nation, by these infamous Libellers; who take Advantage of the Ferment we are in, to make us believe Contradictions. But what a mean Opinion must these Men have of our *English* Understandings, to think we may be thus used? Sure, by Degrees we shall recover ourselves, and let them see, we are not the Fools they take us for: Which we might soon do, if we would but reflect a little, and ask ourselves a very few Questions; such as these: What can be greater Folly, than to believe, in Things we do not understand, Men, who, we find, lie so grossly in those we do? What can Men, who, we know, do not want Cunning, mean by imposing on the Nation in such a Manner, as if all were Fools besides themselves? Can there be any other Reason for their not keeping within the Bounds of Probability at least, but that they have nothing to say, which has so much as the Appearance of Truth in it? What a sad Cause must it be, that stands in Need of such infamous Methods to support it? What can be a surer Proof of the Abilities and Goodness of the Persons they defame,

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than to be forced to have Recourse to such vile Artifices ? What can induce Men to act so base a Part, but some End they dare not own ? And what can that be, but either to give us up directly to *France* and the *Pretender*, or, at least, to gratify their own Ambition, at the Hazard of their Country ? And ought we not to be upon our Guard against Men, who, by the Means they use, so plainly shew they intend us no Good ? Can we think ourselves safe in Guides, who take so much Pains to blind those they would lead after them ? Shall we not suspect Men have some ill Design upon us, when they try to persuade us out of our Senses ; when they tell us, what ruins Credit will raise Money ; that, to check the Progress of our Arms, is the Way to Peace ; and, to make an ill War, the only Method to put a good End to it ? If we can but once be wise enough to put these Questions to ourselves, we shall soon be cured of our Fondness for these false Patriots ; who, while they pretend to be our Friends, are doing the Enemy the greatest Service that can be ; so much Service, that *France* must be very poor indeed, if they are not very well paid for it : For we may be very sure,

Hoc Iliacus velit, & magno mercentur Atrides,

as we may feel, perhaps, by the Effects, before we are much older. But Providence has, on so many Occasions, favoured us, that I am still, in Spite of all these strange Contrivances to ruin us,
or

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or rather to make us ruin ourselves, willing to hope for better Things.

You will forgive this tedious Letter, and impute the Length of it to the Desire I have, of giving you the fullest Satisfaction in the Points you have been pleased to ask my Opinion of, and to the Sincerity with which I am ever,

S I R,

Your most faithful

humble Servant.



THE
NEGOTIATIONS

For a *Treaty of Peace*, in 1709,
considered. In a *Third LETTER*
to a *Tory-Member*.

Part the First.

Iustitiæ prius mirer, Belline Laborum?

* * * Decemb. 22, 1710.

S I R,



SINCE you are pleased to say you have received Satisfaction, in what I have written of the *Management of the War*, I will now give you the fair and plain Account, you desire, of what has been doing these two Years, with Respect to Peace: And I will shew you how the Negotiations at the *Hague* and *Gertruydenberg* came both to fail of the Success that was expected from them. This is a Task which, I confess, at this Time I should wish to be excused from; since
you

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you own yourself convinced, from the D. of *M*'s Conduct in the War, that no particular Blame can lie upon him, with Relation to a Peace ; which was all I undertook to prove to you : But I am on so many Occasions made sensible, how very little this Affair is understood, that I cannot refuse telling you what I know of it. I every Day meet with something or other that convinces me, how much this Matter wants to be explained ; there being no Point that People are so uneasy at, or so much in the Dark about, and, consequently, in which they can be so easily imposed on by the false Insinuations of those, whose Interest it is to lay all the Load they can upon the late *M*. which they can do no Way more effectually, than by representing them engaged in a black Design to perpetuate the War, and the D. of *M*. at the Head of it. This is a Calumny they are concerned to fasten on him and his Friends, on a double Account ; not only to justify their strange hard Usage of them, but to remove from themselves the *Odium*, they have Reason to fear, may, in a little Time, lie heavily upon them, notwithstanding their present Majority. For, if the Fruits of so glorious a War should be lost, which they seem already apprehensive of, and we should be at last forced to submit to an ill Peace, they know true *Britons* will be apt to ask the Reason of it ; and therefore these Gentlemen are already fencing against the evil Day, by throwing, if they can, upon the old *M*— the Blame which must otherwise fall upon themselves : And, that it can fall no where else, you will be soon satisfied, when I

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have shewn you, that the ill Success of these Negotiations is owing to no wrong Conduct in the D. of M. or in any other Person concerned in them on the Part of the Allies; but that, instead of Reproach and Blame, all their Ministers, employed in this Affair, have deserved the greatest Commendation and Esteem for the Fairness, Unanimity, and Steadiness they have acted with, to the great Disappointment of the Enemy, who had Reason and Experience enough, on their Side, to flatter themselves, that, in an Alliance consisting of so many Parts, and of such different Interests, some might be tempted, by the large Offers made them, to desert the Common Cause; which would force the rest to comply on cheaper Terms. *France* has not, on this Occasion, been wanting to itself, in repeating and improving, if possible, its usual Artifices: What has rendered them unsuccessful, is an unusual Firmness on the Part of the Allies, who have bravely rejected all separate Views, and have persisted to act with one Spirit in Defence of so good a Cause.

I need not tell you what Advantage a single Power has over a Confederacy, in Treating of Peace, as well as in Making War; especially when *France* is that single Power. The *French* have shewn, for more than half a Century, that there is no Artifice so base, they will not employ to compass their Ends; no Promises so fair, no Asseverations so solemn, they will not make, to amuse and divide those they treat with. They are so far from keeping the Treaties they make, that they intend to break them, at the very Time they are

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are making them : They have never, in any one Treaty since that of *Munster*, troubled themselves with executing what had been promised in the most ample Words, after the Treaty was once signed : Nay, sometimes after they had induced the principal Allies to consent to a Treaty, they have, in the very first Congress for a General Peace, discovered their Insincerity. This, one who is so well acquainted as you are with the History of *Europe*, knows to be true of all the Treaties *France* has made for these last 50 Years. To go no farther back than the Treaty of *Reswick*, which is fresh in every body's Memory ; the *French* were not content not to execute great Part of what, by that Treaty, they were obliged to, and to execute other Parts of it in so scandalous a Manner, as defeated, in great Measure, the Intention of the Articles ; but, at the very first open Conference, they shewed what was to be expected from them : What they had promised, as the Foundation of the Treaty, both at the *Hague*, and at the Court of *Sweden*, who were to be the Mediators, they not only refused to comply with, but utterly disowned the having ever promised, because it was verbal only, and could not be shewn under their Hand. And, with Respect to *England* in particular, it is notorious, that, when my Lord *Portland* demanded the Removal of the *English* Court from *St. Germain*s, according to what *Mareschal Boufflers* had, in the Name of the King, agreed to, the King, when the *Ma-*reschal could not deny the Promise, denied his having given him any Authority to make it. But

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this is a Fault that will, I know, be easily forgiven the *French* King by some Men, for the Sake of a Correspondence, which could not so easily be carried on, if the *St. Germain's* Court were removed farther off. Fresher still in our Memories is the strange Part the *French* acted in the famous Treaty of Partition. They were not only soliciting at *Madrid* a Will, in Favour of *France*, at the Time the Treaty was making; but the very Treaty itself was the great Argument made Use of, to induce the *Spanish* Court to consent to such a Will, as the only Way to prevent the Partition they were so averse to. And, to compleat the Perfidiousness of *France* in this Affair, when the late King, upon Notice of what *Mareschal Harcourt* was doing at *Madrid*, sent a Minister express to *Versailles* to complain of it, the King of *France* not only denied his Knowing any Thing of the Matter, but, under his Hand, declared, in a Letter to the late King, That, though a Will should be made, in Favour of his Family, he would take no Advantage of it, but adhere to the Partition. This is the Prince we have been these two Years treating with; whose many Breaches of publick Faith, and base Artifices, *Europe* has suffered so much by, that no body, who is in Earnest for a good Peace, can wonder that the Allies think no Care and Circumspection too great not to be deceived any more; at least, not in so important a Point as the Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy; upon which the Safety and Liberty of us and our Allies, and, I may add, of all *Europe*, so much depend.

France

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France could never have so great a Temptation to deceive, as now ; since, unless they can deceive us, the Point, they have been labouring for above 60 Years, must be lost ; the Usurpation of the *Spanish* Monarchy being the grand Intrigue by which they have governed all their Motions since the Treaty of *Munster* : For it was with this View, as we see by the Memoirs, lately published, of that Treaty, that Cardinal *Mazarin* pressed the *Spanish* Match ; whose Words, in a Letter to the *French* Plenipotentiaries in *Jan.* 46, are so remarkable, that I cannot forbear transcribing them. *The Infanta*, says he, being married to his Majesty, we may pretend to the Succession of those Kingdoms, notwithstanding any Renunciation they may force him to make of it. *L'Infante etant marié à sa Majeste, nous pourrions aspirer à la Succession des Royaumes d'Espagne, quelque RENUNCIATION qu'on lui en fit faire.* Such is the Conscience of the Cardinal, such the Justice and Goodness of the Cause the King of *France* has spent so much Blood and Treasure to support. And shall we not suspect his Sincerity in this Cause, to which Faith, and Honour, and Conscience, and every Thing that is sacred, has been so long prostituted ? Can we be too cautious, how we trust the Promises of a Prince, who has shewn, on so many Occasions, that his Word is not to be depended on ? Or can we think any Security too much, in a Matter of so much Consequence ?

But, as *France* never had so great a Temptation to deceive, so it must be allowed, there is no Case in which the Allies can be so much concerned not
to

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to be deceived; the Union of *France* and *Spain* being the most fatal Thing that can possibly befall them; which, should it be at last submitted to, must, humanly speaking, in a few Years, ruin us and our Allies; though not so soon as it would have done, had the *French* been suffered to take quiet Possession of the *Spanish* Monarchy, and to to finish peaceably, by this vast Accession, the Height of Power they were at, when we began the War.

These Reflexions, on the general Conduct of the *French*, in all the Treaties they have made for these last fifty Years, will, I doubt not, convince you of the Necessity there was for the Allies to refuse Entering into any Conferences for a general Peace, till some Preliminaries were first settled, as a Foundation on which it should be built. But, before we come to consider the Preliminaries themselves, that you may the better judge of the Sincerity of *France*, I must observe to you, That they had previously, by their Emissaries, been feeling the Pulse of the *Dutch*; and, by the mighty Professions they made of the sincere Desires of the King to put an End to the War, they obtained some private Conferences the Beginning of the last Year; in which the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies* to King *Charles* was always supposed as the first Step towards a Treaty; and, for the rest, they hoped the *Dutch*, for their Part, would not be very difficult, since they were assured, that in other Points they might have their own Terms; and not only be secured by a good Barrier, in which the *French* were pleased to be
very

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very liberal, but likewise be made very easy in Relation to Trade. The *Dutch*, who, on this Occasion, shewed they understood the *French*, as well as the *French* thought they did them, appeared to be very well pleased to hear of Overtures of Peace, and expressed great Readiness to enter on a Treaty; but that they could do nothing without the Concurrence of their Allies, to whom they communicated what had passed; and, in order to a Treaty, gave Leave to the Ministers of *France* to come to *Holland*; first to Monsieur *Rouille*, and afterwards to the Marquis *de Torcy*; who both timed their Coming thither too remarkably not to be taken Notice of. The D. of M. made two Voyages that Spring to *England*; one in the Beginning of *March*, N. S. which was the soonest the Affairs of the War would admit of his Return, after the Campaign of *Lille*; the other about the End of *April*, when he went to communicate to the Queen what had passed, and to receive her Instructions. Now Monsieur *Rouille* came to *Holland*, almost as soon as the D— was gone from thence the first Time; and the Marquis *de Torcy* followed soon after the D—'s Leaving it the Second: By which it should seem, they thought they might make some Advantage of his Absence; and that it was for their Master's Service to have the *Dutch*, as much as they could, to themselves, as the likeliest Way to procure such a Peace as they had a Mind to. I cannot but observe, on this Occasion, that the Gentlemen, who are so angry with the D. of M. have the Happiness to have the *French* on their Side, in what relates

lates to Peace as well as War: For they too, it should seem, dislike the D—— for a *Plenipotentiary*, as much as they do for a *General*; much less can they endure the Thoughts, that he should be both, since they are sure to be obstructed by him in all their Designs, and can make neither War nor Peace to their Minds, as long as he is at the Head of them. These are the Sentiments of the *French*; and in them it is natural enough; but sure this must seem strange Language here in the Mouths of Men, who would be thought to be the implicit Admirers of her M——y's Royal Wisdom: It is but an odd Way, for a Party to express their great Deference to the Judgment of a Sovereign they tell you they adore, to ridicule the Choice she has made of a Plenipotentiary. Infallibility, I confess, is no Part of the Prerogative, though it seems to be growing fashionable of late, with these Men, to think, or rather say so; which makes it the more extraordinary for them to censure her M——y so freely as they do; which a very little Modesty would keep them from, in this Point at least, since all the Allies approve her Choice, and the Emperor has done the same Thing himself. These two great Princes think those the fittest Persons to treat a Peace, who have carried on the War with such Success; whose Conduct shews, that they have nothing so much at Heart, as the Interest and Glory of those they serve; and that they think nothing so truly an Honour to themselves, as to finish this great War by a safe and honourable Peace. These are the Views the D. of M. and Prince *Eugene* have acted

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ed with, and it is this has recommended them to the Favour of these Princes, who, from the Experience they had of them as *Generals*, chose them for their *Plenipotentiaries*. But the *French*, it seems, and their Friends here, are of another Mind; and, for this Reason, Monsieur *Rouille* and the *Marquis de Torcy* came neither of them into *Holland*, till the D. of *M.* had left it: Which was a plain Proof, that they had some Designs which they feared he would not come into; and that, in his and Prince *Eugene's* Absence, they hoped the States, by the great Inclination they expressed for Peace, might be drawn in to consent to some Points, which might either produce a Treaty to their Minds, or divide the Allies among themselves. This they hoped to do these two Ways; first, by gaining their Consent to a Partition, which they had never absolutely declared against; and next, by offering to them, in Consideration for that, a greater Barrier than they thought consistent with the Interest and Honour of the House of *Austria*. The first of these they knew the *Emperor* would not agree to, and neither the *Emperor* nor *England* to the latter. And, from this Occasion and Ground for Division, they promised themselves great Success: But, to their Surprise, the Firmness of the States was so great, that, as they would absolutely reject nothing, so neither would they agree to any Thing separately from the rest of the Allies, nor enter into any Treaty but jointly with the *Queen* and the *Emperor*; who, to shew their Readiness to hearken to any reasonable Terms of Peace, that would answer

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swer the End for which they went into the War, immediately upon Notice of the Proposals the *French* had made, sent to the *Hague* the D. of *M.* and Prince *Eugene*; the first was attended by my Lord *Townshend*, and the other was soon followed by Count *Zinzendorff*. And both these Ministers distinguished themselves in these Negotiations very much to the Satisfaction of all the rest; my Lord *Townshend*, particularly, has, by his good Sense, Integrity, Openness, and Affability, acquired the universal Esteem of the *States*, and all the rest of the Allies, beyond what could be hoped from so young a Minister, and to such a Degree, as will always be remembered to his Honour in that Country, however it may be denied or forgot in this. If, therefore, you do not meet with his and Count *Zinzendorff*'s Names in what follows, I must desire you would suppose of them, what I say of the two Generals, so far, at least, as to think they did not, in any Thing of Moment, ever differ from them.

But to proceed: Upon the Arrival of these Ministers at the *Hague*, Conferences were daily held with those of *France*, to settle Preliminary Articles. In the Treating of which, their Insincerity soon discovered itself, and great Reason was given to suspect, their chief Aim was to amuse and divide those they seemed so much in Haste to agree with: That, if they could not get such a Peace for themselves as they desired, the Campaign, at least, might be lost to the Allies. For it was very observable, that they easily agreed, and in a very little Time after these Conferences were begun,

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to all the Demands of *England* and *Holland* for themselves, though some Articles were contained in both, which the *French* never dreamt of being asked, when the first Overtures of Peace were made; such as the Demolishing of *Dunkirk*, and the Giving up many Towns which were no Part of the *Spanish Netherlands*, at the Time of King *Charles's* Death, nor had, in the Course of the War, been taken from them. When the first Steps to a Treaty were made, the *French* so little thought of these Demands, that the Quitting even *Lisle* and *Menin* was refused. But now these extraordinary Points, on the Part of *England* and *Holland*, were, by the Ministers of *France*, readily agreed to; and yet, at the same Time, great Difficulty was made with Respect to what was asked for the *Emperor* and the Duke of *Savoy*; though there was nothing in those Articles, but what was extremely reasonable, and necessary to secure the Dominions of those Princes from the Invasions they would otherwise be exposed to. There was an Interval of several Days, before the *French* Ministers would treat about these Articles; nor did they at last consent to them, but with a Reserve, and a Declaration, that this was beyond their Instructions; and that therefore they must suspend a full Assent, till the further Pleasure of the King was known. Now, what could be the Meaning of this Management, but to ensnare the Maritime Powers, if they could, and draw them into a base Design of Sacrificing the Interest of their Allies to their own? And what Use can any body imagine they would have made of this, but to en-

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gage the Allies in a Quarrel among themselves, and to take Advantage of their Differences, to break the Confederacy, and to entice some of the Members of it by large Offers to come into separate Measures with them? But, this Scheme failing, by the firm Adherence of the Maritime Powers to the rest of the Allies, there was one Article still remained to be adjusted, which, in Effect, included all the rest, and which would afford the *French* a specious Pretence for Breaking off the Treaty, whenever they had a Mind to it; and that was to settle Terms, on which a perpetual Suspension of Arms should be agreed. Nobody had ever doubted, but that there was such an Understanding between the *French* King and his Grandson, that the former could oblige the latter to resign the *Spanish* Monarchy, whenever he pleased; since he not only gave it King *Philip* at first, but had hitherto supported him in it. Accordingly every Thing about him was intirely *French*; and the Restitution of *Spain* at least, and the *Indies*, had, as I observed before, always been supposed: And, as this was the Point that occasioned the War, the first Thing settled in the Preliminaries was a perfect and intire Cession of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy to King *Charles* the Third, to be made within two Months from the first of *June* following: And, in Case the Duke of *Anjou* should make any Difficulty to comply with this, it is expressly covenanted in the fourth Article, That his most *Christian* Majesty and the Allies shall take, in Concert, the proper Measures to oblige him to it: What was to be understood

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stood by taking *proper Measures*, both Sides were content should not be then explained. Thus far looked well, and; one would have thought; the *French* meant in earnest, that the Duke of *Anjou* should immediately quit *Spain* to his Competitor : But all hitherto was Words only, and would signify nothing, unless the Execution of this essential Point was effectually provided for ; and there was but one Way of doing this, which was to make this *Cession* one of the Conditions of continuing the Suspension of Arms, agreed to in the 34th Article; to the Conclusion of a general Peace ; which was accordingly done in the 37th Article, which declares, That this Suspension shall continue till a general Peace, provided the King of *France* executes all that is promised, on his Part, in the foregoing Articles, and the whole *Spanish* Monarchy be restored, *rendue & cedée*, to King *Charles*, as is settled in these Articles. This Article touched Home, and discovered plainly; that all the *French* pretended to consent to, in this fundamental Point, was mere Grimace ; and that they meant nothing else but to draw the Allies into a separate Peace, and leave them to get *Spain* as they could. This was the most they meant, and, I am apt to think, for Reasons I will give you by and by, they did not mean so much ; but, whether they did or not, they did not want a specious Cover for their Opposition to this Article ; they made great Professions of the Sincerity of their King's Intentions ; that he would punctually execute all that depended upon him ; and that he would endeavour to

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persuade his Grandson to a Compliance ; but that to force him to it, and that within so short a Term, was not in his Power ; that it would, therefore, be impossible for the King to consent to this Article ; and to consent to the rest of the Preliminaries, unless an absolute Suspension of Arms were agreed to, would be to leave himself at the Mercy of the Allies, and put himself into a much worse State than before ; and these Pretences, you may be sure, wanted no Art to set them off. But to all this it was easy to answer, That they were fully persuaded, that, if the King were really in Earnest in this Matter, he might certainly recall his Grandson without any Difficulty ; and provided he acted the fair Part, and did all he could towards it, according to the 4th Article, he might depend upon it, the Allies would take no Advantage of any Words in the 37th, to begin the War again upon him, when he had faithfully performed the other Parts of it, and surrendered the Places agreed to be delivered up to them in the 35th : That, supposing what they objected to this Article were not a pretended but a real Difficulty, which could hardly be believed, the Consequence then would be, that the Allies must either trust to the Sincerity of *France*, or *France* to that of the Allies. As the King, supposing it not in his Power to oblige the Duke of *Anjou* to resign, would, by executing the rest of the Treaty, be at the Mercy of the Allies ; so, on the other Hand, if the Allies made a Peace with the King, without this Article, they should be at his Mercy for the Recovery of the

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Spanish Monarchy, which was the great Point for which they entered into the War ; but which they could never hope to gain, if he did not absolutely abandon his Grandson ; which they could by no Means depend on, while they had nothing but his bare Word for it. Now, in this Case, which is more reasonable, for *France* to trust the Allies, or the Allies *France* ? This cannot be a very hard Question, since *France* has been guilty of the Breach of Publick Faith, on so many Occasions, that it is hard to find an Instance to the Contrary. This very War will make two notorious Instances of this remembered to all Ages ; the scandalous Violation of the Partition-Treaty almost as soon as made ; and the Usurpation of the *Spanish* Monarchy, notwithstanding the most solemn and repeated Renunciations that had been made of it. It would be endless to enter into a Detail of all the Complaints of this Kind against *France*, since the *Pyrenean* Treaty. And, therefore, it cannot be reasonable for the Allies to trust those, by whom they have so often been deceived : But it is not so with them, they have never been guilty of the Breach of Publick Faith in their Transactions with *France*, in any flagrant Case, at least, I know of none : But I will venture to add farther, that they neither would, nor, if they would, can they act a false Part in such a Case as this. They *would* not, they do not think it for their Interest to continue or renew a War unnecessarily ; they are sufficiently weary, the Burthen of the War has laid so heavy upon them, that they would be glad to have a little Respite, and to be at Lei-

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sure to cultivate the Arts of Peace, and enjoy, as fast as they can, some Fruits of it. Thus they always have done ; they have hardly had Patience to keep up their Armies till a Peace was signed : And it is this Humour of the Allies has made the *French* have so little Regard to execute their Treaties with them ; besides, it must be owned there is a great Probity, Plainness, and Honesty both in the *Dutch* and *Germans* ; which appear in all the Affairs of common Life, and have been very observable in their Dealings with the *French* all this War ; in which the Allies, notwithstanding the many Provocations they have received, have in no Instance retaliated, when they could not do it without Breach of Faith. The War in *Flanders* affords many Instances of this ; that they have always punctually performed whatever Articles they have signed ; and not made Reprisals, where even honest Men have thought they might have done it, without any Violation of Justice. But the greatest Instance, and the only one I shall name, is their exact Performance of the Treaty of the Evacuation of the *Milanese* ; when the *French* had just Reason to fear their Troops would have been detained against the Letter of the Articles, in Revenge of the Injustice and Insolence with which they had disarmed and seized a considerable Body of the Duke of *Savoy's* Troops, at the very Time he was in Alliance with them. I need say nothing of our own Country, that *France* could have no Reason to fear any Perfidiousness from Home. The Character of her Majesty is too well known to give the *French* Grounds for
any

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any such Suspicion ; and, had we a Prince of less Renown on the Throne, *France* would have little to fear from him, unless he were supported by his People ; which no Sovereign of *England* has ever been, when they have thought the War he made unjust. But it is not enough to say the Allies would not be false, nor act against the Intentions of a publick Treaty, I think, I may affirm they cannot be so. A single Potentate is Master of his own Will, and can act without Controul ; but a Confederacy can do nothing without a Concurrency of all Parts ; which, in so unjust a Cause as this, there would be no Reason to apprehend. When all the most just and necessary Causes of a War concur, it is very hard to keep a Confederacy long together ; much less can it be imagined it should be kept up to oppress a Prince, who has done all he can to satisfy the Demands of all Parties. Either Honesty or Interest will certainly disarm some of them. No Ally, when he has gained all he can hope for by the War, will be willing to continue the Expence of it, in Compliment to any of the rest, especially when the Cause is manifestly unjust : No, were it ever so just, this is hardly to be hoped for. When a Confederacy is very successful, Jealousies naturally arise among themselves ; and they are more concerned, that one Part should not be too great Gainers, and have too much to their Share, than that any other should not have enough. Of which we see an Instance, though a very foolish one, among ourselves ; our present Masters of Politicks, to render the very Successes of the War

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odious, alarm us with new Fears, which nobody before ever thought of ; and tell us, The *Dutch* will have, by this Treaty, a better Country than their own. And, if a certain Correspondence, by Way of *Calais*, has been continued, *France* might be assured, that no Advantage would be taken of the 37th Article, though *Spain* was not relinquish'd in the Time stipulated ; and that therefore they might safely sign the Preliminaries, for that the War could not be renewed, since they might depend on it, that *England* would never consent to use, in so barbarous a Manner, a Prince whom so great a Party among them have always had so much Respect for : And without *England* they know the rest of the Allies could do nothing.

But whether it was more reasonable for the Allies to trust *France*, or *France* the Allies, was not left, at this Time, to general Reflexions. What was doing, at this very Juncture in *Spain*, gave the Allies abundant Cause to suspect the Sincerity of *France*, that they meant nothing less than the Restitution of that Monarchy. Nobody that looks into the Accounts of that Time, and sees how thick Expresses went one upon another between *France* and *Spain*, can doubt, whether the King and his Grandson did not perfectly well agree : And not only the News of that Time, but the Facts themselves shew, that the King gave him all possible Assurances that he would not abandon him, though it was necessary for his Affairs to promise it. This, I say, is very plain from what was at that Time doing in *Spain* ; for, though the Marquis *de Torcy* told the Allies, He did not know
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but King *Philip* might be at *Paris* before him, there was not the least Sign of any Intention to relinquish *Spain*; but, on the Contrary, there were, on the Part of the Duke of *Anjou*, all the Appearances that could be of a Prince that thought of nothing less. For the War was pressed with the utmost Vigour in all Parts; *Alicant* was besieged at a vast Expence, and other Places in *Valencia* were reduced with all Diligence; Preparations were made for the Siege of *Gironne*, and the Army was put into the best Condition it could be, to invade *Catalonia*; and, at the same Time, the Marquis de *Bay* advanced close to the *Portuguese* in *Estremadura*, with a Design to give them Battle; in which, against the Opinion of my Lord *G.* they unhappily prevented him. This did not look like a Design to quit *Spain* to King *Charles*; but, on the Contrary, shewed a Resolution to drive him out of it, if possible. But what gave the Allies a greater Jealousy than all this was, the Causing the Prince of *Asturias* to be acknowledged Presumptive Heir of *Spain* by all the States of the Kingdom; which Ceremony was performed with the greatest Magnificence, the 7th of *April*, that is, about a Month after *M. Rouille* had been in *Holland*; which Proceeding, you may remember, every body was then alarmed at; such a Step being plainly taken for no other End but to lay in Matter for a new War; or rather, it was a Declaration, That an End could not be put to this, as long as the Restitution of *Spain* was made one Condition of a Peace. The *French* Ministers had but one Reply to this: That their Master was not

answerable for what the Duke of *Anjou* had done ; but that, for his own Part, he was sincere, and would do whatever depended upon him ; and that therefore, if a Peace was not concluded, it could not lie at his Door. The Allies, though they could not think what was urged had any Truth in it ; yet, to shew how far they were from designing to impose upon the King impossible Conditions, thought of an Expedient which could not be refused, without discovering, that *France* meant nothing by this Treaty, but to make Peace for themselves, and to leave the Allies involved in a War with *Spain*. If it was not in the King's Power to oblige his Grandson to retire out of *Spain*, they declared they would be content with his doing what evidently was in his Power ; which was to deliver up to them such Places in the *Spanish* Dominions, as were garrisoned by his own Troops. But this Expedient was rejected ; and the Marquis *de Torcy* thinking, I suppose, that the Allies, insisting upon the Duke of *Anjou's* being recalled, was a more specious Handle to break off the Treaty upon, than the Refusal of the Expedient they proposed instead of it, he agreed at last to let the 37th Article stand as it is now worded ; which is perfectly agreeable to the main Design of the Treaty, and to the Tenor of the other Articles ; but with a Reserve, as before, to know the King's Pleasure, without whose further Instructions he could not sign. And thus the Conferences, held to settle these Preliminaries, ended the 28th of *May*, and were the same Day signed by the Allies. The Marquis *de Torcy* immediately

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ly set out for *Versailles*, leaving Monsieur *Rouille* behind, to whom he promised to return the King's Answer by the 4th of *June* at farthest; which, from the Necessity of the King's Affairs, the Point the Treaty was carried to, the Marquis's Rank and Character, and personal Merit, and the great Protestations he made of his Master's Sincerity, was hoped would be favourable: But, most of all, from his Desire to the Allies at Parting, that they would hasten the Ratifications of these Articles, with all the Dispatch they could.

These Hopes the Marquis left with the Allies, and the near Prospect of a good Peace, filled all the People with a Joy that is not to be expressed. They waited, with great Impatience, for the 4th of *June*; it was the next Day before the Answer came, upon the Receipt of which, Monsieur *Rouille* acquainted the Allies, that the King could not agree to these Preliminaries: The Articles, excepted against, were the same that the Marquis had before disputed, those relating to the *Emperor* and the Duke of *Savoy*, and the 37th. The Allies were not a little surpris'd at this Answer, and more at the haughty Air with which Monsieur *Rouille*, in a long Conference on this Subject, pressed his Objections; a Behaviour very different from what either he or the Marquis had shewn before; which, there being no visible Cause for, they thought it was in great Measure *Gasconade*; that it meant nothing else but to make what Advantage he could of the Inclinations the Allies had, without Disguise, shewn to Peace; and that he would at last recede from his Pretensions, when he
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saw they would not ; and that, in all Events, they could not, on their Part, give up Articles so reasonable in themselves, and which they had so unanimously agreed to, as absolutely necessary to make a good and lasting Peace. And, what they suspected, did, in good Measure, prove to be the Case ; at least it seemed so ; for, after having insisted with so much Stiffness upon the Objections he had, in the King's Name, made, when he perceived it had no Effect on the Allies, his Departure being fixed for the 9th, the 7th in the Evening, or early next Morning, he waited on the Pensioner ; and, as an Instance of his great Sincerity, and Concern that the Treaty might not be broke off, communicated to him his Instructions, by which it appeared that he was empowered to recede from all the other Points he had before insisted on, excepting that of the 37th Article ; which seems to have been a Master Piece of *French* Artifice : For, if the Treaty must be broke, it is as effectually done by insisting upon one Article, as upon Twenty ; and, which ever Part the Allies took, the *French* would find their Account ; for, if they could be persuaded to give up that, which, in all Appearance, was but one Article, but, in Effect, was the Substance of all, or, at least, of the most important ones, then it was in the Power of the *French* to make Peace, without obliging the Duke of *Anjou* to quit *Spain* ; and, if the Allies could not be brought to this, the Point they should break upon was so specious, that the *French* Ministers hoped for a double good Effect from it : That it would incense the Populace in these Provinces

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vinces against their Ministers, and set the King right in the Affections of his People, which, through the continued Misfortunes of the War, he began to lose : And, in this last Point, they succeeded perfectly well ; there were no Efforts the *French* were not willing to make, to support a Prince, who seemed to prefer their Safety to his own Glory, and to think no Sacrifice too great to procure his People a good Peace ; but their other Point they were much mistaken in ; and the Breaking of the Treaty had no other Effect upon the Subjects of the *States*, though it be a popular Government, than to fill them with the utmost Indignation against the *French*, and loud Resentments of their constant Injustice and Perfidiousness.

But to return to Monsieur *Rouille* ; when he had shewn his Instructions to the Pensioner, which discovered so much more than he would own before, he took his Leave of him without proposing any Accommodation or Expedient in Lieu of this important Article ; and, whether the Truth were all out, and there were not some secret Instructions still behind, was more than any body could tell : And, though this was his Language the 8th in the Morning, they did not know but he might alter it before Night, when he found the Allies were not to be moved, or that he might make a longer Stay ; he and the Marquis *de Torcy* both, having often fixed Days for their Departure, but, when the Time came, thought fit to change their Minds. And what made this the more probable was, that Monsieur *Petkum*, who had all along, without Authority or Character, gone between the Ministers

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Ministers of the Allies and *France*, did that Morning propose to some of the Allies, that *France* should give them two or three Towns as an Equivalent for the 37th Article, to be kept by them till *Spain* should be quitted to King *Charles*. But, since Monsieur *Petkum* made this Motion as of his own Head, without any Commission from Monsieur *Rouille*, who lodged with him, and the Proposal was indeterminate, without either the Names or fixed Number of the Towns that should be given, the Allies could not take any Notice of it. Besides, had the Offer been never so distinct, and made with full Authority, to give two or three cautionary Towns, was to evade, and not to satisfy the Intention of the Article; and was, in Effect, nothing else, but to offer a little better Barrier to the *Dutch*, in Exchange for *Spain* and the *Indies*. In the mean Time, Monsieur *Rouille* spent the Day in Making Visits of Leave, as designing to set out in Earnest for *Versailles* next Morning. When Night was come, and there was no Room to hope for any farther Step being made on his Part, here the Man, who is accused of Prolonging the War, interposed, and shewed how little he deserves such a Censure. The D. of *M.* sent to the Pensioner, and the other Ministers, to desire a Meeting, to try once more if any Thing could be done to save the Treaty: But, this Meeting being disappointed, there was an extraordinary Congress of all the Ministers next Morning; in which the Deputies of the *States* having acquainted them of what had passed, and assured them of their Resolution to push the War with the utmost Vigour,

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Vigour, till *France* was forced to consent to a good Peace, Count *Zinzendorff* thanked the *States*, in the Name of the *Emperor* and King *Charles*, for the Firmness they had shewn on this Occasion : The D. of *M.* did the same on the Part of the *Queen* ; which was followed, with like Expressions of Satisfaction, by all the other Ministers that were present, with very particular Marks of Esteem to the *Pensioner*, whom I have often thought the G—— of the *States*, for his wise and prudent Conduct through the whole Negotiation. I need not say more, to let you know that he is a plain, grave, wise Man, of great Judgment and Abilities, quiet, unpopular, and uncorrupt.

All Thoughts of Peace being now, in Appearance, over, and Monsieur *Rouille* gone, the D. of *M.* who was extremely mortified at this Change of Things, resolved to follow in the Afternoon, and would not give over all Hopes of having still one Interview more with him ; to which End he got to *Brussels*, as soon almost as Monsieur *Rouille*, and sent Word before to Prince *Eugene* ; (who had been there some Days, to give the necessary Orders for Assembling the Army) but Monsieur *Rouille* was gone, before either the D— or Prince could see him : And nothing now was left to the Generals, but to try to do by the Sword, what they could not do by Treaty ; and to make their Way to Peace by a good Campaign.

This, I can assure you, from what I have observed myself in the Progress of this Affair, and the most exact Information I could get from others, is a plain and true Account of these Negotiations

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gotiations thus far; in which one sees, on the Part of *France*, violent Suspicions of Insincerity through the whole Treaty; working its Way by all the Methods of Address and Artifice, which they are so great Masters of: But, in the Allies, Plainness, Unanimity, and an unshaken Constancy; every Thing is open and above-board, without any Divisions in their Conferences with the *French*, or any violent Heats among themselves; even in the great Point of the Barrier, which the *French* had Hopes might make a Breach between the *Dutch* and *Imperial* Ministers: But, by the Prudence of the contending Parties themselves, and the Fairness and Temper with which the D. of M. calmly interposed, this difficult Point was amicably adjusted, and the Disputes upon it produced no Effects that the *French* could take any Advantage of. I believe you have not forgot, I am sure I have not, how People here in *England* reasoned upon these Conferences. While the Preliminaries were like to take Effect, some Men were by no Means satisfied; they thought Care enough was not taken of *England*; which should make us hope, that they will, some Time or other, obtain better Terms for us: And that, in the next Treaty, more Regard will be had to the Trading Interest of *Great Britain*, than the late M— have shewn. And yet no sooner were the Preliminaries rejected, but the Men, who thought but just before there was too little in them, would have persuaded us, there was then a great deal too much, and that it was unreasonable to insist on such high Demands; especially to oblige a great King, whom they have
always

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always admired, to dethrone his Grandson ; though all such invidious Expressions were purposely avoided in the Articles ; and no body, as I have before observed, doubted, but the King, if he were in Earnest disposed to satisfy the Allies, could do it without Difficulty. Such is the Dexterity of these Men in finding Faults, while, to their great Discontent, they are Spectators only : We shall see, whether they are as dextrous in avoiding them, when they tread the Stage themselves. They are sure to have something to oppose, let a M. or General, they do not like, take which Part he will of a Contradiction, and that upon any Subject whatsoever, whether Peace or War ; if he advises Acting offensively in any Part, he is told, That is wrong : Well, let the same M. upon Alteration of Circumstances, or farther Experience, advise a defensive War in the same Place, That is wrong too. If he is against Fighting, it is because it would be a Step to Peace ; if he is for it, he intended a *Counter-Step*. In the same Manner they reason in what concerns Peace : If a M. advises Peace, to be sure he is well paid for it ; if he advises against it, it is to perpetuate the War ; if, to facilitate a Treaty, he is willing to give up some Part of the *Spanish* Monarchy, he shall be accused of Betraying us to *France* : If, according to his Instructions, he insists upon the Whole, it is plain he aims at nothing, by such high Terms, but to render all Treaties impossible. If he acts neither one or other of these Parts by himself, but in Conjunction with the rest of the Allies, and is rather willing to hear their Opinions, than forward

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to give his own; and is so far from assuming to himself a Part that may particularly distinguish him, that he does not so much lead the rest, as he is led by them; yet a Fault must be found where there is none, and that must be all laid on him; which, were it a Fault, he has perhaps the least Share in. One While we are told, That the War is continued to please the *Dutch*; another, that we are to be ruined to compliment the Emperor, and that *England* is the *Dupe* of the War; and, at other Times, that no Side can find their Account in the War, which yet all have agreed to continue, but the General and five or six of his Faction: All these Inconsistencies can go down with the Party, almost at the same Time; nay, in the same Breath: But not a Word to be heard of the Insincerity or Perfidiousness of *France*. Thus the D. of M. is with them a *Dutch-Man*, an *Imperialist*, a *French-Man*, or any Thing else but what he ever was, and ever will be, in Spite of all their Provocations, a true *Englistman*; which I am afraid is one main Cause they are so angry with him; he had too great a Hand in the Revolution to be forgiven; and, if his Successes be not stopped, he will put it out of some Men's Power to defeat the Protestant Succession.

But to set this Matter in a full Light, and let you see how very ridiculous and absurd all these Clamours, are, with Respect either to the D. of M. in particular, or to the Conduct of the Allies in general, with Relation to these Preliminary Articles; I will shew you, First, That, if to insist on the 37th Articles was a Fault, the D. of M. is
not

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not to be blamed for it: And, Secondly, That to insist on that Article was in itself right, and necessary in Order to a good Peace.

First, I say, That, if to insist on the 37th Article was a Fault, the D. of M. is not to be blamed for it. First, because, if he did insist, it was what he was obliged to; he had no Authority to do otherwise. All the World knows, that both Houses of Parliament did, the Beginning of that Year (1709) address the Queen, that no Peace should be made with *France*, without an intire Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy: And her Majesty was pleased to express herself very well pleased with their Address, and that she was perfectly of the same Opinion. This Address being thus approved, no Minister had any Power or Authority to conclude a Treaty upon other Terms, without her Majesty's Command; nor could such a Command be expected from her, without Advice of her Council: And I believe a Council will not easily be found, that will advise against the joint Opinion of both Houses of Parliament. If, therefore, the 37th Article was insisted on, the D. is not to be blamed; he did but his Duty, and could not justify his Doing otherwise; which, if he had, would as certainly have been made a Crime and Misdemeanor, as his not Doing it is now made a Matter of Complaint against him. There is no Room for any Objection here, unless it could be pretended, that this Address was of his Procuring; the Contrary to which is as well known as the Address itself. But, though it is plain that the D. of M. had no Hand in Making this Ad-

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dress, it is as plain, that, when it was made, he was bound by it ; and, since that required the Restitution of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy, he was obliged to insist upon it. So the 37th Article was unanimously adhered to as it is, by all the Ministers ; and their Doing so, I shall now shew you, was very right in itself, and necessary in Order to a good Peace.

First, it is right in itself, that is, just and reasonable, not hard, or insolent, or inhuman, as these Advocates of *France* would have it thought. For what is the Point in Dispute, but to restore to an injured Person what has been unjustly taken from him ? Has not the injured Party, by the fundamental Laws of Justice, a Right to this ? Or is not the Party, who does the Injury, obliged to Restitution, where it is possible ? And is not this the Case of the *Spanish* Monarchy ? I despair of ever proving any Usurpation unjust, if this is not ; but, if it be unjust, does it alter the Case, because the King of *France* has not usurped it for himself, but for his Grandson ? Am I the less obliged to restore what I have unjustly seized, because I have given it to a third Person, provided it be in my Power ? Does not the Duke of *Anjou* know, as well as his Grandfather, that it is a violent Usurpation ? Can he of Right keep what the other had no Right to give ? Is it not kept plainly for the Use and Benefit of the Giver ? Has not the Giver Power to take it from him ? Is it not plain, that his Grandson has not kept it thus long, but by the Support he receives from him ; And, if it be thus manifestly unjust, and the Usurper has it in

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in his Power to make Restitution, is it ill Manners to demand it ? Is the *Spanish* Monarchy such a Trifle, as not to be worth insisting on ? Shall we compliment the King of *France* or his Grandson, with Giving up what so many Princes and States have spent so much Blood and Treasure to regain ? Can that now be thought consistent with the Safety and Commerce of *Great Britain*, with the Interest and Welfare of our Allies, or with the Liberty of *Europe*, which we ventured to begin a War for, under the most unpromising Appearances of ever seeing a good End of it ? But it was Nonsense not to risque all, when all was at Stake ; there was no Room left, but to appeal to Heaven, and take Arms ; which gave us a Chance for escaping the Ruin which was otherwise inevitable. This is the Truth of the Matter, this the Point in Dispute. What then do the People mean by all their senseless Clamour, of the Hardship and Barbarity of the Allies, in obliging the King of *France* to recall his Grandson ? They, who think the Causes of this War such indifferent Things as not to be worth insisting on any longer, though we have so long struggled for them, that we have at last got fast Hold ; these Men, I fear, will, in a little Time, think the same of the Causes of the Revolution too ; nay, they already tell us so ; they are grown so insensible to the Fears they were once in, that they begin to think Popery and Arbitrary Power innocent harmless Things ; they now plainly insinuate, that there was no Danger of the Government in Church and State being overturned, and that therefore the

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Revolution was not necessary ; and, in Vertue of these foolish Sentiments, when the Revolution is upon the Point of being unalterably fixed, they truly are grown weary ; and, after twenty Years Labour, do not think it worth a little more Pains to finish the Work, and put an effectual Stop to the Return of those Evils they were once, as well as their Neighbours, so heartily frightened with. And, it is no Wonder, if Men, who have contracted such a stupid Indolence, and are so indifferent for the Civil and Religious Rights of their own Country, cannot see what Sense there is in insisting upon the Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy ; and are supinely willing to think (if Nonsense can be called Thinking) that the Demand of the Allies is either unjust, or, at best, very rude and unmannerly.

But farther : This Demand of theirs is not only right in itself, but necessary in order to a good Peace ; and the best Way, to set this in a clear Light, is to consider what would have been the Consequence, supposing the Allies had not insisted on it. Now, to shew you what this would have been, I will suppose, for the Present, that the *French* were in Earnest ; and, that if this Article had been receded from, they would have signed the rest. Which Way, now, I would ask, should we have proposed to get *Spain* ? Can we do it, unless the King of *France* intirely abandons his Grandson ? No, certainly ; but he has promised he will : But is his bare Word a Security that may be depended upon ? By no Means. What then ? Why, he gives you up so many
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great Towns, which he would not do, if he did not intend to leave his Grandson to himself. Why so? How can the Giving up these Towns to the Allies be thought any Security? Is it any more than Giving the Allies a Barrier, which Barrier they would have insisted on, whatever became of *Spain*? How now comes that to be a Security, that the King of *France* would abandon his Grandson, which he must, nevertheless, have complied with, though he had abandoned him? Is it the same Thing to part with these Towns, and keep *Spain*, as to part with them and *Spain* too? If not, then his Agreeing to give up one is no Proof he intends to part with the other. Ay, but when the Allies have these Towns, they will force him to it. That I deny: Why so, say they? The Towns are to be delivered in two Months; that is, by the Middle of *August*; and then the Allies will have Time enough to enter *France*, if he sends any Succour to his Grandson. But First, The Surrender that is to be made in two Months is only of those Towns that are to make the Barrier for the *Netherlands*; those, that are to be restored to the *Emperor* and *Empire*, are not to be evacuated till the Exchange of their Ratifications, which is a tedious Work: Besides, though it be stipulated, that the Towns in the *Netherlands*, &c. shall be given up in two Months, I believe, nobody wants to be told, that Things are seldom so punctually executed, as to be performed nicely within the Time agreed. But I will suppose, for once, these Articles had been effectually complied with within the Time, and that the Allies consequently

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would have been at Liberty to invade *France*, if they had openly sent any considerable Succours to *Spain*; but what then? Could not they have sent Money and Jewels to the Duke of *Anjou*, without any Danger of Discovery? Or, Would they not have Pretence enough for Denying it? And would the Allies invade *France*, upon a bare Suspicion of sending such an Assistance to *Spain*? And for Men, though a Body of Troops could not have been sent thither, without being known, might not what Number they pleased of the *French* Troops, that were in *Spain*, have staid there, under a Notion of Desertion, or have been detained by the Duke of *Anjou*'s Order, upon some blind Pretence or other; a Trick the Grandfather has practised often enough, for the Grandson to learn it from him? Well, but suppose *France* had neither openly, nor under-hand, given the Duke of *Anjou* any Assistance for that Summer (not that I can by any Means grant it) how long would that have held? Or, What Use would the Allies have made of it? Could the Troops, we had then in *Spain*, have over-run the Kingdom without farther Help, or have driven out the Duke of *Anjou* in one Campaign? That, I presume, will not, by any body, be pretended. Or, Could a sufficient Reinforcement have been sent Time enough to them, either from *Italy* or *England*, to do any great Matters that Year? That, I suppose, will be pretended as little, by those that consider it was *June* when these Preliminaries were finished. It is plain then, *Spain* could not have been gained that Year, unless the Duke of *Anjou* had consent-

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ed to relinquish it : Let us then, in the next Place, suppose the Summer spent, and the Armies gone out of the Field, and see what we are to expect then. A Peace is made with *France*, the Allies have got, each of them, their respective Shares, and have nothing more to hope for ; they renew, perhaps, the Grand Alliance, with great Expressions of mutual Zeal ; the *Emperor* at least, and the Maritime Powers ; but some of the lesser Princes might possibly shew themselves disgusted, and think they have been neglected : For, as the Preliminaries are now settled, it is certain more than one of them are not satisfied. Suppose the the King of *Prussia*, or Duke of *Savoy*, for Example, had thought due Care had not been taken of them, it is plain, in that Case, their Alliance is no longer to be depended on ; and either of these, falling off, would very much weaken the Confederacy ; especially the last, whom the *French* would be very glad to draw into their Interests. But suppose none of the Allies have any of these Resentments, or at least stifle them, and all consent to renew the Grand Alliance ; What becomes of the Armies, upon leaving the Field ? Is it not certain, that they will, on all Sides, dismiss great Part of their Forces ? Will not the Maritime Powers send Home the Foreign Troops in their Pay, except such as *Holland* keeps for the Defence of their own Frontier ? Shall we hear of any more Armies upon the *Rhine*, or in *Savoy*, when they have made Peace, when the Articles of the Treaty have been all executed, and there is no more any Enemy to molest them ; no Cause

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of Complaint, or Pretence for a new Campaign left? I think nothing can be surer, than that this would have been the Case; the Allies would have thought no more of War in the Places that have been hitherto the Seats of it, nor have made any Preparations for taking the Field another Year. All Sides would have made what Haste they could to have lessened the Burthen, which, during the War, they had been oppressed with. *Holland* particularly would have had full Work to take Care of their new Frontier, to provide so many Towns with sufficient Garrisons and Magazines, and settle what Foot the several Parts of their new Acquisitions should be put upon, with Respect to War, Trade, and Subsidies; and, besides the great Expence this would, for the Present, put them to, they would be at a very great Charge to pay the Arrears due to the Foreign Troops, without which they could not be dismissed. Add to this the extraordinary Allowance, which, upon their Dismissing, is to be made to carry them Home: This would put the States under a Necessity of Retrenching, as much as possible, the Expences of the next Year: And this last Article *England* would be proportionably affected with. Now I I would be glad to know, what should hinder the King of *France*, from the Minute the Allies dismiss their Troops, to give what Assistance he will to *Spain*, provided it be not done too grossly, but gradually, by insensible Steps; and by those many Ways of Artifice, which the *French* are Masters of? If they make a Peace, they may disband 60 or 80,000 Men, or more: And what shall hinder these
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these Men from going into *Spain* to seek their Bread? What shall hinder the King of *France* from giving secret Orders for this; and, when it is complained of, from positively denying, and perhaps, seemingly forbidding it? And may not the Duke of *Anjou*, by this Means, against the next Spring, have a greater Army than the Allies can bring against him? And how then are we to get *Spain*? Will the Allies raise new Armies, and make a new War upon *France* in *Flanders*, upon the *Rhine*, and in *Savoy*, because some Men have insensibly stole out of *France* into *Spain*, against the express Order of the King; which, you are sure, will be pretended? You do not know the Sweets of Peace, or how unwillingly People are, who have once laid down their Arms, to take them up again: If you think the Allies could be brought to this, or that any Armies would take the Field against *France*, after a Peace was once made; What then is to be hoped for? Why, I think nothing more than this; that the *Dutch* and the *Emperor* would contribute for a little While, perhaps for one Campaign, some Money and Troops to act in Conjunction with *England* against *Spain*; in which no great Success can be expected, considering the numerous Army, I have shewn you, the Duke of *Anjou* might and would have. Now if this, upon the Trial of one Campaign, were found to be the Case, I am afraid *Holland* would not be very willing to continue the Prosecution of so expensive a War; and the whole Weight of it another Year would lie upon *England*, except a very little that might be expected from the Emperor;

peror; and what could this end in, but in the Ruin of *England*, and the Loss of *Spain*? For the most, that could be expected from this War, would be, that the Duke of *Anjou* would offer a Partition, such as I have mentioned in my first Letter, but with no Option in the Case; he would certainly keep *Spain* and the *Indies*, and give the other Part to his Competitor; and, if that be accepted, What becomes of *England*, which is so much interested in the Recovery of *Spain*? And, if it be not accepted, What shall hinder the *French* King from assisting his Grandson, after one Year, more openly; and taking upon him to mediate a Peace; that is, to force such an one as he pleases upon us? For how can we help ourselves? Shall we be in a Condition to quarrel with him, when we have been exhausted two Years more with such an expensive War, while he has been enjoying all the Advantages of Peace, to repair the Breaches the War had made in his Affairs; to restore Commerce, retrieve the publick Credit, remedy the ill State of his Finances, look into the Condition of his Fleet, and put himself into the best Posture he can for a new War, if the Support of the Duke of *Anjou* makes it necessary? No, sure; we shall never think ourselves in a Condition to break with him; nor shall we be able to persuade our Allies to it: No Part, therefore, will be left us, but to submit to such a Peace with his Grandson, as he shall, in his Pleasure, think fit to prescribe. I need not enlarge upon the Difficulties of making War in *Spain*, after what I have said in my first Letter: It is easy to see, how the Duke of

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Anjou may find us Work enough for two or three Years, if he do but avoid Coming to a general Action : Sieges will cost Time, as well as Men and Money ; and many must be made before such a Kingdom can be reduced ; and that will give the King of *France* Opportunity enough to do what he will, to support his Grandson secretly or openly, or to prescribe a Peace, or begin a new War, which it is always easy to find a Pretence for ; and we are sure he cannot want Inclination to do whatever is in his Power, which such a Cause calls for ; nor is he so little known, as to leave us the least Room to think, that any Treaties or Engagements can bind him, when Inclination and Power tempt him to break through them. His whole Reign is one continued Proof of this : I have said something of it already, and, therefore, shall add but one Instance, which is a little parallel to the Case before us ; and that is, the Manner in which he kept the Promise he made the *Spaniards* at the *Pyrenean* Treaty, Not to assist the *Portuguese*, who were then at War with them. Never was Treaty made with more Solemnity ; and yet, What did those Engagements signify ? All the Time the Treaty was making, *France* was concerting Measures to support the *Portuguese* ; and the King, the present King, who was then but young in Perfidy, had so little Regard to cover or palliate what he did, that he sent, in the Face of all the World, an Army to the Assistance of those, whose Defence he had renounced, commanded by a *Mareschal of France*. And can we, after such an Instance, depend upon his Word ? Has he
not

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not much greater Temptation to assist *Spain* against us, than he had then to support the *Portuguese* against *Spain*? Is not the Honour of his Grandson, the Interest of his Family, and the Acquisition of so great a Monarchy, of infinitely more Concern to him, than the Defence of *Portugal* could be? A Man must be blind, not to see there is no Comparison between the two Cases; and it is inexcusable, when we are sensible of this, to think, that a Prince, who has been so false in one Instance, can be ever true in the other.

The Sum of this Argument is, That, if a separate Peace be made with *France*, upon the Foot of the Preliminaries, without the 37th Article, nothing can hinder *France* from assisting the Duke of *Anjou*; and, if he be assisted by *France*, we can never be able to drive him out of *Spain*; and, consequently, if *Spain* be ever had, it must be by Treaty: If therefore no Peace can be a good one without *Spain*, then the 37th Article is necessary in Order to a good Peace: Which is the Point I was to prove. I know but one Thing can be said against what I have advanced upon this Head; and that is, That the Allies, though they make Peace with *France*, should still keep up their Armies, and then *France* will not dare to give the Duke of *Anjou* any great Assistance: But First, I have already shewn, that this is a very unreasonable Supposition; the Allies most certainly would not continue to keep up their Armies, were a Peace with *France* once made: But let us now suppose they would, How will this mend the Matter? If we keep on Foot as great Armies as
we

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we have now, we should be no more at Liberty to send Men to *Spain*, than we are now : And, if we sent a considerable Number to *Spain*, they would be wanted elsewhere ; and the K. of *France* would have nothing to fear from us, for Want of a sufficient Strength to act offensively, in Case we should think ourselves sufficiently provoked to it, by any Thing he does in Violation of the Treaty ; nay, considering the Number of Towns given up to the Allies, which all must have Garrisons in them, and those not very small ones, to keep their new Subjects in Awe, we should want a greater Army in *Flanders* than before, to be in a Condition to act offensively : And, if such Armies must be kept up, I cannot see why they should not be employed, that is, why we may not as well continue the War ; or to what Purpose we should make Peace. To me, Continuing the War seems much more eligible than such a Peace, for this plain Reason, that *France* would certainly make a great Advantage of Peace, while we must, under the Name of Peace, continue in a State of War, without the Fruits of it. For Example, all we have done, this Campaign, would, upon that Supposition, have been undone ; and we should have been so much farther off, than we are, from Putting *France* under a Necessity to give us *Spain*. For though the Successes of this Year have been so slighted, as to be thought not worth mentioning, where one would have most expected it ; I can tell you, *Doway* alone is, in the Opinion of *France*, of that mighty Consequence, that, in all the Negotiations that have been carried on, since the Refusal of the Preliminaries,

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naries, to find an Expedient for the 37th Article, *Dowry* has always been excepted out of the Number of Towns that they have pretended to give as an Equivalent. Now this, and the other Conquests of this Campaign, have brought us much nearer to our End, than if our Armies had gone out of the Field, as they came in, and had done nothing. I must therefore still maintain, that, upon all Suppositions, the 37th Article is necessary in Order to a good Peace; unless some real Expedient could be found out, which has hitherto been in vain looked for: But that, and what else has been done towards a Peace, since the Preliminaries were rejected, I must reserve for another Letter. I shall conclude this with shewing you, what at first Sight you will think very strange, and that is, that even a separate Peace could not last Year have been made with *France*, though the Allies had been willing to recede from the 37th Article.

You will remember it was the 8th of *June* when Monsieur *Rouille* shewed the Pensioner his Instructions, and declared finally, that his Master could not agree to that Article: Now, suppose the Allies would have departed from it, could he have signed the rest? No, he had no Authority to do that: He must have made another Journey to *Versailles*, to receive the King's Instructions, as well as to inform him of what had passed. And we may easily guess at Part of these Instructions, that the King, when he found the Allies were content to recede from this Article, would have wanted Amendments to be made to some others

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others that relate to *Spain*; particularly to have those Words left out or explained in the 4th, where he is obliged to take *proper Measures*, in Concert with the Allies, to oblige his Grandson to quit *Spain*. And it is probable he would pretend to new model some of the Articles relating to the *Emperor* and *Savoy*, while he agreed to them in the Main. And who knows how much Time might have been spun out, in going backwards and forwards; while, in the Midst of his Concessions, some new Difficulties are started to delay Signing, as long as he thinks fit? But, supposing nothing of all this, he had a sure Method in Reserve to defeat the whole Treaty: The first Thing to be executed, by Vertue of it, was the Surrender of *Mons*, *Namur*, and *Charleroy*. This was to be done before the First of *July*; but we are sure it would not have been done at all: For, when the Time came, *France* would have pretended it was not in her Power; for these Towns were in the Possession of the Elector of *Bavaria*; and, when *France* should have demanded a Surrender of them, there was a ready Answer for him, That the Towns were the King of *Spain's*, and that he could not surrender them without his Order. This, we are sure, would have been the Case; for, tho' it did not come to bear, the Design was formed, and could not be kept so secret, as not to take Wind: And thus the Treaty could never have had one Step made in the Execution of it; for the King of *Spain*, we may be sure, would not order them to be given up, and, it is as sure, the Elector would never have given them up without Order, but to
make

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make Terms for himself, that he might be restored to his *Electorate*, which Affair had been left out of the Preliminaries, and was reserved to be considered in the Congress that was to be opened, the very Day on which the Surrender of these Towns was to have commenced. He is a wise Man that can tell how this Difficulty could have been overcome, without fresh Delays, and Loss of Time; and the Disputes, this Point would have created, would have put the Execution of all the others so much backward, that, I am apt to think, this single Point, with good Management, might have taken up as much of the Campaign, as *France* and the Elector had a Mind to.

I may add, that it is the Opinion of some knowing Men, that the Concessions, *France* has seemed to make in other Articles, were never intended to be executed; and that they would never have been consented to, but that they knew the Allies could not accept them, as long as the 37th was refused. The *English* Plenipotentiaries, they knew, were tied, by a Vote of Parliament, to insist upon the Restitution of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy; and, as long as that was so, they were sure no other Concessions, they could make, could hurt them in the End, though Making of them was, in the mean Time, of the greatest Service to them, by the seeming Sincerity and Earnestness it shewed, on their Part, for Peace, and by the Room that gave them to amuse and divide the Allies, and spin out the Time as long as they had Occasion for; and by giving them, at last, a Handle to throw the Blame of Breaking off the Treaty upon

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upon them, for Refusing such good Terms, for the Sake of one that could not possibly be complied with : These, and the like Purposes, *France* served by making such large Concessions as her Ministers have done to the Maritime Powers in in these Articles ; but this was only Sporting with them. As long as they kept one Link of this Chain of Articles in their own Hands, the Allies could not be at all the better for having the rest held out to them, nor themselves the worse. But, whether this Opinion be true or not, what I have said before renders it exceeding probable, that *France* never meant the Treaty should take Place ; they designed nothing but to gain Time, and, when that Purpose was served, they broke off. It was necessary for the King's Affairs, at the Beginning of the Year, to make specious Offers of Peace, to quiet the Minds of his People, and induce the Allies to defer the Opening of the Campaign, the Severity of the hard Weather having reduced his Country to great Misery, and made it impossible for his Armies to take the Field early. But by *June* the Case was a little altered, and they began to recover from the Fright they had been in ; Methods had been taken to remedy the extreme Want his Capital City laboured under ; an Inspection had been made of what Corn there was in the Provinces ; great Quantities had been imported, or were expected from the *Levant*, and other Parts ; there was a good Prospect of Summer-Corn every where ; the D. of *Anjou* had gained a considerable Advantage over the *Portuguese* ; and what, it is probable, weighed most of

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all with him, Mareſchal *Villars* had made the King believe his Army was in a pretty good Condition ; and affured him, he was ſo poſted, that it would be impoſſible for the Allies to force the Intrenchments he had made, or draw him out of them ; ſo that they had nothing to apprehend but a Siege ; and that, from the Diſpoſition of the Allies, they thought could be no other than that of *Ypres*, the Preparations for it being ſent up the *Lys* ; and this they hoped would find the Allies Work enough, for a Campaign that began ſo late ; and perhaps the very Want and Famine, which at firſt put them into great Conſternation, they might, upon further Thoughts, ſee, was, in ſome Reſpect, their Security ; ſince, if the Allies ſhould have the good Fortune to attack the *Mareſchal* with Succeſs, it would be impoſſible for them to make much Uſe of their Victory, or penetrate far into a Country, where nothing was to be had ; an Army may make a Famine, but they cannot follow one. Theſe ſeem to have been the Motives that determined them to put an End to the Treaty, when they had drawn it out into Length enough, to answer the Purpoſes for which it was begun : And then the Mask might ſafely be taken off. And this I take to be the true Reaſon that *Monſ. Rouillé* gave himſelf ſuch Airs in his laſt Conferences, and reſuſed, in the King's Name, to agree to the 37th Article, without Offering any Expedient at all for it ; which was ſomething ſtrange, conſidering the Allies had, before the Marquis *de Torcy's* Departure, urged, with ſo much Earneſtneſs, the Neceſſity they were under
to

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to adhere to it. Therefore, I think, this can have no other Meaning in it, but that, upon the *Marquis's* Return, the State of *France* being thoroughly considered, it was judged that they might, without any great Risk, hazard one Campaign more; and that determined the King to break off the Treaty as he did; which, by Offering no Expedient, he shewed his Affairs did no longer, in his Opinion, want.

This, though the best Account I can send you of this Affair, is, I am sensible, extremely short of what it might be: But, considering the Secrecy with which Things of this Nature are and ought to be transacted, I flatter myself, you will be content to find I know so much of them, rather than wonder I cannot tell you more. And, as imperfect as this Account is, if what I have said be true in Fact, and my Reflexions just, you have so much Candor, that, I am sure, you will allow I have proved these three Things:

First, That neither the D. of M. nor any other Ministers of the Alliance, are justly to be blamed, for having contributed unnecessarily to prolong the War, by their Management in these Negotiations.

Secondly, That it was reasonable and necessary for them to insist on the 37th Article, in Order to a good Peace. And,

Thirdly, That Receding from that Article would not then have procured a separate Peace with

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France, whatever it would have done since. All which Points are submitted to your impartial Consideration, and better Judgment, by,

S I R,

Your most faithful

humble Servant.

P O S T S C R I P T.

THE *EXAMINER* is extremely mistaken, if he thinks I shall enter the Lists with so prostitute a Writer, who can neither speak Truth, nor knows when he hears it. I shall not be moved with the Ignorance and Malice of a mercenary Scribbler, who treats the D. of M. and the victorious Troops he has the Honour to command, with so much Insolence, in so many of his weekly Libels; and, in one of them, N. 4. villainously calls him *a Cataline at the Head of a mercenary Army*: Words, which, I trust, will not easily be forgotten. What I have said, of the Management of the War, will, I doubt not, support itself against all his Attacks; who, were he much abler than he is, has met with more than his Match, in the most ingenious Writer of the *MEDLER*; and to his Correction I shall leave him.

THE

THE
NEGOTIATIONS

FOR

*A Treaty of Peace, from the Breaking
off of the Conferences at the Hague, to the
End of those at Gertruydenberg, consider'd,
in a Fourth Letter to a Tory-Member.*

PART II.

*Cum Domino Pax ista venit ———
—— Procul hinc jam Fœdera sunt
Credidimus Fatis, utendum est Judice Bello.*

* * * Jan. 10, 1710-11.

S I R,



Fear you begin to wish you had kept your Desire to yourself, and not asked my Opinion upon Matters that have grown under my Pen so much beyond the Compass, which I, at first, hoped they would have come within : But Patience once more, and this shall be the last Time I will trouble you with my

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Thoughts upon the Management either of War or Peace, till you shall again make it your own Request, to whom I can refuse nothing. To come then to the Business, and resume the Subject where my last left off; I shall give you, in this, the best Account I can, of what was done in Relation to Peace, from the Breaking off of the Conferences at the *Hague*, to the End of those that were held the Year after at *Gertruydenberg*; that is, from *June* the 9th 1709, to *July* the 25th 1710. And, that you may have a more distinct View of this Affair, it may not be amiss to divide this Space of Time into three Parts; and consider first, what passed from the Return of Monsieur *Rouillé*, to Monsieur *Petkum's* Journey to *Paris*, which was about the Middle of *November*. Secondly, What Progress was made in this Affair, between that Journey and the Arrival of the Marquis *d'Uxelles* and the Abbé *de Polignac*, the French Plenipotentiaries, at *Gertruydenberg*: And then give you, in the third Place, some Account of the Negotiations during their Stay there; since which no Advances have been made on either Side in this grand Affair.

First: For what passed between the Conferences at the *Hague*, and Monsieur *Petkum's* Journey to *Paris*, you know, without my telling you, that the Negotiations did not intirely cease with those Conferences, but were still kept up, and carried on by an Intercourse of Letters between Monsieur *Petkum* and the Marquis *de Torcy*; to try if an Expedient could be found out for the 37th Article; the Difficulty in that Article being the only Point

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Point for which the Conferences, in Appearance at least, were broke off. The Point they offered to satisfy the Allies in was, That the King of *France* should not, directly nor indirectly, assist his Grandson. You will easily judge of the Importance of this Point, by what I have said in my last Letter; and by that see, that the Recovery of *Spain* and the *Indies* depends intirely upon it; for, if the King of *France* supports the Duke of *Anjou*, all the Efforts, the Allies can make against him, will be to no Purpose, since *France* can send more Men and Money to *Spain* in a Month, than they can do in a Twelvemonth; but, if the King of *France* will, in good Earnest, withdraw all Assistance from him, then a *Spanish* War would be but a short Business, since, in that Case, there can be no Doubt, but that in a little Time the Duke of *Anjou* would be content to leave the *Spaniards*, or they, at least, would find it for their Interest to leave him. Now, the more important this Point is, the more are the others concerned to insist upon sufficient Security, not to be deceived; and all that has passed hitherto, on the Part of *France*, either in former Treaties, or in the last Conferences, give them but too much Reason to think, they can never be cautious enough, how they trust so perfidious a Prince, in an Affair of so much Consequence. And, if you carry these Views with you in your Thoughts upon this Subject, you cannot easily take up with their foolish and groundless Insinuations, who would persuade you, that the Allies have been too difficult. As to the Expedients proposed to secure this Point,

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all went upon the same Foot with that which Monsieur *Petkum* had proposed, as from himself, the Day before Monsieur *Rouillé* left the *Hague*: That three Towns should be put into the Hands of the Allies, to be restored to *France*, when the Affair of *Spain*, &c. should be decided. This was the Nature of the Expedient in Agitation; and nothing can shew better the Readiness of the Allies to put an End to the War, and the Insincerity of *France*, than what passed between them upon this Subject. The Towns, to be given up for this Purpose, must have been either in *Spain*, or on the Borders of it, or on the Side of *Alsace*, or in *Flanders*. Whatever could have been done of this Kind, was but a poor Expedient for an Article of so much Consequence; and, had the King of *France* been in Earnest, one cannot think he would have made any Difficulty to give the Allies what they were willing to accept: But, as he meant nothing less than what he was so forward to promise, there was no Security of this Sort the Allies could ask, which he did not think too much to grant.

As for Towns in *Spain*, which was the best Security, and most to the Purpose, that Expedient had been proposed, as I told you in my last, during the Conferences at the *Hague*, and was by the *French* Ministers refused; and, to prevent the Allies from persisting in this Demand, the King soon after put it out of his Power to comply with it; otherwise his People, as blind as they are, could not have had any great Opinion of his Sincerity in the Desires he expressed for Peace, while
he

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he rejected a Condition that was so natural for the Allies to ask ; and not only possible, but easy for him to grant ; and which the Safety and Interest of *France*, as distinct from *Spain*, were no Way concerned in. That the Negotiations, therefore, might not continue to rest upon this Point, he took Care immediately, that there should be no Room left for the Allies to insist on this Demand ; and, to that End, withdrew his Troops out of all the *Spanish* Fortresses, as he did afterwards out of the Kingdom, upon Pretence, indeed, of Evacuating *Spain* according to the Preliminary Articles. But that was only a Pretence ; for he kept them there all the Summer, to be at Hand to assist the Duke of *Anjou*, in Case his Army should be attacked, or an Invasion should be made into *Aragon* ; though otherwise the General, that commanded them, had Orders not to venture a Battle, but to be on the Defensive ; as appeared upon the Duke of *Anjou's* Coming to his Army upon the Surprize of *Balaguer* by the Allies, and expostulating with Marechal *Bezons* for not joining upon that Occasion the *Spanish* Army ; for which he justified himself, by producing the King's Orders. By this middle Way the King thought he could deceive the Allies, without abandoning the *Spaniards* ; and, in the mean Time, the Duke of *Anjou*, according to the Direction of *French* Councils, made his utmost Efforts to put *Spain* into a Condition to defend itself, as if they were in Earnest to expect no farther Assistance from *France* : Which had so good an Effect on the *Spaniards*, that they exerted themselves beyond what could

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could be expected of them : They compleated, in a little Time, their old Regiments, and raised, besides, a great many new ones ; and the most vigorous Measures were taken to find Money, and erect Magazines, as if they were to stand, for the Future, on their own Bottom ; though the King of *France* was far from intending they should want his Assistance, when their Affairs called for it. And, that his Grandson might not want a General for his Army, it was publickly talked at *Paris*, before Monsieur *Rouillé's* Return, that, in Case of a Peace, the Duke of *Berwick* had desired Leave to resign his *Baton* of Mareschal of *France*, that he might go and command in *Spain* : Which shews us how the Duke of *Anjou* might have Officers as well as Men from *France*, if he had any Want of them. If therefore the King of *France* withdrew his Troops, it was not with a Design to leave his Grandson to himself, but upon very different Views ; it was to make the Allies and his own People believe he was sincere, and that he was willing to remove, as far as he could, all Difficulties in the Way to Peace ; and yet, at the same Time, and by the same Action, increase the Difficulties he would seem to remove, by rendering, by this Means, the most reasonable Demand of the Allies impracticable ; besides that, he really wanted these Troops himself, against another Year ; the Danger, he was threatened with in *Flanders*, obliging him to have a more numerous Army on that Side. This was all he meant by withdrawing his Troops from *Spain* ; and, therefore, he did not do it till he had put the Duke

of

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of *Anjou's* Affairs upon a pretty good Foot, and he was sure, there could be no immediate Want of them, the Campaign there being at an End. And, that this Removal of his Troops might be of the least Prejudice possible to his Grandson, he contrived that as many of his own Troops should desert, as would make seven or eight Battalions; and, to supply the Place of the rest as far as he could, he sent his Grandson all the *Walloon* Regiments from *Flanders*; from whence they begun their March for *Spain* the Beginning of the *February* following, which was as soon as Money, Arms, and Clothes could be provided for them. And, not content with giving the Duke of *Anjou* this Assistance, and supplying him with great Stores of Ammunition, because new raised Troops could not be much depended on, the King kept many of the Troops he withdrew in *Rouffillon* upon the Borders of *Spain*, to be ready to return, when his Grandson's Affairs should make it necessary. And is not this very much like the Conduct of one, who means, in Earnest, to abandon *Spain*, and would restore it to the House of *Austria*, if he could? But, poor Man! he cannot do Impossibilities. It is a pretty Way to facilitate the Reduction of a Kingdom, to make it as difficult as possible; a great Sign of Sincerity, to put Things out of our Power, which we cannot, without discovering our Insincerity, keep in it; and mighty reasonable to create Impossibilities, and then complain of them. Who can help believing such a Man, when he tells you, he would, with all his Heart, to procure a Peace, give up the
Spanish

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Spanish Monarchy, if he could, but that he really cannot ; and that this is the only Hinderance ? Or, What Pledge of his Good-will is there, one may not expect from him, as a Caution, that he will not, directly or indirectly, hinder your Doing, what he cannot possibly himself do for you ? To expect a valuable Pledge from a Man, to be returned to him when that is done, which he intends never shall be done, is a great Jest. And, therefore, since the *French* King has so plainly discovered this Intention, you must not wonder he makes such Difficulties in settling an Expedient, as you could not expect in a Man who means one Word of what he says.

The first and only good Expedient, you see, is made impracticable, on Purpose that it may not be insisted on ; the next best was, to put into the Hands of the Allies some *French* Towns on the Frontier of *Spain*, such as *Bayonne* and *Perpignan*, which would have enabled the Allies to send Forces to *Spain* with infinitely less Expence and Trouble, and in a Quarter of the Time they can now ; and, at the same Time, have obliged the *French* pretty affectually to keep their Promise, not to assist the Duke of *Anjou*, by cutting off, in a great Measure, the Communication between *France* and *Spain*. This was an Expedient which the King could not say it was not in his Power to comply with ; but, when one has not a Mind to do a Thing, nothing is so easy as to find out a Reason for not doing it. If this could not be said to be an impossible Expedient, it was easy to pretend, that it did not suit either with the
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Safety or Dignity of *France* to put the Keys of his Kingdom into the Hands of the Allies, since he could not be sure what Use they might make of them, or when he should get them again. And this was very right Arguing for a Man who never intended that should be done, which is made the Condition, on which the Caution he deposits shall be restored. If the King does not design *Spain* should be quitted by his Grandson, it must be owned it would not be very prudent in him to give the Allies such important Places under the Notion of Cautionary Towns ; which must either defeat his Design of Supporting his Grandson, or if that Design succeed, could never of Right be demanded back of them ; not but that a Prince of his known Abilities would, we may be sure, soon find a Pretence to ask for them, and that Pretence he would justify, if not readily submitted to, the same Way he has so many others no less groundless, by Force and Arms, which, with him, have always been the Measures of Right and Wrong. But, if he were sincere, if he really meant that *Spain* should be restored, what Inconvenience could there be in complying with this Expedient ? What ill Use could the Allies make of it ? Could they, by the Help of these Towns, hurt *France*, before they had reduced *Spain* ? Can it be imagined that would not find them Work enough ? Or, Is there any Room to fear an Invasion from *Spain* afterwards ? No sure, however significant *Spain* may be in *French* Hands, it will not in Haste be very formidable out of them ; they would have too much Business in looking to themselves,

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themselves, to think of disturbing so powerful a Neighbour; and there would be a thousand Times more Reason for them to be afraid of *France*, than for *France* to apprehend any Thing from them. Nor can there be the least Pretence for a Suspicion, that the Allies, if these Towns were once in their Hands, would never part with them; supposing the End answered, for which they were entrusted with them; for, besides that such a Breach of Faith is without Example on the Side of the Allies, they cannot, for the Reasons I gave you in my last, act a false Part, in this Matter, if they would, especially not on this Side of *France*; where, if the Allies had ever so much Justice on their Side, they could not long support themselves under the mighty Disadvantages with which they must make War on this Frontier; of which you may judge by what I have said, in my first Letter, of the *Spanish* War; which, with little Alteration, will hold here. But there is no Need of saying more, to shew you how ridiculous it is to pretend any Fears of the Allies, if these Towns should be put into their Hands; the Supporting of *Spain* has cost *France* too dear, not to know the low Condition it is in, and that nothing could be greater Madness in King *Charles*, or his Allies, than not to sit down quietly in Peace, the Minute that Kingdom is reduced to his Obedience, without seeking for new Pretences to continue the War needlessly.

Nothing, therefore, can be thought to be the true Reason, why the King of *France* rejected this Expedient, but that he never intended the Allies should

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should obtain the End for which it was asked ; as you will still see more plainly in what follows. On the Side of *Alsace*, nothing was proposed, that I know of, but *Thionville*, a Place of great Consequence to *France*, were they in any Danger from the Empire ; but, considering the feeble low Condition of that enervated, exhausted Body, one cannot but think the strong Places on that Side are of no other Use but to enable the *French* to invade the Empire, and not to secure them against Invasions from it. And what should be deposited only as a Pledge, would be to be restored long before the Empire could be in a Condition to make any Use of it, that would be either unjust in itself, or troublesome to *France*. But, *France* never intending to fulfil the Condition on which the Caution should be restored, this Proposal was rejected upon the same Pretences as the former.

Nothing now was left, but to seek for an Expedient in *Flanders* ; which was what the *French* offered from the first, and all along pressed, as if they were very much in Earnest : But, had they been so, it is very hard to give a good Reason why an Expedient should be looked for here, rather than in any other Part. The Allies, though they were sensible whatever could be given on this Side, was but a poor Expedient at best ; yet they were sincerely disposed to put an End to the War, that they would not absolutely reject it. Whatever Towns *France* could put into the Hands of the Allies on this Side, if they were not such as lie nearest to those that are to be given up by the Preliminaries, their Tenure would be very precarious,

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rious, and it would be very difficult to keep them, when *France* had a Mind to have them again. This you may easily judge of, by the Impossibility the Allies were under last Campaign to make the Siege of *Arras*, while they left *Doway* behind them; and the Difficulty *Ypres* gave them in the Siege of *Aire*. But, if these cautionary Towns were to be of those that lie nearest, they could not be of so much Importance to *France*, as that they should not be willing to part with them to keep *Spain*, since this would only be Making a little farther Addition to the Barrier of the *Netherlands*, as I hinted in my last; which would secure them more from *France*. But, as bad an Equivalent as this was at the best, the *French* refused to make it as good as they could, by excepting such Towns as were of most Consequence, such as *Doway*, *Arras*, and *Cambray*; which would lay them open to an Invasion from the Allies: Which, if the Allies were able to make, they knew their own Designs would give but too just a Handle for; besides, they were unwilling to part with, under the Name of a Caution, what they could not be willing to part with for good and all; since they intended to forfeit the Condition, and not do themselves, or rather not suffer that to be done, which would give them a Right to ask for it again.

This being the Design of *France*, all these Negotiations, by Letters, came to nothing; and one Side would never offer what the other could accept, unless the Allies would be content with the Name of an Expedient instead of the Thing; and have taken that for a Security, which they were before-

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before-hand sure could by no Means answer the End it was given for : Which the Allies were too wise to do ; and had they done otherwise, which is so foolish a Supposition, I do not well know how to make it, had it been agreed to put into the Hands of the *Dutch* three cautionary Towns, over and above those that they are to have by the Preliminaries, Would it have pleased the Gentlemen, who are so angry that a Peace is not yet made ? Would they not have been the forwardest to shew the Insufficiency of such an Expedient ? Would they not, from the evident Folly of it, have readily argued, it was the Effect, not of Folly, but of Treachery ? Would it not have been said, that *Spain* and the *Indies* were given up in Compliment to the *Dutch*, that they might have a better Frontier ? Would not somebody have been censured, as a Favourer of the *Dutch* too, for agreeing to so scandalous an Expedient, for an Article of so much Importance ? Would not Emisaries have been employed in *Holland* and *France*, to learn if there were not some secret Whispers at least, of a private Correspondence carried on by a great Man, for facilitating the Way to a Peace so much to the Mind both of *France* and the *States* ? From what is now doing of this Kind, we may be very sure what would have been done ; and the foolish *Frenchified Anti-Dutch* Politicks of some Men, which, if they prevail, will, some Time or other, infallibly prove the Ruin of this Nation, leave no Room to doubt, but that, if *Spain* must be lost, they had rather lose it without this Expedient, than with it, if *Holland* is to be the better

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for it. This is so plain, that I shall say no more to vindicate the Allies on this Head, which I shall end with observing, that the *French* did not only trifle with the Allies, in Offering ridiculous Expedients; but sometimes did it in Terms pretty evident, when they saw Monsieur *Villars* could not be attacked in his strong Camp near *Doway*, and were in Hopes the Allies could do nothing more on that Side but take *Tournay*, and had no Fears from any other Quarter. Nay, this Insolence they affected to continue even after the Defeat of *Taniers*, which, because it was short of those they had before received, and their Men were so hemmed in with Intrenchments that they could not run away if they would, they would have it thought a Sort of Victory, and a Sign that the *French* Courage was at last restored by *Villars*, which *Vendosme* had in Vain attempted, tho' fetched from *Italy* on Purpose for that great Work: Which had then no other Effect on the King's Affairs, but to ruin them in one Part, without mending them in the other. But now, it seems, the Business is done, and the lost Courage is restored; and, had the *Dutch* been as ready to believe what the *French* said of that Battle, as some other People have been since to credit the Accounts they give of what passed in the late Treaties, they had certainly been frightened into Peace upon their Terms: Any Expedient, or no Expedient, it had been all one, they would have accepted, without Difficulty, so much of the Preliminaries as the Marquis de *Torcy* would have left them. But the *Dutch* knew better the Ground they stood upon; they

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they knew the Accounts of their Friends were to be depended on ; but that the Reports of the Enemy deserved no Credit, whose Affairs put them under the utmost Necessity of Misrepresenting the true State of Things ; an Art they have long practised in great Perfection, and oftentimes with no little Success. This made the States stand to their Point, and not recede an Inch from what they had insisted on ; which, for some Time, occasioned a Stop in the Negotiation, the *French* not knowing how to press their own Expedient, or to accept theirs, since they were resolved to propose no good one, and ill ones would not be received ; and they found themselves more puzzled by the Reduction of *Mons*, which was a plain Declaration to all the World, that the Advantage, as well as Honour of the Battle, was altogether on the Side of the Allies. These Successes of the Campaign, in which the Allies had taken the strongest Fortress in *Europe*, and another not much inferior to it, and had gained, under the greatest Disadvantages, one of the most obstinate Battles that ever was fought, gave the *French* Reason to think the Allies would rather rise than fall in their Demands ; and this made them for a While affect to stand off, and the Intercourse of Letters with Monsieur *Petkum* seemed to be at an End : But this Humour, as it was affected, so it did not last.

After some Time, the Marquis *de Torcy* wrote to Monsieur *Petkum*, to desire, since the Point in Dispute could not be adjusted by Letters, that Passes might be granted for some Ministers from *France* to come to *Holland*, and renew the Confe-

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rences, or that Monsieur *Petkum* might be permitted to go to *France*, to try if his Presence could help to find out an Expedient, that had hitherto been in Vain endeavoured by Letters. The First the States refused, till they knew precisely what they were to come for; since, under the Appearance of some Good, the Presence of *French* Ministers in *Holland* gave them an Opportunity to do a great deal of Harm, by Sowing Seeds of Jealousy among the Allies, Poisoning the Minds of the People against their Governors, and Retarding the great Preparations for another Campaign; which can never be pushed with the Vigour they should, while People are amused with the specious Appearances of an approaching certain Peace. For so the *French* endeavoured to make it every where thought, when they meant nothing less. For these Reasons the States refused to give Passes for any Ministers to come from *France*, till they knew more of their Intentions. But, to shew their Readiness to hearken to any reasonable Proposal, they consented Monsieur *Petkum* should go to *France*, which he did about the latter End of *November*.

But, before I give you an Account of that Journey, I must acquaint you, that, while their Negotiations were carrying on by Letters with *France*, the Duke of *Anjou* did not only take all the proper Measures he could to maintain himself in the Monarchy, which his Grandfather was in Appearance treating to give up, but published a notable Manifesto the Beginning of *July*, wherein he protests against all that should be transacted at the

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the *Hague* in his Prejudice, as void and null, and declares his Resolution to adhere to his faithful *Spaniards*, as long as there is a Man of them will stand by him; and is so far from quitting *Spain* and the *Indies* to his Competitor, that he will not consent he should have those Parts of the Monarchy, which he was then possessed of; and, in Pursuance of this Manifesto, he names the Duke *d'Alba* and Count *Bergbeyck* for his Plenipotentiaries, with Orders to notify it to the Maritime Powers, which Count *Bergbeyck* did, in a Letter to the Duke of *M——* dated from *Mons, August* the 21st, with a Copy of their Instructions, and they sent another at the same Time to the Deputies of the *States*, which were accordingly transmitted to their Principals: But no Answer was thought fit, either by *England* or *Holland*, to be returned to them: And, to admit Plenipotentiaries from him now, would undo all that had been hitherto agreed on; and, instead of Seeking for an Expedient for one Article of the Preliminaries, the Whole of them would have been destroyed, and the Treaty must have been begun intirely anew. This would have been the Consequence of Admitting Ministers from the Duke of *Anjou*; and it was this, we shall see afterwards, the *French* aimed at. But I cannot leave this Head, without observing to you, that, in Count *Bergbeyck's* Letter, there were broad Intimations how grateful the Duke of *Anjou* would be, if, by Means of his Grace's good Offices, his just and reasonable Desires might be complied with: There was nothing he would not do to content *England* in general, or

that might be to his Grace's Satisfaction in particular. I have likewise heard, from good Hands, that Monsieur *Torcy* did very unnecessarily, and with great Officiousness, write two or three very civil Letters to his Grace ; till he found his Civilities were lost upon him. They were both mistaken in their Man, if they thought any Thing could tempt him to go into any secret Measures against the Interest of his Country, and the Good of the common Cause. But these Ministers have, both of them, had too much Experience of the Power of Corruption elsewhere, not to be excusable for Trying it here, when it was so much for the Service of their Masters. And their not Succeeding here has not, I believe, deterred them from trying their Skill, where they may succeed better.

If the D. of *M.* governed himself with Respect to Peace, by private Views, there is, I think, no Doubt, but more is to be got a great deal, by agreeing to the Terms of *France*, than he can ever hope for by refusing them ; and I believe one may safely say, no Minister was ever gratified for making a good Peace, though many have been well paid for persuading their Masters into ill ones.

But to return to Monsieur *Petkum*, and his Journey to *Paris*, which the *States* consented to, not from any Good they expected from it, but to prevent the ill Use the Emissaries of *France* would make of their Refusing it. After a Stay there of about ten Days, and several fruitless Interviews with the Marquis *de Torcy*, he returned to the
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Hague, Dec. 7, without having been able to make the least Progress in the Business he went on, or bringing so much as the Pretence of an Expedient along with him : But, instead of that, he brought the Sense of the *French* Court, in a Paper drawn up by Monsieur *Torcy*, which has been made so publick, that I cannot but presume you have seen it, and must remember, that the Substance of it was to this Effect : “ That the Design of the Preliminary Articles being to prevent, if possible, the Campaign that was then drawing on ; since that Effect could not be obtained, the Reason of them was now ceased, together with the King’s Obligation to agree to them, since they were not accepted within the Time limited : But that, if the Allies would, the King was willing the Winter should be employed in Treating definitively of Peace ; and that, suppressing the Form of those Articles, he would preserve the Substance of them, and, on the Foundation of the Concessions therein made to the Allies, he would consent to resume the Negotiations, to commence from the First of *January* following ; and that the Execution of the Articles should, as is usual in all Treaties, begin from the Time of their Ratification.”

This was the Answer Monsieur *Petkum* brought, which was short even of their Expectations who hoped for least from it ; for this overthrew all the Preliminaries at once, while the King pretended to agree to all but one ; and, by promising to keep the Substance of them, while they destroy the Form, they effectually defeat all that had been

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done, and recover to themselves an intire Liberty to dispute all Points afresh, and to lay Hold of all the Occasions which that would give them to create Divisions and Jealousies between the *States* and their Allies, which is plainly the great Point they have all along aimed at; which, though they have been so terribly disappointed in, they are unwilling to give over, in Hopes their Constancy and Firmness to the common Cause would, in Time, be wearied out, and yield to the importunate Solicitations with which they tempted them.

Though, to prevent a new Campaign might be a Reason for Hastening the Preliminaries, it was not the only or chief Design of them. Whenever a Treaty should commence, the Allies had declared long before, in Answer to the Elector of *Bavaria's* Letters at the End of the *Ramillies* Campaign, they would not enter on it, till some fundamental Points were first settled; the Necessity of which they were convinced of by the dear-bought Experience of former Treaties; and the same Experience has taught the Allies, that no Treaty with *France* can be effectual, if the fundamental Articles are not executed as well as agreed on, before the general Treaty is concluded; which Security the Marquis would intirely take away, by deferring the Execution till after Ratification. Thus, the two great Ends of a Preliminary Treaty, which are to agree on some fundamental Points, and secure the Execution of them, are, by this Answer, utterly destroyed; and the Allies are not only where they were before that Treaty

was

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was begun, but are really the worse for it; it being of greater Advantage to the *French* to know before-hand, what are the particular Demands which the Emperor and Maritime Powers insist on for themselves, and in Behalf of the rest of the Allies. As for Solving all now by two Words, *Form* and *Substance*; two other Words, the *Letter* and *Spirit* of the Partition-Treaty, are still too well remembered for the Allies to be again deceived by *French* Distinctions; which, if they could now pass upon them, it is easy to see, that the Form of these Articles would have been found to be the Substance of them, and the pretended Substance would have proved a Shadow only. Here, then, *Dutch* Bluntness and plain Dealing proved too hard for the *Fineness* of the *French*; a Word not more peculiar to them than the Thing meant by it. The States, having considered this Answer more than it deserved, with the Ministers of the Allies, who all easily agreed in the same Opinion of it, in a Resolution they took Dec. 14., which has likewise been made publick, declared it was not satisfactory, and resolved to push the War with the utmost Vigour.

About the Time that Monsieur *Petkum* returned, the King of *France* wrote to the Duke of *Anjou*, to acquaint him with what had passed, and assure him, that, though he was obliged to recall his Troops, he need not be alarmed at it, for that he would never abandon him; and that he had ordered twelve of his Regiments, that were then in *Spain*, to join the *Spaniards*, in Case King *Charles* should make an Irruption into *Arragon*.
And

And a little after Monsieur *Ibberville* was sent to *Madrid*; but both his Journey and Business were made so great a Secret, that it was not for some Time known whither he was gone; and when he came to *Madrid*, where he arrived *Dec. 26*, his Instructions were to communicate his Business to nobody but the King himself. He did not make a long Stay, nor was he, in Appearance, well received; but no Judgment could be made from thence what his Errand was; there was no Way to distinguish between what was real and what was Disguise. But, to judge from other Steps, it is most reasonable to think his Business was to learn the State the Duke's Affairs were in, and give him his Lesson, how he should manage in so nice a Juncture, with Assurances, that, in Spite of all Appearances to the Contrary, which the Necessity of his Affairs might oblige the King to make, he would never desert him, much less agree with the Allies upon any Terms to turn his Arms against him. But this Journey was made a great Mystery of, to make the Allies believe, the Business of it was to persuade the Duke of *Anjou* to retire out of *Spain*, since it would be impossible for the King to support him any longer. If this King were not a perfect Master in all the Arts and Methods of Deceit, as great an Enemy as he is, I should be almost tempted to pity him, to see how hard a Game he has to play. He has to deal with two Parties, one of which must be imposed on: He assures the *Spaniards* he will assist and support his Grandson, cost what it will; and, at the same Time, he promises most solemnly the
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Allies, that he will not give the least Assistance to him, directly or indirectly. Now, if he can find Credit with both Parties, either he is a very cunning Man, or one of them are very great Fools. In the present Case I should suspect the last, if the Allies could be thus imposed on; for, if we consider which Side, both by Nature and Interest, he is most inclined to, or allow his Actions to be a better Proof of his Meaning than his Words, there is no Room to doubt, but the Allies are the Party he would deceive, if he could; since it is evident, from what I have already said in the Beginning of this Letter, he has, ever since the Conferences at the *Hague* broke off, been doing all he could for the Service of his Grandson, that he may be able to support himself without any visible Assistance from *France*, till her Affairs are so far retrieved, as not to make any Managements in doing it any longer necessary. But all the Inference I would at present make from this is, that, since the *Spaniards* must be deceived, if we are not, or we must, if they are not, no Words or Promises, be they ever so fair, should weigh with us, or be thought an Argument of his Sincerity, unless his Actions go along with them.

But to return to the Negotiations, after the Paper brought by Monsieur *Petkum*, no new Advances were made till the Beginning of *February*, when an Express brought him a fresh Project of Peace to be communicated to the Allies, which differed little from the other, or rather was an Amplification of it. It was, in the main, the same with the Preliminaries, but cast into another Form,

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Form, which as effectually destroyed the Preliminaries, as if it had been put into no Form at all; besides several material Alterations, for the Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy there is a Promise only; the Clause, in the fourth Article, whereby the King engages to take, in Concert with the Allies, proper Measures to oblige his Grandson to it, is left out; the Restoring of the two Electors is insisted on as a Preliminary, and of the Elector of *Bavaria* in particular to the Upper *Palatinate*, in Contradiction to the Preliminaries; by which it is agreed, it should remain to the Elector *Palatine*, whom the Emperor had some Time before put into Possession of it, than which nothing could be more reasonable; no Prince having suffered so much from *France* as one of them, or deserved so ill of the Emperor as the other. As for the 37th Article, the Expedient offered was three Towns in *Flanders* of his own Chusing; an Offer, which, by what I have already said, you will see, is worth nothing, since he would never give any Towns that the Allies could think a tolerable Security for so important a Point; besides that, if the Towns were agreed on, many Difficulties would certainly rise in the Execution, and in Settling the Terms on which they should return to him or not; for if the Allies were to keep them only till the Affairs of *Spain* were decided; What would they be the better for them, if, in the Issue of Things, it should not end to their Mind? Which he would take the best Care he could it should not. I mention this, because I have seen the Condition of the Expedient so worded, or to that

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that Effect ; and it is not very easy to take away all Room for Equivocation, and any Handle that can give, which the Prince, we are treating with, knows how to erect into a clear indisputable Right. But, to compleat the Project, and that the Design and End of the Preliminaries might be intirely subverted, it is proposed, that the Execution of all the Articles be deferred till the Treaty be concluded, and the Ratifications exchanged. This is the noble Project that was sent to the *Hague* the Beginning of *February*, and was the Result of many Councils that had been held in the preceding Month, to satisfy the King's good Subjects of his sincere Desires after Peace ; and, as if this had been an Act of great Grace, the King, if this be not accepted, declares himself free from all Engagements ; but, this being, in Effect, the same with the Paper Monsieur *Petkum* brought, and nothing but the old Bait made up anew, the Allies were too wise to bite at it : But as *France* had all along excepted to nothing but the 37th Article, they were resolved to adhere to the rest, and, therefore, would admit of no Conferences till they explained themselves fully as to that Point. When the *French* saw so much Stiffness on the Part of the Allies, they, who are not such religious Observers of their Word, as to suffer a little seeming Compliance to do them any Harm, or to lose their Point for Want of it, thought fit to recede, in Appearance at least, and gave the States all the Assurance the most express Words could do, that the King agreed to all the other Preliminaries, and that, if they would consent, his Ministers should

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should come and confer with them upon the 37th Article, he did not doubt but what should be proposed from him would be to their Satisfaction. This was so full a Declaration, as gave some Hopes this Difficulty might be adjusted, or, at least, it would have made the Refusal of what they asked look invidious : The States, therefore, to remove all Pretence of Complaint, as if they were too diffident, or had a Mind to prolong the War, which they knew the *French* were always labouring to insinuate ; a Practice, in which their Friends here copy after them perfectly well ; granted them Passports for such Ministers as the King should think fit to send : The Express arrived the 20th, and was sent back the 23d. I mention these Dates (which, as all the rest, are of the New Stile) to shew how little Difficulty the States made, though, at the very Time the King gave them these Assurances, that all the Preliminaries should remain in full Force, only with such Alterations, in the Terms of the Execution, as the Course of Time had made necessary, they knew he had just done what would make other Alterations necessary, and would oblige them to change the Stile, at least, of the Preliminaries, in several Articles, and that in a very material Point ; the Thing, I mean, was his Giving to the 2d Son of the Duke of *Burgundy*, who was born the 15th, the Title of the Duke of *Anjou*, which was an Indication he resolved to insist upon his Grandson's having the Title of King *Philip* given him in the next Conferences : Which, though, in Appearance, a little Matter, would draw after it no little Consequences ; for, if he is

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to retain the Title of King, it cannot be imagined he can ever return to *France* with that Character; that would, upon many Accounts, be so inconvenient, that, had his Return thither been intended, we may be sure his former Title would have been retained. If, therefore, the Name of King was to remain to him, it was intended a Kingdom should do so too; and from thence one of these two Things necessarily followed, either that the King of *France* would make only a separate Peace for himself, and leave the Allies to get *Spain* as they could; or, if he agreed to a general one, it should be upon the Foot of a Partition. But these Inferences, as natural as they were, did not hinder the States to grant the Passports desired, and to do every Thing they could to facilitate the Way to a good Peace.

This short Account of what passed from Monsieur *Petkum's* Journey to *Paris* to this Time, that is, from the latter End of *November*, to the Beginning of *March*, leaves but little Room to expect much from the new Conferences; the Affair having, in this Interval, not at all advanced, but rather gone backwards. For, before that Journey, the constant Language was to look out for an Expedient for the 37th Article, and that all the others were allowed. But, from that Journey, that Language began to change; some Things were to be left out, others put in; the Form, which is the Life of them, as Articles, is taken away, and the Whole new modelled, and the Security is destroyed, while the Execution, agreed on, is deferred. This is all this Interval
produced,

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produced, till just the End of it, when the old Language is again resumed, and the only Point to be adjusted, in Appearance, is the 37th Article.

As this Management of *France* gave the States no great Opinion of their being yet sincere, they pushed the Preparations of the Campaign with all the Vigour possible, and erected prodigious Magazines on the Frontier, that the Army might be able to take the Field early; and wrote, in very pressing Terms, to the Queen, that she would please to send over the Duke of M——, if he could be spared so soon, before the End of *February*, that they might have the Benefit of his *wise Counsels*, as well as reap the Advantage of his *incomparable Valour*: This is the Language in which the States, who have had so much Experience of him, always speak of this great Man; a sufficient Reason with some to undervalue him, who know nothing themselves, but are taught to think whatever the *Dutch* do must be wrong. But to go on, as the Suspicions the *French* gave of their Insincerity, made the States pursue the most effectual Measures for an early Campaign; so it put them upon Taking the best Care they could, that, if no Good should come from the Renewing of the Conferences, they might prevent the Mischief they apprehended was designed by them. And, therefore, though they gave Leave for the Conferences to be renewed, they would not suffer the Ministers of *France* to come into the Heart of their Country, till the Point in Dispute should be agreed. Since the *French* pretended to except to
nothing

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nothing but the 37th Article, and said, they had an Expedient for that, which, they doubted not, would give Content; this being an Affair, which, in all Appearance, required but little Time, and seemed not to require many Conferences; the States proposed, upon *Antwerp* being disliked, to send their Deputies to confer with the Ministers of *France*, either at *Moerdyke*, or *Gertruydenberg*. The *French* liked neither of these Places, but, when no other could be obtained, they chose the last; where they arrived the 10th of *March*, but were met the Day before, by the Deputies of the States, at *Moerdyke*, where was held the first Conference; which sufficiently shewed what slender Hopes there were of any great Good from them. The Ministers of *France* were the Marquis *d'Uxelles* and the Abbé *de Polignac*, Men extremely well qualified for the Business they came upon: And the Deputies, on the Part of the States, were Messieurs *Buys* and *Vanderdussen*, the same by whom the first Conferences with Monsieur *Rouillé* were managed the Year before; and who are known, which I should have mentioned in my last, to have no Aversion to a Peace, if it could be had on reasonable Terms. These Conferences, which were begun on *March* the 9th, continued till *July*; on the 25th of which Month, the *French* Ministers left *Gertruydenberg*: So that these Conferences lasted more Weeks than they should have been suffered to do Days; there being but one single Point, by their own Confession, in Dispute; which is the only Fault that, I believe, any body can find in the Part the States had in the Management of

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this Affair ; and they were as sensible themselves of it, as any body else could be. They knew the Advantage the *French* made of the Stay of their Plenipotentiaries in *Holland* ; which contributed extremely to keep up the Spirits of the People in *France*, and make them bear patiently the Continuance of the War, and the arbitrary and violent Methods made Use of to support it. *Bread and Peace* was the Cry of the common People all over *France* ; and the Court was continually afraid of Tumults in the great Towns, and in the remoter Provinces ; which made it necessary to quiet them with the most specious Appearances of Peace, which they all along gave out was as good as made : And every Express that arrived, the People were made to hope, would bring the welcome News that the Articles were signed. Nor were the *French* content to impose thus on their own People, their Emissaries did the same Thing in *Holland* ; and it was, by their Means, often very confidently reported, that all was agreed, when the *States*, who had no Interest in Deceiving their People, gave themselves no Occasion for their Entertaining such false Hopes. But this the *French* did, to make them insensibly grow weary of the War, and shew themselves out of Humour with their Governors ; and that they might have the Odium of Deceiving them, while themselves made their Uses of it: One of which was, to enable them to find Credit more easily at *Amsterdam* ; where, underhand, it is certain great Sums of Money were negotiated, and sent in Specie to *France* ; which an Appearance of Peace very much facilitated,

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tated, by the Hopes it gave of good Payment; and, in the mean Time, there was the Temptation of great Interest: And, besides all the other Purposes these Reports of Peace served to, they hoped it might make the *States* themselves less forward to supply the great Expence which a vigorous Siege calls for, and utterly averse to a Battle, which the *French* were most afraid of; and, whenever the Conferences should end, the greater the Expectations had been of Peace, the more People would be dissatisfied at its Going off; and the Fault would seem to be least theirs, who had been loudest and talked most for it. These Advantages the *French*, in Fact, did make of the Stay of their Plenipotentiaries at *Gertruydenberg*; and it was beforehand easy to see they would: But the Remedy was not so easy. And, therefore, though the *States* were sensible, from the first Conference, that the wisest Part, they could take, was to send them back immediately, or limit their Stay to a very short Time; they did not only manage their Conferences by Deputies, who, as I have said, want no Inclination to Peace, but suffered the *French* to stay till there was not the least Pretence for more Conferences, or the *French*, at least, would make none, but were themselves willing to be gone. This the *States* thought themselves obliged to do, to prevent the Insinuations of the *French*, which were industriously spread by their Emissaries, as if the old Ministry, the Pensionary, and his Friends, were averse to Peace, and had a Design to perpetuate the War for their own Interest. This is a Calumny has too much Influ-

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ence on the Minds of the People in other Governments, to think that great Care ought not to be taken to obviate the Force and Mischief of it, in one that is wholly popular. This was the Reason that determined the *Dutch* Ministry to let the Plenipotentiaries make so long a Stay; for they too have their Enemies, though not hitherto successful ones.

But to come to the Conferences themselves: The First was on *March* the 9th, at *Moerdyke*; in which, to shew what might be expected from the rest, the Ministers of *France*, after all Assurances that had been given of the King's agreeing to those Articles which give up the whole *Spanish* Monarchy in the most ample Manner, begun with proposing a Partition; and that *Naples* and *Sicily*, with *Sardinia*, and the Towns upon the Coast of *Tuscany* belonging to *Spain*, should be granted to one of the Competitors, without naming which: That, since the *Dutch* would not be satisfied with cautionary Towns in *Flanders*, no other Expedient was left but this; it being very hard to oblige the King to force his Grandson to quit, and impossible to persuade him to it, without a valuable Consideration. Though nothing could be more exactly against the Preliminaries than this Proposal of a Partition, the Allies did not wholly reject it, nor did the other Side absolutely insist upon all they at first asked; which if they had, little had remained for them but to go back, it being impossible to think the Emperor would ever consent to part with *Naples*, which would give the *French* such Footing in *Italy*, as would soon make them

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them Masters of the Whole, and endanger his Hereditary Country. The Ministers of *France* were made so sensible of this, as to give up the Point, and say, They believed the King would, for the Sake of Peace, be prevailed with to desist from that Part of his Demands, towards which they promised their good Offices: And so the first Conference ended. The Deputies returned to the *Hague*, and the Plenipotentiaries sent an Express to the King, to let him know what had passed. Upon the Return of the Express, the Plenipotentiaries sent to the *Hague* to desire another Conference; which was agreed to, and the 20th the Deputies went a second Time to confer with them: Their Part, in these Interviews, having been concerted in the mean Time with the Ministers of the Emperor and *England*, at several Meetings for that Purpose; and the rest of the Allies having been, at a general Meeting, informed of what had been moved in the first Conference. And this was the constant Way in which these Negotiations were carried on, while the Ministers of *France* continued at *Gertruydenberg*. At the End of a Conference they sent an Express to Court; and, upon his Return, perhaps the next Day, perhaps two or three Days after, when they had decyphered their Instructions, and settled Matters between themselves, they notified it at the *Hague*, and desired another Conference; which was agreed to. The Deputies went, conferred, returned, reported; upon which the Allies meet, consult, agree, and settle what farther Steps should be made on their Part. The *French*, on their

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Side, send an Express again to Court, and so on. In this Manner the Deputies went to a third Conference the 6th of *April*, and to a Fourth the 23d. The main Point, debated in these Conferences, was this Partition. And, that no Obstruction to a general Peace on this Foot, on the Part of *England*, might arise from the Address of the two Houses mentioned in my last, Care was taken by the D. of *M.* and the late M—— that the Parliament should not be prorogued in the Spring as usually ; but that the Session should be continued, by short Adjournments, till all Hopes of Peace were at an End, that the Q—— might have their Concurrence, to agree to such a Partition as they should think reasonable. The King of *France* was willing, at last, to recede from *Naples* being Part of it, but insisted on the rest, and would by no Means consent to quit the Towns on the Coast of *Tuscany*, which his Grandson had still Possession of. And, as he was unwilling to give up these, so the Deputies could not consent to part with *Sardinia*, which was already in the Emperor's Possession. So that, on the Part of the Allies, the Deputies were unwilling to part with any Thing, of the Partition proposed, but *Sicily*, and the *French* would quit nothing but *Naples*. The Allies were willing to give something for a general Peace, and it was thought *France*, if they were sincere, would be willing to take any Thing. And this the Allies had the more Reason to expect, from the Turn the Campaign was like to take : The D. of *M.* and Prince *Eugene*, who left the *Hague* the 14th, having passed the *Scarpe*,
without

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without Opposition, the 20th, of which the States had the welcome News Time enough for the Deputies to carry it with them to the fourth Conference. But this Success, which put *France* into a great Consternation, had, in Appearance, no Effect on them. They pretended they had no Power to recede from their last Demands, but would send to Court for farther Instructions; for which they were allowed till the 18th of *May*. But they had no Occasion, it seems, for so much Time: Their Express came back the 3d, which was notified the 7th; but the King still insisting, it was to no Purpose to have more Conferences, which was signified to them by Mr. *Petkum*. Upon which they pretended to be very stiff, and declared they would leave *Gertruydenberg* the 15th or 16th; and the Jest was carried so far, that Part of their Retinue and Equipage was actually sent away. But this was all a Feint: When the 15th came, an Express arrived very *à propos*, to salve Appearances, and enable them to stay with a good Grace: Which they notified the 18th, and the Deputies went to them the 23d. And, in this Conference, the King was pleased to desist from the Towns on the Coast of *Tuscany*, but adhered to his Demand of *Sicily* and *Sardinia*. And, to remove the Objection against the last, a Project had been some Time forming to make a Descent on it, and get into Possession; which Design, when it was in a Manner executed, was happily defeated by a Part of the Forces that were then going from *Italy* to *Catalonia*.

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This Point of the Partition being driven as far it would go, it was now the Turn of the Allies to ask, supposing this Partition agreed to, that these Parts of the *Spanish* Monarchy should be given to the Duke of *Anjou*, which Way the King proposed they should have the rest secured to them: For the Reason the Allies insisted on the 37th Article was, that they might have a general Peace, and not be involved in a separate War with *Spain*. This was the Business of these Conferences, and there was no Sense in the *French* pretending to demand a Partition upon any other Terms, but supposing the Allies would quit one Part of the Monarchy to the Duke of *Anjou*, that he should quit the rest to them. It was to be presumed, the King knew his Grandson's Mind upon this Head, and that he had either Authority from him to treat of a Partition, or that he had himself the Power in his Hands to oblige him to consent to it. But this the Plenipotentiaries could not speak fully to at this Conference; it was left to be the Subject of the next, which was not held till *June* 16. For, though that Express arrived the 6th, it was not notified till the 10th. By this Time the *French* Court were pretty well out of Pain for *Arras*, their Army having been some Time assembled, and in such Ground, as would make it impracticable for the Allies to come either at them or the Town: And this probably had no little Share in regulating the Motions of the *French* Counsels, and the Instructions they sent to their Ministers; with whom the Deputies had, on the 16th, Conferences from Morning to Night, upon
this

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this capital Point, How the Allies should be put into Possession of *Spain* and the *Indies*. To which the Answer was, That the King was willing to concert the proper Measures with them, according to the fourth Article. But this the Deputies could not think sufficient; for this he was obliged to by the Preliminaries, though the 37th had been struck out; besides that, it was inconsistent with a general Peace, which they had all along insisted on, and would necessarily engage them in a *Spanish* War, which they had been treating of a Partition to prevent. But, to understand their Meaning more distinctly, they desired them to explain themselves, what those Measures were, the King would come into: Would he join his Force to theirs, to oblige his Grandson to accept the Terms he should make for him? Why yes, perhaps he would. But, in the Discussing this Point, they took Care to start a thousand Difficulties, to shew it was impracticable; such as these, how to settle what should be the whole Force employed to reduce *Spain* and the *Indies*; what Share each should contribute; how they should act, jointly or separately; who should command; how and where, and by whom their Instructions for Acting should be formed, and the like; and the same Difficulties might be started for the Sea-Service. Well, if these Measures are impracticable, as, no Doubt, they are where one Party never designs to come heartily into them; What are those the King will come into? Why, he will contribute a certain Sum of Money towards the Expence the Allies shall be at on this Occasion. How now will this
mend

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mend the Matter? How shall they be able to settle the Sum, and secure the Payment? The first of these is a very difficult Point, when it comes to be drawn out into Particulars, and to be considered how hard it is to know the Expence of such a War, how long it may continue, when and where, and at what Time the Payments shall be made; and, if a Sum certain cannot be fixed at first, who shall settle the Proportion *France* shall pay, or oblige them to acquiesce in it? But, if these Difficulties could be overcome, what Security can the Allies have for Payment? A very pretty one, indeed, is that which the *French* offered, That the richest Bankers of *Paris* should be bound for it. One would be glad to know, what Remedy the Allies could have against their Bankers in Case of Failure, or how they can reach them. To take *Paris* itself does not seem to me more difficult. But they are Men of Honour, and may be trusted: It is true, and so they have been, till the King's Affairs have made the greatest of them Bankrupts. But if they were Men of ever so much Honour, or were ever so much concerned to support their personal Credit in their own private Affairs: What is Honour or Credit against Reason of State, where an arbitrary Prince is pleased to interpose? Which the King has, this Summer particularly, shewn, he knows how to do; having, for very great Sums, taken the Debts of his Bankers on himself, and declared them his, and by that Means has rendered all legal Remedies impossible. Before, indeed, their Credit was better than the King's, but, by being used for him,

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it is sunk as low as his, and, in Effect, become one with it, that is, no Credit at all. And is not this a rare Security for the Allies to trust, for the Payment of such Sums as may be supposed to be the King's Share in the Charge of so expensive a War? And, if Security could be given for a Sum certain, what is this but, in Effect, to sell a Part of the *Spanish* Monarchy for a Sum of Money, towards carrying on a War, which he will take Care to render ineffectual?

Upon the Report which the Deputies made the 18th, of what had passed in this Conference, the Allies had several Meetings to consider what should be the next-Step. It was plain from the Account the Deputies had given, that it was to no Purpose to think of concerting Measures with *France* for a War with *Spain*, after a Peace made with them: What had been said, about both Troops and Money, evidently shewed, nothing of that Kind could be thought of, which *France* would not be able to defeat, by the Difficulties with which they would take Care to puzzle it; that all Proposals of this Nature were not only inconsistent with the End for which these Conferences were resumed, which was to find an Expedient for the 37th Article, and obtain the Thing designed by the Preliminaries, which was a general Peace; but also contrary to what had, from the Beginning of them, been supposed, upon the *French* proposing a Partition: Which could mean nothing else, but that they were willing the *Spanish* Monarchy should effectually be given up to the Allies, some Part being taken out for the Benefit

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nefit of the Duke of *Anjou*. That, if there were in Earnest Need of Force to compel the Duke of *Anjou* to it, which was not at all probable, it ought to lie wholly on the King, since he had, from the Beginning, promised the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and had laid it down as the Foundation on which they were to treat; which left no Room to doubt, but that the King knew he could, by Persuasion or Constraint, oblige his Grandson to consent to it, since, otherwise, such a Promise could have no other Meaning in it, but, from the Beginning, to amuse and impose on the Allies. But, however, if Force were necessary, they were willing the Troops, they had in *Portugal* and *Catalonia*, should act in Concert with the King's, to obtain this End within the two Months, or such other Time as should be agreed on. And whoever considers the Duke of *Anjou's* Dependance on *France*, will easily be satisfied, that, if the King were sincere, and in Earnest meant what his Ministers had all along promised in his Name, a small Force, and a very little Time, would be more than enough.

Upon these Considerations the Allies resolved to reject the Offer of Money they had made, because it supposed a particular Peace with *France*, and the Continuation of the War with *Spain*, which they could not consent to, for Reasons given in the first Conference; and to demand of them to explain themselves upon the Subject of the Evacuation of *Spain* and the *Indies* in Favour of King *Charles*, agreeably to the Preliminaries, before the Allies could declare their Intentions
with

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with Respect to the Partition ; and that, unless they did this, all farther Conferences would be to no Purpose.

This Resolution the Allies signified to the Ministers of *France*, in a Letter to them from Mr. *Petkum*, July 8, to which they declined giving a distinct Answer, but desired another Conference ; which was accordingly held with them the 13th ; in which the Deputies having explained fully the Sense of the Allies, and the Resolution sent them by Mr. *Petkum* (not that it wanted any Explanation, though the Plenipotentiaries had thought fit to say so, to avoid giving a distinct Answer to it) they insisted on a like clear and full Explication on the Part of *France* : And this being a Home-push, that left no Room for Evasion. When they saw themselves thus pressed, they resolved to put the best Face they could upon the Matter, and were pleased to call this peremptory Summons to explain themselves, a formal Rupture of the Treaty ; and that therefore nothing was left for them to do, but to return Home. The Deputies gave them Time to send once more to Court, in which they desired there might be no Delays, and so parted. The Express, they sent to *Versailles*, did not stay above two or three Hours, as if he had gone merely for Form Sake, and was back again at *Gertruydenberg* the 18th ; which they notified the 21st, with a long Letter, to the Pensionary, in Form of a Manifesto, and went themselves away the 25th. This Letter, I take for granted, you have seen, it has been so often printed ; and, therefore, need not tell you it has
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in it all the Art of a *French* Writer, and of an able Minister; and that it is as well done as the Cause, they are to defend, will admit: But, if you have read this Letter, I cannot but suppose you have also read the Resolution of the States, *July 27*, in Answer to it; which is writ with that Plainness and Sincerity, it is so free from Disguise and Artifice, there is in it such solid Reasoning, so much good Sense, such a Force of Truth, that a Man must be a very ill Judge, or have no very honest Mind, that cannot see, or will not own, that the Integrity and Honour of the Allies is abundantly justified and cleared from the false Aspersions which the *French* Letter would throw upon them; and that the ill Success of these Negotiations is intirely owing to those, who would cast the Blame of the Rupture upon them; it being exceeding plain, that the King of *France* has put it out of the Power of the Allies to make a general Peace, by refusing to give them *Spain* and the *Indies*, without which a good Peace can never be made, or the End for which we went into the War tolerably answered; and, the more this Affair is examined into, the more you will be convinced of the Insincerity of the *French*; and the Necessity the Allies were under, to act as they did.

First, it is indisputably true, and confessed on all Hands, that the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*, whatever became of the rest of the Monarchy, was promised from the very first; they did not pretend to desire so much as one single Conference for Peace on any other Terms.

Now,

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Now, if the King could do what he promised, What becomes of the pretended Impossibility? And, if he could not, What could he mean by such a Promise, but to amuse and deceive? But, if he designed that, then, it undeniably follows, all these Negotiations, on his Part, have been one continued Cheat from the Beginning to the End. And, that this is the Truth of the Case, I have given you many Proofs, both in my last Letter, and in this. All the Expedients he proposed were so many Shams, and had no other Meaning in them, but to gain Time, quiet his People, and sow Jealousies among the Allies; and defeat, if possible, by a Treaty, those he cannot defeat by his Arms. What else could he mean by proposing a Partition as an Expedient, and yet refusing to let it have the Effect of one? To ask the States to consent to a Partition and not suffer them to ask for what, is a little too barefaced. Could they think the *Dutch* would consent to this Expedient, for the Sake of a general Peace, without being sure a general Peace would be purchased by it? I scarce believe they expected that of them; but nevertheless hoped they should gain their Ends by it; and that the very Harkening to the Proposal of a Partition, would create Jealousies and divide the Allies, in which they did not judge very ill; for the Conferences upon this Foot very much alarmed the Ministers of the Emperor and King *Charles*, who were utterly averse to a Partition of any Kind; and it was with great Difficulty they were prevailed with to consent to let the Conferences, with the Ministers of *France*,
be

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be managed by the Deputies of the States, without their being themselves present at them ; which would have rendered the Negotiations, for a general Peace, much more difficult than they were, though *France* had been in Earnest for it. And this was all *France* aimed at, by proposing a Partition ; some of the Allies, they knew, would be extremely against it, while the States, they hoped, would, for so desirable an End, be willing enough to come into it ; and this Difference they promised themselves much from : But, for Fear this Difficulty should be overcome, and the Allies should take them at their Words, and accept some of the Expedients offered, they had another Resort behind, by which they could, at any Time, confound all that had been done, and had great Hopes, at the same Time, that the Alliance might be broke by it. And that was this ; they pretended they could not execute any Part of the Preliminaries, unless the Allies would oblige themselves not to make any farther Demands than what were already contained in those Articles, or, that they should be now declared ; which is contrary to the 32d Article, in which there is a Power expressly reserved for the Empire, the four associated Circles, the Kings of *Portugal* and *Prussia*, and the Duke of *Savoy*, to make what what farther Demands they shall find reasonable. This the *French* insisted on, for no other Reason but because they knew it was impossible for the Allies, in Justice, to comply with it, unless the respective Powers above-named had had Ministers at the *Hague* with full Instructions from each of them ;
which

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which they knew they neither had, nor could have, without losing a great deal of Time : Besides, this Demand of the *French* is contrary not only to the express Terms of the Preliminaries, but to the very Nature of them ; for, if nothing is to be left to be adjusted at a general Treaty, How does a Preliminary Treaty differ from it ? But it was very much for the Purpose of the *French*, who meant nothing but to amuse the Allies, and make Mischief, to insist on it ; which accordingly they did, being sure, which ever Part the Allies took, they should find their Account in it. For, if the Allies would not agree to this Demand, then there was always a Handle ready to break off the Treaty upon ; as long as farther Demands may be made upon them, they cannot be sure any Concessions will procure a lasting Peace, and they shall be in Danger of having the War renewed upon them, after all they shall have done to put an End to it. And this is very plausible and specious ; but, as I shall shew you by and by, has at the Bottom nothing at all in it. But if the Allies had complied with this Demand, and declared no farther Demands should be insisted on, What a fine Game would the *French* have had ? They had nothing else to do, to break the Alliance, but to represent to some of these Members of it, how their Interests were neglected, and what poor Terms the Maritime Powers and the Emperor have made for them. You see, Gentlemen, the utmost your Allies ask for you ; you see the Whole you are to expect from them ; these are the Terms they have made for you, and they have

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promised to oblige you to acquiesce in them : Are these Allies worth adhering to ? Come over to the Interest of the King, and support his first Pretensions, and you will find both him and his Grandson more grateful ; you shall have this, and that, and t'other good Thing ; this Town, that Principality, so much Money, such a valuable Match ; in short, Terms infinitely more advantageous to your Masters, and the Interest of their Families, than any Thing the Allies will do for you. This Artifice the *French* found the good Effects of the last War, and their Fingers itch to be again at it ; for this was the Way they drew off a certain Prince then, which was the Ruin of that Confederacy ; after their Emissaries had been for some Time in *Holland* proposing under-hand Terms of Peace, and endeavouring to find what Articles the principal Allies would be content with for the rest : When they had learnt this, the Use they made of it was to seduce one of them, by offering much better Terms than had been asked for him ; the Bait took, and it was agreed to leave the Side he thought himself ill used by ; nothing remained but to contrive how this might be done most decently ; the Way agreed on was to invade his Country with a great Army, and lay Siege to his Capital. What could the unhappy Prince do in these Circumstances ? He is in the utmost Danger, his Allies neither do nor can support him ; there is no Safety for him but in a Peace. Thus a Member was brought off from the last Confederacy ; and the same Play they want to be again at. This is so certain, that we
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are sure they were trying this very Trick with the same Prince. While the Marquis *de Torcy* made, at the *Hague*, such mighty Difficulties in Complying with the Terms demanded for the Duke of *Savoy*, whom, he pretended, his Master had great Reason to be dissatisfied with, this false perfidious Court was, at that very Time, tempting him with better Offers at *Turin*; but that Prince understood his Interests too well to hearken again to them.

This is the Use the Ministers of *France* hoped to make of this Demand of theirs, if the Allies had been weak enough to have agreed to it; but they were not to be so imposed on, nor would they act in so arbitrary a Manner, as to force any of their Allies to submit to Terms made against their Consent, or without their Knowledge; and, therefore, could not, by all the Artifice of *France*, be prevailed with to preclude them from making such farther Demands as they should think reasonable. But, to shew they were sincere, they were willing to desist from all further Demands for themselves, according to the 31st Article; this they could do, more, in Justice, they could not. And, had the *French* been in Earnest on their Part, they would, without Difficulty, have trusted the Allies in this Point; for they could not, with any Colour of Reason, believe, that when the Maritime Powers and the Emperor were satisfied, they would renew the War at the End of two Months, or what other Time should have been agreed on, for the Sake of any farther Demands on the Part of the other Allies, which it

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would not be very reasonable for *France* to grant them. And, therefore, it cannot be thought they meant any Thing else, by urging this Point, but to make Mischief, and draw the Allies, if they could, into a Snare ; and, if that did not succeed, that they might always have it in their Power to go off.

To reduce the whole Management of the *French*, in this Affair, under one short View : They press the Allies to an Impossibility, contrary to the Preliminaries, and complain, at the same Time, of being pressed to an Impossibility themselves, tho' the Allies ask nothing but what they themselves offered from the Beginning ; and the Steps they have taken, in this Point, are very extraordinary. First, Negotiations are broke off upon the single Point of the 37th Article ; then an Expedient is offered of cautionary Towns ; then the Conferences are again desired to be renewed, upon repeated Assurances of agreeing to all the other Preliminaries except the 37th ; then, as what would solve all Difficulties, a Partition is proposed, which is at last reduced to *Sicily* and *Sardinia*. And what is all this for ? Will they sign the Preliminaries, if this Partition is agreed to ? By no Means ; they take the very Asking of this Question for a plain Design in the Allies to break off the Conferences ; and they who would have given you before all the Preliminaries, except the 37th Article and three cautionary Towns, now take it very ill you will not accept the Preliminaries, not only without that Article, but without any cautionary Towns, or other Expedient, though *Sardinia* and *Sicily* be taken

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taken out of them, without having for this any more Security given than before, that *Spain* and the *Indies* shall be restored, though the Proposing a Partition could not possibly have any other Meaning in it: For it was proposed as an Expedient, but for what? To leave the Allies where it found them? No sure; but to remove the pretended Difficulty of Evacuating *Spain* and the *Indies* in Favour of King *Charles*. But, if this be the plain Meaning of this Proposal, How came the Treaty to break off upon this Point? What can be more unjust than to desire the Allies to quit Part of what the Preliminaries give them, for the Sake of the rest, and yet not tell them which Way the rest is to be had? What more ridiculous than to press the States to all the Inconveniencies which the Consenting to a Partition might be attended with, without Allowing them the least Advantage from it? How can one reconcile the Asking a Partition at the Beginning of the Conferences, and then Breaking them off, because the Allies desire to be secured of the Effect proposed from it?

Now, after all that has been said upon this Subject, can there be any Doubt which Side is in Fault, or, at whose Door it lies, that these Conferences did not succeed? One would think, without entering into the Merits of the Cause, we should, in this Case, believe our Friends rather than our Enemies, and not be in the least at a Loss to know where to lay the Fault, that these Negotiations were broke off, especially considering the Part, the Allies acted, was what they all readily

concurred in. Such Friends, in such a Case, and when so unanimous, ought surely to be credited, by those at least who are not themselves competent Judges of the Matter; and even they that are ought to be very sure of the Goodness of their Reasons, before they presume to dissent from them, much more before they censure them: And, if we all think ourselves so wise, that we will be using our own Judgments, yet sure more Credit will be allowed to such, so many and so faithful Friends, who are embarked with us in the same Interest, than to Enemies, the Worst of Enemies, the basest, falsest, most trickish, most perfidious Court under Heaven: For that the *French* Court is, and has been, Time out of Mind. So that even in a disputable Case, which this is far from being, it would be absurd to credit them before our Friends, especially in an Affair, where it is of the utmost Importance to them to deceive; and, therefore, all the Words they can use, be they ever so solemn, ought not, upon their bare Credit, to have any Weight with us. The grand Project of a universal Monarchy is now upon the Point of being finished or destroyed; it is now at its Crisis; one or other must, in a little Time, be the Fate of it: And can we think they will stick at Saying any Thing, true or false, to prevent the Ruin of it? No; what they will, or, rather, will not do to secure their Project, now they have brought it to such a Point, you cannot better judge, than by seeing what they could bring themselves to do for the Sake of it in its Infancy, when it was but just thought of, and then hardly seemed

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seemed practicable. There is, in the Memoirs of the Treaty of *Munster* lately published, so remarkable an Instance of this, as should deter a Man, as long as he remembers it, from giving Credit easily to any Affeверations whatsoever of a *French* Minister, when it is for the Interest of his great Master, to which all good Faith and Sincerity must bend. There must be no squeamish Kind of Honour; no Integrity must be inflexible; it is the King, he must be obeyed, and nothing must be boggled at that is for his Service. The Case was this: The Union of *France* and *Spain* was a Project Cardinal *Mazarin* was extremely fond of; and, to facilitate this, he hoped, at the Treaty of *Munster*, to get from *Spain* the *Low-Countries*, which he proposed to do two Ways: First, To have them in Exchange for *Catalonia*, which the *French* had taken from the *Spaniards* in the War they were then endeavouring to put an End to. Secondly, By Way of Dowry upon a Marriage of the Infanta with the King. This Design the Cardinal was so full of, that one meets with it in almost all his Instructions and Letters to the *French* Plenipotentiaries, from one End of the Memoirs to the other; and he had endeavoured to draw the Prince of *Orange* into it, upon a Promise of the Marquisate of *Antwerp*. This Matter, somehow or other, took Air, and alarmed the States extremely, who were then in League with *France*. Their Plenipotentiaries at *Munster* complained of it to the Ministry of *France*, who protested nothing of that Kind had ever been proposed to them by the *Spaniards*. But this did not satisfy

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the States; the Year after, 1647, one of their Ambassadors, *Monf. Servien*, went to *Holland*, and, to allay the Jealousies and Fears this Affair had given the States, he protests there is nothing in it, in a Manner the most solemn that can be imagined: He writes a Letter in *April*, about six Weeks after the Prince of *Orange* was dead, to each of the Provinces, and therein tells them, that, as to the pretended Treaties of Marriage or Exchange, it is so gross an Invention (*une fourbe si grossiere*) that there is no Man, who understands any Thing of Affairs, but must know it would be as great Imprudence as Perfidiousness to hearken to any such Propositions; and, though there be no Room for them to doubt of the Assurances which the King's Ministers had already given them, yet, says he, I protest a-new to your Lordships, upon my Life and my Honour, that they are Falsties, maliciously invented by the Enemy; and I submit myself to lose both, if, on the Part of *France*, any Ear has been given to any Thing of this Kind, or any Negotiation has been entered into. After so solemn a Declaration, the good Ambassador thinks it but just that the Authors of this Imposture should be punished in an exemplary Manner, for daring to attack with their Calumnies the Faith and Reputation of a great King. And have we not great Reason to take the bare Word of a Minister of *France*, when they are our Enemies, who could deceive, in this solemn Manner, those whom, at that Time, they were in League with? Others may have a good Opinion of *French* Faith, if they please, and think the Pro-

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testations of *Torcy* or *Polignac* of more Weight than what a whole Congress of our Allies tell us ; for my Part, I shall always remember *Servien*, who acted this scandalous Part, not as *Servien*, but as the Ambassador of *France*, for the same King, and for the same Cause, we are now treating with, and guarding against. There is nothing to false, I cannot think this Prince and his Ministers capable of, that can help them to give the finishing Stroke to their Project, when they could violate their Faith in so infamous a Manner, to give the first Beginnings to it. And, I confess, it is a great Surprise to me, to think we should not in this be all of the same Mind.

But some Men, it seems, were in so much Haste for Peace, that they could not bear the Disappointment ; they had Work to be done, that would not stay ; and yet could not, without a Peace, conveniently be carried on. The Want, they had of a Peace, made them too easily believe there would be one ; and their Impatience to be doing would not let them wait till they could be sure : They were so fond of their Leap, that they were resolved to take it in the Dark ; they find themselves plunged so deep, they do not know which Way to turn themselves, or how to get out, and then are angry there is not a Peace, and would fain lay the Fault on others, right or wrong, to excuse what they have brought upon themselves. In Truth, it was a very great Dilemma these Gentlemen were under : It was very much for their Purpose to have the Ferment, the Nation is in, and a Peace, no Matter what Sort
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of one, come both together. The Ferment they are in Possession of; the Peace is a little doubtful: What now shall they do? If they stay for a Peace, which would be very convenient for them, they may lose the Ferment; for nothing, that is so violent, can last: On the other Hand, if they take the Advantage of the Ferment, they may lose the Peace. Well, it is resolved to venture; if they lose one, it but Ruining the Nation; whereas Losing the other would be the Ruin of themselves. When that is the Dilemma, it is no great Wonder such Men should chuse the Side they have: Self weighs more with them than a whole Nation, whom they vainly think they cannot only make blind, but keep so; and hope to skreen themselves from their Resentments, by Setting them upon those who never did them any Harm, but have steadily pursued their true Interests.

But, if a Nation cannot see, they can feel; and the Time may come when they, who are now so angry with the late M—— that there is no Peace, may find it more than they can do, to excuse themselves for bringing the Nation into a Necessity of submitting to an ill one. When People have been long well in their Affairs, they may contract such an Insensibility of the good Condition they are in, as to be persuaded they are ill; but, when their Affairs go very ill, it is not in the Power of Words to make them believe they go well; and there is nothing can prevent this, nothing can save the Nation from the Dangers some Men would bring it into, and them from what they

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they deserve for it, but the unshaken Constancy, and unwearied Endeavours of those very Men, whom they daily load with the blackest Calumnies, and treat in so barbarous a Manner, as if they never thought they could be used ill enough.

But to return to the Rupture of the Conferences; it is plain they broke off, because the *French* would not secure to the Allies the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*; and it is as plain the *French* ought to have done this; it is what they promised from the Beginning, and undertook for at the Opening of these Conferences, the Proposal of a Partition being incapable of any other fair Construction; and therefore the Blame of the Rupture can lie only upon the *French*, or on those who have encouraged them to act thus, by Discovering the mighty Haste they were in for Peace. For, whether the *French*, when they first began these Conferences, intended they should end as they did, may possibly be a Question. I must own, when I heard they had proposed a Partition, I thought the Necessity of their Affairs had at last forced them to be sincere, and that they would have struck up a Peace before *Doway* was taken, that the Allies might not extend their Conquests beyond the Bounds of their Preliminaries. And, perhaps, even after this they might balance with themselves, and were for some Time irresolute, with Intention to consent or not consent to the Allies, as they found themselves pressed by the War. And, could the Duke of *M——* have either beat their Army, or besieged *Arras*, I believe they would have thought the King might
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with Honour have abandoned his Grandson, after he had sacrificed so much for the Support of him ; and the Safety of *France* would have excused, to all the World, his Quitting *Spain* : And it was with this View principally, they kept their Ministers so long at *Gertruydenberg*, that they might be upon the Spot, to clap up a Peace immediately, if there should be Occasion. By this they were sure to have an Advantage in Case of a Battle, which ever Way it turned ; for, if they lost it, they would have been able to prevent the fatal Consequences of a great Defeat, by closing with the Terms of the Allies, before a Victory could be pursued ; and, if they had won it, they would have made Use of the first Consternation, which the Loss of a Battle would have put the *Dutch* into, to press them to a Peace on their Terms. That this was the most the *French* meant by these Conferences, is evident from what was doing at the same Time in *Spain*. I have observed before, that either the *Spaniards* or we must be deceived ; and, therefore, the *French* kept it in their Power, by the most artful Ways they could, to do either as they found most convenient ; but that the King's Inclination and Interest were too well known, to leave Room to doubt, that he would keep his Promise to the *Spaniards*, if he could. Accordingly we see, he did not only enable his Grandson, as I have observed before, to put *Spain* into the best Posture of Defence it was capable of, and supply him with every Thing that was necessary ; but promised to make the Siege of *Girone* early in the Spring, and was making a new offensive
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and defensive Treaty with him, during these very Conferences. And the Assistance and Assurances, the Duke of *Anjou* had given him, made him think of nothing less than quitting *Spain*. In the Spring he pretended to have an Army of 122 Battalions, and 145 Squadrons, besides the Troops that were coming to him from *Flanders*. Before the Conferences begun, the King received an Express from his Grandson, to acquaint him with the Zeal the *Castilians* express for him, and his Resolution to stand by them; and the *French* Minister at *Madrid* in *April* gave out, that the Conferences were broke off. At the same Time the Duke of *Anjou* was hastening to put himself at the Head of his Army, but was stopped by the Affair of the Duke de *Medina-Celi*; which, as great a Mystery as it is, was probably, at Bottom, a *French* Trick. It was very natural for the *Spaniards* to take Umbrage at the Conferences, and to think it was Time to take Care of themselves; and that, if the King should, in Earnest, abandon them, it was to no Purpose for them to adhere to his Grandson. To feel their Pulse upon this Point, it is probable the *French* Ministers, either *Blecour*, or *Ibberville*, or some others of their Emissaries had pretended to treat with some of the *Grande*es upon this Foot, and acquainted them, that the King's Affairs would not permit him to support his Grandson any longer, and that the King did not expect they should ruin themselves to maintain him on the Throne, since, in that Case, it would be impracticable; but that, if they would dispose him to resign, the King would endeavour

to get some Partition for him. It is extremely probable, this Trick was tried at *Madrid*, to find how the *Grandeess* were inclined to act on this Occasion; the Duke *de Medina* in particular, who was the First Minister; and that, when they had got out of him the Sense of him and his Friends on this nice Subject, the Use they made of it was to betray him to the Duke of *Anjou*; and possibly the Thing went farther, and that in Concert with the *French*, to save the King's Honour, they had agreed to seize his Person, and carry him off; which, I remember, was the first Report we had, upon that Minister's Disgrace. After this Affair was over, which had sufficiently intoxicated the *Spaniards*, the Duke of *Anjou* left *Madrid*, and joined his Army near *Lerida*. And the Duke *de Noailles* was advanced to the Banks of the *Ter*, the River *Gironne* stands upon, to favour his Designs. In *June* the Duke of *Anjou* was so sanguine, that he made no Doubt of being able to drive King *Charles* out of *Catalonia* that Campaign, especially if the Duke *de Noailles* could but make the Siege of *Gironne*: This appears at large in some Letters of his that were intercepted, to the King and the Duke of *Burgundy*, writ to congratulate the Marriage of the Duke of *Berry*, which he shews himself not at all pleased with. Upon his Disappointment in *Catalonia*, when he could neither attack *Mareschal Starenberg*, nor besiege *Baguer*, he grew dissatisfied with his *Spanish* Generals; and in *July* both he and his Princess solicit the King, in very pressing Terms, to send the Duke of *Vendosme* to him; which was soon complied

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plied with, and, that the Duke might have no Apprehensions of the King's Designing to abandon him, he entered into a new Alliance with him. This Alliance was framing while the Ministers of *France* were at *Gertruydenberg*, which Place they left but the 25th; and the 8th of *August*, or before, the Articles of this new Treaty were known publicly at *Paris*: Which makes it plain to a Demonstration, that this Treaty was forming before the Conferences were broke off.

From this Account it is exceeding evident, that the *French* were taking the most effectual Methods to support the Duke of *Anjou*, and make the *Spaniards* faithful to him, while they were persuading the Allies, the King would in Earnest abandon him, and give him no Assistance directly or indirectly; nay, while they were making Terms for him, upon which they would oblige him to resign. And, if this be not insincere in the last Degree, I would be glad to know what is. If he was sincere, Why did he treat for a general Peace, when he either would not or could not make the necessary Conditions of it practicable? Why, when he meant nothing but a separate Peace, did he not frankly, from the Beginning, tell the Allies, that he was willing to make Terms with them for for himself, but that he could make none for *Spain*? Was this for any Thing else but to amuse the Allies, who, he knew, would flatly have refused entering into any Negotiations, if he had spoke out plainly what he meant? Did not he intend, from the Beginning, to defeat, by an Exception, a general Peace, while he pretended all the

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the While to be for it? As old Managers sometimes do with a Bill in Parliament, which they contrive should be lost by an Amendment, while they would be thought zealous for it; which they would not have been able to effect, had they openly declared against the Bill itself. Thus they gain the Point they would have, by seeming to be for what, in Truth, they would not have: And the same Part the King of *France* has acted with Respect to Peace; but not yet with the same Success. He has not got yet what he wants, I mean a separate Peace, by affecting to treat for a general one; which he would, of all Things, keep off. A Man must shut his Eyes very hard, not to see the *French* meant nothing, by these Conferences, but to amuse the Allies, and keep it in their Power to make what Use of them they should have Occasion for; and that they never designed to consent to what was necessary to make a general Peace practicable: They either meant no Peace at all, or only a separate one for themselves; which they hoped, from the Temper of the *Dutch*, the Nature of their Government, and the Experience they have formerly had of them, they might be frightened into: To which End they affected, from the very first Conference, to let nothing fall from them that might look like a Desire to retard the Operations of the Campaign, but, on their own Part, threatened what mighty Things they would do upon the *Rhine* and in *Spain*; and, to intimidate them the more, *Maréchal Villars* condescended to the mean Artifice of writing to the *French* Ministers, from Time to Time,

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Time, Letters filled with the grossest Gasconade, what a brave Army he had; how desirous they were to come to an Engagement; and that if the Allies had a mind to a Battle, they should meet with no Intrenchments, but should find him ready to receive them in an open Plain. These poor Tricks they fancy'd would pass upon *Dutch* Deputies: But they were too well known to be believed; and the Event shewed there was nothing else in all these Boasts aimed at, but to deceive: For the Minute *Douay* began to capitulate, the Marechal retired to safe Ground, and intrenched with all his Might, and dared not offer them Battle all the rest of the Campaign, though more Battalions had been weakened by the Sieges of *Douay* and *Bethune*, than the Battle of *Blenheim* was fought with; and almost as many more were afterwards at the same Time employed in the Sieges of *St. Venant* and *Aire*. But these and all the other Artifices of *France* could not delude or drive the States to quit the common Interest, or induce the Allies to hearken to a separate Peace with the *French*, who they knew, were taking the most effectual Means to make the Reduction of *Spain* impossible, while they were treating of Terms for the Surrender of it. But nothing can discover more plainly the Insincerity of *France*, than what happened after these Conferences were ended: Two Days after their Plenipotentiaries were gone, the Duke of *Anjou* received a considerable Disgrace at *Almenara*, and in about three Weeks after that his Army was

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intirely defeated at *Saragossa*, beyond a possibility of maintaining his Ground, or recovering his Affairs without the Assistance of *France*. Here now was a fair Occasion for the *French* King to shew himself; his Language had been all along, that he could not be active to dethrone his Grandson, but would consent absolutely to abandon him, if that would procure a Peace. The Allies cannot take his bare Word; his Ministers make the most solemn Protestations in his Name, and give repeated Assurances of this in the most express Words, and complain heavily that they are not believed. Now in less than a Month after the Conferences were ended, there happens the best Opportunity in the World for the King to shew his great Sincerity; the Obstruction to a Peace, is the Evacuation of *Spain*. Let now the King but keep his Word, and be passive only, and the Thing will do itself; the Allies cannot fail of *Spain*, if the King does not support his Grandson against them. What Part now does the King take? Does he send to the Allies that he will abandon his Grandson in earnest, if that will not content them? Nothing like it: He balances indeed for some Time what to do, and holds frequent Councils; but for what? Not because he has any doubt, whether he should act agreeably to his Word, or shew he is sincere; for that I have already observed he could not be; he must deceive either us or the *Spaniards*. All the Debate therefore was, which he should do: At first their Affairs seemed to be in so desperate

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a Condition, as to be beyond retrieve; and that all the Support he could give his Grandson would be insignificant; and therefore, there were some Thoughts of making a Virtue of Necessity, and to procure a Peace to *France* by abandoning *Spain*, since, if he did not abandon it, it must be lost. And had the Action of *Saragossa* happened a Month sooner, it is very likely it had proved so; for the Hands of the *French* were too full of other Work to send any considerable Force to *Spain*, till the Campaign was in other Parts, *Savoy* particularly, drawing to an End. After many Consultations, 'tis resolved to make the utmost Efforts to support the Duke of *Anjou*, notwithstanding all their Pretences to leave him to himself, or rather to persuade him to quit a Kingdom which, without their Help, all the World sees he could not have kept. What Success this Assistance, that has been given him, has had, I need not tell you; nor what further Mischiefs the common Cause is like to suffer from it. 'Tis great Pity the Conferences did not last one Month longer; which would have put the *French* under a Necessity of keeping their Word, or in the most infamous Manner breaking it, to support a Cause they had so often, and with so much seeming Earnestness promised to renounce. As it is, there is but one Excuse for them, which those I am arguing against, had rather should not be made; and that is, to plead that the Case is altered, Affairs are not in the same Condition they were in, when they made these

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Promises. They have a Political Observatory at *Paris*, where the Marquis *de Torcy*, and the *French* Ministers frequently examine what Appearances there are in the Heavens of all the Countries in War with them, and according to these they take their Measures of War and Peace; and it is by this they justify their assisting the Duke of *Anjou*. What past in *Spain* the 20th of *August*, they thought sufficiently balanced by what happened to the North-West of them the 19th. What preceded that Phænomenon, and has since followed it, has determined the *French* not only to support the Duke of *Anjou*, but to desist for the present from all further Offers of Peace, by which we are as much plunged into the War as we were seven Years ago, and there seems no Remedy for it but, what is worse than the Disease, an ill Peace. For the Truth of which I shall refer you to your own Reflections upon all the News we have had for these four Months past from *Paris*, and to what is as good a Proof as all the rest, to a Letter of the Elector of *Bavaria*'s Minister to his Master, a Piece of which you have in the *Medley* of the first of this Month; which some People would be glad to prove, is not so genuine, as they know it is.

Some People indeed would still pretend to put a good Face upon the Matter, and *do not question from the D—— of M——'s past Successes, that he will yet frighten our Enemies into an honourable Peace*. But I must beg their Pardon, if I can't be of their Opinion. I am afraid he is not likely

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to do so much at this Time, when the Enemy are encouraged to take Heart afresh, the Allies are full of Jealousies and Fears, and himself extremely mortify'd; Things are not the same, any more than the Usage he meets with: When he is uneasy in his Thoughts, undermined in the Favour of his Sovereign, and vilely misrepresented to the People; when his want of Interest at Home makes it impossible for the Allies to depend on the Hopes he gives them; when he is without Authority in his Army, where it is made criminal to espouse his Interest, and to fly in his Face is the surest Means to Advancement; when it is meritorious in his Officers to cabal against him, and the most factious will be thought the most deserving. With what Heart can a Man in these Circumstances serve? Or what Success can be expected from him, when he is to depend upon professed Enemies for his Support? It is little I think, we can hope for even from him hereafter, though that little be more than any Body else could do.

But it is Time to draw to a Conclusion of this Argument, in which I have said so much, that I flatter myself I may be allowed, not as a Favour but common Justice, to conclude from it, That nothing can be more false and groundless than the malicious Aspersions of these Men, who without the least Regard to Truth, Honour or good Conscience, tell the World that the D—— of M——, in Conjunction with the late Ministry, was for perpetuating the War.

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If they should describe the D—— of M—— to be a short, black, fattish, red-fac'd, ill-shap'd Man, that loves to drink hard, never speaks to be understood, is extremely revengeful and ill-bred; if they should represent his Mind to be a Complication of all ill Qualities, and his Body to be the Image of Deformity, it would be as like him as the Picture those Gentlemen draw of him. Nothing can be more ridiculous and absurd, than to accuse of a Design to perpetuate the War, a Man who has in every Respect out-gone our Wishes, and has done more towards a good Peace, by his own Conduct, Address and Ability, both in War and Peace, by his Conduct in the Field, by his Interest with the Allies, by his happy Temper to prevent or make up Differences, by his Dexterity and Wisdom, by his great Humanity and Sweetness of Behaviour which is peculiar to him, by his Zeal for the Honour of the QUEEN, whom he has served with more Affection than most Men ever did a Mistress; and by his true Concern for the Good of his Country, and the Liberty of *Europe*, in which he has few Equals. By these admirable Qualities, which so eminently shine in him, he has done more towards a good Peace than all those that find Fault with him, ever did or will do, put them all together: He has struck such Terror into the Enemy, and preserved so perfect a Harmony among our Allies, that nothing, humanly speaking, could have destroyed our Hopes of a good Peace, but the Endeavours that have been

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been used to destroy him. What Villainy then was it to try by Calumnies and Lies to ruin him, [who could not sink without drawing the Ruin of the Nation along with him? And 'tis that Consideration makes me express myself with so much Warmth. For as for the Duke himself, he defies the feeble Efforts they make against him; their Malice may add to his Glory, by giving fresh Matter for him to shew the World how great a Man he is under all Tryals, but can lastingly take Nothing from it: For Time will dissipate the thickest Mists with which his Glory may be overcast, and the malicious Attacks of Envy and Faction may very soon turn upon themselves; and at worst Posterity will be just, and his Name will be immortal and live for ever in Esteem, while the Writers of Scandal, and their Masters, are either buried in Oblivion, or remembred with Infamy and Detestation. It is not therefore the Person of the Duke of *M*—— I am concerned for; but for the Connexion which the Fate of this poor Nation, of our Allies, of all *Europe*, has with his. It is the Prospect of an ill Peace after so glorious and successful a War, and the dismal Train of Consequences which such a Peace will bring with it: It is this disturbs me; and it is indeed this, and only this, disturbs him: For were the Glory of the *QUEEN* secured, and the Safety of his Country fixed by a safe and honourable Peace, what could be so desirable to him as to retire and leave the Theatre of Business

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to them, who want so much to have it all to themselves, and that he were gone off of it? In which, he would before now have prevented their Impatience, if the publick Service did not want him: But such is the hard Fate of this great Man, that they can neither bear his Company, nor be without him; they know not how to let him either leave his Command, or continue in it: If he had left it, then with loud Mouths they would have thrown the Odium upon him, which they dare not take upon themselves, and all the Effects of their own ill Management would have been laid upon him, as if his quitting had been the sole Cause of them; and we should have heard nothing but Invective and Complaint of his Ingratitude to his Queen and Country, after such ample Acknowledgments as they have made of his Services. But how base and unjust is this? for with what Comfort can he continue in a Command under a Notion of doing his Country Service, when all Possibility of serving well is taken from him? When nothing is left him that can make a General be obeyed or loved? What Encouragement can he have to venture upon any great Enterprize, when he is sure ill Success will be made a Crime, and good Success from him they had rather be without? What Service then is it they pretend to expect from him? Or what do they mean, by seeming desirous he should continue in his Command? I tremble with Indignation as I write, to think how strangely some Men act, who would con-
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found all Things to serve themselves, and can bear no Vertue that stands in the Way of their Designs; be it never so useful to the World, or be the Interest of their Country never so closely interwoven with it. But they tell us, we need be in no Pain for our Country. There is a certain Set of of Men, the Oracle of the Party says, *they are sure, will use all proper Means to promote a safe and honourable Peace.* Will they? I ask no more, let but the Event make good their Words, and I will forgive them all the rest. But what Means are these to be, or what Peace are we to expect from them? What these Means will be from these Words I cannot guess; but I can tell you what they will not be; they must not be such as have been already used, for this is said in Opposition to those who were for perpetuating the War. Now the Means they used, who are accused of this, were these; they kept Things quiet at Home, took the most effectual Methods to support Credit, carried on the War with Vigour, and maintained a good Correspondence with our Allies, that the common Enemy might find no Room to sow Jealousies or make Divisions. Quiet, Unity, Credit, Vigour, Harmony, these were the Means the last M—— used to perpetuate the War: I leave you then to judge, what Means those must be, that we are now told will, in Opposition to these, be used to put an End to it. But I'll venture to foretel thus much of them, that more proper Means they cannot use, no nor so proper, unless they will condescend to use

use

use the same ; and the same if they had a mind to use, they cannot, it is too late, they are not to be had. What then are we to expect, should be the End of such improper Means? Or how shall we come to a safe and honourable Peace? If the Means they use, be contrary to those that have been already used, we can have no Peace, none that is safe and honourable: For let them remember, no Peace is so, without *Spain* and the *Indies*. Either the Queen and Parliament and Nation, and the whole Body of the Allies, have been these nine Years mightily in the Wrong, who think these necessary to a good Peace; or they are so, who think any Peace can be good without them. Let them remember, it is all one which ever way we suffer *France* to keep Possession, whether by a formal Treaty, or by a separate Peace; which can hardly fail of these two Consequences, to bring the whole Weight of a *Spanish* War upon *England*, and be at last forced to quit what we have been at so great an Expence of Blood and Treasure so many Years contending for; as I have shewn you at large in my last Letter. And that is not the worst of it: If we give *Spain* and the *Indies* to the King of *France*, he will be sure to give us as good a Thing for it, a Prince bred from his Cradle in Bigotry and Tyranny; *Italian* Bigotry, and *French* Tyranny, the two greatest Plagues under the Sun; Plagues we deserve to suffer if we think them none, or repent of the Pains we have been at to keep them out. This will infallibly by the Consequence

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sequence of leaving *Spain* and the *Indies* to *France*, not perhaps presently, unless it be contrived to make it an Article in the next Treaty, which it is very easy to bring about by an ill War; but it is all one, if it be deferred a little, till the *French* have taken Breath, and are at Leisure, after finishing their own vast Designs to take Care of us, for whom they have always had a particular Regard, and will take the first good Opportunity to ruin us: For the Pretender, do doubt, will remember King *James's* dying Advice, never to quit his Religion, and always to look on the King of *France* as his Father. And I hope we shall always remember, his Father gave him that Advice, which is utterly inconsistent with our Civil and Religious Rights; and if it take Place, can end in nothing but the Ruin of this Nation. If not to come into such a Peace, be to perpetuate the War, may it still be perpetuated: If such Means and such an End, be meant by the *proper Means to promote a safe and honourable Peace*; I do not wonder, they cannot like the D—— of M——, they must find another General, and another Plenipotentiary, since he will never be for their Turn. He has gained too much Honour by the War, and espoused too far the true Interest of his Country, to promote an ill Peace, or make Way for it by an ill War; and if nothing else can please these Gentlemen, will never purchase their Favour and Applause, at the Expence of his own Glory and the Nation's Safety; to say nothing of the common Cause, which nothing will prevail

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prevail with him to betray. But I should never have done, if I were to go whither the Pursuit of these Reflections would lead me. I shall therefore, without saying more, content myself with having proved my Point, which I hope I have done to the Satisfaction of any one, who knows enough of Affairs to judge of them, and is honest enough to be impartial; such a Man I know you to be, who will, I make no doubt, own yourself convinced, that nothing can be more groundless than the Calumnies that have been thrown upon the D—— of M—— and his Friends, that the War has been ill managed, in order to perpetuate it. If what I have said be true, nothing can be more unjust and absurd than these Imputations. And I shall content myself with having shewn this, without enquiring what can be the meaning of all those malicious Lies, who they come from, what Purpose they are designed to serve, or what real Offence the D—— of M—— has given these Men; since the Things they pretend to accuse him of, are all Chimerical and Imaginary. But whatever it be they mean, it is the D—— of M——'s Happiness, under all these Disadvantages, to serve a QUEEN, who knows how to put a juster Value on the Zeal and Conduct he has shewn for the Support and Honour of her Reign; who knows, that while it is her Pleasure, and for her Service he should command, he will in spite, and I may add in Contempt of the Use which some Men prepare to make of a Peace, pursue

purſue in the moſt effectual Manner he can, the great Advances he has made towards it.

I have nothing more to add, but to aſſure you, that to the beſt of my Knowledge I have ſaid nothing that is not true, nor concealed any Thing that is, which could give Light to this Subject. I have made no wilful Miſtake in any Part, much leſs any material one in what concerns the main Questions: As for any little Inaccuracies, eſpecially in what relates to the Negotiations, conſidering the Secrecy they have been managed with, and that I write from a Place, where I have no Help either from Papers or Converſation, I ſhall hope to find an eaſy Pardon from you, ſince if theſe Papers prove nothing elſe, I am ſure you will allow they prove this, that I am with the greateſt Truth and moſt perfect Eſteem,

S I R,

Your moſt faithful

bumble Servant.

T H E

Barrier-Treaty Vindicated.

The Introduction. **T**HE Securing the *Protestant Succession* as limited by Parliament, and the providing a sufficient *Barrier* in the *Netherlands* against the Encroachments of *France*, are Points so absolutely necessary to the Preservation of the Religion and Liberty of every *British* Subject, (in the Safety of which, the True Glory of the *Prince*, as well as the Happiness of the *People* consists;) that I was very much surprized to find that a Treaty made for securing to the Nation such invaluable Blessings, should have the Misfortune to be thought Dishonourable to Her Majesty, and Prejudicial to the Interest of *Great Britain*. I could not but think it strange, that the Settlement of the Crown in the Protestant Line, should constitute the principal Glory of a former Reign; and that the Securing the very same Settlement in the most effectual Manner, should be the first avowed Dishonour of the present: That in Concerns of lesser Moment, and upon remote Prospects of Danger, *Foreign Alliances* should be so studiously sought and diligently cultivated; and yet in an Affair of the nearest Importance to the Publick Safety, it should be
thought

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thought a Diminution to the Imperial Crown of *Great Britain* to strengthen itself with a *Foreign Alliance*, against the Opposition of a *Foreign Enemy*: The covering *Flanders* with a strong *Barrier*, should always *hitherto* have been esteemed of the most immediate Concern to *England*; and that *now* every Inch of Ground assigned for that Purpose, should be canvassed and disputed, as if the Neighbourhood of an *Enemy* were more desirable than that of an *Ally*: As if taking from *France* were weakening *Ourselves*, and there were at last some danger of clipping her Wings too close, and reducing her too near to her ancient Limits. Yet such a strong Delusion is gone forth, such a thorough Change hath been wrought amongst us, that even these *Absurdities* have been industriously spread by some, and as greedily received by others; as if the very Measure and Standard of our Interest were inverted, and a Change of Persons had made a real Change in the Nature of Things themselves.

It was given out indeed at that Time, to Persons who were so bold as to ask a *Reason* for what was doing, That whatever Interest *Great Britain* might have in the Points settled by this Treaty, (which was insinuated to be *little enough*,) she certainly paid *too dear* for securing them; that several Advantages, and particularly some relating to *Trade*, were thereby sacrificed without any other Recompence than that of the *Needless* and Inconsiderable Assistance of Seven *Dutch* Provinces. But upon the Publication of the *Barrier-Treaty* itself

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self, with the Letters and Instructions relating to it, I must own that, to my great Surprise, I was so far from discovering any Advantage sacrificed, or any dear Bargain made; that I found no Stipulation throughout the whole Treaty, but what we were either engaged to by *Previous Treaties*, or what it would have been our undoubted *Interest* to have made, tho' we had had no *Succession* to secure, nor any other Recompence to expect, than what will naturally accrue from the *Netherlands* being well defended against the Arms and Ambition of *France*. And as I am firmly persuaded myself, that this Treaty is the best and most solid Security, not only for *preventing* for the future any Attempts from Abroad in favour of the *Pretender*, but likewise for the Supporting the *Protestant Interest* in general, and for confirming to *Great Britain* the Blessing of a *lasting Peace*; I hope it will be no unacceptable Office to endeavour to recover (if possible) a deluded Part of the Nation from the dangerous Infatuations, into which their own Partiality, and the Arts of Designing Men have betrayed them; by considering coolly and impartially a Treaty, whose Subject-matter must be confessed to be in itself of the *greatest Consequence* to the Welfare of these Kingdoms.

In order therefore to form a right Judgment of this Treaty, I shall endeavour to explain the *Nature* and *Importance* of the *Two* great Points proposed

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proposed to be secured by it ; and to shew the *Necessity* there was of providing for their Security by a Treaty of this Nature ; which I hope to do in such a manner, as to leave no material Objection unanswered.

And first, as for the *Protestant Succession*, every True *Englishman* must acknowledge That to be of the utmost Consequence to the Religion, Liberty, and Peace of these Kingdoms. A *Popish Prince* is so many

The fatal Consequences of submitting to a Popish Prince ; and the Necessity of securing the Protestant Succession.

Ways engaged to propagate his own Religion, is taught to place so much Merit in enlarging the Dominions of Holy-Church ; and *Slavery* is such a sure Attendant on that blind and implicit Obedience wherein Popery is founded ; that from the Moment a Prince of that Persuasion ascends the Throne, a Protestant Nation is reduced to the unhappy Choice, either of Surrendring tamely all its Religious and Civil Rights, or of seeing it self brought into the utmost Distraction and Confusion. The sad Experience of King *James's* Reign is too fresh in our Memories to suffer us to doubt what we are to expect, should we ever be so unhappy as to fall into the Hands of the *Pretender* ; One who hath been educated among the *Enemies* of our Country, as well as of our Religion, trained up in *French Tyranny*, as well as *Popish Superstition* ; One whom the Nation hath attainted and abjured, and who will not therefore come upon us with the favourable Prepossessions of a *Legal Successor*, but with the

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Anger and Resentment of an *Injured Exile*; One, lastly, who, to compleat our Misery, must hold his Crown, as it were in Vassalage from *France*, and sacrifice the Interest of his own Subjects out of Gratitude to his Foreign Supporter. If any one can possibly doubt of this, let him only call to Mind those memorable Words that accompanied the *French King's* Present to him, when he sent him to invade us, as recorded by a

* *Memoirs of the Chevalier de St. George*, p. 50. Writer of their own: "Remember (*said he, putting the Sword into his Hands,*) if you prove successful, "that it was a *French Sword*". To which the other most dutifully reply'd, "That if it were his good Fortune to "get Possession of the Throne of his Ancestors, "he would not content himself with returning "him *Thanks* by Letters and Ambassadors, but "would shew his Gratitude by his *Actions*." Thus was the Sword of *France* in the Hands of the *Pretender*, to have reaped the Conquest of *England*. Thus were we to have been reduced into a *French Province*, and with the Misery of Slavery to have had the Ignominy of being Slaves at *second Hand*.

The Danger from a Popish Succession, acknowledged even by the Jacobites themselves.

But there is the less Occasion to enlarge on the Dangers of a *Popish Succession*, because they are confessed even by the greatest Part of the Advocates of the *Pretender*, who are not professed Papists. They own that they submit to it no otherwise than as a hard

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a hard Case, and an unhappy Circumstance which they could wish themselves at Liberty to alter; a Case that has sufficiently exercised their Loyalty, and put their Obedience to its utmost Stretch. They do not pretend to think it for the Interest of their Country or Church, to trust the Guardianship of the *Reformed Religion* with a *Papish Successor*, or to lodge the Supremacy of the Church of *England* in the Hands of a Dependant on the See of *Rome*. And there is Reason to believe, that even *some Papists themselves*, may rather desire to enjoy their Civil Properties under a free Government, than to sacrifice their Estates and Liberties to their Bigotry. Therefore waving any further Arguments, in Behalf of the *Protestant Succession*; I shall proceed to shew,

1. That under its present Circumstances, it can no otherwise be effectually secured than by a *Foreign Alliance*.

2. That no Alliance is so useful for that Purpose, as that of the *States*.

3. In the Last Place, I shall answer the Arguments that have been brought against securing it by a Foreign Alliance: Which Points being fully settled, will I hope remove all Objections that can possibly be made to that Part of the Treaty.

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That the Protestant Succession, under its present Circumstances, can no otherwise be effectually secured, than by a Foreign Alliance.

1st, That the Protestant Succession, under its present Circumstances, can no otherwise be effectually secured than by a Foreign Alliance, will appear to any one who doth but reflect, that there is not only a Person living who pretends to disturb that Settlement, and whose Pretensions are favoured by no inconsiderable Party amongst our selves, but that he is likewise actually supported by the greatest Power in Europe, our most constant and inveterate Enemy. It is well known, with what open Arms the King of France received the late King James; what constant Assistance he afforded him, and what restless Endeavours he used to restore him to his Kingdom; what a considerable Annual Expence he was at for the Maintenance of him and his Family, with a numerous and indigent Set of Followers; well knowing, that if once he could re-place that unfortunate Prince on the Throne of England, he should receive ample Recompence, by securing to himself an entire Influence on all our Affairs, and by that Means put an end to the Endeavours we have so long and successfully used, to stop him in the Pursuit of Universal Monarchy; and that it will be out of our Power to assert the Liberty of others, when once we have lost our own. This was his Design then, and the same no doubt is still the Reason of his harbouring the Pretender. Accordingly, we have seen
a French

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a *French* Fleet with an Army commanded by a Marechal of *France*, already attempting one Invasion in his Favour; and no one, I believe, can think, that what has happened since that Time, should make them less forward to attempt a second.

In answer to this, I know we are told, that the *French* King hath promised to acknowledge Her Majesty's Title, and to remove the Person of the Pretender out of his Dominions. But all the World must

How little the French King's Promise of not supporting the Pretender, is to be depended upon.

be convinced, by what has happened since the Treaty of *Ryswick*, that neither the most formal Acknowledgments, nor the strongest Promises and Engagements, are in this Case of any Weight with *France*. And as for his sending the Pretender out of his Dominions, it is so easy to elude the Intention of that Promise, by supporting him when gone, that no one can look upon that alone as a sufficient Security, tho' it should be complied with. The Friends of the Pretender appear in no pain about that Event; as knowing, that wheresoever he goeth, he carrieth with him the Assurance of the *French* King's Assistance. For his Friends have been pleased to let us know, that in the dying Moments of the Late King *James*, at a time when

Memoirs p.26.

it is reasonable to suppose, that the Impressions of Humanity, and the Solemnity of the Occasion, might dispose his most Christian Majesty to be more than ordinarily sincere; his Last Pro-

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promises to the expiring King were, that he would never abandon the Pretender, but always look upon him as his own Son; That he would acknowledge and entertain him as King of *England*, and hoped to see him treated in the same Manner by all the World: And this he declared himself indispensibly obliged to, by the unalterable Motives of Affinity and Conscience; calling on the Lords and others that were present (who offered to withdraw from the Bed-side through Respect) to be Hearers and Witnesses of what he said. All which was directly contrary to the Promises and Engagements he made at the Treaty of *Ryswick*. Yet this Publick Violation of his Faith hath been the most constant and copious Topick of Flattery for all his Subjects, and was highly applauded by the Pope himself in a Speech delivered in a full Consistory; who likewise wrote a Letter to the Pretender on that Occasion, in which he comforts him with the Consideration of the singular Affection the *most Christian King* had for him; who *thinks with Reason*, says he, *that having acknowledged you a King, it concerns his Glory to give you constant Assistance.*

• P. 46. And the same Author informs us, * that in the Year 1706, when the *most Christian King* found himself under the Necessity of suing for Peace; it was not without severe Struggles of Conscience, to depart from the Promises he had made the late King *James* the II^d: That he first consulted the Court of *St. Germans*, and in a Private Conference with the

Queen

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Queen Dowager and the *Pretended Prince*, at that time assured them, " That he would never depart from their Interest, tho' the present Exigency of Affairs, and the pressing Instances of his Subjects, obliged him to make some Overtures of Peace to the Enemy. To which the *Pretended Prince* himself replied, among other Dutiful Expressions, " That he was content to leave his Cause to Providence, being entirely assured of his Majesty's sincere Affection to him." And is it not reasonable to believe, that Counter-Assurances of the same Nature may have been given at present, supposing the King of *France* doth really intend to remove him out of his Dominions? What such great Gainers therefore shall we be, by shifting the Scene, and altering the *Circumstances* of our Fear, while the *Cause and Foundation* of it still remain the same; while the *Root* of our Evil is not struck at; while his *Power* to disturb us is left unbroken? Will he with the Pretender send away his *Bigotry*? his *inveterate Hatred* to the Protestant Religion? his *settled Design* of bringing us to wear his Yoke, and to be governed by his Counsels, and That at a Time, when by the Accession of *Spain* and the *Indies*, he is nearer accomplishing his Design of Universal Monarchy than ever, to which the Connivance (at least) of *England* is so absolutely necessary? Will it not always be his *Interest* to support the Cause of the Pretender, to keep up the Hearts and Courage of his Party, and by that Means to foment and perpetuate our

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Divisions, which have already been of greater Service to him than all the Fleets and Armies he hath paid? Will it not flatter his *Vanity*, and gratify the *Superstition* of his declining Years, to have the Credit on Earth, and the Merit in Heaven, of restoring Popery in these Kingdoms? Since therefore no Question can be made, but that the Pretender, where-ever he removes, will always be supported by *France*; and that that Crown will by the Terms of Peace be in a better Condition to do it, than even at the Time when these Promises first were made; and since nothing but Power is a reasonable Security against Power; it might justly have been thought an unpardonable Omission in the Late Ministry, had they not opposed a *Foreign Alliance* against a *Foreign Enemy*, and provided a Balance of Power in Support of the *Protestant Succession*, equal to that which is engaged in its Disturbance.

England alone, not sufficient to defend herself against France.

Were the Succession either not disputed, or the Disputer of it not upheld by a Foreign Power, or *England* alone a Match for that Power; were she, in the Stile of a late self-sufficient Writer, *able to defend herself against all Her Majesty's Enemies and Allies put together*; then indeed it would betray an unnecessary Fear, to trouble our selves about forming *Foreign Alliances* on this or any other Occasion.

But

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But that this is far enough from being the Case, our New Politicians themselves are forward enough to own, when it serves their Purpose. It is not unpleasant to observe them contradicting themselves: To hear them gravely doubting, whether they should end one War out of Necessity, or begin another out of Wantonness. If the supposed Pride and Stubbornness of a few *Dutch Provinces*, is to be chastised; then *Great-Britain* is set forth with her *Shield* and *Spear*, and all the Emblems of her *Greatness* are displayed; then her Successes can be remembered, her Riches confessed, her Power magnified: Alone she conquers Provinces, and reduces Kingdoms, and threatens to cope with Friend and Enemy. But is an ill Peace to be forced upon her? Immediately the very same Hands fall to work to strip her of all her Grandeur both imaginary and real: She is made to confess Wants she never felt, and Weaknesses she was never guilty of; all on a sudden she is dis-peopled by War, impoverished by Taxes, eaten up by Debts, overspread with Profaneness, torn in Pieces with Faction, imposed upon by Foreign Friends, and plunder'd by Domestick Enemies. This is the Dress, in which she is made to believe it will best become her to supplicate for Peace; This the moving Figure by which she is to soften that obdurate Enemy, whom her many Successes have not yet been able to compel to Reason. Since humbling *him* proves a Work of Labour and Difficulty, the shorter and cheaper Way, she

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she is told, is to humble *herself*; to cancel her past Successes by Inaction; to expiate her Zeal in forming Alliances, by abandoning her Allies; and her Forwardness in pushing the War, by yielding up the most valuable Fruits of her Victories.

But not to make use of the Concessions of Men that manifest so little Regard for Truth; we have the Experience of Two long Wars to convince us, that the strongest Confederacies which can be formed, are scarce a Match for *France*; and therefore they that are for trusting to the *single Strength* of *England* in Opposition to a Force so much superior, can hardly avoid the Suspicion of meaning to betray the Cause they so lamely support. Our Constitution will not consist with a Standing Army: The *French* King on the contrary, can never be without one; therefore it is our Business to secure the Assistance of such as have always a standing Force ready to oppose to his; and by their Fleets at Sea, as well as their Armies on the Continent, may in Conjunction with us, either deter him from invading *England*, or, if he does, soon find him so much Work at Home, as may oblige him rather to think of defending his *own* Dominions, than invading his *Neighbours*.

That no Alliance is so useful to us, in order to secure the Protestant Succession, as that of the States-General. 2. Having thus proved, that the Protestant Succession, under its present Circumstances, can no otherwise be effectually secured than by a Foreign Alliance; it must without any Difficulty be acknowledged, that
none

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none can be so effectual for that Purpose, as that of the *States-General*; whether we consider their *Situation*, their *Strength*, their *Religion*, or their *Interest*.

They *by the most convenient* for *Whether we* concerting Measures with us, and *consider their* providing for any sudden Emergen- *Situation*; cy. Their *Situation* likewise gives them the greatest Opportunities of distressing *France* both by Sea and Land.

The *Number of Veteran Troops* *their Strength*; they are obliged to maintain in the Time of Peace, are the properest Forces that can be opposed to the disciplined standing Armies of *France*; Their *Naval Power* is likewise the only one in *Europe*, besides our own, that is in any Degree able to cope with that of *France*.

As, next to *Great Britain*, they *their Religion*; are the strongest Bulwark and most zealous Supporters of the *Protestant* Interest, so there is nothing they can have more at Heart, for their own sakes, than preserving *our Succession* in the Protestant Line; since, if *Popery* should once overspread these Kingdoms, and close them in on this Side also, it would be impossible for them to withstand the universal Torrent, and to preserve their *Religion* uncorrupted, in the midst of surrounding Superstition.

The last Circumstance that recom- *or their In-* mends their Alliance to us, is that their *terest*. *Interests* are inseparable from our own: The Safety of each Country depends upon that of the other.

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For, as on the one Hand, should *Holland* fall under the Dominion of *France*, *Britain* would be entirely cut off from any Communication with the Continent, (which, joined to the great Accession of Naval Strength which *France* would acquire by this Conquest, must bring immediate Ruin upon *Britain*; so on the other Hand *Holland* must lose both its Religion and Liberties, and the Moment that *France*, or any Popish Prince under the Influence and Direction of *France*, gets Possession of *Britain*. From whence it necessarily follows, that the mutual Defence and Preservation of each other, ought to be one of the chief Maxims of Government to both Nations.

This is so plain, that the only Handle which the Emissaries of *France* have made use of to divide Us and the *Dutch*, has been the Point of Trade in which they have always endeavoured to represent them as dangerous Rivals. It is certain, the Wealth and Strength of each Nation doth depend entirely upon Trade; and that therefore neither we nor they, can be too careful and tender in that Matter. But the World is wide enough for us both: And if the Pains and Expence that have been employed in the Quarrels we have had with one another upon the Pretence of Trade, had been applied to the keeping a watchful Hand over our Enemies, and preventing the Encroachments they have made upon us in this valuable Article; it is evident the Trade of both Nations would have been much

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much more extensive and flourishing than it is at this Time. And I am far from allowing, that the Trade of the two Nations engages them in such a Rivalship and Competition with one another, as is generally pretended. For all that have any Insight into the Affairs of *Holland* must acknowledge, that their Trade is chiefly founded upon their carrying Goods cheaper than any Nation of the World: The hard and penurious Way of Living they are inured to, enables them to perform the longest Voyages with much less Consumption and Expence than other Nations: By this Means they are become the common Carriers of the Product of other Countries; having none of their own, except what arises from their Settlements in the *Indies*. Our Trade on the contrary, consists almost intirely in vending and dispersing the Product and Manufactures of our own Country and the Plantations, while our Freight is dearer than that of any other Nation. The main Branch therefore of the *Dutch* Commerce, no Way affects nor interferes with ours; neither, if They were to lay it down To-morrow, would any Share of it devolve to *Great Britain*, but to the *French*, the *Danes*, the *Swedes*, the *Hamburgers*, and the other *Hans* Towns, who all both can, and actually do, sail much cheaper than we. And were the *Dutch* at this Time to lose their Plantations in the *Indies*, every knowing and impartial Man must own, considering the present Posture of Affairs in *France*, and the vast Accession of Power they

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they will in all Probability obtain by this Peace, that even these Plantations would inevitably fall into their Hands. *France* therefore is our most formidable Rival, and the proper Object of Jealousy to both Nations; who by fomenting Animosities and Quarrels between us, has had the Address to weaken us at our own Expence, and to make herself powerful under Favour of our Folly and Connivance. The Divisions between *England* and *Holland* first gave her the Courage and Opportunity to increase her Naval Strength, to extend her Dominions in the *Indies*, to drive the *English* out of the Trade of *Hudson's-Bay*, and of great Part of *Newfoundland*; to lay such high Duties on our respective Commodities as amount to a Prohibition, and thereby to encourage and even force her own Subjects to establish our Manufactures in *France*, and by that Means to run away with a great Part of Ours, as well as the *Dutch* Trade to *Spain*, the *Levant*, and other Countries. These are Part of the Fruits of our former Quarrels with the *Dutch*; which, one would hope, might at least have that Effect, as to make us wiser for the future, by teaching us that the only Way to retrieve our past Follies, is by uniting, in order to recover those valuable Branches of our respective Trades which *France* has taken from us; to preserve a Balance of Power in *Europe*, that Peace and Trade may flourish; to provide for the Security of the Seas,

and

and Safety of Commerce; and to oppose any growing Naval Force that may endanger it.

Since therefore it appears from all that has been said, that as the *Situation* and *Strength* of *Holland* do truly enable them, so their *Religion* and *Interest* indispensably oblige them to be zealous in the Support of the *Protestant Succession*, as the only Means to preserve themselves; nothing more can be wanting to prove that their Alliance must be the most useful and lasting, the most hearty and effectual of any for that Purpose.

3. But here we are told, that it is a lessening the Independency of the Crown of *Great Britain*, to call at every Door for Help to put her Laws in Execution; and neither right in Point of Policy nor good Sense, that a *Foreign Power* should be invited to confirm our Succession.

The Objection, that this is a lessening the Independency of the Crown of Great Britain, considered.

These invidious Terms sufficiently denote the Spirit and Designs of those that use them; they shew the true Place where the Treaty pinches; viz. *The Execution of those Laws, and the Confirmation of that Succession.* But they have not in Reality the least Colour or Pretence for saying that the *Dutch* take upon them to confirm our Succession, or to execute our Laws. The Succession was Then confirmed, when it received the Sanction of the Legislature; and *Britain* will be left peaceably to execute her own Laws, if *France*, does not interpose to hinder her. All therefore that

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that the Authors of these malicious Insinuations can mean, is, that it is neither safe nor prudent to strengthen ourselves with a *Foreign Alliance* against a *Foreign Enemy*, for securing a Point of the greatest Importance, in which *that Enemy* openly pretends to disturb and oppose us. And if this be their Meaning, they carry with them their own Confutation; for then all *defensive Leagues* in general must be renounced, as derogatory to the Honour of the Crown; this Treaty being in Reality no other than a *Defensive League*, confined to the Two Points that are most essential to the common Safety of both Nations. Indeed, no Prince or State can enter into a general Defensive Alliance with the Crown of *Great Britain*, but that in Truth, by Virtue of that Alliance, they will be obliged to interpose in our *Defence*, in case we are attacked on Account of our Succession; and consequently, all *Defensive Alliances* will be liable to this Objection: And we ourselves, by Virtue of our *former Defensive Alliances* with *Holland* still in Force, were obliged to have assisted *them* in Case they had been attacked on the Account of their *Barrier*, even tho' the present Treaty had never been made. However, this does not make it the less reasonable, when extraordinary Cases are in View, which may require an extraordinary Degree of Assistance, to provide for them expressly by *particular Treaties*. It appears therefore, that either all *Defensive Alliances* in general ought to be rejected, as derogatory to the Honour of the Powers

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Powers that made them; or, that the Treaty now in Question cannot justly be thought such. But it both is, and always has been, the constant Practice of all the Princes and States in *Europe*, to make *Defensive Alliances*; no single Power being in a Situation to maintain its own Rights against the United Forces of its Neighbours. Even *France* itself, at the highest Pitch of all its Grandeur, has been so far from thinking it any Diminution of its Independency, to enter into Alliances of this kind; that it has always carefully courted the Friendship, even of the most Petty Princes and States. What Dishonour therefore can it be to *Great Britain*, to strengthen itself against *France*, by a *Defensive Alliance* with a powerful Neighbouring State, for securing a Point so necessary to its Safety, and yet in so much Danger from Abroad, as the *Protestant Succession*.

The Sense of both Houses of Parliament on this Head, may be seen by their joint Address to Her Majesty the Third of *March*, 170⁸/₉, *The Sense of Both Houses of Parliament on this Head.*

in which they most humbly beseech Her,
“ That for preserving the Repose and Quiet of
“ *Europe*, and preventing the Ambitious Designs
“ of *France* for the future, Her Majesty would
“ (among other Things) be pleased to take Care
“ at the Conclusion of the War, to continue and
“ establish a good and firm Friendship among the
“ Allies; and that the *French King* may be o-
“ bliged to own Her Majesty's Title and the
“ Protestant Succession, and that the Allies may be

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“ engaged to become Guarantees for the same.”
“ To which Her Majesty was most graciously pleased to answer, “ That She was
“ of the same Opinion with Her Two Houses
“ of Parliament in the several Particulars of
“ that Address, as she had also been in all the
“ others which they had made on the same
“ Subject; assuring them, that no Care should
“ be wanting on Her Part, to attain the Ends
“ that were desired.” And several fresh Circumstances which have arisen since the signing of this Treaty, and which sufficiently betray the Temper and Designs of a certain Set of Men amongst us; such as the Aspersions cast on the late Revolution, and on the Principles by which alone it is to be justified: The strenuous Assertions of an Indefeasible Hereditary Right in the last Addresses; and that Neglect of the *Hanover* Succession, which is so much affected and encouraged in the present: The Contempt thrown on his Electoral Highness’s Minister and Memorial, and the Treasonable Insinuations of Inconveniences that may arise from the Succession of that Illustrious House: These Things, as they cannot but mightily have raised the Hopes of the Pretender, and encouraged *France* to persevere in his Interest, so they must entirely satisfy and convince all those who wish well to the Succession, of the *Prudence* of the Advice given by Parliament, and Her Majesty’s Declaration thereupon, in Pursuance of which this Treaty was made.

But

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But we are told by some, that it is so much the *Interest* of the *Dutch* to maintain the *Protestant Succession*, that it needed not have been provided for by a *particular Treaty*. And here we have a fresh Instance

The Objection, that this Treaty is needless for securing the Protestant Succession, considered.

of the ill Faith and Insincerity of those we have to deal with. At *one Time* and to serve *one Purpose*, the *States* are represented as dangerous Rivals, and formidable Neighbours; as a People that would triumph in our Confusion, and gladly establish themselves on our Ruin. At *another Time*, their Interests are acknowledged inseparable from our own; and they are said to be obliged for their own sakes, to maintain that Succession on which our Peace and Happiness depend; to preserve us from all that Misery and Distraction which Popery must introduce, and which it never can be the Interest of a Rival or an Enemy to prevent. Be it so therefore, since these Gentlemen are so liberal as to allow us our Choice: Be our Interests mutual and our Safety Reciprocal, as I am persuaded they will always be found; Are they at all the less so, by Virtue of this Treaty? Shall that Concurrence of Interest be made an Objection against *this*, which is in Reality the Foundation of *every* Defensive Alliance? Does not a Treaty upon any Point, occasion it to be more considered, and better understood; to be publicly avowed, and steadily pursued? Are Nations always so true to their own

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Interests, as to need no Ties and Obligations to bind them down to the Prosecution of it? no Preservatives against the Practices of an intriguing Enemy, or the Weakness and Corruption of a selfish Ministry? Was it thought at all the less reasonable to form the *Grand-Alliance*, because it was the undoubted Interest of the Parties contracting, mutually to stand by and assist one another? Or, would it have been prudent to have begun a War against *France* with such a loose Confederacy, whose Parts were linked together by no Engagements, but left at Liberty to fall to Pieces, as fast as private Views and separate Interests should draw them asunder? Notwithstanding therefore, that it was the *Interest* of *Holland* to maintain our Succession, a *Treaty* must have been made with them, when the Case should come to bear: And would it have been prudent to defer settling a Point of such Importance, to a Season of so much Hurry and Distraction? But above all, may not such a *Treaty*, made in Time, exclude *France* from all Hopes of prevailing on the *States* to stand unconcerned Spectators of our Ruin, and consequently make her less forward to attempt it? Besides, could we have been secure, that the *States*, being at such a Time become necessary to us, would not have *affected* a Negligence and Supineness in our Preservation, on Purpose to have forced us to purchase their Assistance upon *hard* Terms, which now we are assured of *for nothing*? I say, in the strictest Sense, *for nothing*: For notwithstanding

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standing the extravagant Price, at which some would insinuate that their Assistance is bought, I doubt not but to make it appear in the Sequel of this Discourse, that it cost us *nothing*: That the supposed Price is really an essential Part of our own Security; and what it would have been our undoubted Interest to have stipulated, even tho' the *Protestant Succession* had been entirely out of the Question.

Thus I have considered the Nature and Importance of the *First* great Point proposed to be secured by this Treaty; and have shewn, that *under its present Circumstances* it stands in need of a foreign Guaranty; and that none can be so *proper* and *effectual* as that of the *States-General*. Besides which, I have answered the principal *Objections* made against securing it in such a Manner.

The *Second* great Point I proposed to consider as necessary for forming a right Judgment of this Treaty, is that of the *Barrier*. But as this is not of so simple a Nature as the other, nor of so small a Compass as to come under one short View; to set the whole of it in a clear Light, and that all the Questions falling into it may be fully understood, I shall endeavour to make good the *Five* following Propositions.

1. That it is, in itself, and apart from all other Considerations, the true *Interest* of *England*, that there should be a good and sufficient Bar-

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rier against *France* on the Side of the *Netherlands*; and that no Barrier can be sufficient, that is not at least *equal* to that settled in the *Barrier-Treaty*.

2. That no *Barrier*, how large soever, can be effectually defended against *France*, but by being put into the Hands of the *States*.

3. That for the Defence of a good *Barrier* in their Hands, it is necessary they should have a *free and safe Communication* with it; and reasonable, that the *Barrier-Country* should itself contribute towards the *Expence* of maintaining it.

4. That the *Dutch* had a *Right* to a sufficient *Barrier*, and to have the Defence of it themselves; and that this *Right* was acknowledged and agreed to by the *Allies*, previous to the *Barrier-Treaty*.

5. That their having a *Barrier*, pursuant to this *Right*, and conformable to the present *Treaty* will be far from exposing *Us* to any Sort of *Danger* from them.

That it is in itself, and apart from all other Considerations, the true Interest of *England*, that there should be a good and sufficient *Barrier* against *France* on the Side of the *Netherlands*.

1. As for the *First Proposition*, the former Part of it, That it is in itself, and apart from all other Considerations, the true Interest of *England*, that there should be a good and sufficient *Barrier* against *France* on the Side of the *Netherlands*, is a Point so evident in itself, and hath been so constantly received as the known and avowed Sense of the Nation; that I am ashamed to think, there should be any Number amongst us, who want to have

That

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That proved to them now, which hath hitherto been always allowed as a standing Maxim of our Government, and is now become our Interest more than ever. To have a good Barrier against *France* in the *Netherlands*, is as necessary for us, as it is to preserve a Balance of Power on the Continent, and to prevent all *Europe's* being enslaved by *France*. For the Situation of the *Netherlands* is such, with respect to *Holland* and the Empire, and even to *Britain* itself, that if *France* be once suffered to get Possession of them, it will not be in the Power of all *Europe* to set any Bounds to the Progress of her Arms. The *United Provinces* must in that Case unavoidably fall a Prey to her; as every one must be fully convinced, who will but reflect upon the Extremities to which they were reduced by the *French King's* seizing the *Spanish Low-Countries* at the Death of the late King of *Spain*. The Empire having by that Means lost the Assistance of the *States*, and being cut off from all Communication with *England*, would soon follow the same Fate; being, as we see by long Experience, hardly able to make Head against a Handful of *French* Troops, while the main Strength of *France* is diverted and employed on the Wars in *Spain*, *Italy* and *Flanders*: Much less can it be thought in any Condition to defend itself when it is without Allies, and *France* having rid her Hands of other Wars, is at Liberty to pour in her whole Force upon it. So that if *France* could finish her long-laid Design upon the *Netherlands*, she might

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without Opposition carry her Conquests as far as she pleased into *Germany*. Let us next consider the fatal Consequences that will attend the Loss of the *Netherlands* with respect to *Britain* in particular. If *France* be once Mistress of those Provinces, she will from that Moment have the *Command of the Narrow Seas*; so that our Trade will neither be able to go out nor return with any tolerable Safety. We see of what Consequence it is thought to *England*, that *Dunkirk* should be taken out of the Hands of the *French*; or at least, that the Harbour of it should be ruined; and thence we may judge how fatal it would be to this Nation, to let them get Possession of the *other Flemish Ports*, with such an Increase of Naval Strength as that Acquisition would give them. Our Coasts and River would then be exposed to perpetual Insults, and our Trade would be in so much Danger in the *Narrow Seas*, that we should soon be obliged to give it over. But this is not all: Should *France* be suffered to be Mistress of the *Netherlands*, it is not to be thought the *United Provinces* could maintain their Independency: They must either become directly the Subjects of *France*, or live in an absolute Dependence upon that Crown: And the unavoidable Consequence of That would be, that the great Naval Force of the *Dutch*, which hath hitherto acted in Conjunction *with us*, would then be turned *against us*; and such a vast Accession of the Fleet of *France*, would give her such a Superiority at Sea, as no one I suppose is sanguine enough to think

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think we could dispute: We should in that Case not only suffer all the Inconveniences that necessarily attend our being cut off from the Continent, but we should be perpetually unsafe in our own Ports: For our whole Strength, when without Allies, is in the Sea; and therefore when that Security is gone, we are in a State perfectly naked and defenceless. And as our *Riches* depend chiefly upon our Trade, *they* also must sink with it. Let therefore *France* but get the *Netherlands*, and *our* Ruin needs not wait for that of other Countries upon the Continent: If *France* can force the Submission of the *States*, and have the Use of their Ports and Fleets, *England* must truckle to *France*, if the rest of *Europe* would be content to look on: And if they should not, all the Efforts they could make, would be of little Service to us. For while we have no Maritime Power on our Side, we can have no Help at Sea, where it would be most wanted; nor any Support in Case of an Invasion, though its Suddenness and Strength should make it of the last Necessity: And as for any Efforts made in our Favour on the Continent, when the *States* are either Slaves to, or on the Side of *France*; we may be sure they would be too weak to make any great Impression, or to cause any considerable Diversion in our Favour. So that the Ruin of *England* seems to be the certain Consequence of the Loss of the *Netherlands*: We must for want of Strength in ourselves, or Help from abroad, suffer the Fate

of

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of other Nations ; only with so much the greater Misery, by how much our present Condition is happier than that of others.

A remarkable Passage of Philip de Comines upon this Head. If it were sufficient to have *Reason* on one's Side, I might think it needless to say any more to prove, that it is the true Interest of *England*, that there should be a good

Barrier against *France* on the Side of the *Netherlands*. But because I write in a Time in which *Authority* seems to have much more Force than Reason, I shall in further Proof of this Proposition, appeal to *Authority*, and shew, that the *Netherlands* have in all Times past been looked upon as the Barrier to *England*; and that it was always thought our Interest to hinder the Growth of *France* on that Side. To shew this, I might go back to the Time in which those Countries were governed by the House of *Burgundy*, one of the most Ancient and most Useful Allies to the Crown of *England* against *France*. But this may seem looking too far backwards into the History of Ancient Times; and therefore I shall only take notice of one memorable Passage in the Excellent History of *Philip de Comines* to this Purpose; who speaking in the Beginning of his 6th Book, of the Conquest of the Dominions of the House of *Burgundy* by *Lewis XI.* who laid the first Foundation of the Greatness of *France*, begins his Second Chapter with these Words. " Those, says he, that hereafter shall read this History, will wonder that the *English* suffered
" the

“ the King to take the Towns bordering so
“ near upon them, namely *Arras, Bolloin, Ar-*
“ *des, and Hedin,* with divers other Castles,
“ and to lie so long with his Camp before St.
“ *Omers*”. And the Reasons he gives for this,
are such as deserve to be remembred, which are
these; That “ the King of *France* in Wisdom
“ and Sense surmounted far *Edward IV. of Eng-*
“ *land* then reigning, who was a very Corpu-
“ lent Man, and much given to Pleasures;
“ and endeavoured by all Means possible to con-
“ tent him and entertain him by Ambassadors,
“ Presents, and smooth Words, to the end he
“ should not intermeddle with his Affairs.
“ That he knew well the *English,* as well No-
“ bles and Commons, as the Clergy, to be na-
“ turally inclined to make War upon his Realm;
“ therefore he perceived that he must in any
“ wise keep the King of *England* and his prin-
“ cipal Servants his Friends, whom he saw alto-
“ gether inclined to Quietness, and very greedy
“ of his Money; for the which Cause he paid
“ duly at *London* the Pension of 50,000 Crowns,
“ and farther gave Yearly 16,000 Crowns, be-
“ sides many goodly Presents, to the said King’s
“ principal Servants; and their Acquittances
“ are yet to be seen in the Chamber of Ac-
“ counts at *Paris*. Further, he gave goodly
“ Presents to all the Ambassadors that came to
“ him, were their Messages never so sharp and
“ bitter; and sent them home with goodly
“ Words and Princely Rewards, that they re-
“ turned

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“ turned well contented ; and notwithstanding that
 “ some of them understood that he did all this only
 “ to win Time, the better to atchieve his Enter-
 “ prize in the Conquest of the Duke of Burgundy’s
 “ Dominions, yet winked they at it, because of
 “ the great Riches they received at his Hands ;
 “ and so did the King of *England* himself,
 “ though some of his Council told him plainly
 “ it would be very prejudicial to his Realm ;
 “ and in Parliament divers wise Men that smelt
 “ the Dissimulation of *France* afar off, and re-
 “ ceived no Pension as the others did, were
 “ very desirous, and yet the Commons of the
 “ Realm more desirous, that the King should
 “ send Aid without Delay to the Lady of *Bur-*
 “ *gundy*, Daughter of Duke *Charles*: And un-
 “ doubtedly if the King had not been prevailed
 “ upon by these and some other Reasons, he
 “ would never have suffered the King of *France*
 “ to take Places bordering so near upon the
 “ *English* Dominions, but have sought to defend
 “ them ; and if at the Beginning he had de-
 “ clared himself for the said Lady, the King
 “ had never weakened this House of *Burgundy*
 “ as he hath”. The whole Chapter is very well
 worth reading, of which this is but an Abstract.
 And upon it I beg leave to make these few
 Remarks: That this History was written about
 230 Years ago, by a Person of great Credit,
 who was not only an Eye-witness of these things,
 but had a principal Hand in the transacting of
 them: Which leaves no room to doubt the
 Truth

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Truth of what he says; that it was then looked on as the known Interest of *England*, to hinder the Growth of *France* in the *Low-Countries*, even in those Days, when the *French* Dominions were bounded by the *Soam*; when the Dutchy of *Britain*, with the Port of *Brest*, was no part of them; and the Strength they have now at Sea, was not so much as begun: That it was then a Maxim in our Government, to cherish a strict Alliance with the House of *Burgundy*, to prevent the *French* from extending their Dominions on that Side, and making nearer Approaches towards us; the Dangers being foreseen at that Distance, which we have since felt from the Neighbourhood of a Power, which through our own Fault we have suffered to grow so very formidable: And lastly, that this very ancient and useful Alliance with the House of *Burgundy*, which *England* had before so strictly cultivated, was lost, and that great House ruin'd very unaccountably, not by the Strength and Policy of the Enemy, so much as by the Weakness and Covetousness of their Friend King *Edward*, and the Corruption of his great Ministers, who were all Pensioners of *France*: That it was *French* Gold well placed in *English* Hands, that procured this Accession to their Dominions then, and prevailed with the Court of *England* to suffer them patiently to extend their Conquests in *Flanders*: And they that will carefully look into our History, will find but too much Reason to think, that all the Additions that have been
made

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made to the Power of *France* in latter Times, particularly the mighty Increase of their Naval Strength, and the great Extent of their Conquests in the *Low-Countries*, have been chiefly owing to the same Causes, to the ill Conduct and wrong Measures of our Princes, and the corrupt Practices of their Ministers, sacrificing the Interest of their Country to their own Avarice, and for a *French* Pension selling both the present and future Safety of the Nation.

The Judgment of Queen Elizabeth upon this Head. But to come to better Times, and the Days of good Queen *Elizabeth*, a Name that will be always dear to *Protestants* and *Englishmen*. Every Body knows how much she ventured to weaken the Power of *Spain* in the *Low-Countries*, upon the same Principle, and in Pursuit of the same Interest, as should teach us now to weaken that of *France*; the House of *Austria* aiming then at Universal Monarchy, as *France* hath done since; tho' their Views were never grounded on so solid a Foundation as those of *France* have been; nor had their Dominions the same Advantages of Situation and Compactness; nor was their Scheme for Empire built upon such Rules of good Policy as those of the two great Masters *Richlieu* and *Mazarin*: So that *England* then had much less Reason to be alarmed at the Greatness of the Power of *Spain*, than our Age has had to be alarmed at that of *France*. But this did not hinder the Good Queen from being always on her Guard, and taking all proper Measures to weaken

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weaken a Power, whose Greatness made her think them too near Neighbours. She could not be easy, nor think her Kingdoms safe, while the Strength of *Spain* was so great in the *Low-Countries*. But what Course did she take to weaken it? Was she for increasing the Power of *France* in the *Low-Countries*, in order to lessen that of *Spain*? or would her Kingdoms, in the Opinion of that wise Princess, have been safer by those Countries changing Masters, and the Dominion of them being transferred from *Spain* to *France*? By no Means: She was even then Jealous of the Growth of *France*; and, as much as she was concerned to break the Power of *Spain*, and reduce it within Bounds, or at least remove it farther from her; yet she did not think it good Policy to humble one Power by advancing another, which in Time might be as dangerous a Neighbour to her Kingdoms as the first. She made Alliances indeed with *France*, but went no farther into them than the Necessity of Affairs obliged her: The Way by which she chose to humble *Spain*, as best in all Respects for the Interest of *England*, was to encourage a Third Power distinct from the other Two, and which in Conjunction with *England* might be able to lower the Power of *Spain*, without raising that of *France*, and might upon occasion balance either of them: She favoured, in short, the Revolt of the *United Provinces*, and gave all manner of Protection and Support to the *Dutch* in the Infancy of their State; which no Body I suppose

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suppose is so weak as to think she did merely out of Humanity and Tenderneſs; No, ſhe wiſely ſaw this was the moſt ſenſible Blow ſhe could give to *Spain*, and would moſt effectually remove from her Kingdoms the Dangers that threatened them from the Nearneſs of ſo formidable a Power; and as ſhe judged rightly in this, ſo the Meaſures ſhe took had all the good Effects ſhe could expect from them. This was the Way that wiſe and excellent Queen took, to pull down the Greatneſs of the Houſe of *Auſtria* in the *Low-Countries*, without building up that of *France* on its Ruins.

A Paſſage of the Preſident Jeannin, concerning Queen Elizabeth's Behaviour in this Caſe.

And *France* was ſenſible how well the Queen underſtood this to be her Intereſt, as appears by a Paſſage in the Negotiations of the Preſident *Jeannin*; who giving his Maſter *Henry IV. of France* his Thoughts about a Peace with *Spain* (concluded not long after at *Vervins* in 1598,) ſpeaks thus of Queen *Elizabeth*: “ As to the Queen of *England*, we
“ ought to think, ſays he, that ſhe will be al-
“ ways juſt ſo much for us as ſhe ought to be
“ for Reaſons of State, and no farther; and Ex-
“ perience already lets us ſee, that ſhe deſires
“ the Increaſe of *France* even in the *Low-Coun-*
“ tries no more than that of *Spain*; ſo that ſhe
“ will always weigh her own Intereſt with ours,
“ when ſhe is to give us any Help; and will be
“ more or leſs hearty for us, not as we ſhall de-
“ ſire her or want her Help, but as ſhe ſhall
“ find

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“ find it most for her own Service, and best
“ for her Affairs; and therefore her Assistance
“ cannot be depended upon, if we continue the
“ War in Hopes of conquering the *Netherlands*
“ from *Spain*. On the other hand, if a Peace
“ be made, and *Spain* be suffered to be Masters
“ of the *Low-Countries*, and either to keep them
“ themselves, or give them to the Arch-Duke
“ *Albert* in Marriage with the Infanta *Isabella*,
(which was then designed, and afterwards performed;) besides other Inconveniencies arising
“ from a Peace, what *France* hath most Reason
“ to be afraid of, is, that the Ancient Alliance
“ between *England* and the House of *Burgundy*
“ should be renewed with them against *France*,
“ of which she hath formerly felt so many sad
“ Effects”. From this Passage we may observe, that Queen *Elizabeth* thought close Engagements with *France* the least desirable Way to lower *Spain*; and would have chosen for the Security of *England*, had it been in her Power, that the *Netherlands* might have been in the Hands of neither of them. As *France* was jealous of the Power of *Spain* in the *Low-Countries*, so was the Queen wisely jealous of both; and therefore preferred that Way of weakening one, which made no Addition to the other; viz. to assist and support the *Dutch*.

To remove the Jealousy that both *England* and *France* had conceived of the Power of *Spain* in the *Low-Countries*, was (as we are told in the same Place) one of the chief Motives that in-

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duced *Philip* the III^d, then King of *Spain*, to give those Countries in Dowry with his Daughter to the *Arch-Duke*; since they would have nothing to fear from a Prince, who having no other Dominions, would be obliged to live in Friendship with them. And this View in it was in some Measure served with Respect to *France*: For Monsieur *Jeannin* makes it one Reason for the King's making Peace with *Spain*, that the *Spanish* Court might be at Liberty to conclude this Marriage, which could never be done while the War lasted: " And what, says
 " he, can his Majesty desire more, than that
 " the King of *Spain* should accomplish such a
 " Design; that instead of a Rival and Enemy,
 " who is obliged to be so on Reasons of State,
 " he may have for his Neighbour a Petty
 " Prince, who will not dare to become his Ene-
 " my; and if he should, would be very little to
 " be feared". And this Consideration made *France* less unwilling to abandon the Support and Protection of the *States*. But the Safety and Interest of *England* was not by this Scheme so well provided for. To give away the *Low-Countries* to a Third Power, destitute of any other Dominions, might remove the Jealousy of *France* against *Spain*, but it could by no Means remove the Jealousy of *England* against *France*. For tho' *France* could have nothing to fear from such a Prince, such a Prince would have a great deal to fear from *France*, against whose Power he could never be able to defend himself. And

France

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France must necessarily have greater Hopes of gaining those Provinces when separated in this Manner from the *Spanish* Monarchy, than while they continued to be a Part of it, and consequently under its more immediate Protection. It was therefore the Interest of *England* to adhere to the Support of the *States*, and to cultivate the strictest Friendship with them, as the most effectual Way to keep the two Rival Powers in Respect, and to secure *England* against the dangerous Neighbourhood of Both. This was the Policy and Wisdom of that good Queen; and had those that came after her followed the same wise Counsels, we should at this Time have been in no Pain about a good Barrier in the *Netherlands*.

But another Thing we may observe from these Passages of Monsieur Jeannin is, that as an Alliance with the House of *Burgundy* was always coveted by the Crown of *England*, so it is their constant standing Interest against *France*, to substitute an Alliance in the Room of it with those who have succeeded that House. And it is upon this Principle of *English* Politicks, that the same Monsieur Jeannin, in a Discourse upon the Affairs of *Holland* near 30 Years after, (in 1622), where he considers whether War or Peace between *Spain* and *Holland* were more for the Interest of his Master *Lewis* the XIIIth, speaks thus of

Another Passage of Monsieur Jeannin, concerning K. James's coveting an Alliance between the Successors of the House of Burgundy, Himself, and the Low-Countries.

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King *James*, and the Part he would be like to take: "As for the King of *England*, says he, "there is no Reason to doubt, but he would "promote a Peace between them upon such and "such Terms, because That would be in effect "to renew the Ancient Alliance with the House "of *Burgundy*, between *Spain* which hath succeeded to it, Himself, and all the *Low-Countries*; an Alliance, which the Kings of *England* have always been very fond of. And "this the Two Kings of *Spain* and *England*, "will think as useful to them, as it will be pre-judicial to *France*; there being nothing which "his Majesty ought not to endeavour and attempt to hinder it". This was the Sense of a very able *French* Minister concerning the Interest of *England* against *France*; which leaves no room to question whether it be so or not. But it hath been our Misfortune from those Times quite down to the Revolution, that Foreigners and Enemies have known the Interest of *England*, better than *England* seems to have known it its self.

Of Cromwell's siding with France, against the Interest of his own Country.

To say nothing of the unactive and inglorious Reign of King *James* the Ist; and the Unfortunate one of his Successor: When the Nation was at an end of its unhappy Civil Wars, *Cromwell* might have renewed such an Alliance as Monsieur *Jeannin* speaks of, with great Advantage; and have preserved such a Balance between *France* and *Spain*, as might effectually

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tually have hindered the former from extending their Conquests in the *Netherlands*. But he, (and what better could be expected from him?) sacrificed the Interest of his Country to his own; and sided with *France*, that *France* might in return support him. Men of arbitrary Designs are always fond of *French* Alliances, for a very plain Reason. As they are not in the Interest of their Country, they cannot hope to be supported by such Allies as have the same Interest with it; for that would be strengthening their Country against themselves. But arbitrary Governments, and the Enemies of the Nation, are Naturally, and upon Principle, Friends to such as will invade and oppress its Liberties: And these are the only Alliances that can be confided in by Men of such Designs. And thus it was with *Cromwell*: As he was equally false and bold, under the most specious Pretences of Liberty he had assumed the most arbitrary Government. As this lost him all Confidence in the Affections of the People, to support his Usurpation and Tyranny he found a *French* Alliance very necessary, and therefore entered into great Intimacy with *Mazarine*; which the Cardinal readily embraced; and to make such an Alliance pass with the People, who have naturally an Aversion to *France*, the Cardinal granted him Conditions in Appearance very advantageous; and this procured *Cromwell* a great Reputation with several, who, being unable to look forward, fancied from the present View of Things,

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that he had entirely the Ascendant of the Cardinal. But wiser Men, who could judge of the Affairs of *Europe*, and knew the Interest of *England*, how much it concerned them to check the Growth of *France*, and how much they had it in their Power at that Time, plainly saw that *Cromwell* was in Truth the *Dupe* of the Cardinal, and that That Alliance with *England* was a Master-piece in his Politicks. And *Mazarine* himself was so sensible of the Service he had done the *French* Nation, and what a wrong Step it was on the part of *Cromwell*; that it is known he used to call him, by way of Contempt, the *fortunate Fool*.

The Inclinations of the Court in the Two next Reigns.

This was one of *Cromwell's* last Actions, and happy had it been for this Nation, if these false Politicks had ended with his usurped Government. There was great Reason to hope, that when the Nation returned to its true and antient Establishment, its true and antient Interest would have been resumed; and that those who bore so just a Hatred to the Name of *Cromwell*, would have been the last to have gone into *Cromwell's* Measures. But the Event has shewn how much the Friends of *England* were mistaken in these Hopes. Our Princes losing their Religion in their Exile, and perhaps with that, all true Affection to their Country; or at least having contracted an utter Hatred and Aversion to our Form of Government by Parliaments, returned with strong, tho' dissim-
bled,

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bled, Inclinations to *Popery* and *France*. And what a fatal Influence that had upon all Counsels, from the Restoration to the Revolution, in Respect to the Memory of Princes, who had otherwise a great many good Qualities, I care not to repeat; especially after so many Things have been Published, and some very lately, upon so disagreeable a Subject.

But whatever Designs those unhappy Princes were engaged in, the Nation was steady to its true Interest, and unalterably bent upon the Preservation of the *Netherlands*; that Provinces so very near to *England*, might not fall into the Hands of *France*. Neither the implicit Devotions of the People to the Prince, nor all the Influence of the Court, at a Time when siding with the Court was very Popular, and passed for *Loyalty*; nor all the Practices that could be used upon a Parliament, that was under their Management for above Seventeen Years, could make the People or their Representatives change their Sentiments, in a Point so essential to the Safety and Welfare of the Nation. Every Body knows what Differences there were between the King and his People for much the greater Part of that Reign; all which were owing to this one Cause, that the Court were suspected to be, as they really were, in Measures with *France*. Whereas, had they gone heartily into the Interest of the Nation,

The Sense of the Parliament and Nation, in the Reign of K. Charles the 1st, concerning the Necessity of preserving the Netherlands from falling into the Hands of France.

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and entered into vigorous Measures with *Spain* and *Holland*, for setting Bounds to the Power and Ambition of so formidable a Neighbour; there is nothing the Parliament would not have complied with, to oblige a Prince so much beloved; nothing they would not have given him, to support a Confederate War for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*. For Proof of this, I might appeal to the Universal Joy the Nation expressed upon his making the *Triple Alliance*, and the great Sums they gave to express their grateful Sense of it; tho' it soon after appeared, that the King was at that very Time in *French* Counsels, and concerting with them the Second *Dutch* War; which, when it began, filled the Nation with such Jealousies, and raised such a Ferment in the Parliament, as made the King, after two Summers, glad to put an end to it. After which, the Court having made their own Peace with the *States*, to please People, offered to mediate one, between *France* and Them, and the other Confederate Princes, whom the War made upon the *States* by *France* and *England* had engaged in their Defence. But as long as this Mediation had no Influence upon the Progress of the *French* Arms, who made every Year great Advances in the *Netherlands*, the Nation was not to be quieted; nor could any Thing content them, less than the King's entering himself into the War, and taking part with the Confederates, that the Weight of *England* might do what the King's Mediation would or could not.

The

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The Sense of the *Commons* upon this Occasion, can no way be better seen, than from their own Journals; and therefore I shall give the Reader a short Abstract of them.

In the beginning of 1677, the *Commons* did directly, and in very pressing Terms, represent to the King, that the Minds of his People were very much disquieted with

*The Opinion
of the Two
Houses in 1677
concerning this
Matter.*

the Dangers arising from the manifest Growth and Power of the *French King*; especially by the *Acquisitions* made, and like to be made by him, in the *Spanish Netherlands*: “ In the Preference and Security whereof, *say they*, we humbly conceive the Interest of your Majesty, and the Security of your People, are highly concerned; and therefore we most humbly beseech your Majesty to take the same into your Royal Care, and to strengthen yourself with such stricter Alliances, as may secure your Majesty’s Kingdoms, and preserve the said *Spanish Netherlands*, and thereby quiet the Minds of your Majesty’s People.”

And when the *Lords*, who concurred with the *Commons* in this Address, would have had particular Mention likewise made of *Sicily*, it being of great Importance to our Trade, that *Sicily* be not in the Hands of the *French King*; the *Commons* disagreed to it for this Reason, because “ the special mentioning of *Sicily* would seem to put less Weight upon the Preservation of the *Spanish Netherlands*; the Conservation of which
“ they

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“ they conceive to be of much more Moment
 “ to his Majesty’s Kingdoms, than that of Si-
 “ city. For though it may be of great Impor-
 “ tance to our Trade, that Sicily be not in the
 “ Hands of the *French King* ; yet the *Safety of*
 “ *his Majesty’s Kingdoms is not so immediately en-*
 “ *dangered thereby*, and therefore it ought not to
 “ be equally insisted on.”

*A Second Ad-
 dress from the
 House of Com-
 mons upon the
 same Subject.*

The King agreed with his Parlia-
 ment in owning the *great Importance*
the Conservation of Flanders was of to
 England ; but the rest of his An-
 swer, which shewed his Aversion to
 enter into a War for its Defence, was so little
 satisfactory, that a Motion was immediately made
 for a *Second Address* to his Majesty, to enter into
 a strict and speedy Alliance with the Confederates ;
 and in Pursuance of this Motion, the House did
 about a Fortnight after, (*March 30*) in a *Second*
Address, “ with most earnest and repeated De-
 “ fires implore his Majesty, that he would be
 “ pleased to take timely Care to prevent those
 “ Dangers that may arise to these Kingdoms by
 “ the *Great Power of the French King*, and
 “ the *Progress* he daily makes in the *Netherlands*
 “ and other Places ; and that he would not de-
 “ fer the entering into such Alliances as may
 “ obtain those Ends, promising fully to assist his
 “ Majesty if he should be engaged in a War,
 “ in Pursuance of such Alliances.”

Within

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Within three Days after the King's Answer to this Address, *And a Third.* April 13, the House made a *Third* Address, to assure his Majesty that "they would with most cheerful Hearts proceed both then and at all other Times, to furnish his Majesty with such large Supplies upon this Occasion, (to preserve the *Netherlands* and check the Growth of *France*) as might enable him, by God's Assistance, to maintain the Alliances they had advised, against all Opposition whatsoever."

This Address, upon the King's Answer to it, was immediately *And a Fourth.* followed by a *Fourth*, April 16; assuring his Majesty of their Duty and Affection; and that he might not only depend upon the Supply he desired, but upon all such Assistances as the Posture of his Affairs should require: "In Confidence whereof, say the *Commons*, we hope your Majesty will be encouraged in the mean Time to speak and act such Things as your Majesty shall judge necessary, for attaining those great Ends we have formerly represented to your Majesty."

These repeated Addresses from so loyal a House of *Commons*, sufficient *And a Fifth.* ly shew how much the Nation was alarmed upon the Dangers to which they saw the *Netherlands* exposed. The *Commons* were so bent upon this Point, as a Matter of the last Consequence, that they would take no Denial: Which made the Court resolve upon adjourning them for five Weeks. But what passed in this Interval did not make

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make the *Commons* alter their Sentiments, or less earnest in the Pursuit of them. When they met again, *May* the 21st, they fell into very warm Debates, and resolved to advance still one Step farther in a Matter of so great Concern, which was to address his Majesty to enter into a League offensive and defensive with the *STATES*, and to make other fit Alliances against the Growth and Power of *FRANCE*, and for the Preservation of the *Spanish Netherlands*: And in this Address they tell his Majesty how highly sensible they are of the Necessity of supporting, as well as making, the Alliances desired in their former Addresses; “which we still conceive, say they, so important to the Safety of your Majesty and your Kingdoms, that we cannot without Unfaithfulness to your Majesty and those we represent, omit upon all Occasions humbly to beseech your Majesty, as we now do, to enter into a League offensive and defensive with the *STATES*, &c.” And that no Time might be lost in doing this, they give his Majesty this Reason among others; “the great Danger and Charge which must necessarily fall upon your Majesty’s Kingdoms, if, through want of timely Encouragement and Assistance, the *States*, or any other considerable Part of the Confederates, should make a Peace with the *French King*, (the Prevention whereof hitherto, say they, must be acknowledged to be a singular Effect of God’s Goodness to us;) which if it should happen, your Majesty would afterwards be necessitated

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“ necessitated with fewer, perhaps with no Alliances,
“ to withstand the Power of the French King, which
“ has so long and so successfully contended with
“ so many potent Enemies; and whilst he continues his overbalancing Greatness, must always
“ be dangerous to his Neighbours; since he
“ would be able to oppress any one Confederate,
“ before the rest could get together, and be in so
“ good a Posture of offending him as they are
“ now, being jointly engaged in a War; and if
“ he should be *so successful as to make a Peace, or*
“ *disunite the present Confederation against him,* it is
“ much to be feared whether it would be *possible*
“ *ever to reunite it.* At least it would be a *Work*
“ *of so much Time and Difficulty, as would leave your*
“ *Majesty's Kingdoms exposed to much Misery and*
“ *Danger.* Having thus discharged our Duty in
“ laying before your Majesty the Dangers threatening your Majesty and your Kingdoms, and the
“ only Remedy we can think of for preventing
“ it, and quieting the Minds of your People;
“ we most humbly beseech your Majesty to take
“ such Resolutions, *as may not leave it in the Power*
“ *of any Neighbouring Prince, to rob your People*
“ *of that Happiness they enjoy under your Majesty's*
“ *gracious Government.*” Then they oblige themselves not only by their Promises, with great
Unanimity renewed in a full House, but by the
Zeal and Desires of those they represent, and by
the Interest of all their Safeties, most chearfully
to give his Majesty speedy and plentiful Supplies.

This

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And a Sixth. This earnest and importunate Address, which was presented *May* the 26th, expressed not only the Sense of a very full House, but indeed of the whole Nation; which gave it so much Weight that the Court saw they should be forced to comply with it, unless they betook themselves to the last Refuge in such Cases, and immediately put an End to the Session. The Parliament therefore was accordingly dismissed, and not suffered to sit again till the End of *Jan.* 167 $\frac{1}{2}$. But tho' the Court could interrupt the sitting of the Parliament as they pleased, it was not possible to change their Sentiments; and they no sooner met again, but they resumed their former Debates with more Earnestness, if possible, than before. For as that long Interval, in which they had not been suffered to have any Opportunity of interposing their Counsels with his Majesty, had given the *French* so much farther Leisure to finish their Designs upon the *Netherlands*; the Nation was so much the more alarmed, and in a New Address *Jan.* 31, they

“ humbly desire his Majesty, with the highest
 “ Zeal for his Honour and the Safety of his
 “ People, *not to admit of any Treaty of Peace, where-*
 “ *by the French King shall be left in Possession of any*
 “ *larger Dominions and Territories, or of any greater*
 “ *Power than what he retained by the PYRE-*
 “ *NEAN TREATY; less than which, they con-*
 “ *ceive, cannot secure his Majesty's Kingdoms and the*
 “ *rest of Europe from the Growth and Power of the*
 “ *said King, but that he alone may be able to*
 “ disturb

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“ disturb the Peace thereof whensoever he is inclined to attempt it.” — And they farther desire “ *that in all Treaties, in order to the obtaining that End, his Majesty would be pleased to provide, that none of the Parties that shall join with him in making War for that Purpose, may lay down their Arms or depart from their Alliances, until the said King be reduced, AT LEAST, to the said Treaty.*” The Commons had Reason to hope for a Compliance with this Address; the King having in his Speech acquainted them, that he “ had made, according to their Desire, such Alliances with *Holland*, as were necessary for the Preservation of *Flanders*; That since a good Peace could not be had by fair Means, it should not be his Fault if it were not obtained by Force of Arms; That if he be supported by them, he will not be weary till *Christendom* be restored to such a Peace, as it shall not be in the Power of any Prince alone to disturb.

But whatever influenced the Counsels of the Court, (which is a *And a Seventh.* Subject I am willing to decline,) this Address met with no better Reception than their last. They had been *Then* told, that “ what they did was an Invasion of *the Prerogative* ;” and *Now* they were told, not only the same Thing, but, what is more surprizing, that “ the King having asked the Advice of both Houses, cannot act upon any that does not jointly come from both.” The Commons however not

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not rebutted with this Treatment, persevered ; immediately voted a good Supply ; and upon *March 14* resolved to Address his Majesty, “ *That to quiet the Minds of his Subjects, and encourage the Confederates, he would be pleased immediately to proclaim and enter into an actual War against the French King ; promising constantly to stand by and assist his Majesty with plentiful Supplies :*” To which Address they desired the Concurrence of the *Lords* ; but before it could be entirely obtained, they were adjourned to the Middle of *April* ; and from thence to the 29th ; when the Lord Chancellor acquaints them in the King’s Name, “ That the *States*, whom he had long found weary of the War,” (and indeed had *made* so ; for they were quite discouraged from expecting Help from *England*, when they saw the Zeal and Spirit of the Nation entirely defeated and eluded by the Court) “ were making Haste to get out of it, and were entred upon Considerations of accepting such a Peace as *France* had thought fit to offer, tho’ it be without his Majesty’s Consent or Privy ; a Peace as ill for themselves, and the rest of Christendom, as their Enemies could wish.” And in this difficult Conjuncture the King desires their Advice, (when it is too late) and resolves to pursue it now ; tho’ their giving it before in Time, when it would have been of the greatest Consequence, was made a high Crime. It is not my Business to expose the Insincerity of the Court in this whole Affair : They who would see this, need

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need only read Sir *William Temple's* Letters and Memoirs; a Person of undoubted Reputation and Authority, and who was in those Times his Majesty's Ambassador in the *Low-Countries*. But I cannot but observe from these Words, what a Character the King gives of that Peace that was a little after concluded at *Nimeguen*; and what made that Peace so ill a one, was the leaving so much of *Flanders* in the Possession of *France*, and the Remainder so much exposed by a weak and insecure Barrier.

But to proceed: The *Commons*, who were willing to hope that, if the Court were sincere, Things might be yet retrieved, came May 4th to Two Resolutions, which they laid before the King, without staying to put them into the usual Form of Address, by Reason of the Importance of the Affair, and the Exigency of the Time. In the First, they "declared the League made with
" the States to procure a Peace between the Two
" Crowns upon certain Terms therein specified,
" not to be pursuant to their Addresses, nor consistent with the Good and Safety of the Kingdom:" And yet by these Terms (had *France* been obliged to accept them,) *Tournay*, *Condè*, and *Valenciennes*, were to be restored, together with the Dukedom of *Lorraine*. The Other Resolution was, to desire his Majesty "forthwith
" to enter into the Confederacy for the vigorous
" carrying on the present War; and particularly, that effectual Endeavours might be used

*Followed with
two other Resolutions upon
the same Head.*

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“ for continuing the *States* in the Confederacy ;
 “ and that no Peace might be made with *France*,
 “ without general Consent first had.” And upon the King’s refusing to give any Answer till he had the concurrent Advice of both Houses, they immediately resolved to address his Majesty to give a speedy Answer to their last Address, and to remove those Counsellors who advised the Answers to their former Addresses of the 26th of *May* and 31st of *January*, or either of them ;
 “ by which Answers, they say, his Majesty’s
 “ good Subjects had been infinitely discouraged,
 “ and the State of his Affairs reduced to a most de-
 “ plorable Condition :” They mean the Progress of the *French* in *Flanders*, and the great Jealousy and Uneasiness That gave the Nation. And notwithstanding the King told them *May* 23, that Things were driving violently on towards a Peace, yet still, to prevent *so much* of *Flanders* remaining in the Hands of *France*, they resolved, if his Majesty would then enter into a War against the *French* King, they were, and always would be ready to assist him. But these and all the other Efforts the *Commons* could make, could not force the Court into right Measures, or prevent an ill Peace ; and served only to vindicate themselves to Posterity, from having any Hand in it ; and this I presume it will be allowed they have done.

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It is impossible to read this short Account of the Proceedings of the Commons, and not observe of how very great Importance they thought the saving of *Flanders* was, to the Safety and Security of this Nation.

The King concurs in the same Sentiments with the Commons, when it is too late.

This was so plainly the known and certain Interest of *England*, that all the Arts the Court could use, could not divert them from pursuing this Point: This was the first Parliament that was chosen after the Restoration; which continued sitting above 17 Years; and cannot be suspected either of not having a true Regard for the Prerogative, or a due Deference for the Sentiments of the Court. But the Interest and Safety of their Country was so much concerned in the Preservation of *Flanders*, that this Consideration carried them into these Measures in Opposition to the Ministry; in which they steadily and unalterably persevered; and the Nation was entirely with them; the Point they pressed against the Court, having apparently no other Foundation than their hearty Zeal and Concern for its true Interest. And the King himself thought fit, when it was too late, to express at least the same Concern They did, and to concur in the same Sentiments; as appears from his Speech to them not long after, in which *he opens his Heart freely to them*, and tells them he was “ resolved to save *Flanders*, either by a “ War or a Peace, as *the greatest Foreign Interest* “ *of this Nation*: That Things seem already to

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“ have determined in a Peace, at least as to
 “ *Spain and Holland*; that he is resolved to give
 “ his Guaranty to it in the strongest Manner he
 “ is able; but that he could not tell how far
 “ that would go; for that they had already sent
 “ him Word, that unless England and Holland
 “ will both join in the Charge of maintaining *Flan-*
 “ *ders even after the Peace, the Spaniards will*
 “ *not be in a Condition of Supporting it alone, and*
 “ *must fall into other Measures:* That France on the
 “ other Hand will be left so great, that nothing
 “ Abroad can treat with them hereafter upon an
 “ equal Foot, without the Hopes of being sup-
 “ ported by this Crown: That tho’ after the
 “ Supplies they had given towards a War, they
 “ may think the Peace an ill Bargain; perhaps
 “ they will not believe it so, if they consider that
 “ by it so great a Part of *Flanders* is likely to be
 “ saved; whereas without the Paces made to-
 “ wards a War, there is nothing so certain as
 “ that the whole of it would have been absolutely
 “ lost that Campaign. And I believe you would,
 “ says the King, give much greater Sums than this
 “ will cost you, rather than the single Town of *Os-*
 “ *tend should be in the French Hands, and Forty of*
 “ *their Men of War in so good a Haven overagainst*
 “ *the River’s Mouth.*”

If a Nation will ever be allowed to speak its
 own Sense, it must be owned the *English* Nation
 did so on this Occasion; and the Reader will
 observe that the King in this Speech, where he
 opens his Heart to them, justifies their Sentiments.

Here

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Here then is the Voice of the Nation declaring in the fullest and most unexceptionable Manner, that it is the true Interest of *England*, that there should be preserved a good *Barrier* in the *Netherlands*; and in order thereunto, that *France* should on that Side be reduced *at least* to the Terms of the *Pyrenean Treaty*. And it adds to the Weight of this Authority, that in this Concurrence of Prince and People in the same Sentiments, the People do not concur with the Prince, (in which they might be thought to be influenced or over-awed,) but the Prince with his People; which it is certain could proceed from nothing in this Case, but that they had most evident Reason on their Side, which was too manifest to be denied, however their Desires were eluded or refused.

I might proceed to shew, that the Nation has always continued in the same fixed Opinion of the Necessity of a good *Barrier* for our own safety as well as that of our Neighbours; but it would be altogether superfluous to spend any Time in proving this. The Vigour wherewith they have prosecuted two long Wars against *France* since the Revolution, being the best Demonstration that can be given, how much they think it the Interest of the Nation, that That exorbitant Power should be reduced within some Bounds, and particularly that it should not extend itself in the *Netherlands*. Nor is any Body ignorant that the Danger arising to

The Opinion of the Nation since that Time: And that the Necessity of a good Barrier, was one of the principal Reasons of entering into the present War.

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England, as well as *Holland*, by the Seizure of the *Netherlands* by *France* upon the Death of the late King of *Spain*, was one of the most immediate Causes of our entering into the present War. For it was impossible to give greater Proofs than both Nations did, of their sincere Concern that the Peace might be preserved; They shewed by their previous Acknowledgement of the Duke of *Anjou* for King of *Spain*, that they would not have taken up Arms, if they could have enjoyed any tolerable Degree of Safety without it; but for Peace-sake would have been content with any Terms; and they made that Step upon a Belief that the King of *France* would not refuse to grant such Conditions, as the Peace of *Europe* and their own Safety unavoidably obliged them to insist upon. But these Conditions, so far as related to the Security of the two Nations, consisted chiefly in a *Barrier* for the *Netherlands*; as may be seen by the Proposals made by the *States* to Count d'Arvaux at the *Hague*, March 22, 1701; to whom Mr. Stanhope, the late King's Minister at the *Hague*, did at the same Time deliver Propositions on the Part of *Great Britain*; both which, were such as their Fears made them believe would not be denied, not such as in Reason they could think sufficient. The two Nations were under such a Consternation, that they were willing, for preventing a War, to give up almost every other Point; but a *Barrier* in the *Netherlands* was of that immediate Concern to their Security against *France*, that it could

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could upon no Consideration whatever be receded from ; and consequently a Refusal on the Part of *France*, unavoidably forced them into Arms ; since they must have been ruined without a Barrier, but had a Chance to be saved in fighting for one. It must therefore be allowed that the Loss of their Barrier by the Seizure of the *Netherlands*, was, as I have affirmed, one of the most immediate Causes of their entering into the present War ; and consequently, in the Judgment of the two Nations, a good Barrier is the nearest and most immediate Interest of both. Can more Proof, or better Authority, be desired in so plain a Case ? Can any one be so perverse as to think the *Maritime* Powers can for Ages together have mistaken their Interest, in a Point for which so much Blood and Treasure have been spent ? Can it be thought they have had a more than needful Concern for preventing *France* from getting Possession of the *Netherlands* ?

But we need only look into the Views and Designs of *That* Crown, to be convinced that in this the Two Nations have not mistaken their true Interest ; *their Enemies being Judges*. For there is no one Point *France* has so constantly and with so much Earnestness pursued, as the Acquisition of the *Netherlands* ; and that is a convincing Proof, that there is nothing which the *Ma-*

The Judgment of France herself, concerning this Matter ; shown by the Earnestness wherewith she has constantly pursued the Acquisition of the Netherlands.

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ritime Powers are more concerned to prevent. I might shew this has been the Aim of *France* for two Ages past: But, to look no farther back than the Reign of the present King and his immediate Predecessor; what Endeavours has not that Crown used to compass this Design, which was the Favourite Project of its Two Great Ministers, *Richlieu* and *Mazarin*? The Court of *France* have often applied themselves separately to each of the Powers concerned in the Preservation of the *Netherlands*; to *Spain*, to *England*, and *Holland*; to amuse and lull them asleep, to win them by Menaces or Bribes, that they should favour and consent to, or at least connive at, their extending their Dominions on this Side. They have tried *Matches*, *Exchanges*, *Partitions*, for this End; they have made *Wars* at a vast Expence, *with* or *without Pretence*; and have made *Treaties* again and again, with no other Design than to break them as soon as made; that they might get by Surprize at one Time One, at another Time Another Piece of those Countries, which they knew their Neighbours were too much interested to suffer them tamely to take by open Force, and at once. It was this View made *Lewis* the XIIIth and the *Queen-Mother* so fond of a *Spanish Match*: And we find in *Sully's Memoirs*, that *Henry* the IVth would gladly have done the same Thing, and have married the Infanta of *Spain*, were she never so Old and Ugly, if he could have married the Low-Countries with her. And when *Spain* would not consent

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consent that the *Low-Countries* should be given in Dowry with her, *Richlieu* then applied himself to *Holland*, and for several Years propos'd to them a Partition of the *Netherlands*, if they would not make a Peace with *Spain*, but join their Arms with *France* for the entire Conquest of them: And a Treaty was actually made to this Purpose in 1635, tho' the Design of it was defeated by the Treaty of *Munster* in 1648; when the *States* having plainly discovered what the ambitious Views of *France* aimed at, made their Peace with *Spain*. But this could not induce *France* to lay aside its Design on the *Netherlands*, or so much as to desist a while from it. If they could not compleat the Conquest of these Countries in Conjunction with the *States*, they were resolv'd to pursue it by themselves. *Mazarin*, who succeeded *Richlieu* in this Ministry, did all that was possible, to break off the Negotiations of *Munster*, that no Peace might be made till the *Low-Countries* were entirely reduced; and when he could not compass that, he would have consented himself to any Terms of Peace with *Spain*, and willingly have given up all the Conquests *France* had made in *Roussillon* and *Catalonia*, if they would have parted with *Flanders* either in Exchange, or under the Notion of a Dowry upon a Match between the present King of *France* and the then *Infanta*. This Point the Cardinal laboured with all his Might, as may be seen at large in the Negotiations of the Treaty of *Munster*. And when neither *Hol-*
land

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land could be prevailed on to continue the War, nor *Spain* consent to purchase a Peace of *France* by the Exchange of the *Netherlands*, the Cardinal found means to have the Treaty of *Munster* finished without including the *Spaniards* in the General Peace: By which Means the *French* were at Liberty to turn the whole Weight of their Arms against *Spain*, unassisted by any Friends, and without any other War upon their own Hands. Thus *Spain* and *France* were engaged in a War for 12 Years longer, while one Side would not give up the *Low-Countries* for a Peace, nor the other make a Peace without them. As the *Spaniard* was obstinate, so the *Cardinal* was indefatigable: And tho' the Civil Troubles the Kingdom was involved in, gave him sufficient Cause to wish the War well ended; he could not be persuaded to quit this View: And when he found that *Spain* would neither give up those Provinces, nor could be beaten out of them, he tried again in 1657, to have them yielded to *France* in Favour of a Match; and Monsieur *Lionne* was sent to *Madrid* to negotiate the Affair, but without Success. At last, when a Marriage could not be obtained without a Renunciation, he advised the marrying the Infanta with one; Since, whatever Renunciation were made, the King might, in the good Cardinal's Opinion, by Virtue of such a Match pretend to the Succession of *Spain* and the *Low-Countries*. The Match was accordingly agreed to, in order to a lasting Peace between the two Crowns, concluded by
the

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the famous *Pyrenean* Treaty in *November* 1659. By this Treaty, besides other very considerable Acquisitions, *France* was left in Possession of large Dominions in the *Low-Countries*, and the Match was in due Time to give a Title to the rest. This was the Cardinal's Scheme, who laid the Greatness of *France* in the Acquisition of the *Netherlands*. How well the *French* King has pursued His Measures, all *Europe* sees and feels. In 1667, upon the Death of *Philip* the IVth, without the least Ceremony he invaded *Flanders*, as belonging to him in Right of his Queen; and he has ever since engaged the World in perpetual Wars, still ending one with no other View than to disarm *Spain* and the Powers concerned in the Preservation of the *Netherlands*, that he might with more Success begin another. And to his Arms he has joined all manner of Intrigues; he hath corrupted all the Courts of *Europe* to induce them to favour his Designs, or to engage them in Quarrels among Themselves, or by other Ways to hinder them from combining together to check his exorbitant Ambition. He hath tempted *Spain* with very advantageous Offers, to consent to the Exchange of the *Netherlands*; and has procured the most lively Representations to be made, of the Expence and the Impossibility of keeping them; That they were an insupportable Burthen to the Crown, and involved it in perpetual Wars, without the least Advantage coming from them. At other Times he has offered, both to *England* and *Holland*, a Part
of

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of the *Low-Countries* to facilitate the Conquest of the rest; and there is no Way he hath not tried to amuse them both, and to bring them into his Designs, or to make them patient and easy under them, or to weaken them by Divisions in order to prevent their Opposition. And it is well known, the true Reason of the terrible Resentment he expressed against the *States* in the Year 1672, was to be revenged of them for the *Triple League*, by which he found the *States* could never be made so far his Friends as to favour Designs so prejudicial to themselves: A Stiffness he did not find on the Part of *England*; and therefore, That Friendship he courted above all Things; And the Use he made of it was to conspire the Ruin of the *Dutch*; because, if that Obstacle were once removed, there was nothing left that could stop the Progress of his Arms. By these Methods, the King of *France* has been perpetually gaining Ground in the *Netherlands*. Almost every Year was distinguished by some Advances on that Side; Places were either taken by War, or seized under the Notion of Dependencies in Times of Peace, which by his Want of Faith were more fatal to those Countries than open War: And these Places no sooner fell into his Hands, but all the Force of Art was used to render them impregnable; which shewed he knew the Value of them, and never designed to part with them on any Consideration.

Thus

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Thus steadily was the Design on the *Netherlands* pursued, and One Conquest was followed by another, till the Death of the late King of *Spain* made way for the Seizure of the whole; which, tho' a little Spot of Ground, is of that vast Consequence, that Sir *William Temple*, upon an Apprehension of *Spain's* consenting some time or other to give the *Netherlands* to *France* by Exchange, could not forbear telling my Lord *Arlington*, in a Letter written in 1669, that “with-
“in two Years after the King of *France* were
“well possessed of those Provinces, he doubted
“no Prince or State in *Christendom* would pre-
“tend to dispute with him, any more than the
“*Spaniard* did then. And this was an Event,
“which in his Opinion *deserved* at that time, to
“be a little more thought of than it was.”

*A Passage of
Sir William
Temple upon
this Subject.*

If therefore Reason and Experience, if the constant Sense of our own Nation, and of all that wish well to us; if the Opinion of our Enemies themselves, concurring in the same Judgment, will be allowed to prove a thing: it must be owned, that I have undeniably proved it, to be in itself, and apart from all other Considerations, the Interest of *England*, that there should be a good and sufficient Barrier against *France* on the Side of the *Netherlands*. And if this be true; if a good Barrier be the Interest of *England*, as certainly as it is of *Holland*; it is also true, that whatever *England*, in Conjunction with
Holland,

*The Conclu-
sion of this
Head.*

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Holland has done, or shall at any time do, for the Recovery of such a Barrier, or for the Preservation of it when recovered, is done because it is *our own Interest* it should be done. What *we* do in it, we do for *ourselves*, and for *our own Security*; as well as what the *Dutch* do towards it, is for *themselves*, and for *their Security*. It is *our Barrier* as well as *theirs*; the Interest is mutual; and while they act in Conjunction with us in Defence of it, both Nations may with equal Truth be said to provide for the Safety of each other, by providing for their own. And this one single Inference, if applied as a Rule to the Libels that have been written against the *Barrier-Treaty*, will itself defeat the greatest part of what they say, and shew it to be absolutely false.

I have been the longer in the Proof of the *first* Part of this Proposition, because it is the Foundation of all that follow; and because such Clamours and unfair Methods have been made use of, to extinguish the ancient Sense of the Nation, and misrepresent entirely to the People, a Point in which their Safety is so immediately concerned.

That no Barrier can be sufficient, that is not at least equal to that stipulated in the Barrier-Treaty.

I come now to the *second* Part, viz. *That no Barrier can be sufficient, that is not at least equal to that stipulated in the Barrier-Treaty.* It being evident, that the Trade, Peace, and Safety of *Britain*, do absolutely depend upon the Preservation of the *Netherlands*; and

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and Experience having shewn us, that upon that Account the whole Weight and Burthen of their Defence has, ever since the *Pyrenean-Treaty*, been in a Manner wholly thrown on the Maritime Powers, and must for the same Reasons continue to be so for the future; it is amazing that any *Englishman* should think it possible for those Countries to be too well secured; especially, those amongst us, who would have it thought their peculiar Characteristick, *not to delight in War*. For, unless the Safety of the *Netherlands* be effectually provided for, We and the States shall not only be inevitably exposed to a *new War*, but continue at the Mercy of the House of *Austria*, as to the Terms upon which they'll please to engage with us in it; and consequently, we shall be sure of never being put upon a more equal or favourable Foot than that of the last and the present War. One would have thought therefore, that the Authors of the Libels and Invectives that have been spread against this Treaty, would have been careful how they had quarrelled with it, upon a Point that so apparently favours the Peace and Repose of *Britain*, which they pretend to be so passionately concerned for. But perhaps, finding *France* averse to comply with so good a Barrier as is requisite for the Safety of the Allies, they found it necessary to remove the Blame from *France*, by laying it on the Allies; giving it out that it was very unreasonable to insist in the *Preliminary-Treaty* upon the Restitution of so many strong

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strong Places, as not being in their Opinion requisite for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*; and that the *Barrier-Treaty* carrying those Demands still farther, could be intended only to aggrandize the *Dutch*: Not doubting, but when they have once brought the *Dutch* into the Question, our Heat and Prejudices will at this Time so far blind us, as to make us abandon our own *Interests* without the least Hesitation. Thus are the unreasonable Impositions of *France*, made to pass as the Effects of our own Choice; and the Restitution of the strongest Towns in the *Netherlands*, is represented, not as an *necessary Evil*, but as an *eligible Condition of Peace*. I shall prove therefore, that the Barrier settled in the *Preliminaries of 1709*, was in Truth not sufficient for the Security and Defence of the *Low-Countries*; and that all which may be farther claimed by Vertue of the *Barrier-Treaty*, is far from being more than what is necessary for that Purpose.

That the Barrier insisted on in the Preliminaries of 1709, was not sufficient for the Defence of the Low-Countries.

That the Barrier insisted on in the *Preliminaries of 1709*, was really not sufficient for the Defence of the *Low-Countries*, will appear, by comparing it with the *End and Intention* of a Barrier in general; which is, to put a Country in such a Posture of Defence, that it may not easily be invaded or over-run. But no Country can enjoy that Security, while it is covered with *one single Chain of Towns only*, which if it be in any one Part broken

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broken into, gives the Enemy Entrance into the very Heart of the Country.

Such a Barrier therefore can never be thought a sufficient and reasonable Security, especially against an Enemy, who has always in Readiness a Force superior to what on a sudden can be brought against him. But such is the Situation of the *Netherlands*; it has an Enemy hovering upon its Borders, who is always in a better Posture to invade, than those Provinces are to defend themselves; and when their Outworks are taken, all within is an open Country at the Mercy of the Conqueror. There are indeed many great Towns in the *Netherlands*; more perhaps than in any other Country of the like Extent: But it is That which in some Respects helps to make its Weakness. They are in no Condition to stop the Progress of a victorious Army, as we ourselves found this very War after the Battle of *Ramellies*, when they opened their Gates to the Duke of *Marlborough*, as fast as he could summon them. And, were they in other Respects capable of making some Defence, they are so large that each of them would require almost an Army for its Garrison: So that there is a Necessity for those who defend this Country, either to leave those Towns, without Troops, or to have no Army in the Field: Either of which would end in the Loss of the *Netherlands*. And supposing they had an Army, it could not stir out of Sight of their Towns, without

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leaving them too much exposed. It was this obliged the Allies last War to be in a manner altogether upon the Defensive; the *Netherlands*, for want of a sufficient Barrier being so much exposed, that they never durst venture to leave them without an Army. And what a fatal Influence this had upon that War, I need not say; while *France* was so well covered, as to have nothing to fear from the Allies, and therefore was at Liberty to act offensively on any Side; but the Hands of the Allies were tied, and it was more than they could do to defend a large and weak Frontier. This may let us see, that a good Barrier is more particularly necessary for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*, than of any other Country; and that *one single Chain of Towns only*, is by no Means sufficient to that End; since *France* by a sudden Invasion having taken but one Town, may make all the rest of the Barrier perfectly insignificant, and overrun the whole Country before any Measures can be concerted for its Defence.

But the Barrier settled by the Preliminaries of 1709, in most Parts of it, consists but of *One single Line of Towns*: From *Newport*, for Example to *Menin* (that is, from the Sea to the *Lys*,) there is no Place of any Strength but *Ypres*; and from *Tournay* to *Namur*, (that is, from the *Schelde* to the *Maes*,) there is no Place of Strength for a Second Line but *Mons* only. Nor is the Barrier any stronger between the *Lys* and

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and the *Schelde* ; where *Lisle* is plainly too much exposed, if *Douay* continues in *French* Hands, as it does by the *Preliminaries*. If therefore we would have the *Netherlands* covered by such a Barrier as may in any Degree answered the *End* and *Intention* of a Barrier in general, and be a tolerable Security against *France* ; it must be so formed, as not to leave it easier for *France* to invade than to be invaded ; otherwise, those Countries, tho' they were in other Respects equal to *France*, would never be sufficiently secured, but must always be in Danger from a Prince whose own Country is so much the better covered, that he may hope to invade them with Impunity. Whereas when Things are on such a Foot as may make it full as easy to invade *France* as it is for *France* to invade her Neighbours, she will not easily be the Aggressor ; and if she should, she may have Reason to repent it : The Consequence of which would be, that this Part of the World might hope to enjoy a *lasting Peace*. But that this can never be effected by the Barrier fixed in the *Preliminary Treaty*, is evident from what has been said above ; and therefore that Barrier cannot be thought sufficient for the End proposed. This was the Opinion of all that were acquainted with the Interest of the *Low-Countries* at the Time of these Negotiations ; insomuch that the *States* were mightly blamed for not insisting upon a better Frontier for the *Netherlands*, and particularly for receding from *Valenciennes*, which the *English* Ministers were directed to insist

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upon for a Part of their *Barrier*, as appears by their Instructions lately printed. So far were the *States* from being guilty of the Design charged upon them by the Emissaries of *France*, of continuing the War in order to aggrandize themselves by the Conquests in the *Low-Countries*; that it is plain they would have been content, for the sake of Peace, to sit down with, in Truth, a less *Barrier* than their own immediate Safety required.

But the *Barrier* insisted on in the *Preliminaries* of 1709, fell very short of what was requisite for the Security of the *States*, will appear still plainer by what I am next to prove; namely, That what may farther be claimed by Virtue of *This Treaty*, is far from being more than is necessary for the forming a good *Barrier*.

The *French King* having refused to ratify the *Preliminaries* concerted at the *Hague* in May 1709, all Hopes of Peace vanished, and the *Allies* found themselves under the Necessity of carrying on the War, and consequently of pushing it in *Flanders*, in order to bring *France* to Reason. It was therefore agreed in the *Barrier-Treaty*, which was not signed (as appears by the Date) till several Months after the *Preliminaries*, that *Valenciennes*, and all the Towns which should be conquered from *France* in the Course of the War, should make a Part of the *Barrier* for the *States*, upon the same Terms,
and

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and under the same Regulations as the other Towns specified in the Treaty. And this was no more than what in Justice and Reason ought to have been done : For the *French*, by their Insincerity, having rendered the Endeavours of the *Allies* towards a Peace ineffectual, and put them under the hard Necessity of continuing the War ; and the *Barrier* stipulated in the *Preliminaries* being plainly not sufficient for securing the great End proposed by it ; nothing could be more reasonable, than that under these Circumstances Care should be taken, that (in Case God was pleased to continue the Success with which he had to that Time blessed the Arms of the *Allies*) the Places taken from the Enemy should serve to make good this Barrier, which is of so much Importance to *England* and *Holland* ; and by that means compensate, in some Measure, the vast Expence that we and the *Dutch* were unavoidably engaged in by the farther Prosecution of the War.

The Towns taken since that Time, are *Douay, Aire, St. Venant, Bethune, Bouchain* and *Quenoy*. And that, tho' these Towns are added to the *Barrier* fixed in the *Preliminaries* of 1709, yet the whole will not be more than is necessary for the Security of the *Netherlands*, will easily appear, by comparing it with that which was left by the *Pyrenean Treaty*, which has constantly been thought to be but barely sufficient for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*. For, that the *Pyrenean*

*As appears by
comparing it
with the Py-
renean Treaty.*

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Treaty did more than reduce Things to an Equality between the two Crowns of *France* and *Spain*, and turned the Balance in Favour of the former, is, I think, confessed on all Hands. It was so advantageous to *France*, that she has, by Favour of it, not only removed all Dangers from herself (till the surprizing Turn of Affairs in the present War) but has been able to give perpetual Disturbance to her Neighbours, and has more than once pushed fair for the Conquest of the whole *Netherlands* in two Campaigns; which plainly shews, that even *that Barrier* was far from being more than what the *Allies* had Reason to insist on as a necessary Security for those Provinces. Accordingly it has generally been their Aim, in all their Wars and Negotiations with *France* ever since that Treaty, to reduce Things again, if they could, to that Foot. This is what the Parliament desired of King *Charles*, in their Address of the 31st of *January* 1678, already mentioned, *as the least that was necessary for the Security of his Majesty's Kingdoms and the rest of Europe, against the Growth and Power of the French King.* And this they were so solicitous to obtain, that they farther desired his Majesty *to provide, by the Treaties that were to be made for that End, that none of the Parties that should join with him in making War, might lay down their Arms or depart from their Alliances, until the said King were reduced, AT LEAST, to the said Treaty.* And this is what King *Charles* proposed to the States, when it

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it was too late, if they would join with him in vigorous Measures, and reject the Offers made by *France* ; which they had in a manner accepted at the Time when that Proposal was made ; being quite spent and exhausted with a long War, and not daring to put much Confidence in the Promises of a Court that seemed to act with so little Steadiness. This, I say, was what the *Allies* always aimed at, tho' their ill Success obliged them to be content with a great deal less: The Consequence of which has been, that the *End of one War* has been in Effect the *Beginning of another* ; and Experience has shewn us, that this will always be our Case, till such a *Barrier* be obtained, as may put it out of the Power of *France* to invade the *Netherlands* at Pleasure. But if that left by the *Pyrenean Treaty* has been found insufficient for that End, how can this assigned in the present Treaty be said to be more than sufficient which falls considerably short of the former? For should the *States* at the Peace be put in Possession not only of all the Towns specified in the *Preliminaries* of 1709, but likewise of all that may be farther claimed by Vertue of the *Barrier-Treaty* ; yet *Cambray* (which is owned by every one to be a Place of great Importance) with *Dunkirk*, *St. Omers*, and several Towns of less Consequence, would remain to the *French*, more than were left to them by the *Pyrenean Treaty* ; not to mention *Franche Comptè* : So that the *Pyrenean Barrier* was much stronger than that granted by the present

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Treaty, even tho' we take in *Valenciennes*, and all the Towns conquered from *France* since 1709.

I may therefore be allowed to conclude, that this *Barrier* is far from being more than is necessary; and that any which falls short of this, cannot possibly be thought sufficient for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*.

But if this be so, the only Meaning of the Clamours that have been raised by the Emissaries of *France* against this *Barrier* as too extensive, must be to prepare us to expect a worse; and to reconcile us, if possible, to the *French* Plan of Peace, by which *Lisle*, *Tournay*, and some third Town yet unknown, are to be left in the Hands of *France*; which would render all the rest of the *Barrier* insignificant, and make it as weak and insecure as that stipulated by the Treaties of *Nimwegen* and *Ryswick*; which I name together, as being both equally bad with respect to the *Netherlands*, and both the farthest removed from the Standard of the *Pyrenean* Treaty, to which, at least, (as has been observed before) King *Charles II*d's Parliament thought it absolutely necessary to reduce the Power of *France*.

That

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That the Reader may at one View see the several Steps, by which *France* has been enlarging her Acquisitions in the *Netherlands* for these last Fifty Years; and compare the several Treaties by which those Acquisitions have been confirmed to her, with the *Barrier-Treaty* on one hand, and with the present *French Plan of Peace* on the other; I shall subjoin a *Scheme* of the Principal Towns in the *Netherlands*, left to *France* by its several Treaties with the Crown of *Spain*, from the *Pyrenean* down to the present Proposals of Peace; omitting only that of the twenty Years Truce, because all that was then given up to *France*, was restored to *Spain* by the Treaty of *Ryswick*, which reduced Things to the very same Foot upon which they were left by that of *Nimwegen*.

*A Scheme of
the Principal
Towns in the
Netherlands,
left to France
by several suc-
cessive Trea-
ties.*

By

By the Pyrenean Treaty 1659. By the Treaty of Aix 1668. By the Treaties of Nimeguen 1678. Ryfwick 1697.

All Artois, *except*
Aire.
St. Omer.

All Artois, *except*
Aire.
St. Omer.

All Artois.

In Flanders.

Gravelines, l'Ecluse }
Forts Philippes, Han-
nuin, Bourbourg. }

Gravelines, &c. to
Bourbourg.

Gravelines, &c. to
Bourbourg.

Dunkirk (bought of the
English.)

Dunkirk.

Berg St. Winoc.

Berg St. Winoc.

Douay with Ft. Scarpe.

Douay with Ft. Scarpe.

Tournay, Lifle.

Tournay, Lifle.

Armentieres.

Armentiers.

Oudenarde.

Cassel.

Courtray.

Menin (since fortified in
the room of Courtray)

Furnes.

Furnes.

Ypres *with its Depen-*
dencies.

In Haynault.

Mariembourg, Philip- }
peville, Avenes, Lan-
drency. }

Mariembourg, &c. to
Landrecy.

Mariembourg, &c. to
Landrecy.

Quenoy.

Quenoy.

Quenoy.

Binch, Aeth.

Valenciennes.

Charleroy (in Namur.)

Bouchain, Bavay.

{ Maubeuge, and Condé }
{ not fortified in 1678. }

Cambray.

In Luxemburg.

Thionville, Montmedi, }
Damvilliers, Yvoix, }
Chavancy, Marville, }

Thionville, &c.

Thionville, &c.

By the Barrier-Treaty
1709.

By the French Plan of
Peace 1712.

All Artois, *except*
Aire.
Bethune, St. Venant.

All Artois.

Gravelines, &c. *to*
Bourbourg.

Gravelines, &c. *to*
Bourbourg.

Dunkirk (to be demolished
by the Preliminaries.)
Berg St. Winoc.

Dunkirk (to be demolished.)

Berg St. Winoc.
Douay with Fort-Scarpe.
Tournay, Lille.
Armentieres.
Cassel.

{ The Option of some 3d }
{ Town not yet specified. }

Mariembourg, &c. *to*
Landrecy.

Mariembourg, &c. *to*
Landrecy.

Bavay.

Quenoy.
Valenciennes.
Bouchain Bavay.
Maubeuge and Condè *are said*
to be demanded by the French
at present.
Cambray.

Cambray.

Thionville, &c.

Thionville, &c.

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The Reader cannot but observe, from comparing these Schemes, that as the Barrier settled in the present Treaty approaches the nearest to the *Pyrenean*, (which tho' really not strong enough, yet has always been the Aim of the Allies;) so the Barrier proposed by the *French Plan of Peace*, approaches very near to that of *Nimeguen*; of which Treaty it is sufficient to observe, That the Lord Chancellor *Finch* told the Parliament from King *Charles*, *it was as ill a one for the States and the rest of Christendom, as their Enemies could wish*: And the Event soon confirmed what he said, to be true; the Two last Wars having been almost entirely owing to the vast Accession of Strength which was left to *France* by that Treaty. It is obvious therefore, that any Barrier, less than that settled in the present Treaty, will leave the *Netherlands* exposed, and thereby involve *England* in all the Calamities of a *new War*, or in a State of *Dependency upon France*, more ruinous than War itself.

That the Defence of the Barrier ought to be committed to the States.

2. But it is not a strong Barrier alone that will secure us against *France*, unless it to be also well defended; which (as I shall shew in the next Place) can only be done by committing the Defence of it to the

STATES.

All

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All the Security a Country can have against a powerful Enemy, is either *Treaties with him*, or *defensive Alliances against him*, or a *real Strength in Readiness to oppose him on Occasion*. But the two first of these, the Event has sufficiently shewn, are rather *Nominal* than *Real* Securities. No *Treaties*, we are too well assured, can bind *France*, be they never so solemn; witness all that have been made these Fifty Years. They are all but mere *Paper-Securities*, which are of no Proof against his Canon whenever it is his Pleasure to have recourse to *that Ratio ultima*. He breaks his Faith, before the Ink is dry by which it is pledged; and when he gives his Word, it is because he means to give nothing else. Of which I shall single out a flaming Instance. In 1667, when he invaded the *Netherlands* in the pretended Right of his Queen; at the Time that he was actually setting out at the Head of his Army, he charged the *Spanish* Ambassador, who was then returning to *Madrid*, to engage his Faith and Word to the Queen, that he would live in the strictest Friendship with her; and his Armies had actually begun Hostilities, when his Ambassador the Archbishop of *Embrum*, by his Order gave the *Spanish* Court the strongest Assurances of his sincere Intention to keep the Peace. This Invasion shewed that no *Word*, no *Oath*, no *Treaty*, no *Renunciation*, tho' passed with the utmost Solemnity, and strengthened by repeated Assurances, could tie down his Ambition. And all his

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his Conduct since, has been of a Piece with this Action ; so very little is his Faith to be depended on.

Nor by defensive Alliances against her.

As for *defensive Alliances* and Guaranties, Experience has likewise shewn that they alone, without a standing Force sufficient to oppose any sudden Invasion, are by no Means able to secure the *Netherlands* against the Power and Ambition of *France*, who is always at hand with a numerous Army, and upon the Watch to invade them. For besides that Alliances are very hard to be brought from Paper into Action, from the Closet into the Field ; and when there, seldom act with the same Life and Vigour, the same Steadiness and Unanimity, as Forces subject but to one Prince, animated with one Spirit, and pursuing one uniform Interest ; they are liable to be broken and disunited by Bribes and Pensions rightly applied. *France*, who is perfectly skilled in making Use of all these Advantages, seeing the naked and defenceless Condition of the *Netherlands*, has by sudden Invasions over-run the greatest Part of those Countries, before the Princes engaged in their Defence, could assemble their scattered Forces to protect them ; and the first Successes usually gave her such Advantages, that the Confederates had enough to do to defend what was left ; and their Attempts commonly ended in some Treaty, that gave *France* a Title to the greatest and most valuable Part of her unjust Acquisitions ; and by expunging, in some
Mea-

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Measure, the Memory of former Injuries, left her at Liberty to set out upon a new Score and a still more advantageous Foot. How insignificant to the great Ends proposed by it, was the famous *Triple Alliance*? It was at first looked upon as an invincible Barrier to the *Netherlands*, and an effectual Check to the Power of *France*, at least to its Encroachments on that Side: But how long did these Expectations last? Or what did this mighty Alliance end in? Why, it produced the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, which divested the *Netherlands* of one half of the Barrier left by the *Pyrenean* Treaty. But this was far from satisfying the Ambition of *France*; for as soon as she had taken Breath, and strengthened herself with the Seizure of *Lorrain* in the midst of Peace, she fell upon the *United Provinces* with the whole Weight of her Arms, assigning no other Reason but that she was *dissatisfied with their Conduct*; hoping to secure the Conquest of the *Netherlands* by the previous Reduction of *Holland*. In this most destitute Condition of the *States*, she found Means to draw off the Elector of *Brandenburg* from their Alliance; and when the *Spaniards* at last armed in their Defence, she gladly laid hold of that Opportunity of seizing *Franche-Comptè*, and most of the strong Towns of the *Netherlands*, which were afterwards confirmed to her by the Treaty of *Nimeguen*. This Treaty was concluded under the Mediation and Guaranty of *Great Britain*; and yet so far was That from being any Security to the

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the *Netherlands*, that *France* soon after seizing on several Places under the Notion of Dependencies, ravaged the whole Country with Military Execution (and after a Year's Blockade, at last besieged and took *Luxemburgh*, which was yielded to her by the 20 Years Truce. From all these Instances, I hope, it appears that *Defensive Alliances* alone are by no Means sufficient to secure the *Netherlands* against the Attempts of such a Power as that of *France*; but that the Whole of those Countries must be lost by Degrees, while every Invasion pares off some Part of them; unless to the Alliances made for their Preservation, a standing real Force be superadded. But this is no ways to be had, but first by providing a good *Barrier*, and then by *trusting the Defence of it to the Dutch*.

That if a good Barrier be committed to Them, it will be well defended, needs no Proof; it is allowed on all Hands: All therefore that I am to show, is, that it can be done no other way: If it could, it must be by the House of *Austria*, or by *England*.

But as for the House of *Austria*; *Not by the House of Austria.* that they either cannot, or will not, effectually provide for the Defence of the *Netherlands*, needs, I think, no better Proof, than that for so many Years past they have not. Ever since the *Pyrenean Treaty*, they seem to have left the Defence of those Provinces upon those they think most concerned in their Preservation

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servation, viz. *England* and *Holland*. Whether this is want of Will or Power in them, is not material; but in Fact it is true, that they have not in any degree provided well for the defence of them; They have left them without a Sufficiency of Men, Money, or Magazines; and by that Means, their best Towns have made such a poor Defence, that the Whole has been in Danger of being lost in the short Space of two or three Campaigns. The Enemy has been always at the Gates before they have begun to be in a Posture to receive him. And what Course have they then taken? Why, their Ambassadors in *England* and *Holland* have made pressing Instances for Help; represented the Greatness of their Danger, the Interest We and the *Dutch* had in it; and if we should not assist them, with a menacing Air they told us plainly, that they must consider what they had to do, and make in time a good Bargain with *France*, for the Sale or Exchange of those Provinces for other Countries more convenient on the Side of *Spain*, rather than suffer them to be lost for want of Help from their Allies. This has been the constant Language of the *Spanish* Court, whenever these Provinces have been threatened with a War from *France*. And Sir *William Temple*, in several Places of his Letters, expresses his Apprehensions of their falling into some Agreement with *France* for them, seeing such continual Wars entailed upon them, and their Neighbours unwilling to share so far in their Dangers, as perhaps, says he, it were the Interest of *England* and *Holland* to do: For that there was a considerable Party in the

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Spanish Court, who were for making the best Peace they could with *France*, by a Cession of *Flanders* in Exchange for other Provinces toward *Spain*, and of some other Pretensions. And he owns, if he were in their Council, he should be of the same Mind himself. For whatever Notion some People have conceived of the great Revenues of these Provinces, they were a perpetual Drain to the Court of *Madrid*; as shall be shewn at large, when I come to consider that Part of the Treaty that relates to the *Revenues*. But the Thing speaks itself. And whoever considers the Misery and Poverty of a Country that has been for so many Years a perpetual Theatre of War; and the prodigious expence which must necessarily attend the Defence of Places so much exposed; will easily believe, that *their own Revenues* are by no Means sufficient to answer such a Charge. Considering therefore the low Condition to which the Affairs of *Spain* have been long reduced, there may very well be a great deal of Truth, when they complain, that the Defence of those Provinces is too great a Burthen for them; and that therefore they must either be left without Defence, or others must come into a large Share of it. But if the Crown of *Spain* has not been able to defend the *Netherlands* for half an Age past, it is certainly less able now. And therefore if that Crown should be settled on the Emperor, there is as little to be expected from him in this Respect as from his Predecessors; and still a great deal less, if those who seem concerned that he should have this small Portion, this *Burthen* of the *Spanish Monarchy*, have

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have so little Regard either to his or their own Interests, as to give that Monarchy away from him. But were the House of *Austria* in never so flourishing a Condition, it is not to be supposed they would be at any great Expence for the Defence of the *Netherlands*, which have been, and must be a dead Weight upon their Hands; they would certainly chuse rather to employ their Wealth in securing and fortifying their Territories in *Italy* and *Hungary*; well knowing that the Maritime Powers can never stand by and see the *Low-Countries* fall into the Hands of *France*: And that tho' it should be the Misfortune of one or both of them, to be seized with sudden Fits of *Folly* and *Madness*, which may make them for some short Time mistake their true Interest in this Particular; yet the Preservation of *Britain* and *Holland* does so entirely depend upon keeping those Provinces out of the Hands of *France*, that the Progress of the *French* Arms in those Parts, will sooner or later always bring them to their Senses, and engage them at last to come with their whole Strength to their Rescue: and by this Means, the House of *Austria* are not only sure of our Assistance in all its Quarrels with *France*, but even (as has been observed above) of having it upon their own Terms. And as the Behaviour of Queen *Elizabeth* throughout the whole Course of her Reign, together with the Uneasiness *England* expressed during the Reign of King *Charles II*, at *France's* extending its Conquests in the *Netherlands*, and the vast Expence of Blood and Treasure that we

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and the *States* have been at for the Recovery of them, throughout the whole Course of this and the last War, will always be sufficient Proofs that the House of *Austria* judges right in Relation both to *England* and *Holland* in this Particular ; so they must be standing Reasons for us never to trust or rely upon that House for the Defence of those Provinces.

There was indeed *one Expedient* tried at the End of the last War, by which it was hoped those Provinces would be in a better Condition to resist the Arms of *France* ;

Nor by Troops lent for the Defence of the Barrier.

and that was the *lending Troops* to *Spain* to garrison the Frontier Towns. The late King having, during the last War, by his Credit and Interest at the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, obtained the Government of the *Low-Countries* for the Elector of *Bavaria* ; prevailed with the *States* after the Peace of *Ryswick*, to lend the King of *Spain* twenty Batalions towards garrisoning the small Barrier left the *Netherlands* by that Treaty. The Elector of *Bavaria*'s Character, the great Figure he had made, and the Zeal he had all along shewn for the Common Cause, joined with the great Territories he possessed in *Germany*, which were looked upon as sufficient Pledges of his Fidelity to the Empire, and of his steady Adherence to the Interest of the Allies ; induced the *States* to comply with this Proposal. But this Scheme was so far from securing the *Netherlands* against *France*, that upon the Death of the late King

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King of *Spain*, the whole Country, and with it the *Dutch* Troops themselves, were betrayed into the Hands of *France*; and the *States* found themselves by this one Stroke brought to the very Brink of Ruin; the Enemy being in full Possession of the *Spanish Low-Countries*, and consequently at their Door, and at the same Time Master of great Part of their best Infantry. The Danger this exposed them to, will I presume make them have very little Inclination to try the same Experiment again, and suffer a Body of their best Forces to be at the Mercy of a Governor who is under any other Master.

And there is as little Reason to think that *England* will, either upon Nor by Eng- this or any other Foot, charge it-land. self with the Defence of those Countries; they will neither advance Money to *Spain* without Security, nor be willing the Crown should take cautionary Towns, tho' to have them in Sovereignty for it, since that cannot be done without an Army. For, the same Reasons that make the Nation jealous of a Standing Army at Home in Time of Peace, will make them equally jealous of the Prince's having one within Call; as a Body of Troops in the *Netherlands* would be; that being equally dangerous to their Liberties, or rather more, if they are paid by *Spain*. For that enables the Crown to keep Troops without depending on the Parliament for their Subsistence; which at Home it cannot do; and therefore Troops at Home are more within the Nation's

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Influence, and they have less to apprehend from them. It is not therefore to be thought that *England* would so far hazard its Liberty, as on any Scheme to charge itself with the Defence of the Barrier in the *Netherlands*. The Way that would be most effectual, the Nation would least like: And if they would consent that a Body of their Forces should be cantoned out into several Garisons in Conjunction with other Troops; this would only make our Assistance less significant, and still expose us to the same Danger of having a Standing Army entailed upon us in Time of Peace.

In short, it is vain for these Provinces to look for sufficient and effectual Help either from *England*, or the House of *Austria*; they must therefore have Recourse to *Holland*; for there is no Fourth Power that can in any tolerable Degree protect them. But the *Dutch* are both *willing* and *able* to do it; their Nearness to these Provinces makes it both their Interest to defend them, and places it within their Power, if the necessary Means of doing it be put into their Hands; that is, if they are allowed a free and safe Communication with their Garisons, and a reasonable Proportion out of the Revenues of the Country towards answering so great a Charge. For, as I shall shew in the *Third Place*,

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3. *For the Defence of a good Barrier in the Hands of the States, it is necessary that they should have a free and safe Communication with it, and reasonable that the Barrier Country should contribute towards the Charge of it.*

As to the *First Part* of this Proposition, it seems to be self-evident; if the *End* be necessary, the *Means* in order to it must be necessary also. If the Security of *England* and *Holland* require that the Barrier should be *well defended*, they equally require that those upon whom the Defence of it lieth, should have a *free and safe Communication with it*; since it is otherwise impossible they should effectually defend it. It is therefore necessary that not only the *Frontier-Towns* should be garison'd by the *Dutch*, but likewise those *through which* they are to preserve this necessary *Communication*, and without which the Defence of the Towns where they have Garrisons, will in Truth no more be in their Power, than if they had not a Man in them. For they can neither furnish them with Provisions, Ammunition, Artillery, Materials for Fortification, and such other Necessaries as the Usage of War requires; nor give them any Succour in Cases of Extremity. The Command therefore of the Barrier, will in Effect be absolutely in the Hands of those, who have the Command of the *Communication* between *Holland* and the Barrier; and not only so, but

That for the Defence of the Barrier in the Hands of the States, it is necessary they should have a safe and free Communication with it.

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even the Fate of the *Dutch* Garrisons themselves would likewise in a great Measure be in their Power: And thus the *States*, instead of having the Defence of the Barrier in their own Hands, would have contrived a Scheme for putting a great Part of their National standing Force under the Power and Discretion of another Prince. It is very trifling to pretend, that if these Countries are possessed by the *Emperor*, the *Dutch* may be always sure of a free Communication with the Barrier. For the *States* ought not, by the Rules of common Prudence and Reason, to put so great a Part of their National Force entirely in the Power and at the Discretion of any Ally, tho' he should declare in never so solemn a Manner their Interest to be inseparable from his own. It is possible that a Quarrel may in future Times arise, between the *States* and those who may have the Sovereignty of these Countries; and more possible it is, considering the Inclinations of the Natives towards the *French*, and their irreconcilable Aversion to the *Dutch*, that a Governor may be corrupted by *France*. What has been, may be; and what a Condition would the *States* be in, if, when they have repaired the Frontier-Towns of the *Netherlands* at a vast Expence, and the greatest Part of their Troops and military Stores are lodged in them, their Communication should be interrupted by a perfidious Governor, or the Places necessary to it be delivered up to *France*? This would be ruining the *States* at one Blow, or rather without a Blow. And they must have

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a very mean Opinion of their Prudence, who can think them capable of acting so weak a Part, especially having been once betrayed in this Manner already. Neither is it Treachery or Perfidiousness only, they are concerned to guard against; (tho' when they have so much at Stake, no Caution in that Respect can be too great;) but when the Towns of *Communication* are in their own Hands, they can be surer of their being well defended against all Attempts to surprize or take them, than they can be if they are left in any other Hands. If a *Flemish* or *Spanish* Garrison would defend well the Towns of *Communication*, so they might those of the *Barrier*; but it is certain they never have defended the last well, and thence it is reasonable to conclude they never will the other. If the ill Condition of the Fortifications; if the want of sufficient Magazines and good Engineers in the Town; or of Experience, Courage, and Fidelity in the Commander; or of Pay, Discipline, or Numbers in the Garrison; if any of these Defects have for many Years occasioned the best Towns in the *Netherlands* to be lost, after a weak and short Resistance; why should we think that some or other of the same Causes will not still concur to the Loss of the less exposed Towns, while under the same Direction and in the same Hands? It would therefore be the utmost Imprudence in the *States* ever to undertake the Defence of the *Barrier*, without having at the same Time a Liberty granted

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granted them of putting their own Garrisons into such Places as are necessary for the preserving their *Communication* with it; and consequently into *Ghent* and *Dendermonde*, which are the Keys of the *Scheld* and *Lys*, and of all the Towns and Canals in the Neighbourhood of those two Rivers, through which the *Communication* between *Holland* and *Flanders* must necessarily pass. Of what Consequence these Towns are for this End, appears plainly from the Strefs the *French* have laid upon *keeping* them, and the *Allies* upon *taking* them, during the present War. As for *Dendermonde*, the Duke of *Marlborough* found it impracticable this War to push his Conquests in *Flanders*, till he had first secured this Place by a Blockade, and afterwards taken it. And as for *Ghent*; the *French*, who had gotten Possession of it by Treachery in 1708, chose rather to leave their own Country exposed to a victorious Army, than to abandon that one Place: And the *Allies* were so sensible of the Necessity of retaking it, that they ventured upon a Siege after a Campaign of the greatest Action and Fatigue, in the Depth of a Winter more than ordinarily severe, rather than they would leave so important a Post in the Hands of the Enemy. All which evidently shews, that these Places are of the last Consequence for preserving a free *Communication* between *Holland* and *Flanders*; and therefore in Reality as necessary to the *Dutch* as any Places in the whole Barrier. And whereas it has been objected, that they may be made use of to the Prejudice

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dice of *our Trade*; the Reader may depend upon having that Difficulty fully answered under my *Fifth Head*.

I come now to the *Second Part* of this Proposition; viz. *That it is reasonable the Country of the Barrier should contribute to the Maintenance of it.*

This is no more than it would do, whoever had the keeping of it; no more than it did do, when it was very ill defended: And can any Body give a Reason, why it should not contribute as much to be better defended? Can those who are really

And reasonable that the Country of the Barrier should contribute towards the Charge of maintaining it.

concerned for the Safety of the *Netherlands*, be willing the whole Revenues should be misapplied to feed the Luxury or Avarice of a Governor, rather than any Share of them should be employed in their Preservation? Is it reasonable the *Dutch* should be admitted into the burthensome Part of the Defence only, and be wholly excluded from any Part of those Revenues which have ever been appropriated to that Service? Will not the Sovereign of those Provinces share in the Advantages of the Barrier; and ought he not equally to share in the Expence? Is it worth nothing, to have the *Netherlands* rescued from the Miseries and Oppressions of perpetual War? to have so rich and fertile a Country restored to its natural flourishing Condition, and effectually secured for a Part of those Revenues only, which his Predecessors

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cessors were obliged to sacrifice *entire*, with large Additions out of their own Coffers, without being able to put them in a tolerable Posture of Defence? But we are told it is reasonable the *Dutch* should bear the Expence, because the Barrier is designed for *their* Security. But first, the *Netherlands* (as I have observed before) partake in the Security as well as the *Dutch*; and ought therefore to partake in the Expence: Besides, this way of arguing would draw *England* into Part of the Charge, since *we too* find our Advantages in the Barrier, and have as good Grounds (all Things considered) to call it *our own*, as the *Dutch*. *England* therefore has reason to be pleased, that any effectual Method can be found for securing the *Netherlands*, without *her* taking any Part of the Burthen upon her own Shoulders; and ought to assist towards obtaining such Terms for the *States*, as may enable them to do with Ease to themselves, what she would give a great deal towards, rather than it should be left undone. This great Concern [therefore to exclude the *States* from the *Revenues*, can arise from no other Cause than a Jealousy we have conceived, that they may possibly enrich themselves by them: But as that must depend entirely on the Proportion assigned them, I leave it to be considered under my *Fifth* Head; where I shall prove past all Contradiction, that the *Revenues* allotted them by the Treaty, fall very short of what must necessarily be expended on the Defence of the Barrier. Since therefore we ourselves are so far from

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from being any ways prejudiced by their receiving those Revenues, that we should in all Probability be greater Savers by it than they themselves, who must add considerable Sums of their own, whilst we shall enjoy the Benefit of their Garisons for nothing; I suppose this Consideration will go a great way towards reconciling those who would be thought at least as careful to save the Nation's *Purse* as its *Honour*. And provided we ourselves are no Sufferers, we shall not be suspected to be over-solicitous for the Interests of the House of *Austria*; notwithstanding the inconsistent Zeal that some of the Libellers affect upon this Occasion. Let the Gentlemen, who are so tender of invading the Rights of the Emperor in the *Netherlands*, shew themselves in earnest, by asserting his Title to *Spain* and the *Indies*; and then we shall believe they are sincere in what they say. But that no Injury is done the Emperor, will appear by shewing in the *Fourth* Place,

4. *That the Dutch had a Right to a sufficient Barrier, and to have themselves the Defence of it; and that this Right was acknowledged and agreed to by the Allies, previous to the Barrier-Treaty.*

I might shew, That the *Dutch* have acquired a good Right to the Barrier of the *Netherlands* by all they have done and suffered for forty Years together in Defence of them; which has cost them more than the whole Country is worth, if it were to be sold: That this

That the Dutch had a Right to a sufficient Barrier, acknowledged by the Allies, previous to the Barrier-Treaty.

Barrier

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Barrier hath been the Foundation of all the Treaties relating to Peace or War, that the *States* have made with *France*, or *England*, or *Spain*, ever since the Invasion of the *Netherlands* by *France* in 1667: That it was this Barrier brought on them the terrible War of 1672: That the King of *France*, at the End of that War, gave up the Places he restored in the *Netherlands*, upon *their* Account; because *they* insisted on them, as necessary to *their* Security: That it was to *Them* he gave the Barrier: That it was *They* procured the King of *Spain* the Restitution of the Places taken by *France*: That the Ministers of *Spain* have often called upon the *States* to defend *their* Barrier in the *Netherlands*; and have pleaded it as a Sort of Merit to *them*, that for *their* sakes the Crown of *Spain* would persist in defending the *Netherlands*, even tho' it exhausted all its Treasures.

That they had such a Right by the Grand Alliance, both of having a sufficient Barrier, and of having the Defence of it themselves.

But it is not very material whether they had acquired a Right to a Barrier formerly, or not: That they had a Right to a good one by the *Grand Alliance*, is past Dispute; and it is a manifest Violation of that Treaty, to make a Peace, of which such a Barrier is not one of the Conditions; that having been the principal Motive that engaged them in the present War, and it being expressly provided by the 8th Article, that no Peace shall be made till their Security (which is declared to be the having the *Spanish*

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nish Netherlands for a Barrier between *France* and them) be first obtained. And this is a Treaty not with *England* only, but to which the then Emperor was himself a Party; and therefore whatever the *States* have a Right to by this Treaty, it is a Right the House of *Austria* have themselves consented and agreed to. The first Part of this Proposition will not perhaps be disputed; it will be allowed me that the *Dutch* have a Right to a Barrier, but not to have the Defence of it in their own Hands. There will be no great Difficulty to grant their *Right*, provided it be rendered insignificant; as Experience has assured us it will be, if the keeping of it be committed to any Hands but their own. It is pretended, the *States* have no Right to a Barrier in any other Sense, but that the *Netherlands* should be in some other Hands than those of *France*, that so *France* may be kept at a Distance from them: That the *Netherlands* were formerly a Barrier to them in no Sense but this, and therefore ought to be so in no other now. And this they say is plain from the very Words of the *Grand Alliance*, *Art. 5.* in which it is stipulated, “ That the Allies shall use their
“ utmost Endeavours to recover the *Spanish Low-*
“ *Countries*, that they may be a Fence and Ram-
“ part, commonly called a *Barrier*, to remove
“ and separate *France* from *Holland*, for the Se-
“ curity of the *States-General*, *AS* they have
“ served in all Times, (*quemadmodum ab omni*
“ *Tempore inservierunt.*) until they were seized
“ by the most *Christian King.*” It is not very
surprising,

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surprizing, that those who have falsified the most material Clauses in this Treaty that concern *England*, by a wrong Translation; should lay so much Stress upon the single Word *quemadmodum*, or the Particle *as*, as to think it of sufficient Force to destroy the Right of the *States* to defend their Barrier. But that this is a very *false* Interpretation of this Particle, and that it was not intended to settle in this Article any Thing relating to *the Manner* in which the *Netherlands* were to serve as a Barrier to the *States*, is evident beyond all Dispute, from the last Clause of the ninth Article, in which it is stipulated, that “ when a
 “ Peace shall be made, the Confederates, among
 “ other Things, shall at the same Time agree
 “ among themselves, *in what Manner* the *States*
 “ shall be secured by the aforesaid Fence or Bar-
 “ rier; *Inter se convenient de modo quo Domini Or-*
 “ *dines Generales per Obicem antedictum, vulgo*
 “ *Barriere, securi reddentur:*” And in the *French*, which is equally an Original with the *Latin*;
 “ *Ils conviendront pareillement des moyens propres*
 “ *a mettre en seurete les Seigneurs Etats Generaux*
 “ *par la Barriere susmentionnés.*” Now this Clause in the *Ninth* Article would be superfluous and senseless, if the Point were already settled by the *Fifth*. Which makes it very plain, that the Meaning of those Words in the *Fifth* Article, is only this: That *as* the *Low-Countries* have been in all Times past a Barrier for the *States* against *France*, so the Confederates stipulated to endeavour their Recovery, that they still may be so
 for

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for all Times to come. But as to the particular *Manner* in which this Barrier may most effectually secure them, nothing is determined with Respect to that. It is by the Ninth Article expressly reserved to be settled among the Confederates at the Negotiations of Peace. Not that it was intended by this Article, to leave it as a Matter to be disputed among the Allies, whether the *States* should themselves have the Possession of their Barrier; but to regulate the *Manner* in which the Possession should be settled in them; what Towns should be included in the Barrier; how their Communication should be preserved; what Garisons they should keep; what Powers and Revenues they should enjoy; in short, in what Manner and Method this Barrier should be possessed; which was left to be settled by a particular Treaty, at the Conclusion of the War. But whether the *States* should be suffered to keep Possession of their Barrier themselves; to leave this to the Decision of the Allies at a General Peace, neither was nor could be the Intention of this, nor of any other Article in the *Grand Alliance*; much less was it there determined against them, that they should not have the Possession of their Barrier, and that the *Netherlands* should be no otherwise a Security to them than they had been before.

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As appears from the Design and End of the Grand Alliance. This will be made very evident, by considering the *Design* and *End* of the *Grand Alliance*, for which the Parties to it engaged in the present War; and the *Propositions* which *Holland* made to *France* to prevent the War. First, as to the *Grand Alliance*, it was not made with any King of *Spain* in Possession, nor any acknowledged or declared King, nor with any Son of the then Emperor, but with the Emperor himself, who had indeed good and just Pretensions to the *Spanish Monarchy*; but the Duke of *Anjou* had gotten Possession, and both *England* and *Holland* had acknowledged him in that Quality. And the Allies then had little Reason to hope for so successful a War, as should enable them to demand the Restitution of the whole Monarchy. Here is therefore no King of *Spain* in View, for whom the *Netherlands* are to be recovered as a Part of the *Spanish Monarchy*. The Treaty is between the *Maritime Powers* and the Emperor: And though by the general Words, *Satisfaction* and *Security*, they are at Liberty to extend their Demands as far as Justice and their Success should enable them; yet what they stipulate for in exprefs Words, is only so much as was absolutely necessary to prevent the imminent Dangers the Parties contracting were in from the Union of the Crown of *France* with that of *Spain*. In short, all they stipulate for, except in

Re-

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Relation to Commerce, is, that the *Netherlands* shall be recovered, not for the *Emperor*, nor for any King of *Spain*, but to be a *Barrier to the States*, for the Security both of them and *England*; and that *Milan*, &c. shall be recovered, not to remain as a Part of the *Spanish Monarchy*, or as the *Emperor* was King of *Spain*, but as a *Fief of the Empire*, and as contributing to the Security of his Imperial Majesty's Hereditary Countries. So that the *Maritime Powers* are by this Treaty to endeavour the Recovery of *Milan*, &c. for the *Emperor*; and the *Emperor* is to do the same on his Part for the Recovery of the *Low-Countries* for them; that the *Maritime Powers*, and particularly the *States*, who are a *Barrier to England*, may have them for their *Barrier*. For tho' it be called a *Barrier for the States*, as lying upon the Continent between them and *France*, yet does *England* also find in it its Security; and therefore the Language that runs through the whole Treaty is, * *The*

obtaining a particular and sufficient Security for the Kingdoms and Provinces, &c. of the King of Great

* See Art.
2, 3, 5, 7, 8,
12.

Britain, and the States-General. To see that this was the Design and End of the *Grand Alliance*, that the *Netherlands* were to be recovered for a *Barrier to the States*, and not to be given to any King of *Spain*; we need only read the whole Fifth Article, which is as follows: "The Con-

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“ federates, in order to procure the aforesaid
 “ *Satisfaction and Security*, (*Satisfaction* for the
 “ Emperor, and *Security* to the Kingdom of
 “ *England*, and Provinces of the *States*;) shall,
 “ among other Things, use their utmost En-
 “ deavours to recover the *Spanish Netherlands*,
 “ that they may be a *Barrier* (*Obex & repagu-*
 “ *lum vulgò dictum Barriere*) to remove and separate
 “ France from Holland, for the *Security* of the
 “ *Lords the States-General*, as they have been
 “ in all Times, till his *most Christian Majesty*
 “ lately seized them: As likewise the *Dutchy* of
 “ *Milan* with its Dependencies, as a *Fief* of the
 “ *Empire*, and serving to the *Security* of his *Impe-*
 “ *rial Majesty's hereditary Provinces*; and, with
 “ that the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily* also,
 “ and the Lands and Islands upon the Coast of
 “ *Tuscany* in the *Mediterranean*, which belong
 “ to the Crown of *Spain*, and may be of the same
 “ Use (with Respect to the Emperor,) and will
 “ also be of *Advantage* to the *Navigation and Com-*
 “ *merce* of the *Subjects* of the *King* of Great-Bri-
 “ tain and of the *United Provinces*.” What can
 be plainer, than that by this Article the *Nether-*
lands are to be recovered for a Barrier to the
States; and *Milan*, &c. for the Satisfaction and
 Security of the Emperor? This was the princi-
 pal, if not the only End of the Recovery of the
Netherlands. Nor could it indeed be otherwise;
 for those Provinces were to be taken from a King
 of *Spain* in Possession, and no other in the Treaty

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is named, or so much as supposed. And therefore, if the *Netherlands* were to be a Barrier to the *States*, it was also supposed they should have the *keeping* of that Barrier *themselves*. But because the Recovery of the whole, or any Part of those Countries depended entirely upon the Success of the War; neither the Towns which were to form the Barrier, could be then specified; nor the Regulations under which they were to have the Possession of them, adjusted; this being a Thing of a very complicated Nature; and, *England* and the *Emperor* being interested in it as well as the *States*, it was left to be settled by common Consent at the End of the War, when the Event should shew what Towns they had the disposal of, and what not. For to have regulated a Barrier that was to be conquered by Force of Arms, before they had so much as taken up Arms, or knew for certain the Parts it was to consist of, must have exposed them to Contempt, in Case the Event had not answered their Expectation; and would have been at best no better than building Castles in the Air. Therefore, the Places being not particularly specified in the *Grand Alliance*, is no Argument that it was not the Design of the Allies to put them into the *Hands of the States*. On the contrary, that this was *the proper means of securing them by their Barrier*, intended in the Ninth Article; must be allowed by any one, that will consider in what *Manner*

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the *States* had demanded a Barrier for their Security, previous to the Treaty of the *Grand Alliance*. The Deputies of the *States*, in Concert with the *British* Ministers, gave in a Paper of *Proposals* to the Count d. *Avauz*, the *French* Ambassador at the *Hague*, the 22d Day of *March*, N. S. 1701, about six Months before the *Grand Alliance* was formed; which were as follows.

A
M E M O R I A L

O F T H E

Proposals made by the Deputies of the States to the Count d'Avaux, Ambassador Extraordinary of the King of France, at the Hague, March 22d. N. S. 1701.

[*Recherche modeste des Causes de la presente Guerre, p. 51.*]

W H E R E A S His Majesty the King of Great-Britain, and the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces of the Low-Countries, did, on the 25th of March, in the Year 1700, conclude a Treaty of Partition with His most Christian Majesty, to prevent the Troubles and Inconveniencies which might arise on the Subject of the Succession of the last King of Spain, in case he happened to die without Issue : And whereas among others, the principal Aim of the high Contractors in this Affair was to preserve the general Peace and Tranquility of Europe, and to strengthen the particular Security of this State : It is evident, that although his most Christian Majesty has thought fit to

Proposals made by the Deputies of the States, to the Count d'Avaux, in 1701, which show the Sense of England and the States concerning this Matter, previously to the Grand Alliance.

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accept the Will of the late King of Spain, setting aside the Treaty of Partition; yet their High Mightinesses ought not to lose the Effect of the said Treaty; but the Object of the said Treaty, namely the general Peace and Tranquility, and their own particular Safety, ought to be secured to them, at least by some Equivalent, or other Means.

I. “ Upon this Foundation their High Mightinesses demand, That for the Preservation of the
“ general Peace and Tranquility, in which their
“ own particular Security does in a great Measure consist, a reasonable Contentment and Satisfaction shall be given to his Imperial Majesty for his Pretensions to the *Spanish* Succession which were regulated by the Treaty of Partition; and that his Imperial Majesty shall be
“ admitted and included in the Treaty that his
“ Majesty of *Great Britain* and their High
“ Mightinesses shall make with their most Christian and Catholick Majesties; and that accordingly he shall be invited to enter into the present Negotiation.

II. “ That his most Christian Majesty, in a
“ certain limited Time, as short as can be agreed
“ upon, shall withdraw all his Troops out of
“ the *Spanish Netherlands*, without leaving any
“ of them behind; and that he shall not be permitted ever to send them thither again; but
“ that for the future, within the said *Spanish Netherlands* (excepting the Places of Security, of
which

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“ which Mention shall be made in the following
“ Article,) no Troops shall be kept but only
“ *Spanish, Walloon, or Natives of his Catholick*
“ *Majesty's Low-Countries*, belonging peculiarly
“ to him, under his Oath and Pay ; and none of
“ the Troops of his most Christian Majesty, di-
“ rectly nor indirectly : But if the King of *Spain*
“ should demand any Troops of the King of
“ *Great Britain*, or of their High-Mightinesses,
“ for the Defence of the *Low-Countries* ; they
“ shall be permitted to send them thither.

III. “ That for the particular Security of this
“ State, the Towns, Places, and Forts of *Venlo*,
“ *Ruremonde, Stevenswaert, Luxembourg, Namur,*
“ *Charleroy, Mons, Dendermonde, Damme, and St.*
“ *Dobas*, shall be yielded up and committed to
“ the Keeping of their High-Mightinesses, ex-
“ clusive of all others ; together with their Ca-
“ stles, Citadels, and all the Forts and Works
“ belonging to them, each in the State it is in
“ at present ; with Liberty therein to put and
“ keep such Garisons as they shall think fit,
“ whether their own, or belonging to such of
“ their Allies as they shall think fit to require
“ thereunto ; and that neither *France* nor *Spain*
“ shall be allowed to put the least Garison in
“ those Places ; nor build behind, or round a-
“ bout the said Towns, Castles, Places and For-
“ tresses, any Forts, Lines or Works ; nor to do
“ any Thing whatsoever, which may be prejudi-
“ cial to the Keeping of the said Towns, Ca-
“ stles

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“ stles, Places, and Fortresses, and hinder the Ef-
“ fect of it.

IV. “ That their High-Mightinesses shall be
“ allowed to augment, lessen, and change their
“ Garisons in the said Towns, Castles, Places and
“ Fortresses, whensoever, and as often as they
“ shall think fit; as also to send thither Provi-
“ sions, Ammunition, Arms, Materials for the
“ Fortifications, and every thing in general that
“ may be convenient and necessary for the Ser-
“ vice of the Garisons and Fortifications; that
“ the Passage for the Transport of all these
“ things, as well as for that of the Garisons, as
“ well going as coming, shall be at all Times
“ free and open through the Lands, and over
“ the Rivers of his Catholick Majesty's Territo-
“ ry without any Let or Molestation directly
“ or indirectly.

V. “ That their High-Mightinesses shall have
“ the full Command and Authority over the
“ Towns, Places, Castles, and Fortresses, where
“ they shall have their Garisons; and shall put
“ therein such Governors and Commandants as
“ they shall think fit, without Prejudice to the
“ other Rights, and to the Revenues of the
“ King of Spain, over and in the said Towns
“ and Places.

VI. “ That farther, their High-Mightinesses
“ shall have the Liberty to fortify and repair
“ the Fortifications of the said Towns, Places,
Castles

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“ Castles and Fortresses, in such a Manner as
“ they shall think fit; and in general, to do
“ every Thing that they shall find necessary for
“ their Defence.

VII. “ That no Kingdoms, Provinces, Towns,
“ Lands or Places belonging to the Crown of
“ *Spain*, whether within *Europe* or without; and
“ particularly no Towns or Lands of the *Spanish*
“ *Low-Countries*, shall be capable of being yield-
“ ed or transferred, or devolving or coming to
“ the Crown of *France*, either by Donation,
“ Purchase, Exchange, Contract of Marriage,
“ Succession by Will, or *ab Intestato*, or by any
“ other Title whatsoever; and that they shall
“ not be capable of being submitted to the
“ Power or Authority of the most Christian
“ King in any Manner.

VIII. “ That in the Kingdoms and States of
“ the King of *Spain*, as well in as out of *Europe*;
“ and consequently in the *Spanish Netherlands*; the
“ Subjects and Inhabitants of the United Pro-
“ vinces shall continue in the Enjoyment of all
“ the Privileges, Rights, Franchises, and other
“ Advantages, as well with Regard to their Na-
“ vigation and Commerce, the free Use of Ports,
“ as all other Matters, in the same Manner as
“ they heretofore enjoyed, or ought to have en-
“ joyed them; and that accordingly all things,
“ of what kind soever, excepting what shall be
“ otherwise agreed on by the Treaty that is to be
“ made,

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“ made, shall be left in the State they were in
“ at the Time of the Death of the late King of
“ *Spain*, last deceased.

IX. “ That the Treaty between the Crown
“ of *Spain* and their High-Mightinesses con-
“ cluded at *Munster* in 1648; as also all the other
“ Treaties and Conventions between *Spain* and this
“ State; shall be renewed, or held for renewed,
“ in such manner as shall be agreed on by com-
“ mon Consent, as far as they shall not be altered
“ by the Treaty that is to be made.

X. “ Moreover, that the Subjects and Inha-
“ bitants of the United Provinces shall enjoy in
“ all the Kingdoms, Territories, Cities, Palaces,
“ Bays and Harbours of the Crown of *Spain*,
“ in and out of *Europe*, the same Privileges,
“ Rights and Franchises, as also all the Immu-
“ nities and Advantages, which the Subjects
“ of his most Christian Majesty or other Princes
“ and Potentates do enjoy, or which shall
“ be granted them, and which they shall enjoy
“ for the future.

XI. “ That their Majesties the Kings of *France*
“ and *Spain* shall solemnly promise for themselves
“ and for their Successors, the exact Observance
“ of all these Points in general, and of every one
“ of them in particular.

XII.

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XII. " That the Treaty to be made on this
" Subject shall be guarantied by such Kings, Prin-
" ces and Potentates, as one or the other of the
" High Contractors shall require thereunto, and
" That in the strongest Manner they shall think
" convenient.

XIII. " The Whole with a Reservation of
" Power to enlarge these Points in the Negotia-
" tion, as much as shall be found necessary for
" the Illustration of their true Sense and Mean-
" ing; as also to prevent all Manner of Disputes.
" Done at the *Hague* the 22d of *March* 1701, in
" the Name of the Deputies of their High-
" Mightinesses.

Signed, FAGEL.

In these *Propositions*, which shew the Sense of the *States* and *England* too, previously to the *Grand Alliance*, and which were the Plan of the first Project for a Barrier-Treaty; we see plainly that the *States*, at a Time when they would have been content to sit down with any Terms to prevent a War under such great Disadvantages, yet insisted to have the Towns that were to compose their Barrier put into their own Hands, (*on cederà & confiera a leur garde privative, les Villes, Places, &c.*) to have the sole Military Command, and to enjoy a free and open Communication with them, without the least Permission to *France* or *Spain* to intermeddle in any thing that related to the Defence of them;
tho'

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tho' with a Reserve to all the other Rights of the King of *Spain* in the said Places. But if the *States* in that Juncture chose to break with *France*, rather than not to have the Security they asked; it cannot be imagined they could mean, or would be content with less, to preserve the *Barrier* that was to be the Purchase of so hazardous a War. And therefore when it is stipulated in the *Grand Alliance*, (a Treaty subsequent to these Proposals,) that a *Barrier* should be recovered in the *Netherlands* for their Security, and that proper Means should be agreed upon among the *Allies* for securing them by that *Barrier*; it can be understood in no other Sense, than that they should have the Defence of it themselves. And accordingly, by virtue of these Articles of the *Grand Alliance*, as soon as the *Allies* had made any Impression in *Flanders*, and recovered any Place of Strength from the *French*, it was immediately put into the Hands of the *States*, to be garison'd by their Troops. And tho' upon the Revolution that happened in these Provinces upon the total Defeat of the *French* at *Ramellies*, the Civil Government of the *Netherlands* was administred by the *Queen* and the *States* jointly; yet, in all the strong Towns that have been taken, the *Dutch* have been allowed, with the Consent of her Majesty and the *Emperor*, to exercise the whole Command, Civil as well as Military. And since it would have been impossible by the *Barrier-Treaty* to have made any Alteration in this Disposition during the War, without introducing the

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the greatest Disorder and Confusion ; Things are yet left on the same Foot, upon which they stood before the making of this Treaty. So that no one is to judge from the Powers they are suffered to exercise at present, of what they are to exercise after the Peace ; at which Time they will be restrained entirely to the *Military Command*, pursuant to this Treaty. Which I mention by the by, to prevent some great Mistakes which may be made for want of this Observation. And it was upon a Presumption of this Right, that the *States* were at the whole Expence of the Sieges of those Places.

But what puts it past Dispute that this was looked upon by the Allies as the Sense and Intention of the Treaty of the *Grand Alliance*, is what was stipulated in the famous Preliminary Articles of 1709, with the Consent of *England* and the Emperor, as well as *Holland*. If those Powers that made a Treaty, are the properest Judges of their own Meaning and Design in making it ; here we have all the Parties to the *Grand Alliance* declaring it to be *the Intention of that Treaty, that the States should put Garisons in the Places of their Barrier*. For Proof of which, I shall insert the whole twenty-second Article relating to the Barrier.

A R-

ARTICLE XXII.

The 22d Article of the Preliminaries of 1709. concerning the Barrier.

“ AND as to the Lords the
 “ States-General, his Majesty
 “ shall yield and make over to
 “ them in the most express Terms
 “ that shall be judged proper, the
 “ Place of *Furnes*, with the *Furner-*
 “ *Ambagt* or District belonging to the same,
 “ (the Fort of *Knoque* being therein included ;
 “ *Menin* with its Verge *Ypres* with its Chatellenie
 “ and Dependencies, which henceforward shall
 “ be *Bailleul*, *Warneton*, *Comines*, *Warwick*, *Pope-*
 “ *ringuen*, and what depends on the Places a-
 “ bove-mentioned, the Town and Chatellenie
 “ of *Cassel* remaining to his most Christian Ma-
 “ jesty,) *Lisle* with its Chatellenie, (the Town and
 “ Government of *Douay* excepted,) *Tournay*, *Condè*
 “ and *Maubeuge*, with all their Dependencies ;
 “ the whole in such Condition as the said Places
 “ are in at present, and particularly with the
 “ Cannon, Artillery and Ammunition of War
 “ therein, to serve with the rest of the *Spanish*
 “ *Netherlands* for the Barrier of the said Lords
 “ the States-General ; upon which they may agree
 “ with the said King Charles, ACCORDING TO
 “ THE TENOR OF THE GRAND ALLI-
 “ ANCE, as well with regard to the *Garisons* which
 “ the said Lords the States-General shall maintain
 “ therein, as to all other Things in the *Spanish* *Ne-*
 “ *therlands* ; and particularly as to their having
 “ in Property and Sovereignty the Upper Quar-
 “ ter

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“ter of *Guelderland*, according to the 52d Article
“of the Treaty of *Munster*, in the Year 1648,
“as from Time to Time they shall think fit.
“But it is to be understood, that if there is a
“general Magazine in *Tournay*, the Quantity
“and Quality of the Artillery and Ammunition
“to be left in the said Place, shall be agreed
“upon.”

And by the Twenty-third Article it is agreed,
that his most Christian Majesty shall also deliver
up [to them,] all the Towns and Forts which he
shall have possessed himself of in the *Spanish Ne-*
therlands.

ARTICLE XXIII.

“**H**IS most Christian Majesty shall also deliver up all the
“Towns, Forts and Places, which
“he shall have possessed himself of in the *Span-*
“*nish Netherlands*, in the Condition they are now
“in, with their Cannon, Artillery and warlike
“Stores. But it is understood that if, since the
“Troops of the most Christian King entred
“*Namur*, any Magazine has been erected, or
“Stores of Artillery and Ammunition laid up in
“that Town and Castle more than for their De-
“fence, they shall be removed by the Officers of
“his most Christian Majesty, *in Concert with those*
“*of the States-General*, at the Time of Evacuation,
“which shall not on this Account be retarded,
“but shall be done within the Time that shall

The 23d Article of the Preliminaries.

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“ be limited ; the whole on this exprefs Condi-
 “ tion, that the *Roman Catholick Religion* shall be
 “ maintained in all the faid Places to be deli-
 “ vered up, and in their Dependencies, in the
 “ fame Manner as it is now eftablifhed there,
 “ *except that the Garifons of the States may exer-*
 “ *cife their own Religion as well in the Places yield-*
 “ *ed and made over for enlarging the Barrier, as*
 “ *IN THE PLACES OF THE SPANISH*
 “ *NETHERLANDS THAT ARE TO BE*
 “ *RESTORED.*”

These Words [*to them*] are not indeed expref-
 fed in this Article ; but that it is fo to be under-
 ftood, is evident both from the *Order* of the Ar-
 ticle, and the *Words* of it. For this Article is
 one of thofe, in which are regulated the Pre-
 tensions of *the States*, which begin with the 22d,
 and continue through all that follow to the 25th
 incluſively. And the *Words* of the laſt Clauſe
 leave no Room to doubt, but that theſe Towns
 alſo were to be ſurrendered *to the States*. For
 therein it is ſtipulated, that *the Garifons of the*
STATES may exerciſe their own Religion as well in
the Places yielded and made over for enlarging the
Barrier, as in the Places of the Spaniſh Netherlands
that are to be reſtored. And a little before, the
 Magazines at *Namur* are to be removed by the
 Officers of his moſt *Chriſtian* Majeſty, *in Concert*
with thoſe of the States-General.

By theſe two Articles of the *Preliminary Treaty*,
 (to ſay nothing at preſent concerning *Huy, Liege*
 and *Bonn*,) we ſee the Right of the *States* to the
 Poſſeſſion

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Possession of their Barrier, not only acknowledged and allowed as conformable to the *Intention* of the *Grand Alliance*, but actually granted and confirmed to them in *Execution of that Treaty*, by the Powers that were Parties to it. Nor is it any weakening to this Argument, that the *Preliminary Treaty* was, by the *French King's* Refusal to sign it, rendered ineffectual. For tho' that be true, so far as it relates to *France*; yet it is well known that the Ministers of the Allies signed it, and that their Principals approved what they did; and therefore it cannot but be thought in Reason and Equity obligatory upon them, as far as the Stipulations in it relate to themselves only. But let it be as void as the Friends of *France* can wish it, yet sure it will be allowed that it does at least contain the Sense of the Allies at that Time; and that it is a good Evidence to prove that *England* and the Emperor did then consent that the States should have *themselves* the keeping of their Barrier, pursuant to the Right they claimed by Vertue of the *Grand Alliance*, and which by Vertue of that Alliance they had actually exercised and enjoyed to that Time as well as since. Nor have the Imperial Court by any Declaration on their Part, ever weakened the Force of these *Preliminaries*, but on the contrary have always pressed the Allies to insist upon them, and to treat with *France* on no other Foot.

From all which I infer, that whether we look backward or forward, whether to the *Propositions made by the States to France before the Grand Al-*

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liance, or to that Alliance itself, or to what has been since done in Pursuance and Execution of it; it is both Ways very plain, that the States at the making of that Alliance, intended to have the Barrier in their own Possession, and were understood to intend so by the rest of the Allies; and that they have by Vertue of that Alliance, and by the Preliminary Articles, which, as far as they relate to this Matter, are founded upon it,) an undoubted Right to their Barrier, and to have themselves the Defence of it; that this Right was allowed and confirmed to them by England and the Emperor, and all this previous to the Barrier-Treaty.

That the States having a Barrier pursuant to the present Treaty, is far from exposing US to any Danger from Them.

5. I come now in the *Fifth* Place to shew, that their having a Barrier pursuant to this Right, and conformable to the present Treaty, is far from exposing *Us* to any Sort of Danger from *them*.

All the *Danger* that can possibly be apprehended, or that has ever been suggested by the Enemies of this Treaty, is reducible to these *two* Heads: Either that the *Dutch*, by Vertue of *their* Barrier, may obstruct *our* Trade to the *Netherlands*; or, by the Number of *Towns*, and Largeness of the *Revenues*, may gain such an Accession of *Strength*, as may make them formidable Neighbours and dangerous Rivals to our Commerce in general. Which Apprehensions I shall prove to be altogether groundless and unreasonable, by shewing,

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1st, That their *Barrier* is granted them under such *Regulations* and *Restrictions*, that they cannot attempt any Thing to the Prejudice of our *Trade*, without a direct *Violation* of the Treaty, and an open *Rupture* with us.

2. That after the *Barrier* is put into their Hands, our *Friendship* will become so absolutely necessary to them, that it will be more *their Interest* than ever to avoid coming to a *Rupture* with us.

3. That, supposing they should be so imprudent as to come to a *Rupture* with us, their *Barrier* would be so far from contributing to make them more rich and formidable, that it would rather exhaust and weaken them with respect to England.

I. I am to shew, that their *Barrier* is granted them under such *Regulations* and *Restrictions*, that they cannot attempt any Thing to the Prejudice of our *Trade*, without a direct *Violation* of the Treaty, and an open *Rupture* with us. This is so evident from the Words of the Treaty, that I cannot but imagine, the most inaccurate Reader must have observed, that greater Care could not well have been taken, nor stronger and plainer Words used, for tying up the States from making the least *Encroachment* on our *Trade*.

That their Barrier is granted them under such Regulations and Restrictions, that they cannot attempt anything to the Prejudice of our Trade, without a direct Violation of the Treaty, and an open Rupture with us.

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That they are to have only the military Command in the Barrier-Towns, without any Power of imposing Duties, prohibiting Trade, or making any Orders relating to Commerce.

The *Sixth Article* specifies all the *Places* where they are to have *Garrisons*; and the *Ninth* regulates the *Power* they are to exercise in all the *Places* specified in the *Sixth*: Which *Power* extends no farther than to the *Military Command*; to the putting in of such *Governors, Commandants, Majors, and other Officers* as they shall think fit; who are not to be subject to any other *Orders*, in what relates to the *Security* of the said *Places*, and to the *Military Command*, but solely and peculiarly to those of their *High Migh- tinesses*; without *Prejudice* however to the *Rights and Liberties*, as well *Ecclesiastical* as *Political*, of *King Charles III*d. So that the *Sovereignty* and *Civil Administration* of all the *Towns* and *Dependencies* of the *Barrier*, is entirely reserved to *King Charles III*d. The *Dutch* are totally excluded from any *Power* of this kind, and restrained purely to the *Military Command*. Consequently, they can neither *impose Duties*, nor *take them off*; neither *open* nor *prohibit Trade*; neither exclude *our Manufactures*, nor force the *Consumption* of *their own*; nor make any *Order*, or exert any *Sort* of *Power* relating to *Commerce*, without a plain *Infringement* of the *Ninth Article*.

But

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But this is not all: They are so far from having any Power left them to prejudice our Trade *themselves*, that they are bound to *assist* her Majesty, if at any Time any Attempt should be made by *others* to put our Trade in those Parts on a worse Foot than that of the Nations the most favoured. For in the *Fifteenth Article* it is stipulated, that they shall *take Care*, in Conjunction with her Majesty, that the Subjects of *Great Britain*, and those of their *High Mightinesses*, shall be treated in the *Spanish Low-Countries*, as well as in *Spain*, the Kingdoms and States belonging thereunto, equally, and as well the one as the other, as favourably as the Nation the most favoured. I cannot see how it is possible to insert Words plainer or stronger, for *securing our Commerce*; or how it can with any Justice be pretended, that this Treaty wants to be farther explained on the Head of *Trade*.

I shall therefore enlarge no farther on this Particular, but only subjoin the solemn and positive Declaration made by the *States* on this Subject, in their Letter to her Majesty of the 19th of *February*, 1712, N. S. In which they tell her, that “ having learned, that “ that the principal Exceptions taken to the said “ Treaty, were, that it might *prove prejudicial* “ *to the Commerce of her Majesty's Subjects* in the “ *Spanish Netherlands*; and that some had enter-

That they are bound by the Treaty to assist Her Majesty, in case any others should attempt to put our Trade on a worse Foot than that of the Nations the most favoured.

A solemn Declaration of the States upon this Subject.

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“ tained an ill-grounded and erroneous Opinion,
 “ that the *States* might possibly design to take
 “ Advantage by it to make themselves Masters of
 “ the said *Spanish Netherlands*; their *High Mighti-*
 “ *nesses* did declare positively, and by this Letter
 “ do voluntarily repeat it, that it never was their
 “ Intention, nor ever will be, to make use of their
 “ said Treaty, or of their Garisons in the fortified
 “ Places of the Country, to prejudice in any
 “ Manner the *Commerce* of her Majesty’s Sub-
 “ jects; but that their Opinion is, that what-
 “ ever relates to Navigation and *Commerce* there,
 “ ought to be settled on an entire Equality, that
 “ so her Majesty’s Subjects may not be charged
 “ with *higher Duties* of Importation or Exporta-
 “ tion than theirs, to the end *Commerce* may be
 “ carried on there by both Nations on an equal
 “ Foot. That their *High Mightinesses* did de-
 “ clare, and do declare again by this Letter, that
 “ they never had a Thought, nor have now, of
 “ making themselves Masters of the *Spanish Ne-*
 “ *therlands*, in Whole or in Part; contenting
 “ themselves to have Garisons in the Places men-
 “ tioned in the *Sixth Article*, &c.

*That even
 in case of a
 Rupture with
 us, the States
 cannot obstruct
 our Trade in
 the Nether-
 lands, without
 breaking at the
 same Time
 with the Em-
 peror also.*

But still it will be objected, that
 tho’ this Treaty gives them no *Right*,
 yet it gives them the *Power* to ob-
 struct our Trade whenever they think
 fit; and therefore that at least in
 case of a Rupture with them, we may
 expect to have our whole *Commerce*
 with the *Netherlands* cut off. To
 this

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this I answer, that even in case of a Rupture, they cannot obstruct our Trade, without invading the Rights of King *Charles*, and breaking with *him* as well as with *us*: For he will always be so much concerned in Point of Interest, to maintain his own Sovereignty, and to protect our Trade to his Dominions, (upon which so great a Part of the Revenues of that Country depends,) that it is impossible he should sit still under any Invasion of the one, or Molestation of the other. And few, I believe, understand so little of the Constitution of *Holland*, or have so mean an Opinion of their Prudence, as to think, that for the sake of incommoding that single Branch of our Trade, they would be so mad as to draw a new Enemy upon themselves at such a Time, and to carry on a War at once against the *Emperor* and *England*; which must not only cost them much more than the whole Trade of the *Netherlands* is worth, but throw them unavoidably into the Hands of *France*, (who has the Conquest of the *Netherlands* too much at Heart, to be only an idle Spectator, in case of such a War;) and would therefore probably end, not only in the Loss of their Barrier, but in the utter Ruin of their Republick.

But

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That, if the Fear of obstructing our Trade is an Objection against trusting the strong Towns of the Netherlands in the Hands of the States, it is a stronger Objection against trusting them in any other Hands whatsoever.

But this Objection, if it proves any Thing, proves a great deal too much for the Purpose of those that bring it. For if the strong Towns of the *Netherlands* are not to be trusted in the hands of the *Dutch*, because that in case of a Rupture they may be turned against us; they certainly ought not, by much better Reason, to be trusted in the Hands of any Power that is less concerned to preserve a good Understanding with us than the *Dutch* are; that is, they ought to be trusted in no Hands at all. For though we turn our Eyes all over *Europe*, we shall find no Power so many ways engaged by all the strongest Ties of Interest to cultivate a strict Friendship with *England*, as the *Dutch* will be, especially after this Barrier is put into their Hands; (as I shall shew more fully by and by.) If therefore there were any Force in this Objection, we ought not to contend to have the fortified Places of the *Netherlands* secured by strong Garisons, but should insist on their being dismantled and laid open; since whatever Objection lies against the *Dutch*, will hold rather stronger against the Garisons of any other Nation. But if (as I shall prove in its Place) it will be the Interest of the *States* more than ever, to avoid giving us the least Umbrage or Distaste, after once the Barrier is committed to their Defence; then we have as strong Assurance as the Nature of the Thing

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Thing will admit, that the fortified Places of the Barrier will no more be made use of to the Prejudice of our *Trade* by *Them*, than they would be by *any other* Friend or Ally of *Britain*, into whose Hands they could be put.

But before I dismiss this Head, it will be proper to take Notice of a certain Representation of the *English* Merchants at *Bruges*, which has been lately printed and dispersed; and which is said in the Preface of the Libel to which it is annexed, *to signify the Inconveniencies which those Merchants already felt, and further apprehended from this Barrier-Treaty.* And in the Title it is again called, *The Representation of the English Merchants at Bruges, relating to the Barrier-Treaty.* Yet by the Substance of it, it appears plainly to have been drawn up only as *an Information in general, what Conditions of Trade to France and the Netherlands were proper to be insisted on at the Treaty of Peace.* The Date of it is *for some Reason or other* suppressed: However it is certain, that it was made at a Time when only the *Name* of the *Barrier-Treaty* had been heard of in *Flanders*, but the *Nature and Conditions* of it were not at all understood. For instead of containing any real Complaint against the Treaty, it shews that they had been led into false Fears, by being misinformed as to the Substance of it; and that they desired nothing more of her Majesty for the
Security

*Concerning
the Represent-
ation of the
English Mer-
chants at Bru-
ges.*

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Security of their Trade, than what was ready stipulated to their Hands in the *Barrier-Treaty*, though they were not at that Time acquainted with it. That the Reader may the better judge of the Truth of what I affirm, I shall insert the whole Representation as it stands printed at the End of the *Remarks on the Barrier-Treaty*.

The

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*The Representation of the English Merchants
at Bruges relating to the Barrier-Treaty.*

David White, and other Merchants, Her Majesty's Subjects residing at Bruges, and other Towns in Flanders, crave Leave humbly to represent,

“ **T**HAT whereas the Cities of *Lisle, Tour-*
“ *nay, Menin, Douay,* and other new Con-
“ *quests in Flanders and Artois,* taken from the
“ *French* this War by the united Forces of her
“ Majesty and her Allies, are now become entire-
“ ly under the Government of the States-Gener-
“ al; and that we her Majesty's Subjects may
“ be made liable to such Duties and Imposi-
“ tions on Trade, as the said States-General shall
“ think fit to impose on us: We humbly hope
“ and conceive, that it is her Majesty's Inten-
“ tion and Design that the Trade of her Domi-
“ nions and Subjects, which is carried on with
“ these new Conquests, may be on an equal Foot
“ with that of the Subjects and Dominions of the
“ States-General, and not be liable to any new
“ Duty, when transported from the *Spanish Ne-*
“ *therlands* to the said new Conquests; as, to our
“ great Surprise, is exacted from us on the follow-
“ ing Goods, *viz.* Butter, Tallow, Salmon, Hides,
“ Beef, and all other Product of her Majesty's
“ Dominions, which we import at *Ostend*, and
“ there pay the Duty of Entry to the King of
“ *Spain,*

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“ *Spain*, and consequently ought not to be liable
 “ to any new Duty, when they carry the same
 “ Goods, and all others from their Dominions,
 “ by a free Pass or *Transire*, to the said new Con-
 “ quests : And we are under Apprehension that
 “ if the said new Conquests be settled or given
 “ entirely into the Possession of the States-Gen-
 “ eral for their Barrier, (as we are made believe by
 “ a Treaty lately made by her Majesty’s Am-
 “ bassador, the Lord Viscount *Townshend*, at the
 “ *Hague*,) that the said States-General may also
 “ soon declare all Goods and Merchandizes which
 “ are contraband in their Provinces, to be also
 “ contraband or prohibited in these new Con-
 “ quests, or new Barrier ; by which her Majesty’s
 “ Subjects will be deprived of the Sale and Con-
 “ sumption of the following Products of her Ma-
 “ jesty’s Dominions, which are, and have long
 “ been declared contraband in the *United Pro-*
 “ *vinces* ; such as *English* and *Scotch* Salt, Malt
 “ Spirits or Corn Brandy, and all other Sorts of
 “ distilled *English* Spirits, Whale and Rape, Oil,
 “ &c. It is therefore humbly conceived, that
 “ her Majesty out of her great Care and graci-
 “ ous Concern for the Benefit of her Subjects
 “ and Dominions, may be pleased to direct, by a
 “ Treaty of Commerce or some other Way,
 “ that their Trade may be put on an equal Foot
 “ in all the *Spanish Netherlands*, and the new Con-
 “ quests or Barrier, with the Subjects of *Holland*,
 “ by paying no other Duty than that of Impor-
 “ tation to the King of *Spain* ; and by a Provi-
 “ sion,

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“ sion, that no Product of her Majesty’s Domi-
“ nions shall ever be declared contraband in these
“ new Conquests, except such Goods as were es-
“ teemed contraband before the Death of *Charles*
“ II. King of *Spain*. And it is also humbly
“ prayed, That the Product and Manufacture
“ of the new Conquests may also be exported
“ without paying any new Duty, besides that of
“ Exportation at *Ostend*, which was always paid
“ to the King *Spain*; it being impossible for any
“ Nation in *Europe* to assort an entire Cargo for
“ the *Spanish West-Indies*, without a considerable
“ Quantity of several of the Manufactures of
“ *Lisle*, such as Caradoros, Cajant, Picoses, Bo-
“ ratten, and many other Goods, &c.

“ The chief Things to be demanded of *France*
“ are; to be exempted from Tonnage; to have
“ a Liberty of importing Herrings and all o-
“ ther Fish to *France*, on the same Terms as
“ the *Dutch* do, and as was agreed by them
“ at the Treaty of Commerce immediately af-
“ ter the Treaty of Peace at *Ryswick*. The en-
“ larging her Majesty’s Plantations in *America*,
“ &c. is naturally recommended.”

Now if the Reader will reflect on
what has been quoted above, out of
the ninth and fifteenth Articles of
the Treaty; by the first of which,
the *States* are excluded from any
Share in the Civil Government, and
consequently from all Power of im-

*That this Re-
presentation,
instead of con-
demning the
Barrier-Trea-
ty, is really a
Petition in its
behalf.*

posing

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posing Duties of any kind ; and by the latter, are obliged to preserve the Trade of both Nations on an equal Foot: And if he will call to Mind the Declaration lately made by the *States* themselves on this Subject, in their Letter to her Majesty, I cannot but suppose, that he will acknowledge this Representation to proceed on a *Mistake of the Terms of the Barrier-Treaty*; and to be so far from condemning it, that it is in reality a *Petition in its behalf*. For by it the *English* Merchants in *Flanders* apply to her Majesty, not to have the Barrier taken out of the Hands of the *Dutch*, (for that, they know, would be in Effect, restoring it to the *French* ; and, instead of easing their Commerce, would end in the total Ruin of it;) but they only desire to have their Trade secured in such a Manner, and put upon such a Foot, as is actually provided by the Barrier-Treaty.

The Complaint of the Merchants about the exacting Duties of Import and Export ;

They complain indeed, that Duties of Import and Export had been exacted of her Majesty's Subjects in some of the Barrier-Towns, over and above the Royal Duties paid at *Ostend* ; which the Merchants plainly attribute to those Towns being become *entirely under the Government of the States-General*. But in what Manner those Places became *entirely* under the Possession of the *States-General*, and upon what Considerations it was found necessary to leave them so during the War, has been examined above. And it cannot any ways be pretended, that

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that *this Treaty* was the *Cause* of those Hardships; since it is contrived in the strongest Terms possible, to secure her Majesty's Subjects from any Sort of Inequality or Oppression.

If therefore the *States* had, at any Time put us under the unjustifiable Hardships complained of in this Representation, and had persisted in so doing; it is not to be doubted, but that we should have heard of fresher and stronger, as well as more authentick Complaints on so important a Subject. The reiterated Representations of the Merchants in *Flanders*, with her Majesty's repeated Instances to have this Grievance removed, and the *States* positive Refusal to comply, would hardly have failed being produced at a Time when Complaints of any Kind against the *Dutch* are so carefully sought and so greedily received. The *States* themselves would have had more regard to common Honesty and Truth, than to have endeavoured to impose on her Majesty by the publick and voluntary Declaration above-cited, when their Practice in the *Netherlands* might so soon have been brought in Evidence against the Truth of their Letter.

Some indeed, out of the Abundance of their Good-will to this Treaty, have been at the Pains to coin a Distinction, which, if founded in Truth, would warrant any Hardship of this kind that the *States* should think fit to impose on

Not well grounded.

A groundless Distinction made by some, between the newly conquered Barrier-Towns and the Spanish Netherlands.

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her Majesty's Subjects. The Towns and Places of the Barrier, that were not in the Possession of the late King of *Spain* at the Time of his Death, but have been conquered from *France* in the present War, constitute (if we will believe these Gentlemen) a distinct Country from the *Spanish Netherlands*: And consequently, any Equality of Trade stipulated within the latter, cannot, they say, be construed to extend to the former. There ought therefore, according to them, to have been a particular Regulation made in this Treaty for our Trade that passes through the *Spanish Netherlands* to these new conquered Towns. But I shall shew, that there is not the least ground for any such Distinction, neither in this Treaty, nor in any other, where the *Spanish Netherlands* and the *Barrier* have yet been named; all the Towns, Places, and Forts, intended for the Barrier, whether in the Possession of the late King of *Spain* at the Time of his Death, or conquered from *France* since, being always comprehended under the general and antient Appellation of the *Spanish Netherlands*. In the fifth Article of the *Grand Alliance* it is said, that the Allies shall use their utmost Endeavours to recover and conquer the *Spanish Netherlands* for a *Barrier* to the *States*. In the 22d Article of the *Preliminary-Treaty*, where the Towns are specified that were to be yielded by *France*, and were not in the Possession of the Crown of *Spain* at the Death of the late King *Charles*, it is said, " That those Towns are " to serve, with the rest of the *Spanish Netherlands*, " for

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“ for a Barrier to the *States*, upon which they may
“ agree with the said King Charles, as well with
“ regard to the Garisons which the said Lords
“ the *States-General* shall maintain therein, as to
“ all other Things in the *Spanish Netherlands*.” By
which it is manifest, that those Towns were look-
ed upon as a Part of the *Spanish Netherlands*, to
which they did all originally belong, and are
all to be re-united at the Peace. And as for the
Barrier-Treaty, the whole Style and Tenor of it
will still make this more plain. In the sixth
Article, all the Towns and Forts where the *States*
are to have Garisons, as well those that were
not, as those that were in the Hands of the late
King of *Spain* at the Time of his Death, are
put upon the same Foot, and named without any
Sort of Difference or Distinction. And in the
ninth Article, which expresses what Power is left
to *them*, and what is reserved to King Charles, in
all the Places recited in the Sixth, the *States* have
only the military Command; all ecclesiastical and
civil Power being equally reserved to him in those
Towns that were not in the Possession of the late
King of *Spain*, and in those that were. And
tho’ by the eleventh Article, the Revenues of that
Part of the Barrier, which the Crown of *Spain*
was not possessed of at the Death of the late King,
are to be left to the *States* towards the Mainte-
nance of their Barrier; yet the *States* have no
other Power conveyed to them by this Article,
but that of receiving the Revenues for the Uses
therein mentioned; no Part of the Sovereignty in

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civil or ecclesiastical Affairs, reserved to King *Charles* by the ninth Article, being transferred to them by this. In the twelfth Article it is stipulated, that no Town of the *Spanish Netherlands* shall ever devolve to the Crown of *France*; where the Words *Spanish Netherlands*, plainly denote the whole Barrier. For no one can be so absurd as to imagine, that the *States* intended to limit this Provision to those Towns only, that were in the Hands of the late King of *Spain* at the Time of his Death, while they left the far stronger Part of their Barrier capable of being reunited to the Crown of *France*. But there is the less Reason to enlarge on these Particulars, since the Distinction I am arguing against, is manifestly contrary to the very Foundation of this Treaty; which is no more than this, that the whole *Spanish Netherlands*, together with the rest of that Monarchy, being to be restored to King *Charles* the III^d at a Peace; and the *States* having by their Treaties, a Right to a sufficient Barrier, and to have the Defence of it put into their own Hands; the Queen agrees and settles with them in this Treaty, the Conditions and Regulations under which they are to have the said Barrier; promising at the same Time to use her good Offices with King *Charles*, that all the Terms specified in this Treaty may be inserted in the Convention to be made for that Purpose between King *Charles* and the *States*.

If

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If therefore it be evident from the Style and Tenor of all these Treaties, that there is no Ground for this Distinction between the *Barrier-Towns* and the Towns of the *Spanish Netherlands*; there is neither Sense nor Justice in affirming, that sufficient Care has not been taken to preserve the Equality of Trade throughout the *whole Barrier*; when

And the unreasonableness of inferring from that Distinction, that sufficient Care has not been taken to preserve the Equality of Trade throughout the whole Barrier.

it is as plain as Words can make it, that Care has been taken to preserve it throughout the *Netherlands*, under which I have demonstrated that the *whole Barrier* is included.

Notwithstanding these Objections therefore, it is incontestibly proved, that the *Dutch* cannot by Vertue of their Barrier attempt any thing to the *Prejudice of our Trade*, without a direct *Violation of the Treaty*, and an *open Rupture* with us. But that this will never be the Case, we have the strongest moral Assurance; as I shall shew in the next Place, by proving,

2. That when once the *Barrier* is put into their Hands, *our Friendship* will become so *absolutely necessary* to them, that it will be *more their Interest than ever*, to avoid coming to a *Rupture* with us.

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*That when
the Barrier is
once put into
the Hands of
the States, it
will be more
their Interest
than ever, to
avoid break-
ing with Us.*

Whoever will look back on the past Conduct of the *States*, will find that they have always courted our Friendship, and esteemed it as their greatest Security. “ The very Frame “ and Constitution of their Government, as Sir *William Temple* “ observes, is made for Rest, and “ not for Motion. Their first Interest is to continue the Peace, while it may be “ done with Safety ; and when that fails, the next “ is to open a War in favour of *Spain*, and in “ Conjunction with *Us* ; and the greatest they “ have in the World, is to preserve and increase “ their *Alliances* with *Us*.” Accordingly they have never been the Aggressors in any War particular with *England*. Our Quarrels with them in 1665, and 1672, were grounded on the private Complaints of Merchants, and the Punctilio of the Flag ; which Disputes might easily have been compromised, had we not been instigated, or rather bought by the common Enemy to break with them upon any Terms, that he might have the Advantage of wearing out the two naval Powers against one another, and establishing himself on the Ruins of both. The Eagerness they expressed in joining with *England* in the *Triple Alliance*, drew upon them the whole Weight of the *French* Arms, and was very near ending in the utter Extirpation of their Republick : And their whole Behaviour ever since the Revolution, shews it to be a standing Maxim of their Govern-

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Government, never to abandon the Friendship and Interest of *England*, unless *England* first abandons its own; unless our Friendship cannot be had but upon such Terms, as would expose them to the Ruin it was designed to prevent. This has been the constant and uninterrupted Sense of *Holland*, from the first Foundation of their State: And I shall shew, that their having a *Barrier pursuant to this Treaty*, will make it more their Interest than ever, to adhere to *England*, and to rely upon our Support.

The Kings of *France*, if we may judge of their future Conduct by the whole Tenor of their past Behaviour, will never lay aside their ancient and hereditary Project of uniting the *Netherlands* to their Dominions; the Reasons that have induced them steadily to pursue this End, being such as from the Nature of them must always subsist: From whence it necessarily follows, that they must be constant Enemies to those who have openly taken upon them the Protection and Defence of those Countries. In former Times, by the Favour of certain Conjunctions, the King of *France* has found Opportunities to make the *Dutch* believe, that their Interests were in some Measure reconcilable with his; but now all Possibility of a lasting Friendship and Confidence between the two Nations, is entirely cut off. The first Step that he sets in *Flanders*, must engage them in a Rupture with him; his first Attack must be upon them,

Because thereby the Resentment of the Crown of France will be entailed on them for ever.

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and he cannot invade but through their Sides. Now if this be the Case; if *Holland*, by undertaking the Defence of the Barrier, has entered the Lists against *France*, and entailed on itself the Enmity and Resentment of that Crown for ever; the Match is so very unequal, that no one can doubt but the *States* will stand in more need than ever of the Friendship and Assistance of some neighbouring Power. The Art of Sieges is brought to that Perfection, that the strongest Towns must fall of Course, without an Army in the Field to relieve them; and no one can imagine that the *States* will be able to furnish that Army, without the Assistance of *England*: Of which they have had sufficient Proof throughout the whole Course of this War, and too *fatal* an Instance *this last Campaign*. For as *England* has been the only Power in the Alliance, besides themselves, that has sent any Number of Troops purely at its own Charge, for the Recovery and Defence of those Countries; So we see, upon the withdrawing those Troops, how little the joint Forces of the rest of the Allies have been able to cover the Frontier-Towns, and to make Head against *France*. The committing therefore the Defence of the Barrier to the *States*, will indeed be a good Security to them against any *sudden Invasion* from *France*; but must at the same Time, (if they intend to preserve it,) make them *more dependent* with Relation to their *Friends*, more cautious and observant towards those by whose Assistance

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tance alone they can hope to *hold* it. But what a Value the *States* set upon our Friendship and Support, and how insignificant they think the strongest Barrier without it, can no ways better appear, than from that Steadiness they shewed in rejecting the specious Proposals of *France*, made to them at the Time of the late preliminary Treaty in 1709; by which the *French* King offered to give them the *whole* *Netherlands* for their Barrier, with the *entire* *Sovereignty* of them, and all the Advantages of *Trade* to the *Spanish* Dominions that that they could desire, if they would but enter into separate Measures with him. The Interest therefore of *Holland*, as it has obliged them *formerly*, so it will *now* oblige them *more than ever*, to cultivate a strict and inviolable Friendship with *England*, without which they cannot hope to preserve the Barrier they have been so earnestly contending for.

3. But because Nations are not always true to their Interest, I shall shew in the *last* Place, *that supposing they should be so imprudent as to come to a Rupture with England, their Barrier would be so far from contributing to make them more rich or formidable, that it would rather exhaust and weaken them with Respect to England.*

The

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That, supposing the States should be so imprudent as to break with England, their Barrier would be so far from making them more rich or formidable, that it would rather exhaust and weaken them with respect to England,

Because the whole Revenue of the Spanish Netherlands has never been sufficient, since the Pyrenean Treaty, to keep them in a tolerable Posture of Defence: And therefore much less can that Portion assigned the States by the Treaty, be sufficient.

The Notion that has been conceived among Us, of the Largeness of the *Revenues* allotted them towards the Maintenance of their Barrier, is so very wide of the Truth; that I am sensible what strong Prejudices I must encounter in endeavouring to prove, that they are far short of what must necessarily be expended on the Garisons and Fortifications; and consequently that the Barrier, far from making them richer, will bring a constant Burthen and Expence upon them. But I hope to make this appear so very clearly, that no one shall have the least Reason to apprehend that any Surplusage of these *Revenues* may be applied to the Improvement of their Trade, or the Increasing of their *Naval Strength*, which are the only two Points in which it is pretended they can become formidable to *Great Britain*.

It is well known that the whole Revenue of the Spanish Netherlands ever since the Pyrenean Treaty, has not been sufficient to keep them in a tolerable Posture of Defence; that the maintaining these Provinces against the Incursions of France, has been such a constant Charge to the Crown of Spain, that the Spaniards have often had it under Deliberation to exchange them for other Provinces nearer the Body of their Monarchy. Sir William Temple (as has been before

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fore observed) in several Places of his Letters, expresses his Apprehension of their coming to some such Agreement with *France*, seeing such continual Wars entailed upon them: And in other Places he tells us, that while *France* continues so great Forces and Designs on Foot; tho' the Peace holds, *the Preservation of Flanders will cost Spain 200,000 Pounds a Year, besides the Revenues of the Country*; that upon the breaking out of the War in 1667, *Spain* remitted to *Flanders* about 400,000 Crowns in less than two Months, and had negotiated at *Amsterdam* for 900,000 more: And it is certain, that in a Treaty between *Spain* and *Holland* for preserving the Peace of *Nimeguen*, the *Spaniards* obliged themselves to remit constantly to *Flanders* 100,000 Crowns a Month; which were also paid with the greatest Exactness, as appears by the Count *de Fuemmayer's* Speech to the Deputies of the States, *March* the 12th, 1681; in which he likewise insinuates, that his Master's Constancy in succouring and maintaining the *Low-Countries*, might possibly exhaust all his Treasures to no Purpose, if the *States* did not contribute to their Preservation, as being the most interested in it. And the Reader may remember, that the Court of *Spain* used much the same Language to King *Charles II.* upon the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Nimeguen*; declaring that "except *England* and *Holland* both, contributed to-wards the Charge of maintaining *Flanders*, even after the Peace, they should not be in a

" Con-

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“ *Condition of supporting it alone, and must fall in-
 “ to other Measures.*” And several other ways
 it might be made to appear, that *Spain* has been
 obliged to furnish large Sums out of its own Cof-
 fers for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*; e-
 ven larger, than *all the Revenues* assigned the
States for that Purpose amount to. But if the
whole Income of that Country, with such large Ad-
 ditions out of the *Spanish Treasures*, was never
 sufficient since the *Pyrenean Treaty* to maintain and
 defend the Barrier; it may reasonably be con-
 cluded, that *Part* of them only, and that so *mo-
 derate* a one as is allotted the *States* by this Trea-
 ty, cannot be any ways proportionable to the Ex-
 pence.

*A Computa-
 tion of the
 Particulars of
 the Revenue,
 and the Ex-
 pence.*

If we descend to *Particulars*, this
 Matter will be still more plain. The
 Town and Chatellenie of *Liste* with
 the Bayliwick of *Douay*, the Town
 of *Orchies* and its other Depend-
 encies, is unquestionably the richest
 and largest Conquest of any of those whose *Re-
 venues* are appropriated towards the Maintenance
 of the Barrier. The King of *France* must also be
 allowed to be no unskilful Manager of *Revenues*.
 Yet all that he could draw from this wealthy
 Precinct in Time of Peace, amounted to no
 more than 3, or at the most 400,000 Livres a
 Year; whether under Name of Aids, Domains,
 Fortifications, or other ordinary Impost; except-
 ing only the Duties of Import and Export, of
 which

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which tho' an exact Estimate cannot be made because they were included in the general Farm of the conquered Countries, yet they cannot be rated at more than one Third of the other Revenues; which being added to the Sum already mentioned, makes the whole Annual Product of that Chatellenie about 533,000 *Liveres Flemish* Money; which is 12 *per Cent.* less in Value than that of *Holland*. So that the whole, reduced into *English* Money, amounts to 42640 Pounds, at eleven *Dutch* Guilders to the Pound *sterling*. Now whoever will look into the yearly Estimates of the House of Commons, will find by a middle Computation, that the annual Charge of every thousand Men, whether in Field or Garison, is laid at above *twenty thousand Pounds*, exclusive of Transports, Ordnance, Hospitals, and other Contingencies. So that this rich Chatellenie, may be able to maintain in Time of Peace a Body of 2000 Men; which is scarce one third of what is necessary for the Garison of *Lisse* alone; over and above which, there still remain to be provided for, the Garison of *Douay*, and the Magazines and Fortifications of both those Places. But if the *most considerable* Chatellenie of any in the Barrier, is able to raise no larger a Sum towards defraying the Charges of its Defence; I may be allowed to infer, that the *lesser* Towns and Chatellenies will prove deficient in Proportion. And when we add to these, the several Towns of the Barrier, whose Revenues are reserved to
King

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King *Charles* the III^d, and the whole Expence of which must therefore fall on the *States*; sure no one can imagine that the additional Allowance of 100,000 Pistoles a Year, is any ways answerable to the great *Charges* the *States* must be at for covering such a wide Frontier, for maintaining such numerous Garisons, for repairing and keeping so many Fortifications, ruined or damaged in the Course of a long War. So that there is a very good Reason to conclude, that the Barrier, instead of increasing their *Riches*, will constantly require a considerable *Sum out of their own Revenue* towards its Maintenance; and, by employing their Men and Money, will leave them less at Liberty than they were before, to disturb their Neighbours, supposing they could ever so far forget their own Interests as to have a Mind to it. Their *Fleet* particularly, which has been the principal Bulwark of their Defence in all their Wars with *England*, (for we were never so mad as to think of attacking them through *Flanders*.) will receive no Addition from the Barrier; but rather be worse mann'd and equipped, when so many Hands and such large Sums are diverted to the Defence of the *Netherlands*, from whence they cannot be withdrawn without the Loss of the Barrier, and the utmost Danger to *Holland* itself.

Thus

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Thus I have made good my fifth and last Proposition, which was, *That the States having a Barrier pursuant to their Right acquired by former Treaties, and conformable to the Regulations of the present Treaty, is far from exposing Us to any Sort of Danger from them.* But perhaps there was the less Occasion for me to have spent so much Time in proving this Proposition; since those who have expressed the greatest Apprehensions of this kind, and have been the forwardest in condemning the present Treaty, have however not not so much as once insisted, that the Defence of the *Netherlands* should be put into *other Hand*; but on the contrary have made it a Part of their Boast and Glory, that by the present Scheme for Peace, the *States* are to have the very same Barrier as was demanded of *France* in 1709, excepting two or three Places only: And sure it will not be pretended, that the Safety of *Great Britain*, or the Preservation of our Trade, is better consulted by the *Exception* of those two or three Places; since, though taken from the *Dutch*, they are to be put into the Hands of *France*.

But,

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The great Objection, founded on the 15th Article of the Treaty; that it is highly prejudicial to the Commerce of Great Britain, to submit our Trade in the Spanish Dominions, to an Equality with that of Holland and other Nations.

But, granting that the Barrier exposes us to no Sort of Danger from the *Dutch*, there still remains one Objection to be answered, which has been managed with the greatest Industry by the Enemies of this Treaty, and has furnished them with the most popular Topicks of Clamour and Invective against it; as if the very Terms of the Treaty itself, were *highly prejudicial to the COMMERCE of Great Britain*. This Objection is founded on the 15th Article, by which the Subjects of *England* and *Holland* are put upon an *equal Foot of Trade* to all the *Spanish Dominions*. Against which it is objected, that the Crown of *England* never submitted to this *Equality*; but that the *British* Subjects were both *by their Treaties*, and by *constant Custom*, distinguished in their Trade to the *Spanish Dominions*, from *Holland* and all other Nations, till by this 15th Article *her Majesty* was made a *Party* to those Clauses in the Treaty of *Munster*, that are most beneficial to the *Dutch*, and even a *Guarantee* to the *States* for *Privileges against her own Subjects*. This is indeed a very heavy Charge; and therefore it was reasonable to expect it should have been well supported, and clearly proved: But on the contrary I am firmly persuaded, that upon a full and impartial Examination, there will not appear to be the least ground for any one of the Particulars whereof
this

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this general Charge consists. In order to set this Matter in a clear Light, I shall consider,

1. The Foot upon which the Trade between *Holland* and the *Spanish Dominions*, and that between *England* and the *same Dominions*, stood by *Vertue of their respective Treaties* with the Crown of *Spain*, from the Time that the *States* were first acknowledged a free Republick by that Crown, to the breaking out of the present War. And I shall make it appear, that the Trade of each Nation has all along stood upon an *equal Foot by Vertue of those Treaties*; and that the one as well as the other, had a Right of being treated as favourably as the Nations the most favoured by *Spain*.

2. I shall prove, that the Subjects of *Great Britain* have not *in Fact* been any ways distinguished in their Commerce with *Spain*, nor by any *Custom or Prescription* enjoyed greater Privileges of Trade than the *Dutch*.

3. I shall make it appear, that our Princes have been so far from not submitting to the Advantages granted the *Dutch* in the abovementioned Articles of the Treaty of *Munster*, that the *Crown of England* actually *first procured* them for the *States*, and by an exprefs Treaty became *Guarantee* for their Performance; and that her Majesty is under no Engagement by this Article, but such as she had *previously* taken upon her by the Treaty of the *Grand Alliance*.

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That the Trade of England and Holland to the Spanish Dominions, has always, by Vertue of their respective Treaties with the Crown of Spain, stood upon an equal Foot.

By the 12 Years Truce.

1. I am to consider the Foot upon which the Trade of each Nation stood by Vertue of its Treaties with Spain, to the breaking out of the present War; and to shew that both had a Right of being treated equally, and as favourably as the Nations the most favoured. To begin with *Holland*: The first formal Treaty, in which the United Provinces were acknowledged a Free and Independent State by Spain, was that of the 12 Years Truce, concluded at Antwerp the 9th of April, 1609, between Philip the III^d of Spain, the Arch-Duke Albert, and the Arch-Duchess Isabella (to whom the *Netherlands* were at that Time made over,) on the one Part; and the *States-General* of the *United Provinces* on the other. In which, among other Regulations for the Advantage of their Trade, it is stipulated (*Art. 4.*) “ That the Subjects of the *States* shall be permitted to trade in Safety to all the Dominions of the King of Spain, and the Arch-Duke and Dutchess, situate in *Europe*, where the Subjects of any other Kings or Princes the Friends or Allies of Spain are permitted to traffick, and to the Dominions of any Princes and States out of *Europe* that would suffer them, without any Molestation from the King of Spain or his Officers, to them, or to the Princes, States, or private Persons “ that

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“ that should traffick with them.” Which last Clause was purposely contrived to take in the Trade to the *Indies*, and was declared by the *Spanish* Ministers to be more than had at that Time ever been granted to the Crown of *England* in its Treaties with *Spain*: See *Jeanin's Negot. Tom. 2. p. 394.* In *Article 6th* it is stipulated, “ That the Subjects and Inhabitants “ of the Dominions of the King of *Spain*, “ of the Arch-Duke and Dutchess, and the “ States, trading into one anothers Countries, “ shall not be obliged to pay greater Duties and Imposts, than the Subjects of the “ Country, and such of their Friends and Allies “ as shall be the least charged.” And *Art. 7th*, That “ the Subjects and Inhabitants of the “ minions of the said *States*, shall have the same “ Security and Liberty in the Dominions of the “ King of *Spain*, the Arch-duke and Dutchess, “ as were granted to the Subjects of the King of “ *Great Britain* by the last Treaty of Peace and “ secret Articles made with the Constable of “ *Castile*.

So that by this Treaty, the *States* had a Right to be treated in all the *Spanish* Dominions as favourably as *Great Britain* or the Nations the most favoured.

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*By the Treaty
of Munster.*

The next Treaty that they made with *Spain*, was that of *Munster*, concluded between *Philip* the IVth and the *United Provinces*, *January* 30, 1648 : Which, as to the Terms of it, is really little more than a Renewal of the *Treaty of Truce* ; as will appear to any one that will take the Pains to compare them together : For by it their Trade is continued on the same Foot upon which it was put by the abovementioned *Treaty of Truce*, some Particulars only being more fully explained. The most material *Articles* in this Treaty relating to *Commerce*, are the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th.

By the 14th it is agreed, That the River *Schelde*, and the Canals of *Sas Swyn*, and other Mouths of the Sea adjoining, shall be kept shut on the Side of the *States* : Which is no more, than what was left to them by the 9th *Art.* of the *Treaty of Truce* ; as appears by comparing that Article, with the Difficulties and Objections made against it by the Arch-duke's Ministers, recited in *Jeanin's* Summary Narrative of the Negotiation ; *Tom.* 1. *p.* 9. *The Arch-duke and Dutcheſs* insisted, that the *Commerce of the River* (*Schelde*) should be wholly free and open, without obliging the Merchants and Vessels arriving in *Zeeland* to unlade there and to change their Shipping, as the Province of *Zeeland* earnestly required they should ; with a Resolution not to depart from this Demand, &c. *And*, *Tom.* 2. *p.* 397. *They* (the *Spanish Ambassadors*) afterwards made mention of
the

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the Article relating to the Home-Trade, (viz. Art. 9th,) and would have persuaded us (the Ministers of England and France,) that it was by no Means reasonable, nor what they could ever consent to, that the Zeelanders should continue in their Province those high Imposts, and the same Rule of levying Duties, which they had practised in the War, and during the Cessation of Arms, in which all the neighbouring Princes were interested as well as they; and that, if it was resolved to continue these Exactions, they should find Means of revenging themselves; which would hurt the Zeelanders full as much, as the Zeelanders studied to hurt them. But we having insisted, that no Alteration should be made in this Article; and that, the Truce being once concluded, they might confer amicably on this Head, and settle it to mutual Satisfaction; they readily answered us, That the Article, as it is at present, being left to the Discretion of the States, they would remit nothing of it afterwards, seeing the Treaty would remain in Force whether they did or no. However, notwithstanding their Arguments, the Article was let to stand; they promising themselves that it would be found necessary on each Side, for the mutual Convenience of Trade, to make some Alterations therein.

By the 15th Article of the said Treaty of *Munster*, the Merchandizes going in and out of the Harbours of *Flanders*, are to be charged with the same Duties, as the Merchandizes going and coming along the *Schelde* and the Canals on the Side of the *States*. This is no more than an Ex-

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planation of the 6th *Art.* of the *Treaty of Truce*: For the Subjects and Inhabitants of the United Provinces being by that Article to pay no greater Duties in the Dominions of the Arch-duke and Dutcheſs, than ſuch of their Friends and Allies as ſhould be the leaſt charged; this Article takes Care that the *Scheld* and Canals on that Side, which are the Paſſages through which the *Dutch Trade* paſſes into the *Netherlands*, ſhall not be charged with greater Duties and Impoſts, than the Harbours in *Flanders* through which the Trade of other Nations paſſed into the ſaid *Netherlands*.

By the 16th *Article*, the *States* are allowed to enjoy the ſame Privileges and Freedom of Trade to the *Spaniſh* Dominions, as had been or ſhould be granted to the *Hans-Towns*, who were at that Time the People moſt favoured by *Spain*. This alſo is a Conſequence of the ſixth and ſeventh *Articles* of the *Treaty of Truce*.

The 17th *Article* of the *Treaty of Munſter* repeats the 7th of *the Truce*, by which the ſame Liberty and Security in the *Spaniſh* Dominions is granted to the *Dutch*, as the *Engliſh* obtained by the *Treaty* and ſecret *Articles* made with the *Conſtable of Caſtile*.

By other ſub-
ſequent Treas-
ties.

So that the *Treaty of Munſter* did really give the *Dutch* no Advantages with reſpect to the *Spaniſh* Trade, but what were expreſſed in, or fairly deducible

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deducible from the *Treaty of Truce*: Which the Reader is desired to remember, for an Use that will be made of it by and by. Pursuant to these Regulations, their *subsequent Treaties* in 1650, 1673, and 1676, refer to and confirm the *Privileges of Commerce* they had acquired by the fore-mentioned Stipulations: And upon this Foot, *Their Trade* stood at the Beginning of the present War.

As for the Rights and Benefits of Trade which *the Subjects of Great Britain* have acquired by *Vertue of their Treaties* with the Crown of Spain, they are chiefly founded upon the above-mentioned Treaty made by King *James I.* with the Constable of

And by King James the Ist's Treaty with the Constable of Castile, and one made by King Charles the IId, in 1667.

Castile, and one made by King *Charles the IId*, May the 13th, 1667. And by what has been already said, it is plain they cannot be greater than those stipulated to the *Dutch* by their Treaties with the same Crown. But for a farther Proof of the Equality of both, it is to be observed, that as on the one Hand, the Privileges granted to *Great Britain* and the *Hans-Towns* have been made the general Standard of the Advantages granted to the *States*; so on the other Hand, the Privileges granted to the *States* and the *Hans-Towns*, have been made the general Standard of the Advantages stipulated for the Subjects of *Great Britain*; as appears by the last mentioned Treaty between the two Crowns, concluded at *Madrid*

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the 23d of *May* 1667, in which it is stipulated, (*Article* 8,) that, “As for what may concern
 “ both the *Indies*, and any other Part whatsoever,
 “ the Crown of *Spain* doth grant to the Subjects
 “ of *Great Britain*, all that is granted to the
 “ *United Provinces* of the *Low-Countries* in their
 “ Treaty of *Munster* 1648, Point for Point, in
 “ as full and ample Manner, as if the same were
 “ herein particularly inserted; the same Rules
 “ being to be observed, whereunto the Subjects
 “ of the said *United Provinces* are obliged. And
 “ by the 38th *Article* of the same Treaty, it is
 “ agreed and concluded, that the Subjects of the
 “ King of *Great Britain*, and the King of *Spain*,
 “ shall have and enjoy in the respective Lands,
 “ Seas, &c. of one and the other, and in all
 “ Places whatsoever, the same Privileges and Se-
 “ curities, whether they concern their *Persons* or
 “ Trade, with all the beneficial Clauses and Cir-
 “ cumstances, which have been granted by either
 “ of the said Kings to the most *Christian King*,
 “ the *States General*, the *Hans-Towns*, or any
 “ other Kingdom or State whatsoever, in as full,
 “ ample, and beneficial a Manner, as if the same
 “ were particularly mentioned and inserted in the
 “ Treaty.” And upon this Foot, Our Trade
 stood at the breaking out of the present War.

And we may observe by the by, from what
 has been now quoted, that it is so far from being
 true, that the Crown of *England* never submitted
 to the advantageous Terms granted the *Hollanders*
 by

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by the Treaty of *Munster*, that in this Treaty of 1667 it expressly stipulates for its own Subjects all the beneficial Clauses of the Treaty of *Munster* that were made in Favour of the *Dutch*, and the *same Privileges and Securities* that were enjoyed by Them. But of this I shall bring much stronger Proof under my *Third Head*. In the mean Time, I hope there is sufficient Reason to conclude, that Care has been constantly taken by *England* and *Holland* in their Treaties with *Spain* for above an hundred Years, that the Subjects of each Nation should be treated, in their Trade to all the *Spanish* Dominions, *equally*; and one as well as the other, as favourably as the People most favoured.

2. Having thus proved, that by *That the Trade*
Virtue of our Treaties we have no of *England*
Right superior to the *Dutch*; I shall and *Holland*
now shew that we have not, *in Fact*, to the *Spanish*
been any ways distinguished in our *Dominions*,
Commerce with *Spain*, nor by any *has, in Fact,*
Custom or Prescription, enjoyed greater stood upon an
Privileges of Trade than the *Dutch*. equal Foot;
The Trade from *England* to *Spain* and that there
has been so very great and extensive, has been no
that there is hardly a considerable Merchant a- *Custom or Pre-*
mongst us that is not in some Degree acquainted *scription to the*
with the Terms upon which we traded to those *contrary.*
Parts before the breaking out of the War. It
might therefore reasonably have been expected,
that so much Caution would have been used, as
not to assert Facts which must be own'd by every
one,

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one, that has any Insight into that Trade, to be without the least Foundation. But because it cannot but be confessed, that *Great Britain* has not *by virtue of any Treaty*, obtained more advantageous Terms of Trade to *Spain* than the *Hollanders*; it is immediately asserted, without producing one single Instance, that the *British* Subjects have, at least *by Custom and Prescription*, enjoyed greater Privileges of Trade, than the *Dutch*, or any other Nation. This Opinion has gone over the Kingdom with all the Advantages of the first-comer, has taken Possession, and may perhaps be too strong for Ejectment. But, upon Examination, its Title will be found as false and counterfeit as any of the former.

For first, as to the *Low-Countries*, *Both as to the Low-Countries.* the *English* Merchants at *Bruges* and other Towns in *Flanders*, do not pretend, in their Representation, to any such *Custom or Practice* in their Favour; but only desire that Her Majesty, out of Her great Care and gracious Concern for the Benefit of Her Subjects, would be pleased to direct by a Treaty of Commerce, or some other Way, that *their Trade* may be put upon an equal Foot in all the *Spanish Netherlands*, and in the *New Conquests or Barrier*, with the Subjects of *Holland*.

And as to the rest of the *Spanish Dominions*, *And as to the rest of the Spanish Dominions.* I challenge any Merchant that has ever liv'd or traded in *Spain*, to shew any known and allowed *Practice, Custom or Usage*, by which Her Majesty's

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Majesty's Subjects have been more favoured in their Commerce to those Parts, than those of the *States*. To prove the contrary, I shall take the Liberty to insert a Letter on this Subject, communicated to me by a Friend, and written by Sir *William Hodges*; who by his long Residence in that Country, and by his great Experience in Commerce, has gained such universal Esteem and Reputation, for understanding perfectly well the *Spanish* Trade; and is known to be a Gentleman of such Honour and Integrity; that I make no doubt but what he says, relating to an Affair he is so much Master of, will carry with it an indisputable Authority, and have Weight enough clearly to decide this Question.

*A Letter from
Sir William
Hodges on this
Subject.*

Copy of a LETTER from Sir WILLIAM HODGES, to ----, dated, *Winchester-street, March 5, 1711-12.*

SIR,

NOT being at home when you did me the Favour to come to my House, nor well enough at present to wait upon you at your Lodgings, I write these Lines to acquaint you, that all the Time I lived in Spain, I never knew or heard of any Privilege, great or little, that the English had more than the Dutch; or of any Advantages granted by the Crown of Spain to the English, Dutch, or French, but that the Ambassadors of the others never left soliciting till they had got the same: And, if I don't mistake, every one
of

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of the above-mentioned Nations have an Article in their Treaties of Peace and Commerce, that whatever Privilege and Advantage one Nation hath, or at any Time should be granted to it, the same should be granted to the others.

And as I believe it will appear, by comparing the Treaties of Peace and Commerce which England and Holland have ever made with the Crown of Spain, that the Privileges were always the same to both Nations; so I never heard, nor do I think it can be made out by any known Practice, Custom, or Usage in our Trade to any Part of Spain, that We were allowed greater Advantages than were given to the Dutch.

As to the Customs paid in Spain, especially in Cadiz, Port St. Mary's, Lucar and Seville; the Dutch and French, and indeed all Nations have the Advantage of Us; as I think I have demonstrated in the additional Articles, and other Papers humbly proposed to be insisted on, whenever Her Majesty shall think fit to treat with the Crown of Spain. Not but that whenever the English import into Spain the Goods and Merchandises of Holland or France, they pay no more than if imported by the Dutch and French; and when these import any of the English Goods or Merchandises, they pay the same as if imported by the English.

As to what you desire to know relating to the Judge-Conservator, I must acquaint you, that the English and Dutch Nations have an Equal Privilege in any of their Factories, that will be at the Charge of a Salary to one that will engage to appear in Defence of their Articles of Peace and Privileges,
against

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against any Governor or other Minister of the King's, who may pretend to violate the same. But in Cadiz, the English never had a Judge-Conservator but once in all my Time, and the Dutch had the very same Person for theirs; but the Merchants of both Nations soon dismissed him, because the Governors of the Place were always greater Men than any that could be chosen for a Judge-Conservator: For which Reason, the English and Dutch residing there, rather chose to put themselves under the Protection of the Governor, giving him the same Gratuity or more, than to the Judge-Conservator. If there be any thing wherein I may be serviceable, pray command,

S I R,

Your most Humble Servant,

WILLIAM HODGES.

P. S. *The English and Dutch which resided in Seville, had always a Judge of the Audiencia or Chancery for their Conservator, and usually the same Person for both Nations. In Malaga they had usually one of the Judges of the Chancery of Granada for their Judge-Conservator, and deputed some Person of Note and Authority to act for him in ordinary Cases.*

Can any Evidence be stronger or fuller than this for proving that the *Dutch* had in every Respect as great Advantages as the *English*, as well by *Custom and Practice*, as by their Treaties? Nay, does it not appear, that the *English* are so far
from

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from having been favoured more than the *Hollanders*, or any other Nation whatsoever, that all other Nations had in some Particulars rather the Advantage of them? And consequently, that this 15th *Article*, by which the *States* themselves are obliged to join in taking Care that the Subjects of *Great Britain* shall be treated in all the *Spanish* Dominions *equally* with their own, and as favourably as the People the most favoured; lays a Foundation for our obtaining *better* Terms of Commerce to *Spain*, than we ever yet have fully enjoyed? From what has been said, it must therefore be acknowledged, that the *Dutch*, at the breaking out of the present War, not only had by Vertue of their *Treaties* a Right to be treated as favourably as *Great Britain*, or the Nations the most favoured; but did also *in Fact* enjoy that Right, and traded to the *Spanish* Dominions upon that Foot; and that the *English* had not either by their *Treaties*, or by any *Usage and Custom*, greater Privileges and Immunities of Trade than the *Dutch*.

3. But because it is still objected, that the Crown of *England* never submitted to this Equality, till by the 15th Article of the Barrier-Treaty it was made a Party to those Clauses in the Treaty of *Munster*, which are most beneficial to the *Dutch*; I shall shew in the *third* Place, That the Crown of *England* not only long ago submitted to the advantageous Terms there stipulated, but actually

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tually *first procured* them for the *States*, and by a particular Treaty became *Guarantee* for their Performance; and that her Majesty is laid under no Obligation by this Article, but what she was *previously* engaged to by the Treaty of the *Grand Alliance*.

The Treaty of the twelve Years Truce (concluded at *Antwerp*) was the first, as has been observed above, that did or could give the *States* the same Privileges and Immunities of Trade to the *Spanish* Dominions, as were granted to the Subjects of *Great Britain*, or of any other Friend or Ally of the Crown of *Spain* that should be the most favoured. From this Treaty (as I have already shewn) all the beneficial Clauses relating to the Trade of the *Dutch*, were derived into the Treaty of *Munster*; and particularly the *Equality* of Trade between *England* and *Holland*, was there stipulated in the very Words of the 7th Article of the *Treaty of Truce*. But the Project of the *Treaty of Truce*, and every individual Article in it, was drawn up, not by the *States* themselves, but by *Sir Richard Spencer* and *Sir Ralph Winwood* on the Part of *King James the First*, in Conjunction with *Messieurs Jeannin* and *Ruffy*, Ambassadors of *Henry the Fourth of France*, pursuant to their Instructions; and the same was communicated by them to their respective Masters for their

That the Crown of England has been so far from not submitting to the Advantages granted the Dutch in the above-mentioned Articles of the Treaty Munster; that it actually first procured them for the States, and by a particular express Treaty became Guarantee for their Performance.

Approbation

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Approbation, before it was reported to the *States* in order to be signed; the said Ambassadors of *England* and *France* having managed the whole Negotiation, without the Intervention of any Minister or Deputy on the Part of the *States*, till all the Articles of the Treaty were settled and adjusted; and with the greatest Difficulty and most pressing Sollicitations, they induced, or rather forced the Crown of *Spain* to grant the *States* the advantageous Terms stipulated throughout that Treaty: More especially the beneficial Articles relating to Trade, as they met with greater Opposition from the Crown of *Spain* than any others; so they were more particularly laboured by the Ambassadors of *England* and *France*, and couched in the strongest Terms possible for the Security of the *States*: And though the Treaty was several Times in Danger of being broken off, yet the Mediators could never be brought to depart from the least Demand they had made in Favour of the *Dutch* Commerce.

After * the Treaty was first concluded by the Ambassadors, and † again after it was signed by the *States*, the Kings of *England* and *France* ordered their Ambassadors to notify to the *States* their full Approbation of it: And not content with that, they both entered into a particular Treaty of Guaranty (signed June 17th, 1609) for the Maintenance of it; with an express Declaration, that if the *States* were molested in their Trade to the *Indies*, (which Trade they could not
get

* See *Jeannin*
Tom. 2. p. 398.

† See *ibid.*
p. 492.

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expressly mentioned,) the Treaty should be looked upon to be as truly broken, and the same Succour sent the *States*, as if it were violated in all the other Articles of it. For the Truth of all which, I refer the Reader to *Jeannin's Negotiations*, Vol. II. in 12mo. 1659; and particularly to the *Summary Report* of the Negotiation made by the Ministers of *England* and *France* in the Assembly of the *States-General*, March 18, 1609; soon after the Treaty was concluded by the Ambassadors, and prepared for the Ratification of the *States*: Which *Report*, is to be found; Tom. 2. p. 391; and shews what extraordinary Care and Caution the Ambassadors used, that the *States* might enjoy the Privileges of Commerce to *Spain* and the *Indies*, in as full Extent as the *English*, *French*, or any other Nation did or could possibly enjoy them. And though this Treaty was only to continue for twelve Years, yet that Limitation was purely owing to the *Spaniards*; the said Ambassadors being directed by their respective Masters to use all possible Endeavours for improving it into an *absolute and perpetual Peace* upon the same Terms. Tom. 1. p. 827. & alibi.

So far is it therefore from being true, that the Crown of *England* never submitted to the Advantages stipulated for the *States* in the Treaty of *Münster*; that the same Advantages were, as has been shewn, actually first procured by the Assistance, and afterwards confirmed by the Guaranty of *England*; and that, not at a Time when our Affairs were in the utmost Confusion, (which is

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objected against the Treaty of *Munster*, as being made in the Year 1648;) but at a Time when the fresh Reputation of Queen *Elizabeth's* long and glorious Reign had put her Successor in a Situation to reject any Treaty that should have been thought inconsistent with his own Honour and the Interest of his Subjects.

That her Majesty is laid under no Engagement by this 15th Article of the Barrier-Treaty, but what she was previously obliged by the Grand Alliance.

As appears by the 8th Article of That Alliance.

I shall now shew in the *last* Place, that her Majesty is laid under no Engagement by this 15th *Article* of the *Barrier-Treaty*, but what she was *previously* obliged to by the *Grand Alliance*. For Proof of this, I shall transcribe the 8th *Article* of the *Grand Alliance* (as far as it relates to Trade) which is as follows:

“ It shall not be permitted to
 “ any of the Parties when the War
 “ is once begun, to treat of Peace
 “ with the Enemy,
 “ unless Liberty be granted unto the Subjects of
 “ the King of *Great Britain* and the *States-Ge-*
 “ *neral*, to exercise and enjoy all the same Pri-
 “ vileges, Rights, Immunities and Franchises of
 “ Commerce by Sea and Land, in *Spain*, the
 “ *Mediterranean*, and all the Lands and Places
 “ which the King of *Spain* last deceased did
 “ possess at the Time of his Death, as well in
 “ *Europe* as elsewhere, which they used or enjoy-
 “ ed, or which the Subjects of both or either of
 “ them, by any *Right acquired by Treaties*, Cus-
 “ toms or any other way whatsoever, might have
 used

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“ used and enjoyed before the Death of the
“ late King of *Spain*.” It appears therefore;
that the House of *Austria*, the *Queen*, and the
States, when they went into the War, tied them-
selves up from making Peace, till *England* and
Holland should obtain the same Privileges of Trade
to all the *Spanish* Dominions, as both or either
of them had a Right to, whether by *Treaties*,
Agreements, *Customs*, or any other way. Now
what the Privileges are, which each Nation had
at that Time a Right to by Vertue of its *Trea-*
ties with the Crown of *Spain*, has been examined
above, where it was proved *that they had both a*
Right of being treated equally, and one as well as the
other as favourably as the Nations the most favoured.
Her Majesty therefore had not only submitted to
the advantageous Terms of the Treaty of *Mun-*
ster, before they were revived by the present
Treaty; but had promised not to lay down her
Arms till the Trade of the *Dutch* should be put
upon such a Foot as was there stipulated, that is,
upon as favourable a Foot as that of her own
Subjects. And if *Great Britain* had Reason to ex-
pect, that Care should have been taken in the
former Negotiations of Peace, to secure to her
some Advantages in Relation to the *Spanish* Trade,
superior to, and exclusive of, the *Dutch*; the Blame
cannot with Justice be laid upon the *Barrier-*
Treaty, but must fall on that WISE AND EX-
CELLENT TREATY OF THE GRAND
ALLIANCE.

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The Conclusion.

Thus I have gone through the principal Points necessary to the forming a right Judgment of the *Barrier-Treaty*, in such a Manner as to obviate all those Objections against it, upon which any Stress seems to have been laid: And because such uncommon Industry has been used, to draw the Nation into a Belief that their *Trade* is not only neglected but sacrificed in this Treaty, I have endeavoured more particularly to shew, that *That*, as well as their other most valuable Interests, are secured by it in the most effectual Manner.

The Vindication of the Minister that negotiated this Treaty, and the Lords of the Council who advised the Ratification of it, is no Part of my Design in publishing these Sheets. I am very sensible, that considering the present Temper of the Nation, nothing said in their Justification can have much Effect: And the Miseries that must inevitably be entailed on Posterity by setting this Treaty aside, will make their Memories more honoured in future Ages than the most ambitious amongst them can possibly wish or desire. The Motives therefore which induced me to write, were quite of another Nature. Having carefully perused the *Barrier-Treaty* soon after it was printed and published, I was fully convinced that it was the best Scheme that had yet been contrived for enabling *Great Britain* to hold the Balance of *Europe*, and for securing to her, not the Name and Shadow, but the solid Blessings of a safe and lasting Peace; being entirely of Opinion with our
An-

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Ancestors, who have always looked upon the *Low-Countries* as the *Out-works of Britain*, and that our first and greatest foreign Interest was to save those Provinces from falling into the Hands of *France*; and being likewise fully convinced from Reason and Experience, that the chief Defect in all former Schemes for protecting and securing the *Netherlands*, lay in not providing a constant standing Force ready to oppose any sudden Invasion: Which Defect is remedied in this Treaty, and the Defence of them put into the only Hands which we in Reason ought to trust. This Persuasion, and these Motives, prevailed with me to endeavour (as is natural in the like Cases) to vindicate my own Opinion, in defending that of our Ancestors; and to restore, if possible, the ancient and approved Sense of the Nation in a Matter so nearly related to its Safety, and which is now become more our Interest than ever, by the close Connection the Security of our *Succeſſion* has with the Preservation of those Countries. For I have shewn, that foreign Alliances are absolutely necessary to its Security, and particularly an Alliance with the States. But no Use can be expected from an Alliance with them, if they are not put in Possession of such a Barrier, as may enable them to appear in Defence of the *Succeſſion*, without exposing themselves to such Danger from *France*, as would threaten nothing less than the Ruin of their State. As nothing can endanger the *Succeſſion*, but *France's* espousing the Cause of the Pretender; so nothing can tie up the Hands of *France* from attempting

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this, but the Danger such an Attempt would draw along with it, and the Fear of an Impression from the Side of the *Netherlands*. But such an Impression cannot be made there, without the *States* be secured by such a *Barrier*, as may make it possible for them to break with *France*, without the utmost Danger to themselves. Nor is it to be imagined, that the *States* can be brought to break with *France*, while there is so great an Inequality between her Barrier against the *Netherlands*, and that of the *Netherlands*, against her, as there will be, if Things are left in *Flanders* upon the Foot of the *French* Proposals. The *States* in such a Case will not dare to do any thing that may expose them to the Resentment of *France*; and when *France* is once secure of that Point, What is there that she will not attempt to disturb our present Settlement, which stands so much in the Way of her Designs against the Protestant Religion, and the Liberties of *Europe*? 'Tis therefore the Interest of *England* to maintain the *States* in their Right to a strong and sufficient Barrier on a double Account; both as we are concerned in common with them, to prevent *France* from extending its Conquests in the *Netherlands*, which is the greatest *Foreign Interest* we can have; and as the Preservation of the *Netherlands* is, in its Consequences, the best Security to the *Protestant Succession*, which is our nearest *Home-Concern*, and that on which depends the very Being of our Religion and Liberty.

France

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France must therefore without Doubt look upon the Advances we have made towards setting this Treaty aside, with more real Pleasure and Satisfaction, than all the Successes she hath been crowned with through the Course of this most memorable Campaign. She cannot but be truly sensible, that this Treaty had laid a lasting Foundation for the strictest Friendship between *Britain* and *Holland*; a Friendship, which she has found so fatal to her Ambitious Designs during the present War, that the Effects of it will not easily be forgotten nor forgiven: Neither could any Thing strike such a Terror into her, as the Prospect of meeting the same formidable Enemies, and the same formidable Arms, united in the Defence of the *Netherlands*, as often as she should think fit to invade them. She knew that a standing Body of fifty or sixty thousand Men in those Provinces, all of them regular and well disciplined Forces, under the Command of a Protestant State, and ready to be supported on occasion by the whole Stength of the two Maritime Powers, would certainly give a new Turn to the Affairs of *Europe*, and raise the Protestant Interest in general to such a Height, that it would have nothing to apprehend from its most inveterate Enemies. Neither would the ill Consequences of this Treaty with Respect to *France*, in all Probability have been confined to the *Netherlands* only; but it is reasonable to suppose, that all the Pro-

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vinces and States bordering upon that Kingdom, when they had felt the good Effects of this Treaty, and found by Experience, upon how much easier Terms Peace was to be preserved, than to be recovered when lost, would have been forward to have formed some Association of this Nature, under the Protection of the two Maritime Powers. And by this Means, a Barrier might have been secured, not only for the *Netherlands*, but thence extended to the *Alps*, and a stronger Alliance have been substituted in the room of the old *Burgundian* League, which for so many Years together exhausted the Strength and checked the Growth of *France*; the Effect of which, would have been the settling the Tranquility of this Part of *Europe* on such a solid Foundation, as it should never have been in the Power of any one Prince to undermine by Treachery, or to disturb by open Violence.

*A Copy of
the Treaty and
Counter-Pro-
ject, with some
Observations
upon them.*

Having fully considered the Nature and Importance of this Treaty, and answered the most material Objections that have been brought against it; I shall now conclude with a *Translation of the Treaty and Counter-Project*, something more correct than those formerly printed: And where any Variation occurs that may seem of Moment, I shall make some Observations upon it.

THE

The BARRIER-TREATY between Her Majesty and the States-General.

Treaty.

HER Majesty, the Queen of Great Britain, and the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces, having considered how much it concerns the Quiet and Security of their Kingdoms and States, and the publick Tranquility, to maintain and to secure on one Side the Succession to the Crown of Great Britain, in such manner as it is now established by the Laws of the Kingdom; and on the other Side, that the said States-General of the United Provinces should have a strong and sufficient

Counter-Project.

HER Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, and the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces, having considered how much it concerns the Quiet and Security of their Kingdoms and States, and the publick Tranquility, to maintain and to secure on one Side the Succession to the Crown of Great Britain, in such Manner as it is now established by the Laws of the Kingdom; and on the other Side, that the said States-General of the United Provinces should have a strong and sufficient

Treaty.

ficient Barrier (a) against France and others who would surprize or attack them; And Her Majesty and the said States-General apprehending, with just reason, the Troubles and Mischiefs which might happen, which respect to this Succession, if at any Time there should be any Person or any Power who should call it in Question; and if the Countries and States of the said Lords the States-General, were not secured by such a Barrier: (b) For these said Reasons, Her said Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, tho' in the Vigour of Her Age, and enjoying perfect Health, (which God preserve to Her many Years;) out of her usual Prudence and Piety, has thought fit to enter, with the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces, into a particular Alliance and Confederacy,

Counter-Project.

ficient Barrier (a) against France, in case she should surprize or attack them: And her Majesty and the said States-General apprehending, with just reason, the Troubles and Mischiefs which might happen, with respect to this Succession, if at any Time there should be any Person or any Power who should call it in Question; and if the Countries and States of the said Lords the States-General, were not secured by such a Barrier: [(b) And the abovesaid Queen of Great Britain, and the said Lords the States-General, duly reflecting upon the Advantage which France has always made use of, to sow Discord and foment Jealousy among the Allies, during the Negotiations of the preceding Treaties of Peace, for want of necessary and reasonable

Treaty.

federacy; the principal End and only Aim of which, shall be the publick Quiet and Tranquility; and to prevent, by Measures taken in Time, all the Events which might one day excite new Wars. With this View it is, that Her British Majesty has given Her full Power, for agreeing upon certain Articles of a Treaty additional to the Treaties and Alliances that She already has with the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces, to Her Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary, Charles Viscount Townshend, Baron of Lyn-Regis, Privy-Counsellor of Her British Majesty, Captain of Her said Majesty's Yeomen of the Guard, and Her Lieutenant in the County of Norfolk: And the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces, to the Sieurs John de

Counter-Project.

fonable Preliminaries being well established among the Allies.] For these said Reasons, Her said Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, tho' in the Vigour of Her Age, and enjoying perfect Health, (which God preserve to Her many Years;) out of Her usual Prudence and Piety, has thought fit to enter, with the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces, into a particular Alliance and Confederacy; the principal End and only Aim of which, shall be the publick Quiet and Tranquility; and to prevent, by Measures taken in Time, all the Events which might one Day excite new Wars. With this View it is, that Her British Majesty has given Her full Power, for agreeing upon certain Articles of a Treaty additional to the Treaties and Alliances that She already

Treaty.

de Welderen, Lord of Valbrugh, Great Bayliff of the Lower Betuwe, of the Body of the Nobility of the Province of Guelder; Frederick Baron of Reede, Lord of Lier, St. Anthony and Ter Lee, of the Order of the Nobility of the Province of Holland and West-Frizeland; Anthony Heinius, Counsellor-Pensionary of the Province of Holland and West-Frizeland, Keeper of the Great Seal, and Superintendent of the Fiefs of the same Province; Cornelius Van Gheet, Lord of Spanbroke, Bulokestein, &c. Gideon Hoeuft, Canon of the Church of St. Peter at Utrecht, and Counsellor elect in the States of the Province of Utrecht; Hessel van Sminia, Secretary of the Chamber of Accounts of the Province of Frizeland; Ernest Ittersum, Lord of Osterhof, of the Body

Counter-Project.

ready has with the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces, to-----, And the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces, to-----.

Treaty.

Counter-Project.

Body of the Nobility of the Province of Overysfel ; and Wicher Wichers, Senator of the City of Groninguen ; all Deputies to the Assembly of the said Lords the States-General on the part, respectively, of the Provinces of Guelder, Holland and West-Frizeland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Frizeland, Overysfel, and of Groninguen and Ommelands ; who, by Vertue of their full Powers, have agreed upon the following Articles.

who, by Vertue of their full Powers, have agreed upon the following Articles.

(a) *Against France and others.*] These Words, [*and others,*] ought not, it is said, to have been added in the Treaty ; the Design of the Treaty being to secure the Barrier of the States against France only. That the *First and chief* Design of a Treaty for the Barrier, was to secure it against France, I readily allow ; because the *First and Chief Danger* is from thence: But if it is the Interest of England that it should be secured at all, it is certainly the Interest of England that it should be secured against others as well as France. If the Barrier be lost for want of such Security, whoever the Invaders be, England as well as Holland loses the Protection it gives them against France ; and therefore it is our Interest as well as theirs, that it should be secured on all sides, and exposed to the least Danger possible. And since the
States

States oblige themselves, to assist in maintaining the *Protestant Succession*, not only against *France*, but against *all others* that shall attempt to disturb it ; there is the same Reason Her Majesty should give as full a Guaranty to the *States*, for securing their Barrier against *all* that shall attack it. The Interest of Both is reciprocal, and therefore the Engagements ought to be so too. Nor can any Inconvenience arise, from making the Guaranty *General* against *all* Invaders ; because the Obligations of mutual Assistance can't by This Treaty take place on any other Occasion, but then only, when Her Majesty or the *States* shall be attacked *on Account of the Succession or Barrier*. And therefore, if the Barrier be not attacked, tho' the *States* be invaded in any other Part, Her Majesty is not hereby engaged. It will be pretended perhaps, that there is no Reason to apprehend any Danger from any Power besides *France* : But first, That is not true ; for *France* by her Intrigues has formerly engaged some Princes of the Empire in a War against the *Dutch*, and may do so again. But if it were true that nothing was to be apprehended from any other Power than *France*, it is necessary the Treaty should be made general, if it were only to guard against the mean and pitiful Evasions That Crown is always ready to make use of to carry on her Ambitious Designs. Of which it will be sufficient to give one Memorable Instance, which is to the present Purpose. In the Year 1701, when the *French* Forces had seized the whole *Spanish Low-Countries*, and had by Lines and Forts entirely cooped up the *States* on that Side ; not content with this, to cut off the *States* from all Communication with the Empire, *France* sent, in Concert with the Elector of *Cologne* a great Body of Troops into most of the strong Towns belonging to that Elector, and yet at the same time declared they would observe the Peace and the Treaty of *Ryswick* ; and therefore these Troops were called *Auxilliary Troops of the Circle of Burgundy*. Where now is the Difference, whether the King of *France* attack
the

the *Dutch* in his own Name, or whether his Troops do it under the Name of any body else? The Troops are the same, and the Danger all one. If this Treaty therefore were not made *general* against *all* Invaders, such an Evazion might defeat the Intention of it even against *France* it self. Thus much for the Reason of this Addition; And that the Reader may be satisfied it is agreeable to the *Counter-Project* it self, he need only have Recourse to the 16th Article, by which the Defence of the Succession and the Barrier, is left *general* and unlimited.

(b) The Reason why these Words [*And the abovesaid Queen, &c. duly reflecting upon the Advantage which France has always made use of, &c. for want of necessary and reasonable Preliminaries being well established among the Allies,*] were left out in the Treaty; will appear by observing, that the *Counter-Project* was formed before the Preliminary Treaty in 1709, whereas this of the Barrier was not made till after it; and therefore this Clause was properly left out, the Intention of it having been fully answered and complied with in the Preliminary Treaty, sign'd by the Queen, the Emperor and the States,

Treaty.

Article I.

THE Treaties of Peace, Friendship, Alliance and Confederacy, between Her *British* Majesty and the *States General* of the *United Provinces*, shall be approved and confirmed
by

Counter-Project.

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THE Treaties of Peace, Friendship, Alliance and Confederacy, between Her *British* Majesty and the *States-General* of the *United Provinces*, shall be approved and confirmed
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Treaty.

by the present Treaty,
and shall remain in their
former Force and Vigour,
as if they were inserted
in it Word for Word.

II.

The Succession to the
Crown of *England* having
been Settled by an Act of
Parliament passed the
Twelfth Year of the
Reign of His late Maje-
sty King *William* the
Third; the Title of which
is, *An Act for the further
Limitation of the Crown,
and better Securing the
Rights and Liberties of the
Subject*: And lately, in
the Sixth Year of the
Reign of Her present Ma-
jesty, this Succession ha-
ving been again Establish-
ed and Confirmed by a-
nother Act made for the
*greater Security of Her
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Counter-Project.

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ed and Confirmed by a-
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vern-

Treaty.

vernment, and the Succession to the Crown of Great-Britain, &c. in the Line of the most Serene House of Hanover, and in the Person of the Princess Sophia, and of Her Heirs, Successors and Descendants, Male and Female, already Born or to be Born: And though no Power has any Right to Oppose the Laws, made upon this Subject by the Crown and Parliament of Great Britain; if it should happen nevertheless, that under any Pretence, or by any Cause whatever, any Person, or any Power or State should pretend to dispute the Establishment which the Parliament has made of the said Succession in the most Serene House of Hanover, to Oppose the said Succession, to aid or favour those who shall Oppose

Counter-Project.

vernment; and the Succession to the Crown of Great-Britain, &c. in the Line of the most Serene House of Hanover, and in the Person of the Princess Sophia, and of Her Heirs, Successors and Descendants, Male and Female, already Born or to be Born: And though no Power has any Right to Oppose the Laws, made upon this Subject by the Crown and Parliament of Great Britain, if it should happen nevertheless, that under any Pretence, or by any Cause whatever, any Person, or any Power or State should pretend to dispute the Establishment which the Parliament has made of the said Succession in the most Serene House of Hanover, to Oppose the said Succession, to aid or favour those who shall Oppose

Treaty.

pose it, whether directly or indirectly, by open War, or by fomenting Seditions and Conspiracies against Her or Him to whom the Crown of *Great Britain* shall descend according to the Acts aforesaid; The *States General* of the *United Provinces* engage and promise to Assist and Maintain, in the said Succession, Her or Him to whom it shall belong by virtue of the said Acts of Parliament, to aid them in taking Possession, if they be not then in Possession, and to Oppose those who would disturb them in the taking such Possession, or in the actual Possession, of the said Succession.

III.

Her said Majesty and the *States-General*, in Consequence

Counter-Project.

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III.

Her said Majesty and the *States-General*, in Consequence

Treaty.

sequence of the Fifth Article of the Alliance concluded between the Emperor, the late King of *Great-Britain*, and the Lords the *States-General*, the 7th of *September*, 1701. shall employ all their Force to recover the rest of the *Spanish Low-Countries*.

IV.

And further, they shall endeavour to Conquer as many other Towns and Forts as they can, in order to their being a Barrier and Security to the said Lords the *States*.

V.

And whereas, according to the Ninth Article of the said Alliance, it is to be agreed, amongst other Matters, how and in

Counter-Project.

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Treaty.

in what manner the *States* shall be secured by means of this Barrier; the *Queen of Great-Britain* shall use *Her Endeavours to procure* that in the Treaty of Peace it may be agreed, that all the *Spanish Low-Countries*, and what else shall be found necessary, whether of Conquered or Unconquered Places, shall serve as a Barrier to the *States*.

VI.

That to this end their High Mightinesses shall be allowed to put and keep Garrison, *to change augment and diminish it as they shall judge proper*, in the Places following. Namely, (f) *Newport*, [(a) *Furnes*, with] *Fort Knock*, [*Ipres*,] *Menin*, the [Town and] Cittadel of *Lisle*, *Tournay* [and its Citadel,

Counter-Project.

in what manner the *States* shall be secured by means of this Barrier; the *Queen of Great-Britain* shall assist in procuring, that in the Treaty of Peace it may be agreed, that all the *Spanish Low-Countries*, and what else shall be found necessary, whether of Conquered or Unconquered Places, shall serve as a Barrier to the *States*.

VI.

That to this end their High Mightinesses shall be allowed to put and keep Garrison in the Places following: Namely, *Newport*, *Knocke*, *Menin*, the Citadel of *Lisle*, *Tournay*, *Condé*, *Valenciennes*, *Namur* and its Citadel; *Liere*, *Halle* to be Fortified, the Fort of *Perle*, *Damme*, the Castle of *Gand*.

Citadel,] *Condé, Valenciennes*, [(b) and the Places which shall from henceforward be Conquered from France :] [*Maubeuge*,] [(c) *Charleroy*,) *Namur* and its Citadel, *Liere, Halle* to be Fortified, the Forts *Perle*, [(e) *Philippe*,] *Damme*, the Castle of *Gand*, [(d) *Dendermond* :] [(e) the Fort of *St. Dbonas*, being joined to the Fortifications of *Ecluse*, and being entirely incorporated with it, shall remain and be yielded in Property to the States :] [(g) The Fort of *Rodenbuysen*, on this side *Gand*, shall be razed.]

(a) *Furnes, Ypres*, Town of *Lisle*, Citadel of *Tournay, Maubeuge*.] The Addition of these Places, is conformable to Her Majesty's Instructions to Her Ambassadors in the following Words : “ And for the greater Extent and “ Strength of the intended Barrier, you are likewise hereby directed to insist, that the Towns and Forts of *Furnes, Knoque, Ypres, Menin, Lisle, Tournay, Condé, Valenciennes*, and *Mauberge*, be at a Treaty of Peace yielded up, and “ delivered by *France* to *Charles* the Third King of *Spain*, to “ be garrison'd in such manner, as shall be agreed on by the “ Treaty concerning the said Barrier, to be forthwith made “ and concluded between Us and the States-General.]

(b) *And the Places which shall hereafter be conquered from France.*] These Words are no more than a Repetition of the 4th Article of the *Counter-Project*.

(c) *Charleroy.*] I have already shown that Her Majesty and the Emperor did by the 23d Article of the Preliminary Treaty, agree that this Place among others should be restored by *France* to make a Part of the *Dutch Barrier*: And it being by its Situation of the greatest Importance for covering the Country between *Maubeuge* and *Namur*, where there is no other Place of Strength for 40 Miles together, it could not in Justice or Prudence have been omitted in the *Barrier-Treaty*.

(d) *Dendermonde.*] The Necessity of making this Town a Part of the Barrier, in order to preserve a safe and free *Communication* between the *States* and their Garrisons, has already been sufficiently demonstrated under my *Third Head*: And it can't be pretended this Place can any way prejudice or influence our Trade; since, if any Danger of that kind were to be apprehended, (which I have fully shewn under my 5th Head there is not,) it must arise from the Castle of *Gand*, as lying in the direct Passage of our Trade. But the Reader will observe that the Castle of *Gand* is made a Part of the Barrier by the *Counter-Project*.

(e) *Fort Philippe and Fort St. Dhonas.*] The Addition of these two Forts can be of no Importance. For with Relation to the first, the *States* have ever since the Treaty of *Munster* had the Command of the Entrance of the *Scheld*, by the Possession of Fort *Lillo*, which lies nearer the Mouth of that River than Fort *Philippe*. Neither can it be pretended that the *States*, by means of their Garrison in Fort *Philippe*, may defraud King *Charles* of his Customs, (which has been objected by the Libellers; since he not only has a Custom-House higher up the River between Fort *Philippe* and *Antwerp*. but is at Liberty, if That is not thought sufficient, to erect as many more as he pleases, notwithstanding this Treaty. As for Fort *St. Dhonas*, it stands so near *l'Ecluse*, (which Town belongs to the *States*,) that it really makes a Part of
its

its Out-works, and was therefore incorporated with it long before this Treaty was made.

(f) *Newport*] I have already had Occasion to shew the Necessity of making *Gand* and *Dendermonde* a Part of the Barrier : And tho' *Newport* is specified in the *Counter-Project*, yet because it has been pretended that this Place, as well as the other Two, is no necessary Part of a Barrier against *France*, but at the same time highly prejudicial to the *British* Trade ; I shall here answer both those Objections. As for the *First*, it is impossible for any one that has the least Notion of a Barrier against *France*, and of the Situation of the *Low-Countries*, to think that it is not as necessary for the *Dutch* to have a Garison in *Newport*, as in any other Frontier-Town whatever ; or that the other Places specified in the Treaty, can be an effectual Security without *Newport*. For What is meant by putting the Barrier into the Hands of the *Dutch*, but that they should Garison and defend the Chain of Towns which divide the *Spanish Netherlands* from *France*, that no Pass or Inlet may be left open for the *French* to make a sudden Invasion as they have often done ? And let any one cast his Eye upon the Map, and see whether any Town is a more essential Part of this Chain, on the Frontier, than *Newport* ; whether the Barrier is in any Part so weak, as in this ; and whether it would be safe to leave such an Extent of Country, as is between the Sea and *Ypres*, open and exposed. If *Newport* is left without a Garison, a *French* Army may march directly to *Bruges* and *Gand*, cut the *Dutch* off from their Communication with their Garisons, and bring them into the utmost Danger, without the rest of the Barrier's being of any Use to them. An Irruption made by *France* on that side, it is evident would be of more dangerous Consequence both to the *Spanish Netherlands* and the *United-Provinces*, than in any other Part of the Barrier ; and therefore *Newport* is so far from being in 'no Sense a Part of the Barrier, that scarce any other Frontier-place is of so much Importance to it. The *Second* Objection is, That the *States* having a Garison in *Newport*, may make the *British* Trade precarious. Now not to mention the Arguments brought under

my 5th Head, which shew that it is morally impossible that the *Dutch* should ever by virtue of their Barrier attempt any thing in Prejudice of our Trade ; it is sufficient to observe with respect to *Newport*, that its Situation and the Badness of its Harbour are such, that the *English* have never carried on any considerable Trade thither, but have always frequented *Ostend* ; which, besides the Advantage of a more commodious Harbour, lies more convenient for forwarding our Goods to *Brussels*. Now this Town is left intirely in the Hands of the King of *Spain* ; and it is to be observed, that the *British* Effects having once paid the Royal Duties or Customs there, they are free for all the other Towns of the *Spanish Netherlands*. And whereas, by the 9th Article of the Treaty, All Rights and Privileges, Civil and Ecclesiastical, are reserved to King *Charles* over all the *Spanish Netherlands* ; and, by the 15th, the *States* engage to assist in maintaining the Trade of both Nations upon an equal Foot ; it follows, that any Attempt made by the *States* to the Prejudice of the *British* Trade, would be in all Places alike an Encroachment upon the Sovereignty of the King of *Spain*, and an open and direct Violation of the Treaty ; and must therefore, as such, engage them in a Rupture with him and us : Which Opportunity *France* would not fail to improve to the seizing of the Barrier, and the Ruin of the *States*. As long therefore as *Holland* preserves the least Regard for its own Safety and Interest, we shall be more secure of not having the strong Towns of the *Netherlands* turn'd against us, by trusting them to their Hands, than we could be by putting them into the Possession of any other Power in *Europe* : Which is as great a Security, as the Nature of the thing will admit of, or as can indeed be desired.

(g) *The Fort of Rodenhuyfen on this side Gand, shall be razed*]. The Situation of this Fort, is such, that if the *States* were to have the Castle of *Gand*, (as was settled by the *Counter-Project*,) it was absolutely necessary this Fort should be demolished ; since it lies between *Gand*, which is to be put into the Hands of the *States*, and the *Sas van Gand* which is already in their Possession,

Possession, and commands that Canal along which all their Provisions, Warlike Stores, &c. must pass to *Gand*, so that it might be of the greatest Prejudice to the *States*, without being of any manner of Service to the King of *Spain*.

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VII.

VII.

The said Lords the *States-General* may also [(a) *in case of an apparent, Attack, or*] [(b) *War,*] put as many Troops as they shall think necessary in all the Towns, Places and Forts of the *Spanish Low-Countries*, where the Reason of War shall require it.

[(a) *In case of an apparant Attack.*] Whoever considers how little Ceremony *France* always used in invading her Neighbours, by the sudden Inundation of Powerful Armies; must think it full as needful for the Safety of the Barrier, to provide against the Case of an *Apparent Attack*, as that of an *open War*.

[(b) *War.*] [(b) *Open War with France.*] The Reason why this Treaty in general, and consequently this Article, ought not to be confin'd to *France only*, has been already given: And it is plain from the very Words of it, that the Privilege of putting their Troops into any Towns of the *Spanish Netherlands*, is restrained to the Case of an *Attack or War on the Low-Countries and the Barrier only*. For by this Article nothing can authorize or justify their putting Troops into any Place of the *Low-Countries*, but the *Reason of War in case of an Attack*. Should therefore the Bishop of *Munster*, for Example, or any other Neighbour, attack the Province of *Frise* or *Over-Iffel*;
it

The said Lords the *States-General* may put into the said Towns, Forts, and Places; and, *in case of* [(b) *Open*] *War with France*, into all the other Towns, Places, and Forts; whatever the Reasons of War shall require.

it is evident the *Dutch* could in such a case neither claim nor exert this Privilege, of putting their Troops into any Places of the *Low-Countries* ; because those Countries not being attacked, there could be no Pretence that *the Reason of War* required they should do it ; nor indeed would they have any Interest in such a case to do it. The Liberty therefore here given the *States*, is no more in Truth, than what they might in Reason and Justice have taken, even tho' there had been no such Stipulation made in this Treaty. For the Defence of the *Low-Countries* being put into their Hands, it would be ridiculous to imagine, that in case those Countries were attacked, the *States* ought not to make the best Disposition they could of their Troops for their Defence, and for preventing the Designs of the Enemy, by putting their Forces into all Places where *the Reason of War* should require it. Nor is there the least ground for that malicious Insinuation, that upon a Rupture between *Britain* and *Holland*, the Riches and Strength of the *Neiberlands* may be turned against us ; For we must first resolve to attack the *Low-Countries*, and consequently break with the House of *Austria*, before the *States* can make use of any Strength they have in those Parts against us ; And should That be the Case, we might depend upon being opposed by all the Power and Wealth of those Countries, ever tho' the *States* should have no Garrisons in them. But all the Objections of this kind, are already fully answered under my 5th Proposition, where I have largely shewn, *That their having a Barrier pursuant to this Treaty, will be far from exposing Us to any sort of Danger from Them.* Therefore I shall add nothing more on this Head, but the Declaration of the *States* in their Letter to Her Majesty of the 19th of February, 1712, in which they assure Her " That they have not the least " Thought of making Use of the Privilege stipulated in the " 7th Article, to put Troops into other Places, but only in " case of the last and most apparent Necessity", viz. of putting them into those Places. Now there can never be a Necessity of putting Troops into those Places, but only when the *Neiberlands* are attacked.

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VIII.

VIII.

They may likewise send into the Towns, Forts and Places, *where they shall have their Garisons*, without any Hindrance, and without paying any Duties; Provisions, Ammunitions, Arms and Artillery, Materials for the Fortifications, and all that shall be found *convenient and necessary* for the said Garisons and Fortifications.

They may likewise send into the *said* Towns, Forts, and Places *above-mentioned*, without any Hindrance, and without paying any Duties; Provisions, Ammunitions, Arms, and Artillery, Materials for the Fortifications, and all that shall be found necessary for the said Garisons and Fortifications.

IX.

IX.

The said Lords the *States-General* shall also have Liberty to Appoint in the Towns, Forts and Places of their Barrier, *mentioned in the foregoing Sixth Article*, where they shall have their Garisons, such Governors and Commandants, *Majors and other Officers*, as they shall think proper; who shall not be subject to any other

The said Lords the *States-General* may also put in the *said* Towns, Forts and Places of their Barrier, where they shall have their Garisons, such Governors and Commandants as they shall think fit; who shall not be subject to any other Orders, relating to the Security and Military Government of the said Places,

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ther Orders, whatsoever they may be, or from whomsoever they may come, relating to the Security and Military Government of the said Places, but to those of their High Mightinesses only and exclusively, yet without prejudice to the Rights and Liberties, as well Ecclesiastical as Political, of King Charles the Third.

ces, whatsoever they may be, or from whomsoever they may come, but only to those of their High Mightinesses, exclusive of all others, yet without Prejudice to the Rights and Liberties, as well Ecclesiastical as Political, (a) and to the Revenues of King Charles the Third, in Respect of the said Towns.

(a) *And to the Revenues.*] These Words are left out, to make the Treaty consistent with itself. For the *Revenues* of such Towns in the 6th Article, as were not in Possession of King Charles the II^d at his Death, are by the 11th Article of the *Counter-Project* assigned towards the Maintenance of the Barrier; and therefore it would have been absurd to have reserved King Charles's Right to the *whole Revenues* in this Article, when it is (*in part*) taken away by the 11th.

X.

X.

That, besides, the said Lords the *States* shall have Liberty to Fortifie the said Towns, Places and Forts which belong to them, and Repair the Fortifications of them, in such

That, besides, the said Lords the *States* shall have Liberty to Fortifie the said Towns, Places and Forts which belong to them, and Repair the Fortifications of them, in such

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such manner as they shall judge necessary ; and further to do whatever shall be useful for their Defence.

XI.

The Lords the *States-General* shall be left in Possession of all the Revenues of the Towns, Places, Castellanies, and their Dependencies, which they shall have for their Barrier from *France*, which were not in the Possession of the Crown of *Spain*, at the time of the Death of the late King *Charles* the Second ; [(a) and besides this, a Million of *Livres* shall be settled, for the Payment of One hundred thousand Crowns every three Months, out of the clearest Revenues of the Spanish Low - Countries , which were then in Possession of the said King ; to serve Both together for the Maintenance of the Garisons of
the

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such manner as they shall judge necessary ; and further to do whatever shall be useful for their Defence.

XI.

All the Revenues of the Chatellanies and Dependencies of the Towns and Places which the Lords the *States-General* shall have for their Barrier from *France*, and which were not in the Possession of the Crown of *Spain* at the Time of the Death of the Catholick King of *Spain*, *Charles* the Second ; shall be settled for a Fund to provide for the Fortifications, as also for the Magazines and other necessary Expences of the said Towns of the Barrier.

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the States, and] for providing the Fortifications, as also the Magazines, and other necessary Expences, in the Towns and Places above-mentioned.

[*(b) And that the said Revenues may be sufficient to support these Expences, Endeavours shall be used for enlarging the Dependencies and Castellanies aforesaid, as much as possible; and particularly for including in the Castellany of Ipres, that of Cassel, and the Forest of Niepe; and in the Castellany of Lille, the Government of Douay; Both having been so joined before the present War.*

(*a*) *And besides this, a Million of Livres, &c.]* This Addition is authorized by Her Majesty's private Instructions to Her Ambassadors. [“ Whereas it is expected that several
“ Towns now belonging to and in the Hands of *France*,
“ should be given up and yielded by the Treaty of Peace,
“ to be garison'd by the Forces of the *States-General* for the
“ Security of their Barrier; if therefore the Revenues of such
“ Towns, their Dependencies and Territories, so deliver'd
“ up and garison'd, be not found sufficient to answer the
“ necessary Expences to be made for that Service; in such
“ Case, you have Liberty to consent to the adding such
farther

“ farther Sum or Sums, as shall be thought requisite and reasonable for that Purpose, out of the Incomes and Revenues arising in general from the *Spanish Low-Countries*”.]

And how far short the *whole Revenues* assign'd the *States* will fall, of the Expence necessary for maintaining the Barrier ; has been already fully and clearly proved under my 5th Proposition.

(b) *And that the said Revenues, &c.*] This Addition tending only to the weakning of *France*, and to the reducing those Chatellenies to the Foot upon which they were before the present War, was highly reasonable in Consideration of the great Disproportion which I have shewn there is between the *Revenues* and the *Expence* of the Barrier

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XII.

That no Town, Fort, Place, or Country of the *Spanish Low-Countries*, shall be granted, transferred, or given, or descend to the Crown of *France*, or any one of the Line of *France*, by vertue of any Gift, Sale, Exchange, Marriage-Settlement, Inheritance, Succession by Will, or *ab intestato*, from any Title whatsoever ; nor, in any other manner whatever, be put into the Power or under the Authority of the most Christian King,

or

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XII.

That no Town, Fort, Place, or Country of the *Spanish Low-Countries*, shall be granted transferred, or given, or descend to the Crown of *France*, or any one of the Line of *France*, by vertue of any Gift, Sale, Exchange, Marriage-Settlement, Inheritance, Succession by Will, or *ab intestato*, from any Title whatsoever ; nor, in any other manner whatever, be put into the Power or under the Authority of the most Christian King,

or

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of France.

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of France.

XIII.

XIII.

And whereas the said Lords the *States-General*, in Consequence of the Ninth Article of the said Alliance, are to make a Convention or Treaty with King *Charles* the Third, for securing the *States* by means of the said Barrier, the Queen of *Great Britain* shall use Her good Offices, that all the foregoing Particulars, relating to the Barrier of the *States*, may be inserted in the aforesaid Treaty or Convention; and Her said Majesty shall continue Her good Offices, till the above-mentioned Convention, between the *States* and the said King *Charles* the Third, be concluded, agreeably to what is before-mentioned; and Her Majesty shall be Guarantee

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rantee of the said Treaty
or Convention.

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rantee of the said Treaty
or Convention.

XIV.

(a) *The whole, nevertheless, without Prejudice to such other Treaties and Conventions, as the Queen of Great Britain and their High - Mightinesses may think fit to make hereafter with the said King Charles the Third, in relation to the aforesaid Spanish Netherlands, or to the said Barrier.*

(a) *The Whole nevertheless without Prejudice, &c.] This Article was (I suppose) omitted as being perfectly insignificant. For it is not said, such Treaties as the Queen OR the States shall make, disjunctively; which would in effect have rendered the whole Treaty insignificant; but, the Queen AND the States. Now it is manifest that, without any such Article, Her Majesty and the States have the very same Power of making any future Treaties or Conventions upon this or any other Subject by common Consent, as they would have had if this Article had been inserted. Since therefore this Treaty could not in the Nature of it possibly prejudice any subsequent Treaty made by a Joynt Agreement, it would have been perfectly superfluous to have stipulated that it should not.*

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XIV.

And that the said Lords the *States* may have from this time, as much as possible, a Barrier in the *Spanish Low-Countries*; they shall be permitted to put their Garisons in the Towns already taken, and which shall hereafter be taken, before the Peace be made and put in execution. [(a) *And in the mean time the said King Charles the Third shall not be allowed to enter into Possession of the said Spanish Low-Countries, neither in whole nor in part; and during that time, the Queen shall be aiding to their High-Mightinesses to maintain them in the Enjoyment of the Revenues there, and to find the Million of Livres a Year, above-mentioned.*]

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XV.

And that the said Lords the *States* may have from this Time, as much as possible, a Barrier in the *Spanish Low-Countries*, they shall be permitted to put their Garisons into the *principal* Towns already taken, and which shall hereafter be taken before the Peace be made and put in Execution.

(a) *And in the mean time, &c.*] It has been observed already, that this Treaty leaves the *Netherlands* in the same State that it found them, *during the War*; since it would have

have been impracticable to have made any Alterations with respect to the Government of those Provinces before the Peace, without introducing the greatest Disorder and Confusion. The *States* therefore being put in Possession of the Towns conquered from *France*, and of the Revenues arising from them, by virtue of the Grand Alliance before ever this Treaty was made ; things are only left by this Clause upon the same Foot, till the Conclusion of the Peace. And that no one may think they have enriched themselves by these Revenues, it is well known that since the taking of *Menin* in 1706, they have received in all, from the New Conquests or Barrier, no more than one Million and $\frac{1}{2}$ of Livres, which hardly amounts to 25,000 Pounds Sterling *per Annum* ; a Sum so very unequal to the vast Expence the *States* (alone) have been at, for the Sieges of so many strong Towns, and for repairing the Fortifications of them when taken, that no one can imagine they have in these Five Years, by the Revenues of all the conquered Places, more than made themselves whole for the single Siege of *Lisle* ; since, when our Successes were to be lessened and vilified, it has been confessed that the Money spent on the Siege of one Town, would have built Three. And as to the Additional Sum of 400,000 Crowns to be raised Annually upon the *Low-Countries even during the War*, it is well known that the *States* cannot receive or expect any Benefit of it during the War ; the whole Revenues of the Country being appropriated to the Charges of the Civil Government, the Payment of the *Walloon* Regiments, the supplying the Imperial Troops with Bread and Forage, and to other Incident Charges of the War. But there is no Occasion to say any thing in Justification of this Clause ; since, were it never so practicable to raise the Million, the *States* declared to the Duke of *Marlborough* and the Lord Viscount *Townshend*, that they never intended to make use of this Concession for that Purpose, but only to induce King *Charles* the sooner to comply with the Convention desired of him.

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XV.

(a) And whereas their High - Mightinesses have Stipulated by the Treaty of *Munster*, in the 14th Article, That the River *Schelde*, as also the Canals of *Sas*, *Swyn*, and other Mouths there opening into the Sea, should be kept shut on the Side of the *States*;

And in the Fifteenth Article, That the Ships and Commodities going in and out of the Harbours of *Flanders*, shall be and remain charged with all such Imposts and other Duties, as are raised upon Commodities going and coming along the *Schelde*, and the other Canals above-mentioned:

The Queen of *Great Britain* promises and engages, That their High-Mightinesses shall never be disturbed in their Right and Possession in that respect

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spect, directly nor indirectly; but shall continue to enjoy them fully: As also that Commerce shall not in prejudice of the said Treaty, be made more easy by the Sea-Ports, than by the said River, Canals, and Mouths of the Sea on the side of the States of the *United Provinces*, directly nor indirectly.

And whereas by the 16th and 17th Articles of the same Treaty of *Munster*, his Majesty the King of *Spain* is obliged to treat the Subjects of their High-Mightinesses as favourably as the Subjects of *Great Britain* and the *Hans Towns*, who were then the People the most favourably treated; Her *British* Majesty and their High-Mightinesses promise likewise to take care, that the Subjects of *Great Britain* and of their High-Mightinesses, shall

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be treated in the *Spanish Low-Countries*, as well as in all *Spain*, the Kingdoms and States thereto belonging, equally, and as well the one as the other, as favourably as the People the most favoured.

(a) As to this Article ; it has been so fully proved above, to be only a Renewal of the Engagement Her Majesty was under by the 8th Article of the *Grand Alliance*, that nothing more need be said in its Defence.

XVI.

The said Queen and the States-General oblige themselves to furnish, by Sea and Land, the Succours and Assistance necessary to maintain, by Force, Her said Majesty in the quiet Possession of Her Kingdoms ; and the most Serene House of *Hanover* in the said Succession, as it is settled by the Acts of Parliament before-mentioned : and to maintain the said *States-General* in the Possession of the said Barrier.

XVII.

XVI.

The said Queen and the States-General oblige themselves to furnish, by Sea and Land, the Succours and Assistance necessary to maintain, by Force, Her said Majesty in the quiet Possession of Her Kingdoms ; and the most Serene House of *Hanover* in the said Succession, as it is settled by the Acts of Parliament before-mentioned : and to maintain the said *States-General* in the Possession of the said Barrier.

XVII.

Treaty.**XVII.**

After the Ratifications of this Treaty, a particular Convention shall be made of the Conditions upon which the said Queen, and the said Lords the States-General, shall engage themselves to furnish the Succours which shall be judg'd necessary, as well by Sea as by Land.

XVIII.

If Her *British* Majesty, or the States-General of the *United Provinces*, be attacked by any Body whatsoever, on account of this Convention; they shall mutually assist one another with all their Force, and become Guarantees of the Execution of the said Convention.

XIX.

There shall be invited and admitted into the present

Counter-Project.**XVII.**

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XIX.

There shall be invited and admitted into the present

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present Treaty, as soon as possible, all the Kings, Princes and States, who shall be willing to enter into the same; particularly his Imperial Majesty, the Kings of *Spain* and *Prussia*, and the Elector of *Hanover*. And Her *British* Majesty, and the States-General of the *United Provinces*, and each of them in particular, shall be permitted to request and invite those whom they shall think fit to request and invite, to enter into this Treaty, and to be Guarantees of its Execution.

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XX.

(a) *And whereas by the 5th and 9th Articles of the afore-mentioned Alliance concluded between the Emperor, the late King of Great-Britain, and the Lords the States-General, the 7th of Sept. 1701, it is agreed and stipulated, that the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, with all the*

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the Dependancies of the Crown of Spain in Italy, shall be recovered out of the Possession of France, as being of the last Consequence to the Trade of the two Nations; as likewise the Spanish Netherlands, for a Barrier to the Lords the States-General: therefore the said Queen of Great-Britain, and the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces, agree and oblige themselves not to enter into any Negotiation or Treaty of Peace with France, until the Restitution of the said Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, with all the Dependancies of the Crown of Spain in Italy; as likewise the Spanish Low-Countries, with the other Towns and Places in the Possession of France above-mentioned in this Treaty; and in the manner as specified in this Treaty: as also, all the rest of the entire Monarchy of Spain,
be

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be yielded by France as a Preliminary.

(a) See the Note at the End of *Article 22d* of the *Counter-Project*.

XX.

XXI.

And as Time has shewn the Omission which was made in the Treaty signed at *Ryswick* in the Year 1697, between *England* and *France*, in respect of the Right of the Succession of *England* in the Person of Her Majesty the Queen of *Great-Britain* now reigning; and that, for want of having settled in that Treaty this indisputable Right of Her Majesty, *France* refused to acknowledge Her for Queen of *Great-Britain*, after the Death of the late King *William* the Third, of glorious Memory: Her Majesty, the Queen of *Great-Britain*, and the Lords the States-General of

And as Time has shewn the Omission which was made in the Treaty signed at *Ryswick* in the Year 1697, between *England* and *France*, in respect of the Right of the Succession of *England* in the Person of Her Majesty the Queen of *Great-Britain* now reigning; and that, for want of having settled in that Treaty this indisputable Right of Her Majesty, *France* refused to acknowledge Her for Queen of *Great-Britain*, after the Death of the late King *William* the Third, of glorious Memory: Her Majesty, the Queen of *Great-Britain*, and the Lords the States-General of

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of the *United Provinces*, do agree and oblige themselves, not to enter into any Negotiation or Treaty of Peace with *France*, before the Title of Her Majesty to the Crown of *Great Britain*, as also the Reign of Succession of the most Serene House of *Hanover* to the aforesaid Crown, as it is settled and established by the afore-mention'd Acts of Parliament, be fully acknowledged, as a Preliminary by *France*, and that *France* has promised at the same time to remove out of its Dominions the Person who pretends to be King of *Great-Britain* : [And that no Negotiation nor formal Discussion of the Articles of the said Treaty of Peace shall be entered into, but jointly and at the same time with the said Queen, or with Her Ministers.]

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of the *United Provinces*, do agree and oblige themselves, not to enter into any Negotiation or Treaty of Peace with *France*, before the Title of Her Majesty to the Crown of *Great-Britain*, as also the Right of Succession of the most Serene House of *Hanover* to the aforesaid Crown, as it is settled and established by the afore-mentioned Acts of Parliament, be fully acknowledged, as a Preliminary by *France*, and that *France* has Stipulated at the same time to remove out of its Dominions, the Person who pretends to be King of *Great Britain*.

Treaty.

Counter-Project.

XXII.

And whereas Experience has shewn of what Importance it is to Great-Britain and to the United Provinces, that the Fortress and Fort of Dunkirk should not be in the Possession of France, in the Condition they are in at present; the Subjects of the Two Nations having sustained such great Losses, and suffer'd so much in their Commerce, by the Ships taken from them as Prize by the Privateers and Ships fitted out of that Port, during the last and the present War; and whereas the Situation of this Port is such, that France by its boundless Ambition may always be tempted to undertake some Enterprize against the Dominions of the Queen of Great-Britain, or of the Lords the States-General, and to interrupt the Publick Peace and Tranquillity; for the Preservation

Treaty.

Counter-Project.

tion of which, and of the Balance of Europe against the exorbitant Power of France, the Allies engaged in this long and burdensome War: Therefore the abovesaid Queen of Great-Britain, and the Lords the States - General of the United Provinces, do agree and oblige themselves not to enter into any Negotiation or Treaty of Peace with France, until it shall be yielded and stipulated by France; as a Preliminary, that all the Fortifications of the said Town of Dunkirk, and of the Forts depending thereon, shall be entirely demolished and razed, and that the Port shall be entirely ruined and made impracticable. (a)

(a) These Two Articles, the 20th and 22d of the Counter-Project, the Ambassador was authorized to leave out, by Mr. B——'s Letter of the 2d of August 1709; the Intention of them having been fully answered by the Unanimous Concurrence of the Allies as to Both Points, in the Preliminary Articles settled and sign'd by them several Months before this Treaty was concluded. And the Resolution the States have hitherto shewn in adhering to the Subject-matter of

of them, must convince every body that there was no need of making them enter into any New Engagements on those Heads.

Treaty.**XXI.**

Her *British* Majesty, and the Lords the *States-General* of the *United Provinces*, shall ratify and confirm all that is contained in the present Treaty, within the space of four Weeks, to be reckoned from the Day of the Signing. In Testimony whereof, the under-written Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Her *British* Majesty, and the Deputies of the Lords the *States-General*, have signed this present Treaty, and have affixed their Seals thereunto.

*At the Hague, the 29th
of October, in the
Year 1709.*

(L. S.) *Townshend.*

(L. S.) *J. V. Welderen.*

(L. S.) *J. B. van Reede.*

(L. S.) *A. Heinsius.*

(L. S.) *G. Hoefst.*

(L. S.) *H. Sminia.*

(L. S.) *E. V. Ittersum.*

(L. S.) *W. Wichers.*

Counter-Project.**XXIII.**

Her *British* Majesty, and the Lords the *States-General* of the *United Provinces*, shall ratify and confirm all that is contained in the present Treaty, within the space of ———, to be reckoned from the Day of the Signing.

The

Treaty.

The Separate Article.

WHEREAS, in the Preliminary Articles Signed here at the *Hague* the 28th of *May*, 1709, by the Plenipotentiaries of his Imperial Majesty, of Her Majesty the Queen of *Great-Britain*, and of the Lords the States-General of the *United Provinces*, it is Stipulated, amongst other Things, that the Lords the States-General shall have, with entire Property and Sovereignty, the Upper Quarter of *Guelder*, according to the Fifty-second Article of the Treaty of *Munster*, in the Year 1648; as also that the Garisons which are or hereafter shall be on the Part of the Lords the States-General in the Town of *Huy*, the Citadel of *Liege*, and, in the Town of *Bonne* shall remain

Counter-Project.

The Seperate Article.

Whereas, in the 52d Article of the Treaty of *Munster*, in the Year 1648, it has been already stipulated, That the Upper Quarter of *Guelder* shall be exchanged for an Equivalent; the Queen of *Great-Britain* will employ all Her good Offices, that what is here mentioned may be regulated to the reciprocal Satisfaction of King *Charles* the Third, and the Lords the *States-General*.

Treaty.

Counter-Project.

main there 'till it shall be otherwise agreed upon with his Imperial Majesty and the Empire: And whereas, the Barrier which is this Day agreed upon in the principal Treaty, for the mutual Guaranty between Her *British* Majesty and the Lords the States - General, cannot give to the *United Provinces* the Security for which it is established, unless the Parts of it be well joined together by a close Communication from one end to the other; for which Purpose the Upper Quarter of *Guelder*, and the Garisons in the Citadel of *Liege*, *Huy*, and *Bonne*, are absolutely necessary; Experience having thrice shewn, that *France* having a design to attack the *United Provinces*, has made use of the Places above - mentioned in order to come at them, and to penetrate into the said

Treaty.

Counter-Project.

said Provinces : And
 whereas further, with re-
 gard to the Equivalent
 for which the Upper
 Quarter of *Guelder* ought
 to be yielded to the *United
 Provinces* according to the
 Fifty - second Article of
 the Treaty of *Munster*
 above - mentioned ; his
 Majesty King *Charles* the
 Third will be much more
 gratified and advantaged
 in other Places, than that
 Equivalent can avail :
 Therefore, that the Lords
 the States-General may
 have the Upper Quarter
 of *Guelder* with entire
 Property and Sovereign-
 ty, and that the said Up-
 per Quarter of *Guelder*
 may be yielded in this
 manner to the said Lords
 the States-General in the
 Convention or Treaty
 that they are to make
 with His Majesty King
Charles the Third, accor-
 ding to the Thirteenth
 Article of the Treaty
 concluded

Treaty.

Counter-Project.

concluded this Day ; as also that their Garisons in the Citadel of *Liege*, in that of *Huy* and in *Bonne*, may remain there, until it be otherwise agreed upon with his Imperial Majesty and the Empire ; Her Majesty, the Queen of *Great-Britain*, engages Herself and promises by this separate Article, (which shall have the same Force as if it was inserted in the principal Treaty,) to use the same Endeavours for all This, as She has engaged to do for their obtaining the Barrier in the *Spanish Low-Countries*. In Testimony whereof, the Underwritten Ambassador-Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Her *British* Majesty, and Deputies of the Lords the States-General, have Signed the present Separate Article, and have affixed their

Seals

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Seals thereunto. *At the*
Hague, *the 29th of Octo-*
ber, 1709. (a)

(L. S.) *Townshend.*

(L. S.) *J. V. Welderen.*

(L. S.) *J. B. van Reede.*

(L. S.) *A. Heinsius.*

(L. S.) *G. Hoefft.*

(L. S.) *H. Sminia.*

(L. S.) *E. V. Ittersum.*

(L. S.) *W. Wichers.*

(a) That this Article, as it now stands, was necessary for the Security of the *States*, and for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*, and likewise conformable to Her Majesty's Intentions, will appear by the following Observations. First, It must be remembered that the *Counter-Project* was formed before the Negotiations for Peace were set on Foot; that afterwards, in concerting the *Preliminary Articles*, the Extent of the whole Barrier for the *States* came to be not only discussed, but settled; and that the Ministers of the *Emperor* and the King of *Spain*, as well as those of Her Majesty and the *States*, agreed among other things by the 22d Article of the *Preliminaries*, That the *States* should have in full Property and Sovereignty the Upper Quarter of *Gueldre*, according to the 52d Article of the Treaty of *Munster*, 1648.

And by the 29th Article, it was agreed that the Garisons which are or hereafter shall be on the Part of the *States-General* in the Town of *Huy*, Citadel of *Liege*, and Town of *Bonn*, shall remain there until it shall be otherwise agreed upon with his Imperial Majesty and the Empire.

These Two Points having been thus regulated by the Consent of all the *Allies* in the *Preliminary-Treaty*, there could be

no Objection against making them Part of the *Barrier-Treaty*. For,

1. As for the Upper Quarter of *Gueldre*, Her Majesty did agree by the separate Article of the *Counter-Project*, That pursuant to the 52d Article of the Treaty of *Munster*, She would employ Her good Offices to have that Matter regulated to the punctual Satisfaction of the King of *Spain* and the *States*. And since the King of *Spain* had consented in the *Preliminary-Treaty*, that the Sovereignty of the Upper Quarter of *Gueldre* should be given to the *States*; it was plain that this 1st *Separate Article* of the *Barrier-Treaty*, was only pursuant to Her Majesty's declared Intentions in the *Separate Article* of the *Counter-Project*.

2. The making of the Towns mentioned in this *Separate Article*, Part of the Treaty, could admit of no Difficulty; since it imported no more, than the Queen's good Offices for obtaining the Effect of what was agreed with the Consent of the Emperor in the *Preliminary-Treaty*, as a provisional Security for keeping these Places out of the Hands of *France* or their Adherents. Is it not evident to any one who knows the Situation of *Huy*, *Liege*, and *Bonn*, that they are of the last Importance for the Defence and Security of the *Empire* as well as the *States*, and for keeping open the Communication between the *Empire* and the *Low-Countries*? Has not *France* attempted three times to penetrate thro' these Places into the *United Provinces*? Is it not therefore of the greatest Consequence, that these Towns should be sufficiently secured? And could any other effectual Means be taken for that Purpose, besides what is provided in this Article? If the *Dutch* be not allowed to keep their Garisons in those Places, until the Emperor and the *Empire* are come to an Agreement upon some other effectual Method for doing it; must they not be left open and exposed to the sudden Attacks of *France*? The Elector of *Cologn*, should he be restored at the Peace, has a Right to *Bonn* by his Electorate; and to *Liege* and *Huy*, as Bishop of *Liege*. But would it be safe to trust the Defence of these Places in the Hands of that Prince, an avowed Creature of *France*? Are we sure, that being restored to his Dignity and Dominions, he would become more faithful to the
Empire?

Empire ? Or would not there be too much Reason to apprehend, that he would again upon a good Occasion betray them to the *French* ? But these being Imperial Towns, the *Emperor* and the *Empire* (it may be said) will take care of them : And so they may : Nothing contained in this Article debars them from this Right ; but, on the contrary , whenever they shall think fit to agree upon a Method of securing them by a Garison of *Germans*, the *Dutch* have no Pretence of keeping theirs there any longer ; as appears by the express Words of this Article. But if the Provision made by this Article be necessary for a Barrier against *France*, and agreeable to the true Interest of the *Empire* and the Common Cause, and no more than what had already been agreed in the *Preliminary-Treaty* ; what particular Objection can *England* have to it ?

Treaty.

The Second Separate Article.

W Hereas the Lords the States - General have represented, that in *Flanders*, the Limits between *Spanish - Flanders*, and that of the *States*, are settled in such a manner, as that the Land belonging to the *States* is extremely narrow there ; so that in some Places the Territory of *Spanish Flanders* reaches to the Fortifications,

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fications, and under the Cannon of the Places, Towns, and Forts of the *States*; which occasions many Inconveniencies; as has been seen by an Example a little before the beginning of the present War, when a Fort was attempted to be built under the Cannon of the *Sas van Gand*, under pretence that it was upon the Territory of *Spain*: And whereas it is necessary for avoiding these and other Inconveniencies, that the Land of the *States* upon the Confines of *Flanders* should be enlarged, and that the Places, Towns and Forts should, by that means, be better covered: Her *British* Majesty entring into the just Motives of the said Lords the States-General in this respect, promises and engages by this *Separate Article*, That in the Convention which the said Lords the States-General

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General are to make with his Majesty King *Charles* the Third, She will be aiding to them, that it may be agreed, That by the Cession to the said Lords the States General, of the Property of an Extent of Land necessary to obviate such like and other Inconveniencies, their Limits in *Flanders* shall be enlarged more conveniently for their Security, and those of the *Spanish Flanders* removed farther from their Towns, Places and Forts, to the End that these may not be so exposed any more. In Testimony whereof, the under-written Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Her *British* Majesty, and Deputies of the Lords the States - General, have sign'd the present *Separate Article*, and have affixed their Seals thereunto,

Treaty

Counter-Project.

unto. *At the Hague,*
the 29th of October,
1709. (a)

(L.S.) *Townsend.*(L.S.) *J. B. van Reede.*(L.S.) *A. Heinsius.*(L.S.) *G. Hoefst.*(L.S.) *H. Sminia.*(L.S.) *E. V. Ittersum.*

(a) The Matter of this Article is so evidently reasonable, that it would be superfluous to go about to justify it.

Thus I have considered the several Variations, which have been pointed out and magnified with so much Art and Industry; and have shewn that there is not one of any Moment throughout the whole Treaty, but what is either pursuant to former Treaties, or necessary to the rendering the Barrier compleat and effectual; and, on that Account, as much for the Interest of *England*, as of *Holland* itself.

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End of the Third VOLUME.

